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Low levels of energy access in sub-Saharan Africa and the acknowledgement of 
anthropogenic climate change have made sustainable energy products such as solar 
lanterns and efficient cookstoves a popular subject of international development 
programmes. At the same time, market-based approaches for distributing such 
‘humanitarian goods’ have become increasingly prevalent. Based on ethnographic 
material from inside two development intermediaries, Global Village Energy 
Partnership (GVEP) International’s ‘Developing Energy Enterprises Project’ (DEEP) 
in Kenya and Uganda and SolarAid’s social enterprise ‘SunnyMoney’ in Malawi, 
this thesis argues that: 1) the complexity of applied market devices enhances 
inequalities between market actors; 2) the engendering of economic subjectivities 
within distribution chains can increase value-sharing; 3) there is space for both for-
profit and non-profit ‘development’ intermediaries in marketisation processes, and; 
4) further focus should be put on the promotion of domestic manufacturing. 
Stabilised market maps are used to present the activities of each organisation before 
turning to three frames of analysis that consider the problematisation, qualification 
and valuation of the energy products, the recruitment and training of supply chain 
‘entrepreneurs’ and the specific market roles of development intermediaries, 
including provision of ‘brokerage’ services and as integral market actors. Bringing a 
theoretical vocabulary from economic sociology and science and technology studies 
into the arena of international development, the thesis reveals the extensive socio-
technical configurations that constitute markets and create power asymmetries 
between actors. Without neglecting the vulnerabilities of the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
(BOP) as a ‘target group,’ it enhances our understanding of the shifts away from 
charity dependent beneficiaries’ towards ‘entrepreneurs,’ ‘customers’ and 
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1 Overview 
Access to modern energy services is lacking in large parts of many developing 
countries and is a particularly prevalent issue in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Many development intermediaries have highlighted this situation and tried to find 
solutions in terms of both suitable products and ways of getting them to people who 
could benefit from them. Although increased energy access is not one of the 
Millennium Development Goals, it is often noted that achieving many of those eight 
goals is hampered if people have no access to energy services. 
In recent years, efforts in the field of ‘international development’ have increasingly 
moved towards a private sector focus in many areas, particularly with the growth of 
business development services and microfinance. This trend has been seen more 
recently in the work of development intermediaries with rural energy technologies: 
various organisations now run programmes that aim to stimulate local markets for 
small-scale clean energy products, through supporting entrepreneurs and small 
businesses along the supply chain.  
Renewable energy and energy efficient technologies for lighting, cooking and other 
energy-dependent activities (hereafter called sustainable or clean energy products), 
have been recognised as offering viable, low-carbon energy solutions to rural 
populations. At the same time, there has been increasing funding for ‘low carbon 
development’ under international climate change policies, particularly carbon credit 
frameworks. Such opportunities for finance may have been part of the reason for 
increasing activities to design and distribute clean energy products.  
1.1 Thesis aims and approach 
The aim of this research is to gain more detailed insight into the efforts of 
development intermediaries that are involved in creating markets for domestic-scale 
clean energy products within sub-Saharan Africa. Although there is no one 
recognised term for the type of programme they use, they are sometimes described 
as ‘market-driven’ or ‘market facilitation’ approaches. The programmes are 
analysed within the broader context of increasing business involvement in what is 
traditionally termed a ‘development’ issue, and the thesis discusses the cross-over 
between development and business.  
Two case study programmes have been selected for the primary research: Global 
Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) International’s Developing Energy Enterprises 
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Project (DEEP) and SolarAid’s pico-solar social enterprise called SunnyMoney. The 
research involved intensive study of these programmes in-situ in Kenya and 
Uganda for GVEP International and Malawi for SolarAid. The approach is 
ethnographic, with participant observation as the main research method, supported 
by semi-structured interviews and secondary data analysis. Although the case 
study organisations agreed to remain non-anonymous, quotations or actions have 
not been referenced to individual staff for confidentiality reasons. Similarly, it has 
not always been possible to reference data taken from interviews with other 
organisations as confidentiality was often requested. The real names of 
entrepreneurs, dealers and customers interacted with have deliberately been used 
where they agreed to it. This is in order to allow future research to return to the 
same informants and generate longitudinal data.  
The core of the conceptual framework is provided by the social study of markets, 
particularly Çalışkan and Callon’s (2010) recent work on marketisation that also 
draws insights from actor-network theory and science and technology studies. They 
conceptualise markets as ‘socio-technical assemblages’ and argue that aspects such 
as power dynamics, performativity and market devices are often overlooked and 
need to be considered within a marketisation research agenda. Development 
intermediaries such as non-governmental agencies (NGOs) are noted as viable 
marketising agencies. Here this theoretical vocabulary is brought into the arena of 
international development and used to provide a detailed analysis of market-based 
approaches to distributing clean energy products.  
The specificity of market assemblages are inextricably linked to their location in 
space and time. The research for this thesis was multi-sited, taking place in multiple 
locations across Kenya, Uganda and Malawi. Where possible, the thesis aims to 
describe the particularities of the different geographical contexts and any specific 
influence this may have had on the findings. However, further analysis in this 
regard was ultimately limited by the multi-sited nature of the research, so that 
deeper exploration of each context and its specific influence was not possible within 
the boundaries of this thesis.  
1.2 Thesis structure 
The thesis is structured so that Chapters 2 and 3 provide an overview of the context 
and relevant literature. Chapter 2 describes market-based approaches within 
international development and their links with sub-Saharan Africa and sustainable 
energy, and this is followed by a review of the literature that constitutes the 
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conceptual framework (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 presents and discusses the research 
design in more detail.  
The research aims to address four questions in particular. 
1. What marketisation activities are the case study development 
intermediaries undertaking? 
Chapter 5 responds to this question with detailed ethnographic insight into the two 
case study development intermediaries and their programmes. Market maps have 
been created to show how the development intermediaries sit within the markets 
for clean energy products that they are involved with. In this way market mapping 
is used as a presentation tool to demonstrate general observations of programme 
structure in the first instance, as well as being used as a preliminary analysis tool. 
The question is then more extensively answered within the responses to the next 
three questions, which form three ‘frames’ that guide the analysis.  
2. How are the clean energy products stabilised, qualified, valued and priced 
for exchange as market goods? 
For the second question the clean energy products are framed at the centre of the 
analysis and their stabilisation as ‘humanitarian goods’ is described in Chapter 6. 
This is followed by an examination of the processes of qualification (in Callon’s 
sense of the term), valuation and pricing that occur through the application of 
cognitive and technical tools by various market actors. Particular focus is put on the 
role of market devices that are used to add value to products, such as warranties 
and carbon credit methodologies, and the power dynamics that emerge through 
market actors’ differing levels of access to them.  
3. What processes render people into ‘local entrepreneurs’ and thus economic 
actors? 
The focus is then shifted in Chapter 7 to the ‘local entrepreneurs’ as the next frame 
of reference. Local entrepreneurs and dealers are drawn into the development 
intermediaries’ marketisation programmes as participants in the domestic supply 
chains of clean energy products. Their recruitment, training and evaluation are 
specifically discussed, with the availability and utility of skills, social networks and 
technical tools analysed at each stage. Consideration is also given to beneficial and 
negative aspects of the ‘economisation’ of these local actors by external forces.  
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4. What factors affect the agency and actions of the development 
intermediaries as marketisation actors? 
For the final question, the framing is moved to the development intermediaries as 
organisations that operate within the international development industry. The 
different demands put on them and their responses to being both development 
actors and marketisation actors are considered in Chapter 8, with some comparative 
analysis of the two case study organisations. The wider impacts of a shift towards 
market-based approaches within international development are also discussed and 
more practical lessons for policy and programme design drawn out. 
Finally, Chapter 9 pulls together the main conclusions of this research, highlights 
some of its limitations and proposes areas of further investigation. 
1.3 Research findings 
Through the approach outlined above, the research highlights the dynamic nature 
of markets as socio-technical assemblages. Sustainable energy products are 
particularly interesting to study because of their multi-faceted valuations: as 
‘humanitarian goods’; as ‘low carbon’ technologies that generate carbon credits; as 
income-generation opportunities; as affordable energy solutions. This research finds, 
however, that some of the ‘market devices’ being designed and applied by 
marketisation actors to attach particular values to energy products rely on complex 
configurations of technical and material components that can be unavailable or 
inaccessible to other market participants. The financial and technical agency of 
international actors to access carbon finance devices, for example, turns them into 
‘macro-actors’ and creates power asymmetries with local artisan manufacturers. 
Similarly, simple items (such as receipts) that are required for warranties to function 
are not always available in informal, rural settings. More locally appropriate after-
sales service systems may therefore be required to protect a potentially vulnerable 
target group. 
The conceptual framework used for this research stresses that markets are not cold, 
stable entities but are configured out of a collective performance that follows sets of 
tacit rules and procedures. Like many market-based development approaches, both 
development intermediaries recruit and train local ‘entrepreneurs’ to make and/or 
distribute energy products. Some critics have found such engendering of ‘economic’ 
subjectivities problematic, but here it is argued that it can in fact increase the value 
gained locally from supply chains for humanitarian goods. Furthermore, their 
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‘economisation’ does not occur from a baseline of zero market involvement or 
understanding, and although existing networks, skills and material resources are 
inevitably drawn on, there appears to be no forced requirement to do so in these 
case studies. Difficulties inevitably arise, however, such as if formal indebtedness is 
advocated as the only solution for enterprise growth or if trust-based relationships 
of entrepreneurs are jeopardised through subsequent product failures. This further 
underlines the need for appropriate after-sales service systems. 
Overall, these case studies demonstrate that market-based approaches offer space to 
both for-profit and non-profit organisations. In particular, the provision of market 
‘brokerage’ services under GVEP International’s Developing Energy Enterprises 
Project enhances the agency of local market actors, perhaps not only in economic 
terms. The relatively recent concept of ‘social enterprise’ offers a promising for-
profit model that could provide enhanced impact checks, if regulatory frameworks 
are developed further and take into account the unavoidable positive bias of 
monitoring activities.  
This thesis also argues that the shift within development discourses from charity-
dependent ‘beneficiaries’ to ‘entrepreneurs’ and ‘customers,’ alongside increased 
focus on investment opportunities within sub-Saharan Africa, might partially 
address ‘post-development’ arguments that development activities inherently 
reinforce negative conceptualisations of developing countries. The caveat is that 
power asymmetries between international and local actors need be kept in check 
and greater value-sharing facilitated. For this reason, continued promotion of 
domestic manufacturing capacity is necessary. Continuing to address consumer 
finance barriers in ways that adhere to some of the lessons learnt here are also 
fundamental in ensuring that these humanitarian goods are really accessible to 
those at the ‘bottom of the economic pyramid’. 
1.4 Research contribution  
Literature review shows that there has been limited in-depth academic research into 
market-based approaches within international development, and certainly little that 
applies the theoretical vocabulary promoted by Çalışkan and Callon (2010) in their 
call for more research into marketisation processes. In the context of sustainable 
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energy technologies, notable exceptions include work by Akrich (1992) and Cross 
(2013) on solar lighting products and Dolan’s (2012) analysis of BOP entrepreneurs1.  
This thesis builds on the small body of literature to consider a larger array of 
market-based approaches in extended depth and through a socio-technical 
marketisation lens, including support for both local artisanal production and 
imported goods distribution, and a greater range of technologies (clean cookstoves 
and biomass briquettes are the focus in addition to solar products.) It therefore 
contributes to the existing body of literature in economic sociology and the social 
study of markets, extending existing work and bringing a focus on humanitarian 
goods and their distribution to this discipline. It also firmly situates the conceptual 
approach within a landscape of international development theory and practice, 
offering a new combination that deserves further exploration.   
The ethnographic case-based methodology used here generates ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz, 1973) of how the development approaches work in practice. It also gives the 
opportunity to update older descriptions from ‘inside’ NGOs such as Crewe and 
Harrison’s (1998) detailed account from the 1980s and 1990s, since when the nature 
of international development organisations appears to have changed considerably. 
Although this thesis alone may offer limited opportunity for broader generalisation 
or development of new theories around development intermediaries and 
sustainable energy programmes, it at least increases the collective body of evidence 
for ‘naturalistic generalisation’ (Stake, 2000) in future.  
In addition to its contribution to social science, this research is also intended to have 
a practical value for energy and development practitioners and policymakers. Again, 
this is reflected in the methodology. Lewis and Mosse (2006) emphasize that:  
[…] ethnographic research can provide policymakers and aid managers with 
valuable reflective insights into the operations and effectiveness of international 
development as a complex set of local, national, and cross-cultural social interactions.  
Although policy or strategy solutions have not been sought directly in this thesis, 
the findings are believed to be highly relevant and are being disseminated through 
knowledge transfer activities.  
 
  
                                                      
1 The research material includes the ‘Solar Sister’ initiative in Uganda 
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2 Background and literature review: development, markets 
and energy 
This chapter introduces some of the history of international development, providing 
an overall context before identifying how market-based approaches emerged within 
the field. It then focuses in on sub-Saharan Africa and sustainable energy 
technologies for rural energy access. At each stage, key academic literature is 
discussed in order to provide a critical insight and present the current knowledge 
base. Areas of contestation and limited analysis that may benefit from further 
research are also identified. The discussion concludes that additional in-depth 
primary research into market-building development approaches, including those 
focused on providing clean domestic lighting and cooking products for energy 
access, could make a valuable contribution.  
2.1 Historical overview of international development  
Use of the term ‘development’ in an international development context is widely 
considered to have become commonplace following US President Harry Truman’s 
1949 Inaugural Address. ‘Point Four’ started with the following oft-quoted 
statement:  
We must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas. (cited in Esteva (1992) p.6)  
Although the term was already familiar in some areas, this particularly prominent 
public reference to ‘underdeveloped’ areas is said to have firmly established the 
dichotomy between advanced ‘developed’ countries and ‘underdeveloped’ ones 
afflicted by associated conditions of poverty, the latter representing a homogenous 
group and requiring the former’s support to escape their condition (Esteva, 1992). 
This new terminology supported a paradigmatic shift away from an earlier world-
view of ‘colonisers’ and ‘colonised’ (Rist, 2008), coinciding with the achievement of 
independence of many colonies from the 1940s onwards.  
The varied tenets of post-Truman development theory are grounded in a much 
older history of thought. Theories around how societies progress in a certain 
direction of growth or according to certain changes in political economy can be 
traced back to various earlier theorists, including Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Max 
Weber (Payne and Phillips, 2010) and the Saint-Simonians, Friedrich List and John 
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Stuart Mill (Cowen and Shenton, 1995), for example. In more recent times the term 
‘development’ has become a highly contested concept used to describe both a 
process, intentionally directed or otherwise, and an undefined goal. There have 
unsurprisingly, been diverse proposals of how to achieve it.  
Overwhelmingly in the history of the term and despite frequent criticism, economic 
growth has been a focal point. For example, as early as 1969 Seers issued a 
communication entitled ‘The Meaning of Development’ that stated: 
[…] it looks as if economic growth may not merely fail to solve social and political 
difficulties; certain types of growth can actually cause them. (Seers (1969) p.2) 
Despite such critics, the economic focus has remained and some of the key debates 
over time have been around the necessary or desirable levels of state intervention in 
national industries and services in order to promote economic growth.  
In the late 1980s, a neoliberal turn in western economic theory led to a neoliberal 
agenda being adopted by the primary multilateral development organisations, 
particularly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. 
Neoliberalism became the justification of structural adjustment policies and 
subsequent ‘good governance’ initiatives, with loans being provided to developing 
country governments only on the condition of national macro-economic reforms 
such as privatisation and deregulation (Rist, 2008). Such approaches have since 
received significant criticism, not least because of their neglect to consider unique 
individual country contexts. A lack of sustained increase in economic growth rates 
and, in the case of a number of Latin American countries, the total collapse of their 
economies, were seen as the results of failed structural adjustment policies. Reduced 
living standards were also associated with the rushed privatisation of state services. 
At the same time the successful economic growth and increased welfare standards 
of Japan and other newly industrialising East Asian countries from the 1960s to late 
1990s appeared to justify at lease some level of state involvement in industrialisation 
activities (Payne and Phillips, 2010). 
Different approaches to development were still being sought, and gradually some of 
this work gathered momentum to present a range of ‘human development’ 
approaches. A ‘basic needs’ focus promoted by the United Nations’ (UN) 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) proposed a shift in development goals 
away from aggregate economic growth towards the delivery of essential services, 
employment opportunities and participation in political decision-making for all 
(ILO, 1976). A key proponent was Amartya Sen, who took the idea further and 
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promoted both a definition and means of development as ‘promoting the freedom 
of individual agency’. Sen (1999) also highlighted that problems of deprivation, 
destitution and oppression can equally be found in rich countries as well as poor.  
Gradually aspects of these human development ideas moved to the mainstream 
development machinery and in 1990 the UN Development Programme (UNDP), 
originally founded in 1966 (UNDP, 2013d), produced the first Human Development 
Report: “with the goal of putting people at the center of development, going beyond 
income to assess people’s long-term well-being” (UNDP, 2013a). It ultimately paved 
the way for the Millennium Summit, the signing of the Millennium Declaration and 
the indirectly associated establishment of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs, Figure 1) in 2000 (Saith, 2006). 
Figure 1: The eight Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2013c) 
  
The MDGs again aimed to shift development focus to the achievement of broader 
living standards and basic human rights, and thus finally reduce single-minded 
focus on economic growth. The MDGs still receive significant criticism, however, 
such as: a failure to address the politically problematic area of inequality between 
rich and poor; a focus on poverty in developing countries and lack of 
acknowledgement of its existence in developed nations, and; continued failure to 
appreciate often vastly differing country contexts (Saith, 2006).  
The brief overview above focuses on international development theory and related 
institutions, particularly the World Bank, IMF and UN agencies, but Charnovitz 
(1997) argues that a wide variety of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have 
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influenced international governance for at least two hundred years. Lewis (2005) 
highlights a significant growth in interest in the role of development NGOs from the 
late 1980s onwards, but finds very little acknowledgement of their work in writings 
prior to this. He attributes the surge in interest partly to the neoliberal meta-
narrative of the time that promoted a move away from state intervention and, in 
tandem, recognised the ability of NGOs to deliver services outside of the state (Lal, 
2002), as well as a continuing search by individuals for alternative development 
agendas that would focus more on localised interests of the poor and grass-roots 
initiatives than mainstream development was currently doing. As Lewis (2013) 
describes:  
There was a period of discovery and celebration of NGOs among international 
donors as they became seen as a possible ‘magic bullet’ that would bring new 
solutions to long-standing development challenges that had up to that point been 
characterized by inefficient government-to-government aid programmes and 
frequently ineffective and unsustainable development projects. (ibid., p.65)  
The term ‘NGO’ has a broad range of applications and has been defined in 
numerous ways, leading to a diversity of interpretations. For example, it can 
sometimes be restricted to non-profit organisations only and therefore exclude the 
growing number of for-profit organisations emerging in the development sector. 
This thesis therefore uses the term ‘development intermediaries’ to signify 
organisations that have a stated intention of directly participating in international 
development efforts through delivery of ‘development-related services’, sometimes, 
but not always, on the basis of donor funding.  
2.2 Emergence of new market-based development 
approaches 
The neoliberal policies of the 1980s and 1990s that forced developing countries to 
‘open up to the market’ through hurried structural adjustment programmes are now 
seen to have failed to contribute to, and in fact considerably damaged, the 
international development agenda. However, some less aggressive, more nuanced 
market-based initiatives have also emerged, particularly through the work of NGOs 
and other development intermediaries. Although these approaches still work on the 
premise that stimulating domestic economic activity is conducive to development, 
they show greater sensitivity to the specific needs of both businesses and 
individuals and take on some of the ‘basic needs’ and ‘pro-poor’ human 
development ideas discussed above (King and McGrath, 1999). There is a huge 
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range of activities that could be considered here, so the discussion below has been 
shaped into three loosely defined categories of market-based development 
initiatives.   
Positioning within global markets 
A key criticism of early neoliberalism is that in combination with rapid globalisation 
it left developing countries in very weak positions within international markets, 
particularly for agricultural produce which often constitute primary exports. 
Initiatives such as “Making Markets Work for the Poor”, supported by national 
development agencies including the UK’s Department for International 
Development, are based on the principle that the poor depend on market systems 
for their livelihoods and that these market systems can be changed in pro-poor ways 
(DFID, 2008), for example by promoting better institutional arrangements at various 
levels from local government to international agreement. It could also be through 
direct work with market actors, such as supporting a lead firm (often, but by no 
means exclusively, in a western country) to identify and implement pro-poor 
policies within their supply chain (Humphrey and Navas-Aleman, 2010). Tools and 
frameworks such as the UN’s Guiding Principles on business and human rights, the 
UN Global Compact, and ethical labels such as Fair Trade have been developed to 
promote such activities (Ruggie, 2013). Supporting social and economic 
development in such ways is now often wrapped up in companies’ corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) agendas. Another value chain approach is to work directly with 
those within a chain to help them add more value to their products (Johnson, 2009). 
This last method can also be considered within the ‘enterprise development’ 
category discussed later.  
International and domestic businesses serving ‘BOP’ markets 
At the same time that development intermediaries are focussing on producers 
situated at the raw material end of global value chains, there have also been calls for 
private sector actors to see the poor in developing countries as potential consumers 
of manufactured goods and therefore to design products that specifically meet their 
needs. This partly stems from Prahalad’s (2010) efforts to promote the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’ (BOP) as an active market opportunity. He describes the BOP as the 
around four billion people who live on less than US$2 per day. The term is thought 
to have first been used by Franklin Roosevelt in a 1932 radio address during the 
Great Depression in which he urged people to put their faith back in the primary 
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units of economic power: the men at the bottom of the economic pyramid (Errington 
et al., 2012). 
Prahalad gives examples such as the large mobile phone uptake in ‘BOP markets’ as 
evidence that the poor are willing and able to pay for products that meet their 
lifestyle needs and desires. Figure 2 shows that more than half of the population of 
sub-Saharan Africa now own a mobile phone and three quarters either own or have 
access to one. Furthermore, Figure 3 shows that ownership and access rates are still 
high even when only the poorest are considered: a third of the poorest 20% of 
Ugandans own a mobile phone, for example.  
Figure 2: Access to a mobile phone in sub-Saharan Africa (Godoy et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 3: Access to a mobile phone among the poorest 20% of population of each 
country (Godoy et al., 2012) 
Woller (2002) highlights the impact that regarding the poor as valid consumers of 
financial services has had on the microfinance sector. Microfinance was one of the 
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first specifically BOP-targeted business models and “shattered stereotypes of the 
very poor as not bankable” (ibid., p.305). There are also many examples of the 
impacts microfinance can have on individuals’ abilities to develop productive 
enterprises, again linking with enterprise development initiatives discussed below.  
Microfinance providers have received various criticisms, however. For example, the 
need to decide between profitability and providing for the poorest of the poor, as 
opposed to just the relatively poor, has been recognised as limiting the impact that 
the service can have on poverty reduction (Cull et al., 2007, Woller, 2002). Smith 
(2009) discusses the example of the pharmaceuticals industry and the similar issue 
of limited profit opportunities, leading to the reality that: “[…] there is simply very 
little incentive for the private sector to develop vaccines for HIV, malaria or 
tuberculosis” (ibid., p.84). Reviews of multinational companies’ policies show that 
many do not incorporate a poverty alleviation role in their corporate sustainability 
strategies, or where they do they are limited compared to what international 
development advocates might hope for (Kolk and van Tulder, 2006).  
Innovative public-private funding partnerships offer one solution to bridge the 
incentives gap (Smith, 2009, pp.86-88). Prahalad (2010) also proposes a framework 
of interconnected players that can establish the necessary market structure to design 
and deliver BOP-targeted products. Figure 4 shows how the work of private 
enterprise can be combined with that of development agencies, civil society 
organisations, governments and local BOP entrepreneurs in order to build effective 
BOP markets.  
Figure 4: Interconnectedness of players in BOP markets (Prahalad, 2010) 
 
International companies such as Unilever, Bic, Danone (Dolan et al., 2012), Hewlett-
Packard (Schwittay, 2011) and Coca-Cola (Foster, 2008) have used BOP approaches 
to sell their products in developing countries, directly or indirectly employing 
networks of ‘BOP entrepreneurs’ to provide the local distribution systems and 
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engaging or partnering with NGOs and local governments to help establish their 
activities. In some cases, framing their products as ‘humanitarian goods’ helps these 
multinational companies to create the necessary buy-in to take their market-
building approaches forward (Cross and Street, 2009).  
Other private sector actors attempting to deliver humanitarian goods through a 
business approach are social enterprises. These are hybrid businesses that are more 
specifically oriented towards achieving social and/or environmental benefits than 
typical multinational corporations might be. They still have an aim of financial self-
sufficiency rather than long-term reliance on donors, but profitability is not a 
defining criteria (Blowfield, 2012). Dr Mohammad Yunus, the founder in 1976 of the 
first microfinance institution, Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, is one of the most well-
known proponents of the social enterprise model (Rashid and Rahman, 2009). 
The model is by no means restricted to developing country contexts and it is being 
increasingly widely used globally. However, there is still no specific definition for a 
‘social enterprise’ and only a handful of legal structures are available and they are 
neither mandatory nor have wide geographical reach (Westaway, 2011).2 Some 
argue that this results in a lack of coherent analysis of social entrepreneurship (Abu-
Saifan, 2012), limited specific policies to promote ‘real’ social enterprises and the 
opportunity for more ‘mainstream’ businesses to appropriate and benefit from 
incorporating a social enterprise identity into their marketing (Jones, 2012).  
Through analysis of existing social enterprise models, Abu-Saifan (2012) proposes 
the boundaries of social entrepreneurship illustrated in Figure 5, whereby non-
profit social enterprises have some form of earned income strategy and for-profit 
social enterprises have socially beneficial aims incorporated into their business 
mission. Either side of this, beyond the social entrepreneurship definition, are 
charity-dependent non-profit organisations and mainstream for-profit businesses.  
                                                      
2 A new hybrid legal form has been introduced in the UK called a Community Interest Company (CIC). In the US 
there are various options in different states, such as a Low Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C), a Benefit 
Corporation (B-Corps), or a Flexible-Purpose Corporation (Westaway, 2011). All of these structures are optional 
and most African countries are yet to have something equivalent. 
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Figure 5: The entrepreneurship spectrum illustrating the boundaries of social 
entrepreneurship (Abu-Saifan, 2012)  
 
In the field of international development, some suggest promotion of social 
enterprises that “are based on market principles but dedicated to improving the 
lives of the poor” (Rashid and Rahman (2009) p.1057) as a more sustainable option 
than engaging mainstream businesses such as multinational corporations in BOP 
markets.  
Enterprise development and entrepreneurship  
Encapsulating aspects of both of the above categories, the third type of market-
based development approach focuses on supporting the growth of private 
enterprises within developing countries. Often referred to as ‘private sector 
development’ initiatives, they involve helping existing businesses to grow and new 
businesses to start up through provision of a range of support services. 
Entrepreneurship has been central to various reincarnations of economic 
development theory, and private sector development approaches try to promote, 
identify and support entrepreneurial activities. In many cases development 
intermediaries focus on helping low income entrepreneurs specifically, including 
those who might be defined as ‘BOP entrepreneurs’ within Prahalad’s (2010) 
proposed market-building system. 
The international development sector has been interested for at least 35 years in 
supporting the growth of small enterprises in particular. A Committee of Donor 
Agencies for Small Enterprise Development was formed in 1978, although at the 
time it was still the interest of a limited few (Steel, 2009). Steel provides a thorough 
history, describing how the focus in the 1990s was on non-financial support such as 
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Social Entrepreneurship: Definition and Boundaries
Samer Abu-Saifan
Boundaries of Social Entrepreneurship
This section distinguishes between social entrepreneur-
ship and other non-entrepreneurial, mission-driven initi-
atives. As discussed earlier, the term social 
entrepreneurship is becoming more popular and is attract-
ing growing amount of resources. It is frequently observed 
in the media, used by public officials, and is commonly re-
ferred to by academics. This is in part because of the sup-
port social entrepreneurs are receiving from complex 
network of organizations that highlight their work and 
contributions to society (Dacin et al., 2011; tinyurl.com/
7a9bh9d). However, the lack of consensus on the definition 
of social entrepreneurship means that other disciplines 
are often confused with and mistakenly associated with so-
cial entrepreneurship. Philanthropists, social activists, en-
vironmentalists, and other socially-oriented practitioners 
are referred to as social entrepreneurs. It is important to 
set the function of social entrepreneurship apart from oth-
er socially oriented activities and identify the boundaries 
within which social entrepreneurs operate. 
According to the Skoll Centre for Social Entrepreneur-
ship, the definition of social entrepreneurship should 
not extend to philanthropists, activists, companies with 
foundations, or organizations that are simply socially 
responsible (tinyurl.com/yd8ggyq). While all these agents 
are needed and valued, they are not social entrepren-
eurs.
Building on our proposed definition of social entrepren-
eurship, we propose boundaries to properly position so-
cial entrepreneurs in the spectrum of entrepreneurship. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, social entrepreneurs operate 
within the boundaries of two business strategies: 
1. Non-profit with earned income strategies: a social 
enterprise performing hybrid social and commercial en-
trepreneurial activity to achieve self-sufficiency. In this 
scenario, a social entrepreneur operates an organiza-
tion that is both social and commercial; revenues and 
profits generated are used only to further improve the 
delivery of social values.
Figure 1. The entrepreneurship spectrum illustrating the boundaries of social entrepreneurship 
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provision of training and technical assistance. Around 1997 this became termed as 
‘business development services,’ distinguishing it from newly-emerging financial 
services provided through microfinance.  
Enterprise development draws on ideas such as the ILO’s foregrounding of 
employment opportunities as central to a ‘basic needs’ development approach. It 
equally relates to the subsequent emergence of ’sustainable livelihoods’, a niche 
development approach that emerged in the early 1990s (Scoones, 2009). Helmore 
and Singh (2001) describe how: 
A key feature of the sustainable livelihoods approach is the recognition that the root 
of all human development and economic growth is livelihoods – not just jobs per se, 
but the wide, infinitely diverse range of activities people engage in to make a living. 
(Ibid., p.3-4) 
The sustainable livelihoods approach recognises that people have access to assets, or 
‘capital’, which act as resources that can enhance their livelihoods. Capital is 
commonly summarised into distinct types, including: natural, financial, human, 
social and physical capital, with various others sometimes added (Scoones, 2009). 
These are shown in Figure 6.  
Figure 6: The five types of capital in the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach 
(Heemskerk, 2005) 
 
Enterprise development approaches aim to help small businesses draw on existing 
assets or gain further capital to help them grow. For example, existing social capital 
in the form of social relationships can be used to increase product sales, new human 
capital can be acquired in the form of knowledge via training programmes, or 
financial capital can be increased through microfinance loans. Although the 
sustainable livelihoods approach is now less commonly referenced, use of the 
sociological term ‘social capital’ is still widely used. The term and its critique are 
discussed further in the following chapter.  
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Enterprise development approaches also link with an increasing recognition of and 
interest in what has been conceptualised as the ‘informal sector’ or more recently as 
the ‘informal economy’. Although the concept was popularised by the ILO, its 
origins are often attributed to anthropologist Keith Hart’s (2007, 1970, 1973) writings 
on the small-scale informal service-sector enterprises established by the Frafra in 
Ghana (Palmer, 2004). Pellissery (2013) asserts that “the informal economy is the 
sole source of livelihood for the vast majority of households in the global South” 
(ibid., p.81) and cites the initial definition of economic informality from a 1972 ILO 
paper as:  
[…] characterized by: (i) ease of entry; (ii) reliance on indigenous resources; (iii) 
family ownership of resources; (iv) small scale of operations; (v) labour intensive 
and adapted technology; (vi) skill acquired outside the formal school system; and 
(vii) unregulated and competitive markets. (Cited by Pellisery (2013) p.82)  
More recently the ILO has redefined the informal economy as  “all economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not 
covered or insufficiently covered by formal arrangements” (ILO (2009) p.iii). Private 
sector development initiatives tend to be aimed at either improving service 
availability for informal economy workers and/or helping them to move from the 
‘informal’ to the ‘formal’ economy (Hope, 2008). 
The Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto (2001) finds that formal economic 
frameworks are often highly inaccessible for the poor, particularly in developing 
countries that may have bureaucratic and antiquated legal frameworks. This 
restricts formal registration of assets such as businesses and property and leads to 
such resources being ‘dead capital’, creating an ‘undercapitalized sector’ where 
many people live and work outside of the law and rely instead on extralegal social 
contracts. De Soto highlights the innovation and determination of those that manage 
to do well despite such barriers:  
The words ‘international poverty’ too easily bring to mind images of destitute 
beggars sleeping on the kerbsides of Calcutta and hungry African children starving 
on the sand […] it draws attention away from the arduous achievements of those 
small entrepreneurs who have triumphed over every imaginable obstacle to create 
the greater part of the wealth of their society. […] I resent the characterization of 
such heroic entrepreneurs as contributors to the problem of global poverty. They are 
not the problem. They are the solution. (ibid., p.34) 
There are a wide variety of ways that development intermediaries engage in 
enterprise development, from bottom-up approaches that target specific business 
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types or sectors to top-down attempts to change conditions more broadly to 
facilitate private sector growth. Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2006) describe a 
‘new minimalist paradigm’ in private sector development literature that argues 
against interventionist programmes to support individual sectors or enterprises, 
instead favouring general efforts that favour all types of businesses, such as 
strengthening property rights frameworks and regulatory streamlining. However, 
Altenburg and von Drachenfels find that such approaches are overly optimistic and 
overlook some of the benefits and successes of more targeted market-based 
programmes. 
Sometimes enterprise development initiatives are carried out in tandem with 
approaches from one of the first two categories discussed above, for example when 
local entrepreneurs are supported through business development services with the 
overall intention of helping them to deliver ‘humanitarian goods’ to poor consumers. 
A seemingly successful example is cited by Smith (2009): International Development 
Enterprises, an international NGO based in India, ran a long-term programme to 
introduce treadle pump technology to Bangladesh. Having developed a cheap foot-
based pump system and after engaging with farmers to establish that it was a 
desirable product, the NGO initiated a start-up phase that included technology 
demonstration, supporting partner producers, establishing quality control and 
making low profit-margin sales. After establishing the primary market momentum, 
International Development Enterprises withdrew from direct sales to become a 
‘market facilitator’, providing technical support to new private producers, and 
finally into a wider promotion role where they provide training and other 
facilitation activities in support of treadle pumps. Smith (p.78) particularly notes 
how the NGO sought to make its own role in the market redundant over time. 
2.3 Detailed!analysis!of!market1based!development!approaches 
The focus of this thesis is on ‘market-based development approaches’, taken to be 
the array of initiatives undertaken by NGOs, social enterprises and businesses to 
provide welfare solutions through building or facilitating markets. It does not 
include the broader, more aggressively applied pro-market mechanisms described 
earlier as part of the larger-scale neoliberal development thinking of the 1980s and 
1990s, such as structural adjustment.  
Some of the evaluative work examining market-based development programmes 
has been described above. Here a more in-depth examination of various case studies 
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is provided, many of which involve a combination of both enterprise development 
and delivering products associated with social benefits. Dolan (2012) highlights 
tensions within programmes which simultaneously constitute “the ‘poor’ as 
development beneficiaries, ‘modern’ consumers and capitalist entrepreneurs” (ibid., 
p.3). The discussion is divided into the last two categories of consumers and 
entrepreneurs and examines how development intermediaries apply these concepts.   
The poor as entrepreneurs 
A significant critic of enterprise development approaches is Julia Elyachar (2005). 
Her book Markets of Dispossession presents in-depth ethnographic analysis of the 
creation of the ‘micro-entrepreneur’ category in Cairo in the 1990s following a suite 
of funding packages from international organisations in the wake of structural 
adjustment. The focus of the ethnography is the neighbourhood of el-Hirafiyeen, a 
place specially built to house both relocated traditional master craftsmen and new 
‘micro-entrepreneurs’. The latter is a category created by NGO programmes out of 
disadvantaged youth who were given rapid technical and business training along 
with development loans in order to start their own micro-enterprises. She found 
that it was suddenly not enough to be a traditional craftsman, instead you had to be 
a ‘micro-entrepreneur’. Where tradition, trust and social ties had previously been 
valued outright, the youth were trained to value these in economic terms: short-
term, individual gain was being promoted by the NGOs, in direct contrast to the 
longer-term ‘relational value’ that the traditional master craftsmen of Cairo attach to 
deepening workshop-based relationships. Overall, Elyachar describes this process 
as dispossession, whereby the microenterprise initiatives appropriate the 
relationships, networks and forms of co-operation which people at the BOP rely on 
to survive and arbitrarily incorporate them into their market development projects.  
Cross and Street (2009) analyse Unilever’s Project Shakti that established a network 
of local saleswomen to sell their Lifebuoy soap in rural India. Between 2000 to 2004, 
enough Shakti Ammalu (Ammalu meaning ‘Mothers’) had been recruited to sell the 
soap in 50,000 villages across 12 states, reaching 70 million consumers. Again it is 
suggested that the women were being dispossessed of their relations of kinship, 
community and indebtedness in order to sell products. “When the Shakti Amma 
sells soap to village women in rural Andhra Pradesh her existing network is 
appropriated by a project of market development, and the work of building and 
maintaining these relationships is the creative labour that Hindustan Unilever 
extracts to add value to the Lifebuoy soap brand.” (ibid., p.9) Ultimately, the 
multinational company is utilising poor people’s networks to gain profit.  
 20 
Simone (2004) proposes conceptualising ‘people as infrastructure’, based on analysis 
of inner city economic collaboration between residents in Johannesburg. Regular but 
flexible social meetings between people act as a type of infrastructure akin to more 
physical city infrastructure such as highways, pipes and cables. Elyachar (2012) 
suggests that recognising people’s connectivity as an economic resource could help 
promote them to receive the deserved recompense for their utilisation.  
Other researchers present case studies that highlight more positive impacts of 
market-based programmes and suggest that their use of social ties is already 
rewarded to some extent, both economically and through non-economic personal 
benefits. In their analysis of Unilver’s Project Shakti, Cross and Street note its 
similarity to the ‘Avon ladies’ model: a way of selling female-oriented products 
through informal networks of women that originated in California in 1886. The 
original Avon company has since proliferated worldwide and Dolan and Scott (2009) 
provide a detailed account of the Avon system in South Africa. Again the use of 
social networks is key: women are recruited to become sellers by other women 
already within the scheme. In their study Dolan and Scott found that “over 80 per 
cent of women were introduced to Avon by friends, relatives and co-workers” (ibid., 
p.208). A similar proportion also said that they then used their existing social ties for 
gaining sales. Sellers (‘representatives’) receive about 20% commission on sales, 
whilst the women that recruit them (‘group sales leaders’) also receive a small 
commission on sales made by the representatives they recruit, in order to incentivise 
them to recruit carefully and provide continuous motivation to their recruits.  
In addition to these economic benefits the researchers identified a strong narrative 
of personal empowerment and confidence building through the Avon women’s 
participation in direct selling activities. A study in South Africa suggested that 
confidence is a particular barrier to women taking up entrepreneurial opportunities, 
with over 50% of South African women deeming themselves incapable of doing so 
(Maas and Herrington, 2006). The reports the Avon women gave of enhanced 
personal well-being through increased confidence, self-esteem and autonomy led 
Dolan and Scott (2009) to conclude that: 
While the company employs a range of strategies to motivate women as capitalist 
entrepreneurs, it has also opened up new possibilities for women to become agents 
of personal and social change; not a small accomplishment in a context where 
gender inequality, exclusion and disempowerment often frame a woman’s life. (ibid., 
p.215) 
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As well as the clear benefits, the South African Avon women were still found to 
experience some down-sides to using their social ties for economic purposes, often 
reporting feeling “squeezed between buyers and the company” (ibid., p.210). Over 
two-thirds of the traders interviewed stated that payment often caused tensions, 
particularly when trying to collect money from close friends and family. Low-
income vendors are unlikely to have excess capital to use as contingency for paying 
the parent company in such situations. It highlights the pressure exerted on 
informal sales representatives caused by the contrasting relationships that they are 
at the centre of: a formalised contract between themselves and Avon with tightly 
controlled credit availability on one side, and an informal social tie based on trust 
and social expectations on the other side.  
In a similar study Dolan et al. (2012) studied the CARE Bangladesh Rural Sales 
Program, for which the international NGO ‘CARE’ partners with various 
multinational and domestic companies to provide a business opportunity for 
women (“aparajitas”) to sell those companies’ products door-to-door. It now 
represents a network of more than 2,400 women across 58 hubs in Bangladesh 
selling a wide variety of goods, including toiletries, agricultural products and 
medicine, and represents an approach more specifically designed with 
‘development’ in mind than the Avon model might be described as. The program 
targets the very poor and marginalised, such as widows or those with incapacitated 
husbands. In many cases they had already been carrying out informal sales or 
services to provide extra income, so the sales channels were often established to 
some extent – illustrating that such initiatives are not always appropriating purely 
non-economic social ties. To ease payment processes the women are allowed to 
make their own arrangements for exchange where found desirable, including 
bartering or swapping. CARE provides business training, identification cards and 
items such as carry bags for the women to transport their goods in. Again most of 
the aparajitas interviewed by Dolan et al. (2012) described feelings of increased 
confidence and respect from their participation ‘in the market economy’, as well as 
tangible increases in income used to improve their families’ standard of living.  
As well as the dispossession of social ties and practices, Elyachar (2005) criticises 
how ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ are encouraged into debt through taking up loans. 
Microfinance is an approach within enterprise development that grew rapidly after 
the first micro-credit programmes emerged in the 1970s. It has often had a gendered 
dimension, focusing on women specifically in line with feminist development views, 
and it has widely received both praise and criticism. There has also been recognition 
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that microfinance is not enough on its own to build successful businesses and that 
challenges faced by entrepreneurs can be much broader than simply financial ones 
(Chikweche and Murisa, 2013).  
Ismail (2006), however, argues that the new development discourse around 
microcredit and entrepreneurship reconstructs the poor as entrepreneurs simply 
needing injections of capital in order to tap into their social capital to lift themselves 
out of poverty. She suggests that macro-level arguments of inequalities in the world 
economy have been abandoned in favour of the micro-level engenderment of 
entrepreneurial subjects, transferring the responsibility for getting out of poverty on 
to the poor themselves. Ismail highlights that even the success of microcredit 
programmes is often measured on the basis of whether it has led to larger loans 
being taken: “In impact-tracking studies, success is signalled by the borrower’s 
ability to repay the loan and in his/her engagement in getting a larger loan. In other 
words, greater indebtedness and an inability to break out of the debt cycle is 
interpreted as a measure of success by the lenders.” (ibid., p.92) 
Clearly in some cases the indebtedness of the poor will be unproductive. Moxham 
(2006) presents an example of a relatively unsuccessful project to provide micro-
credit loans to widows to establish kiosks in the Bobonaro district of Timor-Leste, 
under a World Bank initiative to build a market economy in the aftermath of 
gaining independence. In 70% of cases, the widows did not make enough money to 
pay back the original loan. Cited failings included overcrowded and unprofitable 
trading niches. In that case repayment of the loans was not enforced, but as with 
Elyachar’s (2005) work it shows that to be successful, market-based development 
initiatives require much more than simply training in a particular business model 
and access to capital. Several years after el-Hirafiyeen had been established to house 
new micro-enterprises, many of its workshops could be found no longer in use, the 
youth designated as entrepreneurs having left to find other sources of income.  
Profit-making microfinance organisations must inevitably impose relatively high 
interest rates in order to cover the expense of administering numerous disparate 
small loans. Although these rates still tend to be significantly lower than the only 
alternative of informal money lenders, microfinance is still claimed to have led to 
suicides among borrowers unable to repay loans in India (Ly and Mason, 2012). In 
more comprehensive market-based initiatives there are ways in which the 
indebtedness of entrepreneurs can be kept to a minimum, helping to avoid such 
extreme results. Avon, for example, are careful to enforce that accounts are cleared 
before a new order can be placed (Dolan and Scott, 2009). In the CARE Bangladeshi 
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Rural Sales Program, women in fact cited use of their income from making sales to 
pay off other debts, and even loaning money to others in some cases (Dolan et al., 
2012). Syed (2009) assimilates the provision of access to credit to Sen’s (1999) vision 
of development as freedom through enhancing the agency of people, particularly 
women, to pursue their own goals.   
There have been various analyses of the impact of business development services 
offered without any form of micro-credit or specific agenda to sell products. The 
programmes can offer business methods training, technical assistance or a 
combination of both. Mano et al (2012), for example, analysed a managerial training 
programme for micro and small metalwork enterprises in Ghana by assessing 
business practice and performance of the participants before and after. The results 
showed that the programme helped increase business survival rates in general but 
had mixed impacts on performance otherwise, although there were certainly some 
improvements. Other studies have also had similar findings and performance levels 
are acknowledged to be widely affected by other factors, including diverse 
education levels of targeted entrepreneurs, limited acceptance of benefits of 
improving business practices, and changing external conditions impacting low-
resilience enterprises (McKenzie and Woodruff, 2013).  
The poor as consumers  
Blowfield (2012) describes how: “business is being depicted as a consciously 
engaged agent of development, and has become a preferred actor when it comes to 
lifting people from poverty” (ibid., p.415). Yet at the same time, he highlights, 
businesses are by no means compelled to act as development agents, their 
engagement in poverty alleviation is likely to be propelled by economic self-interest 
and there is not yet a robust accountability system for development outcomes of 
business ventures, positive or negative. Blowfield therefore warns that there needs 
to be wider debate about the potential drawbacks or dangers of the private sector 
serving the poor with tailor-made products. Some of the analysis in this area focuses 
on specifically what products are being promoted. 
Taking the products that are sold under the CARE Bangladesh Rural Sales Program 
(Dolan et al., 2012), items such as medicines and nutritional supplements can clearly 
be argued to improve the living standards of those purchasing them, yet other 
products such as a skin-lightening cream manufactured by Unilever are much 
harder to reconcile with ‘development’ aims. Elyachar (2005) highlights the case of 
the Bangladeshi micro-credit organisation Grameen Bank signing a contract with 
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the multinational agricultural firm Monsanto. Despite much controversy over its 
genetically modified crops, the social networks of the poor that Grameen Bank had 
already harnessed were used to sell Monsanto’s agricultural inputs. Dolan (2012) 
equally notes the contradictions inherent in initiatives that promote “single-serve 
sachets of soap and shampoo in a context of global climate change” (ibid., p.3). 
Nestle frames selling instant noodles in Papua New Guinea as a development 
solution through their ‘Creating Shared Value’ work; although the supply chain 
provides jobs, conceptualising instant noodles as delivering humanitarian benefits 
must surely be questioned (Errington et al., 2012). Foster (2008) also analyses Coca-
Cola’s ‘corporate citizenship’ reports that do not address their actual products but 
still find that: “Employing and training workers, a precondition of making a profit, 
is […] offered with self-congratulations as evidence of good citizenship—especially 
in Africa, where the Coca-Cola system is the continent’s largest single private sector 
employer with sixty thousand employees.” (ibid., p.158) 
Redfield (2012) provides case studies of public-private partnerships that can less 
controversially be described as humanitarian goods, including: pharmaceuticals to 
treat ‘neglected’ and less profitable diseases characteristic of developing countries, 
such as sleeping sickness; pre-packaged food products designed to treat 
malnutrition; personal water filtration devices, and; bags designed to facilitate the 
breakdown of human waste into compost in order to solve waste management 
issues in high density urban areas lacking sanitation infrastructure. Redfield notes 
that issues still remain, however, including moral debates over intellectual property 
rights for life-saving technologies. Again there is also recognition that such products 
only tackle the effects of poverty, not the causes. Another more promising example 
is the treadle pump technology described above (Smith, 2009). 
Cross and Street (2009) describe Unilever Lifebuoy soap as one of the inspirations 
for Prahalad’s (2010) book The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid as it showed that 
public health could be both a social welfare project and a successful business 
venture. It was seen to exemplify how collaborations between the private sector, 
local government, NGOs and BOP entrepreneurs can function and how businesses 
can solve development problems without the need for philanthropy or 
compromising on profits. Yet Cross and Street (2009) describe how the anti-bacterial 
agent ‘triclosan’ was incorporated in the Lifebuoy soap made specifically for the 
Indian market, despite increasing concerns in the US over the negative health 
impacts of these types of agents in the longer-term. It was argued that the profit-
making motivations of Unilever were being downplayed in order to promote the 
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soap as a social good, not the commodity it inherently was. In terms of development 
assistance, many local community leaders in India felt that improving access to 
clean drinking water would have been a much better focus for local governments to 
reduce the spread of disease, rather than putting time and money into the Unilever 
partnership. 
The sale of the imported Lifebuoy soap was also seen to put Kerala’s indigenous 
soap manufacturers at risk, many of whom had developed businesses with the help 
of more locally-targeted poverty alleviation programmes (ibid.) Equally, the 
example presented by Moxham (2006) where the World Bank promoted kiosks in 
Timor-Leste led to the undermining of local production due to the kiosks selling 
cheap imported products such as cooking oil, rice and coffee. In an attempt to 
counter this, the aparajitas in the CARE Bangladesh Rural Sales Program (Dolan et 
al., 2012) are allowed to sell locally-made products of their choosing in addition to 
products from the domestic and multinational partner companies, therefore 
supporting the local economy more broadly. 
Roy (2012) argues that there is a need for the “ethicalization of market rule” in order 
“to take account of, and even mitigate, the exploitative character of bottom billion 
capitalism.” (ibid., p.106). Seeing microfinance as a BOP product which has resulted 
in suicides amongst consumers in India shows that the world’s poor are also 
potential victims of capitalist interests, as well as beneficiaries. Principles of 
consumer protection are now hoping to be harnessed through industry ethics codes 
in order to ensure “responsible” finance. Roy argues that similar frameworks need 
to be developed for bottom billion capitalism more generally.  
In summary, the main areas of controversy in the market-driven development 
approaches described above are businesses and NGOs appropriating the traditions 
and social ties of the poor for economic purposes, promoting indebtedness, 
jeopardising local markets with imported products, and there being limited controls 
over what is presented as a humanitarian good. On the other hand, there are clearly 
cases in which individuals have benefited considerably from either being supported 
to become an ‘entrepreneur’ in a BOP-targeted market system or by being given 
access to goods that can help improve their standard of living.  
2.4 Markets and development in sub-Saharan Africa 
The 1980s were seen as a lost decade in development terms for sub-Saharan Africa 
due to the now widely acknowledged failure and damage of structural adjustment 
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policies (Lal, 2002). However, Taylor (2012) argues that there were some eventual 
benefits of these ‘crude liberalization templates’ once they had been refined over 
time and were able to contribute to reductions in government expenditure and 
interest rates and improved opportunities for private enterprise. The increasing 
private sector focus within development more recently has attempted to extend 
some of these opportunities further; almost every sub-Saharan African country has 
now adopted a private sector development programme of some sort at government 
level (ibid.) Despite this, there is still a limited proliferation of successful large-scale 
businesses in sub-Saharan Africa. For example, in 2012 not one of the Fortune 
Global 500, the list of the biggest corporations in the world by profit, had its 
headquarters located on the African continent (CNN Money, 2013).  
Various reasons have been offered for the poor growth of the private sector in 
African countries. Taylor (2012) finds that some pessimists suggest that Africa does 
not have a ‘culture conducive to business’. In response he asserts that business in 
Africa is in fact more prevalent than often presented, due to formal indicators 
continuing to ignore its multi-faceted nature. In their report on the African informal 
economy, the ILO (2009) estimates that up to nine out of every ten workers in both 
urban and rural areas have ‘informal’ jobs but that these often go unrecognised in 
official statistics.  
Palmer (2004) attributes the high levels of informal economic activity in Africa to 
weakness and inaccessibility of the formal sector, high rates of rural to urban 
migration and rapid population growth. Figure 7 below shows that the average 
‘ease’ of doing business ranking for sub-Saharan African countries according to the 
World Bank and IFC’s (2013) Doing Business report is 140th out of 185 countries. The 
indicators used show weak legal institutions and complex and expensive regulatory 
processes. The costs of activities such as registering a business are calculated as a 
percentage of per capita income in order to make the comparisons. These trends are 
unsurprising given de Soto’s (2001) assertion that high levels of ‘extralegal’ informal 
economic activity are generally a result of inaccessible formal frameworks. The 
importance of informal work to the GDP of African countries is now being 
increasingly recognised and given support within state and non-governmental 
development policies and programmes (Palmer, 2004).  
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Figure 7: Average ranking of sub-Saharan African countries in terms of ease of ‘doing 




Pessimism about Africa’s current situation and future prospects has been argued to 
partially stem from an intentionally negative portrayal of the continent, along with 
other ‘developing’ regions, within development discourses and the media. ‘Post-
development’ thinking has been the main source of criticism for development as a 
paradigm, with writers such as Escobar (1995) citing the ‘development apparatus’ as 
a vehicle for facilitating continued western hegemony over developing nations in 
post-colonial times. Payne and Phillips (2010) attribute the emergence of post-
development theory to three contributing factors: the use of discourse analysis as a 
research tool; the realisation of the impossibility and unsustainability of achieving 
western-style ‘middle-class living standards’ for the entire global population, and; 
the apparent failure overall of the development project to achieve its stated aims.  
Post-development draws heavily on Foucault’s work on the role of particular 
discourses in covertly reinforcing power relations. Foucault’s method for the 
exploration of power struggles using discourse analysis is discussed further in the 
following chapter. The method has been applied to development by various writers 
to show how the history of the language and the tools of development perpetuate its 
practices. Prominent writings include a collection edited by Jonathan Crush (1995) 
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2 Sri Lanka 81 ! ! ! !
2 Ukraine 137 ! ! !
4 Uzbekistan 154 ! ! ! !
5 Burundi 159 ! ! ! !
6 Costa Rica 110 ! ! ! !
6 Mo golia 76 ! ! !
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10 Kazakhstan 49 ! ! !
Note: Economies are ranked on the number of their reforms and on how much they improved in the ease of doing business ranking. First, Doing Business selects the economies that 
implemented reforms making it easier to do business in 3 or more of the 10 topics included in this year’s aggregate ranking. Regulatory reforms making it more diffi cult to do business are 
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rankings, among those economies with at least 3 reforms. 
Source: Doing Business database.
FIGURE 1.1   OECD high-income economies combine effi cient regulatory processes with strong 
legal institutions
   Average ranking on sets of Doing Business indicators
Note: Strength of legal institutions refers to the average ranking on getting credit, protecting investors, enforcing contracts and 
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with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, paying taxes and trading across borders.




































Stronger legal institutions and
simpler and less expensive
regulatory processes
Stronger legal institutions but 
more complex and expensive
regulatory processes
Weaker legal institutions but 
simpler and less expensive 
regulatory processes
Weaker legal institutions and







Average ranking on ease
of doing business
Size of bubble reflects
number of economies
c.p001-014.indd   4 10/4/12   11:21 AM
 28 
entitled Power of Development, and another by Wolfgang Sachs (1992) called The 
Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power. In the introduction to the 
latter, Sachs draws attention to the ‘web of key concepts’ that development relies on 
that have arisen from western thinking: poverty, production, equality, the notion of 
state, and so on. He argues that development leads to the sanctioning of any 
intervention in the name of this higher goal and that based on its discourses, 
development completely overrides “the riches and blessings which survive in non-
Western cultures” (ibid., p.5). 
Many of the examples used in post-development literature are from case studies of 
development activities in sub-Saharan African countries. For example, through 
analysis of World Bank documents for a project in Lesotho in the period from 1975 
to 1984, Ferguson (1994) illustrates how development discourse inevitably presents 
a particular view of the target country that opens it to development intermediaries 
as a viable case for intervention, even if that view differs wildly (such as in Lesotho) 
from academic discourse. In this way he finds that development discourse 
continually reinforces the need for development interventions through intentionally 
playing up the ‘under-developed’ view of developing countries. Bayart (2000) finds 
that marginalisation discourse has further exacerbated the negative image 
constructed of Africa: 
The vast literature produced by journalists and academics which refers ad nauseam to 
the marginalization of the sub-continent, or to its ‘disconnection’, even if it is only 
‘by default’, does no more than reproduce Hegel’s idea that this part of the globe is 
an ‘enclave’, existing in ‘isolation’ on account of its deserts, its forests and its alleged 
primitiveness. (ibid., p.217) 
Recent work by Jerven (2013), for example, has also highlighted that national 
indicators commonly used to measure ‘development’, such as gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita, are produced by national statistics offices that often have 
fairly limited capacity and resources in African countries. This leads to a paucity of 
data that is now known to have resulted in very low estimations for economic 
growth of African countries, illustrated by recent revisions of GDP for Ghana and 
Nigeria that nearly doubled the previous estimations after renewed data collection 
efforts (ibid.) Although the concept of development and what is taken to indicate 
progress towards it, as well as the subsequent use of data provided by national 
statistics, are all shaped by development discourses, there are also other factors that 
impact on how ‘developing’ countries are portrayed.   
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Trade, not aid, for ‘development’  
The realisation that the African continent has been negatively portrayed by 
development actors and more broadly, including in the media, has become 
increasingly widespread and resulted in concerted efforts to highlight the issue and 
promote a more positive image. For example, in 2012 a video entitled “Africa for 
Norway” was released by a consortium of Norwegian students and academics. It 
was funded by Norwegian development agencies and used a South African cast and 
production company to show-case a spoof new campaign called ‘Radi-Aid’ that 
asked Africans to donate radiators to the people of Norway, accompanied by 
images and description of the freezing conditions experienced by Norwegians in 
winter. Its purpose was to illustrate how negative stereotypes are produced and 
perpetuated: “Imagine if every person in Africa saw the “Africa for Norway” video 
and this was the only information they ever got about Norway. What would they 
think about Norway?” (Radi-Aid, 2013) 
Although some key post-development writers such as Escobar (1995) are overtly 
anti-capitalist, an alternative response to the critique of the development paradigm 
as reinforcing conceptions of Africa as a continent in need of charity is a concerted 
effort to promote African countries as offering plentiful business and investment 
opportunities. Campaigns focusing on this often use the slogan ‘trade, not aid’. This 
phrase is thought to have emerged originally to describe demands of developing 
countries at the first UN Conference on Trade and Development in 1964 for financial 
aid via the IMF to be replaced with a subsidies system for primary producers 
(Fridell, 2004). It has since been adopted by many initiatives and campaigns that try 
to reduce aid-based approaches and dependency.   
Tony Elumelu (2013), a successful Nigerian businessman, has tried to take this 
further to promote an ‘Africapitalism’ concept. He states that: 
Africa never should have been a charity case. Our people are as industrious, 
innovative, and entrepreneurial as any on the planet. Economic growth over the past 
decade, even under some of the harshest conditions, has been nothing short of 
stunning. (ibid., p.6) 
Elumelu suggests that the African private sector has not yet transitioned fully from 
short-term rent-seeking type investments to more long-term profit-making 
entrepreneurial activities and that to do that requires further funding and support 
of entrepreneurial activities, reduced foreign exploitation of mineral resources, and 
government efforts to create a better enabling environment through improved 
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market infrastructure. He proposes that NGOs be involved in pushing for those 
market conditions and supporting entrepreneurs. Again, this returns to the model of 
private enterprises, development intermediaries and governments working together 
to create a conducive business environment and facilitate the growth of markets. 
2.5 Energy access as a development problem 
Whilst not wanting to reinforce the much-critiqued negative image created of 
developing countries and sub-Saharan Africa in particular, there are clear 
differences between countries termed as developed and those termed as developing 
with regards to living standards. One of the factors contributing to these differences 
is modern energy access, something that affects people directly and indirectly in 
terms of their ability to undertake productive enterprises. Again coming back to 
Sen’s (1999) conceptualisation of development as freedom, limited access to modern 
energy services can be argued as a comparative restriction of personal agency.  
Globally, just under 1.3 billion people have no access to electricity and 2.6 billion 
rely on traditional biomass for cooking, associated with serious environmental and 
household air pollution issues. The majority of these live in rural areas of 
developing countries. The problem is most acute in sub-Saharan Africa, where 72% 
of people lack access to electricity and over 650 million people lack access to modern 
cooking fuels (IEA et al., 2010). Figure 8 illustrates the resulting situation: based on 
2009 data, total annual residential electricity consumption of the 791 million people 
living in sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) is roughly equivalent to the 
total annual consumption of the 19.5 million people living in New York State in the 
US.  
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Figure 8: Annual electricity consumption in New York and sub-Saharan Africa (Ibid.) 
 
Although energy access is not included as a Millennium Development Goal in its 
own right, it has been recognised that modern energy services are essential for 
delivering most, or even all, of the eight Goals (GNESD, 2007). Accordingly, in 
September 2010 the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, announced a target of 
universal energy access by 2030.  An enormous amount of work is required to meet 
this target (Practical Action, 2010) and energy access is the focus of many 
development intermediaries trying to contribute to its achievement. 
A universal goal to “Secure Sustainable Energy” has also now been proposed for the 
post-2015 development agenda that is intended to take the place of the Millennium 
Development Goals once they expire in 2015. In a report compiled by the ‘High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda’ (2013), the 
illustrative national targets shown in Figure 9 are also proposed as a sub-set of the 
universal goal, to be reached by 2030. 
Figure 9: Illustrative post-2015 sustainable energy targets to reach by 2030 (The High-
Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the Post-2015 Development Agenda, 2013) 
 
The targets shown in Figure 9 indicate the extent to which energy access discourse 
has become intrinsically linked with the environmental agenda, so that the focus is 






























7a. Double the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix
7b. Ensure universal access to modern energy services 1, 2
7c. Double the global rate of improvement in energy e!ciency in buildings, industry, agriculture and 
transport 
7d. Phase out ine!cient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption 1,3
8a. Increase the number of good and decent jobs and livelihoods by x 2
8b. Decrease the number of young people not in education, employment or training by x% 2
8c. Strengthe  pro uctive capacity by providing universal access to "nancial services and infrastructure 
such as transportation and ICT 1, 2, 3
8d. Increase new start-ups by x and value added from new products by y through creating an enabling 
business environment and boosting entrepreneurship 2, 3
9a. Publish and use economic, social and environmental accounts in all governments and major companies 1
9b. Increase consideration of sustainability in x% of government procurements 3
9c. Safeguard ecosystems, species and genetic diversity
9d. Reduce deforestation by x% and increase reforestation by y%
9e. Improve soil quality, reduce soil erosion by x tonnes and combat deserti"cation
10a. Provide free and universal legal identity, such as birth registrations 1,2
10b. Ensure people enjoy freedom of speech, association, peaceful protest and access to independent 
media and information 1, 3
10c. Increase public participation in political processes and civic engagement at all levels 2,3
10d. Guarantee the public’s right to information and access to government data 1
10e. Reduce bribery and corruption and ensure o!cials can be held accountable 3
11a. Reduce violent deaths per 100,000 by x and eliminate all forms of violence against children 1, 2, 3
11b. Ensure justice institutions are accessible, independent, well-resourced and respect due-process rights 1, 2 , 3
11c. Stem the external stressors that lead to con#ict, including those related to organised crime 3
11d. Enhance the capacity, professionalism and accountability of the security forces, police and judiciary 3
12a. Support an open, fair and development-friendly trading system, substantially reducing trade-distorting 
measures, including agricultural subsidies, while improving market access of developing country products 3
12b. Implement reforms to ensure stability of the global "nancial system and encourage stable, long-term 
private foreign investment 3
12c. Hold the increase in global average temperature below 2$ C above pre-industrial levels, in line with 
international agreements 
12d. Developed countries that have not done so to make concrete e%orts towards the target of 0.7% of gross 
national product (GNP) as o!cial development assistance to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20% of GNP 
of developed countries to least developed countries; other countries should move toward voluntary targets 
for complementary "nancial assistance
12e Reduce illicit #ows and tax evasion and increase stolen-asset recovery by $x 3
12f. Promote collaboration on and access to science, technology, innovation, and development data 3
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concurrently put on promoting renewable energy, reducing promotion of fossil 
fuels and encouraging energy efficiency.  
Sustainable energy in developing countries 
Renewable energy and energy efficient technologies for lighting, cooking and other 
energy-dependent activities, hereafter termed ‘sustainable’ or ‘clean’ energy 
technologies, have been widely recognised as offering viable, low-carbon energy 
solutions to rural populations in developing countries (Moomaw et al., 2011). There 
is now a large range of sustainable energy technologies available and a variety of 
configurations in which they can be installed. In line with the case study 
organisations, this thesis focuses on pico-solar photovoltaic (PV) products for 
individual households or business units, in the form of solar lanterns and lighting 
kits that provide light and often also electricity for other low electrical-demand 
activities such as phone charging. It also focuses on domestic-scale ‘improved 
efficiency’ cookstoves (generally referred to as ‘clean cookstoves’) that reduce the 
amount of cooking fuel consumed (commonly firewood or charcoal) compared to 
traditional cooking methods through high levels of thermal efficiency, and biomass 
briquettes which are made from various organic waste residues and can be used as 
a more sustainable alternative to firewood and charcoal. More details on these 
particular products are provided in Chapter 5. 
Martinot et al. (2002) have provided a thorough review of approaches to 
disseminating renewable technologies in developing countries since their 
emergence. They found that donor organisations could still be inclined to provide 
large subsidies or even distribute equipment free of charge, despite clear evidence 
(i.e. previous failure of such programmes in the long-term) that these approaches 
are unsustainable and even harm the creation of viable markets. More recently, 
however, development intermediaries focusing on energy have followed the general 
turn in the development sector towards new market-based approaches. They have 
also been joined by private sector organisations, from small social enterprises to 
large multinational organisations, interested in creating and/or distributing 
sustainable energy products to the ‘BOP’, often in partnership with the more 
traditional development actors. For example, Jacobson (2006) asserts that: 
The single largest trend in international solar policy circles over the past decade has 
been to shift solar dissemination strategies from heavily subsidized donor projects to 
private market-based approaches that seek to achieve—or at least move toward—
‘‘full cost recovery.’’ (ibid., p.145) 
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Figure 10 shows the OECD/IEA estimation of investment in energy access in 
developing countries overall in 2009, suggesting a total of US$9.1 billion was used to 
provide 20 million people with access to electricity and 7 million people with 
advanced cookstoves. Around half of this was provided by multilateral 
organisations and bilateral aid (48%), just under a third by developing country 
governments (30%), and 22% by the private sector – something that has been a 
relatively recent emergence in what has traditionally been seen as a development 
problem.  
Figure 10: Share in total investment in energy access by source, 2009 (OECD and IEA, 
2011) 
 
Uptake of small-scale renewable energy systems in Africa has increased over time, 
particularly solar photovoltaic systems for homes. Growth rates are much slower 
than in other areas such as Sri Lanka though. In 2007, Africa had around 500,000 
solar home systems in use but over half of these were in Kenya and South Africa, 
with numbers outside these two countries being relatively small (REN21, 2010). 
Market-based approaches and associated private sector investment have increased 
significantly in Africa in the last couple of years, however. Hammond et al. (2007) 
estimate that the total BOP energy market in Africa has a potential value of US$27 
billion (characterising the BOP as those with a maximum annual income of $3,000 in 
local purchasing power equivalent). The whole purpose of their report “The Next 4 
Billion: Market Size and Business Strategy at the Base of the Pyramid” is to 
encourage businesses to take up the challenge of designing BOP products and 
making a successful business out of their production and distribution. It provides 
various case studies of successful examples of this, such as the example of E+Co 
which is discussed further below. 
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Examples of market-based initiatives to supply sustainable energy products 
Martinot et al (2002) use the term ‘market facilitation organisations’ to describe 
“entities that support the growth of particular markets through a variety of means 
[…] networking, information dissemination, market research, user education, 
partner matching, business-deal identification and facilitation, technical assistance, 
consulting services, financing, and policy advocacy or advice” (ibid., p.336). 
Through these measures, the organisations increase local supply-side business 
capability and capacity. Martinot et al. concluded that market facilitation can be a 
powerful approach for disseminating renewable technologies in developing 
countries, but that it was under-utilised at the time of writing. This section outlines 
some examples where it is now being applied.  
One of the first widespread programmes to create and support local enterprises for 
renewable technologies was the UN’s Rural Energy Enterprise Development (REED) 
programme. REED was a partnership between the United Nations Foundation, the 
United Nations Environment Programme, a non-profit company that specialises in 
clean energy investment called E+Co, and local NGOs in its countries of operation. 
In its 2003 report, the programme partners stated that:  
As experience with many clean energy technologies increases, so does technical 
progress, which has dramatically lowered the cost of energy from sources such as 
modern biomass technologies and wind energy. The focus has now shifted from one 
of technology, demonstrations and gifts to that of empowerment, markets and 
investments. (UNEP and United Nations Foundation, 2003) 
The REED approach, summarised schematically in Figure 11, identified and 
nurtured local entrepreneurs to form enterprises that could produce and distribute 
modern energy services to local rural and peri-urban communities. The support 
provided included business development services and seed capital in the form of a 
loan or similar to help finance enterprise start-up. REED operated in Africa as A-
REED, with operations in Mali, Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal and Zambia. The A-REED 
investment facility closed in 2007 (E+Co, 2011) but the individual partner 
organisations, including E+Co (international), ENDA (Senegal), TaTEDO (Tanzania) 
and the Mali-Folkecenter, appear to be continuing to use similar  approaches.  
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Figure 11: The REED approach (UNEP and United Nations Foundation, 2003) 
 
In addition to those original A-REED partners, some other ‘market facilitation 
organisations’ applying market-based development approaches to sustainable 
energy products in sub-Saharan Africa are described below.  
• Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) International’s Developing Energy 
Enterprises Project (DEEP) was set up in 2008 to provide business and technology 
training and a loan guarantee scheme to new and existing energy service 
entrepreneurs. (GVEP International, 2012a) 
• British NGO SolarAid has established a social enterprise called ‘SunnyMoney’ to 
import micro-scale solar products into African countries, catalyse demand and 
establish supply networks. (SolarAid, 2011) 
• The Rural Energy Foundation trains and supports commercial retailers and 
distributors of solar home systems and solar lanterns in sub-Saharan Africa. They 
provide training in technology, marketing, sales and business administration, with 
an associated micro-franchise option. (The Ashden Awards, 2010) 
• The Enabling Access to Sustainable Energy programme focuses on removing 
bottlenecks in local energy markets through supporting the scale-up of sustainable 
business models. Facilitated by the Dutch organisation ETC International, it has a 
portfolio of nearly 40 projects in eight countries. (de Vries et al., 2010) 
• Lighting Africa is a joint International Finance Corporation (IFC) and World Bank 
programme to support markets for off-grid lighting products, through market 
intelligence, product quality assurance, business support services, consumer 
education and public sector engagement. (Lighting Africa, 2010) 
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• The World Bank funded and GVEP-implemented ‘Supporting Energy SMEs in sub-
Saharan Africa’ programme offers business training, access to finance and 
investment for small businesses involved with sustainable energy supply chains in 
Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, Mali, and Senegal. (GVEP International, 2012a) 
As well as an increasing focus on market-based energy access programmes by these 
more conventional development intermediaries, there has been an increasing 
number of social enterprises being set up in the energy access sector. This has 
particularly been the case for the design and distribution of pico-solar lighting 
systems and highly engineered clean cookstoves. Table 1 below identifies some of 
those companies.  
Table 1: Examples of social enterprises for solar lantern and clean cookstove design 
and distribution 
Technology Company name Country of origin 
Solar lanterns and 
lighting/charging kits 





Barefoot Power Australia 
ToughStuff UK 





Like SunnyMoney described above, Grameen Shakti is another example of a social 
enterprise set up specifically to distribute clean energy products. Wimmer (2012) 
provides a useful interview with its founder, Mohammad Yunus, describing how 
and why it was legally structured. It was set up initially as a company limited by 
guarantee, a legal format typically used by charities and meaning that it does not 
have shareholders and can therefore theoretically make losses without significant 
recourse. It was established to make solar home systems available to the poor in 
Bangladesh, and has also expanded to clean cookstoves and biogas systems. It 
became clear to Yunus, however, that the original legal structure allowed the 
operations to be carried out in a financially unsustainable manner. Therefore 
Grameen Shakti Social Business was set up as a social business, using the standard 
legal structure of a company limited by shareholders but setting up a charter 
declaring that the shareholders would only take their investment money back over 
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time and not receive any dividends. All profits would be invested back in the 
company instead. (Wimmer, 2012) 
Policies to promote private sector investment in sustainable energy 
Most of the activities described above involve a combination of private investment 
and development funding, often in the form of grants. Public and private funds are 
increasingly being committed to low carbon development initiatives in developing 
countries due to growing acceptance that the contribution of human activity to 
climate change represents a huge global risk. It is recognised that the energy 
consumption of developing countries will increase significantly over time and 
therefore efforts are being made to facilitate the additional energy generation being 
based on low carbon technologies. The Copenhagen Accord, for example, commits 
developed countries to providing significant additional funds – US$100 billion a 
year by 2020 – to developing countries to support climate change mitigation, 
adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building (UNFCCC, 
2009). To put this into perspective, the IEA et al. (2010) estimate that US$36 billion of 
investment annually could allow every citizen in the world to have access to 
electricity and clean cooking facilities by 2030.  
A ‘High Level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing’ that included various 
heads of state was convened in 2010 to consider financing mechanisms for the 
Copenhagen Accord funding. Their final report described a need to prioritise 
channelling funding to Africa, including a possible ‘Africa Green Fund’ as a sub-
mechanism of the main Green Climate Fund which will host the dedicated resources 
(UN, 2010). The Green Climate Fund will provide a mix of grants and loans to low 
carbon activities in developing countries. It is still under design but its architecture 
includes a ‘Private Sector Facility’ “which will address barriers to private sector 
investment in adaptation and mitigation activities, such as market failures, 
insufficient capacity and lack of awareness” (Interim Secretary of the Green Climate 
Fund, (2013) p.1). 
An already operational source of finance for organisations involved in distributing 
sustainable energy products is through the sale of what have become known as 
‘carbon credits’. These tradable certificates are generated under specific policy 
mechanisms to promote increased investment in low carbon energy projects, 
amongst other project types, that otherwise might not be financially feasible. There 
are two main types of mechanism that facilitate the generation of carbon credits by 
projects in developing countries. The first is the regulatory system known as the 
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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This is operated under the UN’s 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and allows eligible projects 
to produce and sell ‘certified emission reductions’ (CERs). These are measured in 
tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) and signify the volume of greenhouse gas 
emissions avoided through the project’s activities. The way in which this happens is 
discussed further in Chapters 0 and 6. The buyers of the CERs in the past have 
predominantly been developed countries that were required to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and were able to buy ‘offsets’ to 
constitute part of the reduction (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012). This led to carbon 
trading under the CDM becoming known as the compliance or regulatory market. 
The World Bank (2010) estimates that the CDM leveraged around US$95 billion in 
clean energy investment between 2002 and 2008, compared to US$80 billion of non-
carbon-finance-linked sustainable energy investment in developing countries over 
the same period, and just US$19 billion for climate change mitigation delivered 
through Official Development Assistance. This shows how significant a source of 
finance it has been. However, the CDM has been slow to take-off in sub-Saharan 
Africa compared to other regions. As shown in Figure 12, Africa as a continent only 
hosted 7% of CDM projects in 2009, compared to 72% by China (Kossoy and 
Ambrosi, 2010). 
Figure 12: Primary CDM sellers in 2009 (Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010) 
 
(unsp. = unspecified countries) 
Concerted efforts to increase the uptake of the CDM in Africa have been made and 
in 2011 more projects were registered in the region (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012). The 
scheme is currently suffering from lack of international agreement to either continue 
the Kyoto Protocol, which expired in December 2012, or initiate a new agreement 
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that will equally secure demand for carbon credits. However, the EU, which drives 
the majority of demand for credits from the CDM, confirmed its continued 
acceptance of them beyond 2012, prioritising credits from least developed countries 
(ibid.) – although this will exclude countries such as Kenya (UN-OHRLLS, 2013). 
Even if the CDM ceases to exist altogether, the EU intends to obtain carbon credits 
through bilateral agreements with least developed countries (Lewis, 2010).  
The other mechanisms under which carbon credits can be generated and traded 
internationally are known as voluntary mechanisms. There is a wider variety of 
these and they work on the basis of organisations and individuals wanting to offset 
their ‘carbon footprints’ voluntarily, but still requiring a clearly structured way of 
doing so (Ecosystem Marketplace and Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2013). 
Voluntary carbon trading mechanisms have been established by various 
organisations, such as a consortium of development intermediaries including the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) that created the Gold Standard system for carbon 
offsets (The Gold Standard, 2013). The voluntary market does see a slightly higher 
percentage of credits originating from the African continent, amounting to 10% of 
the 80MtCO2e transacted in 2012. Some of these credits were generated by clean 
cookstove projects in Kenya, Ghana, Mozambique, Uganda and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Ecosystem Marketplace and Bloomberg New Energy 
Finance, 2013).  
Since they first emerged, the detailed processes of carbon finance mechanisms have 
been continually revised and new layers of complexity added over time. The 
intention is to make them more transparent and more accessible and thus inclusive, 
but various critics have found the opposite to be occurring. Gutierrez (2011), for 
example, analyses systems for gaining carbon credits from carbon sequestration in 
forests and describes how: “instead of unfolding and evolving into something 
different, it in-folds and becomes increasingly pervasive and convoluted” (p.641) in 
a process she terms ‘capital involution’. She finds that “the resulting system 
excludes small-scale producers from the market and rewards mostly the few 
international agencies that validate the projects” (p.640). This discussion is taken up 
further in the following chapter.    
2.6 Critique of market-based approaches to energy access 
Much of the earlier discussion regarding the critique of the new wave of market-
based approaches to poverty alleviation is also valid for initiatives focused on 
sustainable energy products. Clean, safe and affordable lighting and cooking 
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products are fairly easily reconciled with development aims, reducing one 
particular tension discussed earlier. However, the products must still be of 
appropriate quality in order to ensure that local sales entrepreneurs are able to 
maintain the trust of their social ties and that consumers do not spend their limited 
incomes based on false promises. At the same time, care is needed to avoid those 
involved in the distribution networks being encouraged into indebtedness and their 
social relationships subsumed into supply chains. Imported products and uneven 
subsidies can also jeopardise existing local enterprises.  
Luther (2004) cites non-technological research and development efforts, such as 
development and investigation of dissemination strategies, as a fundamental 
requirement to achieve technology diffusion, yet there appears to be limited 
detailed analysis of market-driven approaches. Most academic studies into 
development interventions involving renewable energy focus on case studies that 
demonstrate the technologies as effective rural electrification solutions (e.g. Gupta 
(2003), Obeng and Evers (2009)) or analyse the barriers to their take-up (e.g. 
Chaurey et al. (2004), Ockwell et al. (2007)). Some of the existing studies on market-
driven approaches to sustainable energy provision are discussed below. 
Pico-solar products 
Akrich (1992) and Cross (2013) have analysed the history of solar lighting products 
in two different periods of time that reflect the evolution of approaches. Akrich 
looks specifically at the early design of a photoelectric lighting kit by a French 
government-funded development agency. The end-users were excluded from the 
design process, so that when the systems went from Paris to rural areas of Senegal, 
problems quickly became apparent – such as the lack of a switch except on the light 
itself, which was often out of reach. There was also found to be a lack of 
replacement parts in local markets so that the systems were very difficult to 
maintain, and other issues meant limited success of the initiative.  
Cross (2013), on the other hand, shows how the origins of social enterprise d.light 
Design’s Nova S.200 solar lantern were much more conducive to the creation of a 
product that blended its humanitarian side with commercial viability. d.light 
emerged from a group project of Stanford University graduates well versed in C. K. 
Prahalad’s work. They intensively engaged end-users in India in their design 
process and continue to incorporate feedback from users into the product’s 
evolution over time. Rather than relying on traditional development funding, aside 
from initial grants from winning social innovation competitions, the product was 
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brought to market through engaging a suite of private investors on the basis of 
future sales of both the lights and associated carbon credits under the CDM. 
Interestingly, the d.light S.200 was revealed in 2010 at the 100th object chosen for the 
British Museum’s exhibition ‘A History of the World in 100 Objects’ (ibid.), 
illustrating the significance that solar lanterns and similar humanitarian goods are 
perceived to hold. 
As well as the design process, the distribution methods of pico-solar systems are 
key. Miller (2009) presents an extensive solar market analysis in “Selling Solar”, 
focussing on the initially slow up-take and later accelerated diffusion of 
photovoltaic panels in countries such as Sri Lanka, India and Bangladesh. He 
suggests that, although well designed products were available, the main barriers 
were: 
• the absence of consumer finance to make solar more affordable, and; 
• the absence of a market infrastructure to make solar more available. 
Balint (2004) compared two projects being implemented by small NGOs in El 
Salvador to introduce solar home systems to rural households. He terms one of the 
projects as ‘market-based’ because householders were given the opportunity to buy 
the systems, while the other was ‘donor-based’ as residents were given the systems 
free of charge in return for their commitment to local environmental schemes. The 
market-based approach involved the NGO partnering with one local firm, 
providing them with an initial number of solar home systems on the basis of 
repayment if sold successfully, and trained them as installers. They initially set up a 
demonstration project, installing systems in five households free of charge for a 
fixed period. The project was successful in some ways, and the villagers with the 
demonstration systems actually bought them slowly over time using a credit-based 
financing package. However, the only other customers were richer households and 
community development organisations, and ultimately the firm was unable to 
repay much of its initial debt. Luther concluded that: “Both partners underestimated 
difficulties associated with developing and nurturing a market for [solar home 
systems] in poor communities.” (ibid., p.725)  
Niethammer and Alstone (2012) examine the role for women in modern off-grid 
lighting markets, through a study of Lighting Africa’s work in five sub-Saharan 
African countries. They find that the barriers to consumers can still be financial, 
since for “the average household or small business, a basic, good-quality lamp 
represents about one-fifth of their monthly income” (ibid., p.151) meaning that 
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significant planning is required to be able to make a purchase. They note that 
distributor finance is also an issue, but that indebtedness can be avoided. For 
example, Solar Sister, operational in Rwanda, Sudan and Uganda, offer a micro-
consignment model whereby the first consignment of solar products are provided 
interest-free.  
Kolk and van den Beuse (2012) assess four private enterprises that sell off-grid 
sustainable energy products in developing countries. Out of three companies they 
examine that sell solar systems, only Grameen Shakti in Bangladesh offers any form 
of consumer credit, delivered through their affiliation with Grameen Bank. 
Kamworks in Cambodia and Sunlabob in Laos both struggle to serve the poorest 
without subsidies or consumer finance options. They rely on sales of solar home 
systems to middle-income consumers for their main income and seek partnerships 
with donors for serving people that would be conceptualised at the BOP. However, 
Kolk and van den Beuse also note that: “Large, stand-alone donor programmes can 
distort local markets if they do not relate to local companies that need to play a role 
in longer-term solutions” (ibid., p.563). 
Although the literature described here shows that there has been diverse research 
into the design of pico-solar systems, the reasons for their sometimes limited uptake 
and the relative viability of market-based approaches, there is less detailed analysis 
of the specific processes occurring to actually create the market infrastructure for 
these products. Cross (2013) describes d.light’s partnership with Sahki Retail (“sahki” 
meaning friend) in southern India which recruits, trains and manages rural sales 
women in a manner similar to the Avon-model discussed earlier. D.light relies on 
this network of entrepreneurs and their existing relationships to make sure their 
solar lanterns are made available to the desired end-users. Wimmer (2012) describes 
some of the recruitment and training processes for Grameen Shakti solar engineers. 
Dolan (2012) also includes the Ugandan-based solar lantern distributor ‘Solar Sister’ 
in her review of ‘BOP entrepreneurs’, highlighting the importance of their training 
and experience over time: 
[…] many women in these systems have long been ‘petty entrepreneurs’; they have 
lengthy personal histories of market exchange and on-going reciprocal relationships 
through which they trade goods, favours and services. However, becoming a BoP 
entrepreneur requires the acquisition of a different cultural repertoire; one that 
emphasizes the values of responsibility, competition, risk-taking, a positive attitude 
and market discipline (ibid., p.6) 
 43 
Cookstoves and briquettes 
In “Whose Development”, Crewe and Harrison (1998) provide a detailed 
ethnography of clean cookstove projects run by the British NGO Intermediate 
Technology, which later became Practical Action. Crewe undertook research for the 
NGO in Sri Lanka and was later directly employed as a social scientist at their UK 
headquarters, so the book is written from the vantage point of an ‘insider’. It mainly 
critiques development interventions overall, particularly the paternalistic 
dichotomy created by the conceptualisation of developers versus beneficiaries. 
There is limited analysis of the intricate processes of the development 
intermediary’s role in market-building but it does give a useful overview of the 
chequered history of cookstove dissemination programmes in general. Improved 
cookstoves entered the development agenda as early as the 1950s and many 
international organisations suddenly became involved in the 1970s after heightened 
awareness of deforestation rates, but often with little success: 
The claims about deforestation, and availability of funding, influenced national 
governments to concentrate on disseminating vast numbers of fuel-efficient stoves 
very quickly. Quality was often sacrificed on the altar of quantity. The technical 
performance of stoves was measured in relation to fuel consumption, despite the 
fact that in many places the stove-users were more interested in saving time than in 
saving fuel. The unpopularity of the new stoves was attributed to the cultural 
conservatism of their users. By the late 1980s Africa, Asia, and South/Central 
America became littered with abandoned ‘improved’ stoves. (ibid., p.11-12) 
Many projects were therefore dismissed as failures and funding was significantly 
cut for cookstove projects in development, with this legacy remaining for a 
considerable length of time. Crewe and Harrison state that there have been many 
successes, however, with cookstoves often being popular with those who purchased 
them. They cite an example in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s where potters were trained 
to make clay liners for improved cookstoves. After assembly the stoves sold at 
subsidised prices, with funding often coming from international donors. This does 
not seem to have created any issues with distorting the prices, perhaps because 
there were limited other initiatives making and selling similar products. However, 
Crewe’s research did find that the potters were becoming particularly wealthy and 
that this was creating tensions locally, as well as contributing to gender disparities. 
Bailis et al. (2009) describe how a recently renewed interest in improved cookstoves 
has arisen from links between the use of solid cooking fuels with high rates of 
respiratory diseases such as tuberculosis. Cookstoves have emerged again as a 
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development solution, but this time in response to health issues instead of 
deforestation rates. However, they note that emphasis has now shifted to market-
based approaches, so that organisations previously working in cookstove 
dissemination with donor support are facing pressure to move to commercialised 
approaches, potentially at the risk of not being able to provide cookstoves to lower 
income households. Other research gives credence to these concerns. Shrimali et al. 
(2011) interviewed 12 organisations selling clean cookstoves in India and found that 
only one had been able to become profit-making through an intentional targeting of 
commercial market customers only. Sesan et al. (2013) also found that a for-profit 
approach to selling alcohol-fuelled CleanCook stoves in Nigeria resulted in 
exclusion of ‘BOP’ consumers.  
Bailis et al. (2009) argue that hybrid approaches that use a combination of donor 
funding and commercial activities to catalyse markets should not be discredited, 
citing the example of the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ) which emerged from donor 
funding to pay for design activities, local manufacturing facilities, ongoing training 
and public education. However, they also warn that the relative successes came at 
significant cost over time: 
The KCJ is now widely available across Kenya and its distinctive hourglass design 
has been replicated in markets across sub-Saharan Africa. By 2001, over 2 million 
Kenyan house- holds (roughly 40% of charcoal users) were using a KJC (Ministry of 
Energy., 2002). However, this degree of saturation took nearly two decades to 
achieve and was initiated by eight years of sustained funding equivalent to over a 
million dollars in current terms. (ibid., p.1700) 
Limited analysis of market-based programmes to promote biomass briquettes can 
be identified in the literature on clean cooking technologies and fuels. Although 
clean cookstove research is relatively prevalent, unsurprisingly given the long 
history of the technology, it again seems to offer limited in-depth analysis of the 
detailed processes of creating market infrastructure, in terms of both the people and 
the technical requirements necessary.   
2.7 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reviewed activities and thinking in international development over 
time. It has shown the convergence in recent years of development approaches with 
economic principles of markets, and from the other side the encouragement of 
businesses to meet the needs of people at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ in terms of 
income levels. This meeting of development with business (Figure 13) has led to an 
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increasing prevalence of market-based approaches to what have traditionally been 
seen as development problems, often involving collaborations between the private 
sector and more conventional development intermediaries, and/or the use of social 
enterprise business models.  
Figure 13: The range of actors involved in designing and distributing BOP products 
(Source: Author)  
 
This thesis will look specifically at market-based approaches to the distribution of 
sustainable energy products in sub-Saharan African countries. Widespread 
acceptance of the contribution of human activities to climate change means that 
grants and loans for low carbon development activities are available and increasing 
in volume. Particular efforts are being made to channel these financial resources to 
African countries, amongst other less developed regions. The availability of carbon 
credits may already have promoted activities in this sector to some extent.  
An initial review of the literature suggests that more detailed ethnographic analysis 
of these types of approaches would offer a useful contribution, by examining the 
specific processes that occur when trying to build market infrastructure to make 
what can be conceptualised as humanitarian products available to potential low-














3 Conceptualising markets and market-based activities 
As described in the previous chapter, the absence of market infrastructure is seen as 
a key barrier to making new, clean energy technologies such as solar PV and clean 
cookstoves more available in developing countries. Both traditional development 
intermediaries and more profit-driven organisations are now trying to establish sub-
Saharan African ‘markets’ for energy products targeted at off-grid rural ‘consumers’. 
The primary conceptual framework chosen here to further develop the analysis of 
market-building is the work of Michel Callon and Koray Çalışkan on processes of 
marketisation.  
This chapter provides an overview of the emergence of the social study of markets 
over time, briefly summarising the relevant work of early theorists and particularly 
highlighting the importance of Granovetter’s (1985) ‘embeddedness’ concept. It 
leads to the more recent conceptualisation of markets as socio-technical assemblages 
and in particular Çalışkan and Callon’s (2010) related call for a research programme 
for the study of markets that centres on this way of framing ‘marketisation’ 
activities. Connected concepts such as entrepreneurship, power dynamics, social 
capital, and trust are also drawn on in this thesis and are outlined here, completing 
the initial exploration of some of the key background literature.  
3.1 The social study of markets 
Although inevitably heterogeneous, markets do have common fundamental 
characteristics. Carruthers and Babb (2000) summarise these into four key elements, 
providing a helpful starting point on which to build the following discussion on the 
social study of markets. 
1. Property and property rights: a market needs property, in the broadest sense of the 
term, that is to be exchanged, and a system that establishes clear rights to that 
property. It is in fact those property rights that are fundamentally exchanged.    
2. Medium of exchange: fiat money (determined as legal tender by government law 
rather than due to any intrinsic value) is now the almost universal medium of 
exchange.  
3. Buyers and sellers: a market requires both buyers and sellers of the property for 
exchange to go ahead. These can be referred to as actors in the market.  
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4. Reliable information: a well functioning market requires buyers and sellers to have 
confidence that everything is as it seems, with standardisation ensuring that actors 
can make informed judgements about the property to be exchanged.   
These four elements provide the basic structure for a market to function. However, 
as the evolution of the social study of markets has shown, the way in which these 
different elements come into being and can be ‘framed’ for analysis is open to a 
more nuanced variety of approaches that have developed over time, each building 
on earlier concepts and often drawing on different academic disciplines. 
Early theorists 
The study of markets has traditionally been the domain of economists. Adam Smith 
(1759, 1776) first introduced the notion that the ‘invisible hand of the market’ would 
set prices of exchange according to supply and demand, based on the premise that 
individual humans want to maximise their own personal gains but thus leading to 
the benefit of society overall. The concept of rational self-interested actors later 
became known as ‘homo economicus’ or economic man, such as through the work 
of and reaction to the English political economist John Stuart Mill (Persky, 1995). In 
this way economic theory gradually created a conceptualisation of ‘the market’ as 
an almost naturally occurring system for the ordering of exchange and allocation of 
scarce resources through the decisions made by rational economic actors.  
Early analysts that focused more specifically on the social nature of markets 
included Weber (Weber et al., 1968), who looked at the impacts of religious ideas 
and values on economic activities, introducing the idea that market activities are 
influenced by social relations. Durkheim identified how social contracts in the form 
of morality were a necessary precursor to industrial capitalism, even if he felt that 
that same capitalism would then lead to morality’s decline (Fevre, 2003). Polanyi 
(1957) later went on to question the idea of a self-regulating market, laying the 
foundations of the embeddedness concept that was to become a central pillar of 
economic sociology. 
Polanyi’s work also highlighted that markets are not the only possible systems of 
economic exchange. While it is accepted that exchange of some form is generally 
inevitable in society (with an exception being the hunter-gatherer model), entire 
societies have functioned without the emergence of markets. Polanyi looked at the 
example of the Trobriand Islanders of Western Melanesia, where reciprocity and 
redistribution are the key aspects of exchange.  
 49 
Beyond these examples, there has historically been limited sociological analysis of 
markets. It only became a prominent field in its own right in the 1960s, sparked by 
the spread of institutionalist thought, and leading to a subsequent boom sometimes 
termed as ‘the new economic sociology’ (Swedberg, 1994).  
The embeddedness concept 
White (1981) introduced the idea that stable production markets are only possible if 
actors take each other into account when making market exchange decisions. 
Shortly after, Granovetter (1985) started to develop the embeddedness concept, 
highlighting that:  
behaviour and institutions […] are so constrained by ongoing social relations that to 
construe them as independent is a grievous misunderstanding. (Ibid., p.482) 
Granovetter suggests that the common neoclassical view is that pre-market 
economic behaviour, such as gift giving, was heavily embedded in social relations 
but that in modern society the market has increasingly deviated from social 
relations almost into its own independent sphere. In fact it could even be said that 
the view goes as far as seeing social relations now embedded in the market. 
Granovetter takes an opposing stance, seeing markets as embedded in non-market 
social relations, including institutions, networks and culture. Fligstein (1996) notes 
the partial success of the concept, demonstrated by evidence that it can explain 
effects that economic models cannot.  
Granovetter (1985) particularly raises the issues of trust and malfeasance, which he 
describes as neglected prior to a ‘flurry of interest among economists’ (ibid., p.487) 
from 1970 onwards. Solutions that then emerged for how fraudulent market 
activities are prevented include the existence of ‘generalised morality’ (seen by 
Granovetter as an ‘over-socialised’ solution) and the creation of institutional 
arrangements that make malfeasance the less desirable option (seen as an under-
socialised solution). While he accepted that these would play some contextual part 
in market-based transactions, he highlighted that the production of trust in 
economic life through social relations was key. Although trust could also lead to 
malfeasance, and in fact incidences of fraud are often only made possible because of 
the existence of trust, in general the desire to create and maintain trust and 
corresponding trust in others inhibits malpractice. Overall, Granovetter felt that 
although the embededness concept could not predict outcomes of economic 
interactions, it showed that ultimately the detail of social structure determines 
whether order or disorder will occur.  
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Callon (1998) asserts that Granovetter’s embeddedness solution is frequently 
misinterpreted or under-estimated. By comparison with Polanyi’s concept of 
embeddedness, which suggests that actors are embedded in the institutional context 
in which economic activities take place, he posits that Granovetter is describing that: 
[…] the agents’ identities, interests and objectives, in short, everything which might 
stabilise their description and their being, are variable outcomes which fluctuate 
with the form and dynamics of relations between these agents. (Callon (1998) p.8)  
This distinction is important because it assimilates Granovetter’s concept more 
closely to the ‘actor-network’ or ‘assemblage’ idea, discussed later on.  
Networks, social capital and power 
In addition to his embeddedness work, Granovetter (1982) undertook foundational 
work on the contribution of networks between people to personal agency. He 
looked at the difference between strong ties, for example when people are close 
friends, and weak ties, for example where they are merely acquaintances. Most 
people tend to have a group of close friends that are often also close friends with 
one another, and a few acquaintances who are unlikely to know each other. 
However, those acquaintances will have their own group of close friends. The 
‘strength of weak ties’ theory suggests that by giving access to a whole new group 
of tightly associated people, acquaintances can be a more valuable resource than 
close friends. Granovetter backed this up with empirical evidence from job seekers, 
where those using weak ties to find jobs tended to have a much shorter or no period 
of unemployment than those reliant on strong ties. In essence, an actor’s 
transformative potential and thus capability is enhanced or otherwise by the nature 
of the networks in which they are embedded.  
Koniordos (2005) identifies the importance of support provided by informal 
networks (‘close relatives, workmates, friends, ex-bosses, suppliers and even clients’) 
for people setting up small independent businesses in Greece. He suggests that it is 
not necessarily strong or weak ties that are more important, but all possible sources 
are used for gathering information, suppliers and clients, and that without such 
resources the independent businesses would be unlikely to become established – 
certainly no example of this was found.  
Based on the utility of networks for developing and maintaining business, 
relationships are often conceptualised as ‘social capital’ (Meagher, 2005).  Fafchamps 
and Minten (2002) find it a key concept when studying markets: 
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Understanding the role that social capital plays in market exchange is not just a 
playtoy for theorists, it is also crucial for policy, particularly for the design of 
institutions that support markets. To understand what functions these institutions 
must provide, it is useful to examine the role that relationships play in actual 
markets and the different channels through which they assist market exchange. 
(Ibid., p.2)  
The origins of ‘social capital’ as a term are linked to the works of various 
sociologists such as Pierre Bordieu and James Coleman, in addition to those more 
focused on the utility of networks specifically like Granovetter. Its usage has been 
particularly analysed since it become prominent in development theory from 1993 
onwards; the World Bank, for example, named social capital the ‘missing link’ thus 
far in development in a 1997 report (Harriss and De Renzio, 1997). Meagher (2005) 
warns against ‘the social capitalist paradigm’, suggesting that its restrictive 
conceptualisation can sometimes conceal more than it shows, with a particularly 
detrimental impact on studies of the informal economic sector in Africa. She argues 
that social capitalism tends to focus on the beneficial aspects of networks only, 
giving an “emphasis on the ability of social networks to provide an effective basis 
for economic development outside the framework of the state” (ibid., p.219). Not 
only can social ties in fact provide limitations in certain cases, she states, but 
reducing network observations to a simplistic description of weak and strong 
critically ignores finer-grained issues such as changing power relations. Nonetheless, 
social capital often features in analyses of market-based activities, often tied up with 
the notion of trust – such as in informal economic settings. 
Trust and social contracts 
Preda (2009) states that trust is “a fundamental condition of market transactions” 
(ibid., p.60). He finds that while institutional frameworks prevent malfeasance to 
some extent (by increasing the likely penalty and thus associated risk), trust is also 
created through networks of personal relationships which have their own “sets of 
tacit, as well as explicit rules, rights, and obligations, together with behavioural 
scripts” (ibid., p.60). These mechanisms based on social relationships become more 
fundamental where institutional frameworks are lacking, weak or inaccessible, such 
as in the informal economy. De Soto (2001), for example, describes how people 
operating in the ‘extralegal’ sector rely on informal systems of social contracts. 
The extralegal arrangements they cobbled together are explicit obligations between 
certain members of society to provide security for their property and activities. They 
represent combinations of rules selectively borrowed from the official legal system, 
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as hoc improvisations and customs brought from their places of origin or locally 
devised, and they are held together by a social contract supported by the community 
as a whole and enforced by authorities the community has selected. (ibid., p.90) 
In his study of Tanzanians in the African blackwood carving, or vinyago, market, 
Molony (2009) found that the most successful micro and small enterprises (MSEs) 
were those which developed the minimal levels of trust required for exchange to 
take place, despite a weak institutional context for creating trust through contracts:  
Trust and the need for direct, personal interaction through face-to-face contact — 
one of the most pervasive features of African MSE economies — emerge as a 
common theme across the case study industries and are likely to remain a crucial 
aspect of the way most MSE business is conducted. (Ibid., p.285)  
Fafchamps (1996) examined contract enforcement in Ghana. As a conceptual 
framework, he uses the work of North (1990) and others that identifies three 
different types of contract enforcement mechanisms: those based on guilt, those 
based on coercion (legitimate or illegitimate) and those based on repeated 
interaction. The last of these is associated with trust and reputation. His study of 
Ghanaian companies illustrates the importance of long-term, personalised 
friendships, with companies expressing “an overwhelming preference to do 
business with people they already know, even if it means dealing only with a few 
people” (Fafchamps, 1996, p.444). The firms identified this as the best way of 
minimising contract default, and equally the motivation for their own contract 
performance was to maintain their profitable, long-term relationships. 
Fafchamps’ observation links with the notion of clientisation, which examines 
relationships developed through market-based transactions, rather than pre-existing 
relationships that help to shape the nature of transactions. Despite higher profits 
being available, actors in a market often prefer to deal with an established client, 
even in highly money-orientated markets such as commodity trading (Abolafia, 
1998).   
Fafchamps (2004) has also examined the importance of relationships to agricultural 
traders in Madagascar. His research shows that more successful traders have 
stronger and more relationships. In a survey, 62% of small traders, 73% of medium-
sized traders and 77% of large traders felt that personal reputation and relationships 
were very important to their business. Fafchamps presents six main roles that 
relationships play in trade: business training and start-up support; information 
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sharing; regularity of demand and supply; credit; prevention of contractual 
breaches, and; risk sharing.     
3.2 Markets as socio-technical sssemblages 
Taking the embeddedness idea further, or perhaps as Granovetter intended (Callon, 
1998), leads to the conceptualisation of markets as social constructs. This term 
recognises the importance of recurrent interactions between actors in creating social 
structure and applies it to markets (Swedberg, 1994). In essence, a market is a social 
construct because it is created out of repeated social interactions, with the market 
continuously being shaped by the nature and meaning of those interactions. 
However, the use of social construction theory allows limited consideration of 
technical, non-human aspects of markets.  
Latour’s work (1992, 2005) highlights how objects are often seen as ‘dark matter’, 
presumed to have no active role in social matters, yet the capabilities of technologies 
and meanings people associate with them in fact have an important role in how 
events unfold. This is particularly so when considering the design, manufacturing 
and exchange of seemingly passive objects as saleable and usable goods. Actor-
network theory and science and technology studies with their ‘insistence on 
assemblages of humans and non-humans’ (Çalışkan and Callon (2010) p.9) have 
helped fill this void, leading to a new conceptualisation of markets as socio-technical 
‘agencements’, usually translated as assemblages or arrangements.  
Actor-network theory (ANT) was primarily developed by Michel Callon and Bruno 
Latour through their work within science and technology studies, such as writings 
on how an actor-network approach can explain the emergence of macro-actors 
(Callon and Latour, 1981). An ‘actor-network’ has a similar meaning to a socio-
technical assemblage, whereby an entity with agency is not simply one human, 
rather it is the collective embodiment of human and non-human actors defined by 
the numerous interactions taking place with other human and non-human actors. It 
is not a static, permanent state where the networks can be assimilated to social ties. 
Instead, the interactions are brief moments of encounter, or ‘associations’ (Latour, 
2005). The entities in questions are not cold, stable and independent humans with 
equally cold, stable links to others, but hot and unstable configurations, with their 
constant, dynamic flow of associations with others creating their agency. MacKenzie 
(2009b) notes the different use of ‘actor’ in actor-network theory compared to 
mainstream sociology. In sociology it is generally taken to denote a human being, 
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whereas in actor-network theory non-humans are also considered as actors, an 
aspect which has sometimes been controversial amongst sociologists.  
Callon (2008) uses the term ‘agencement’ to describe actor-networks made up of 
physical forms, including objects, virtual systems and human beings, that have 
certain capabilities of action according to their combined capacities. Çalışkan and 
Callon (2010) note that use of the French term provides a sense of the specific 
configuration providing the capacity to act, through it sharing the same root as 
‘agency’. In essence, different configurations of objects, virtual systems and humans 
will produce different levels of agency. Çalışkan and Callon provide examples such 
as a pilot flying an aeroplane or an astronomer locating and studying new galaxies. 
MacKenzie (2009b) gives the example of a human with a calculator undertaking 
very different actions to someone without one. Another example is how access to 
information and communication technologies (ICT) influences the abilities and 
actions of market participants. Molony (2009) found that some blackwood carving 
traders in Tanzania who have access to ICT and are able to use it effectively do so to 
maintain their international business relationships. 
Within the development sector, social capital, whereby humans have agency 
through their connectivity with other humans, is seen as both a potential input if an 
intervention draws on a target group’s perceived social capital, and also as a 
possible outcome. An example of how provision of electricity access can contribute 
to social capital is provided in the PISCES project on bioenergy initiatives: 
[…] access to modern energy itself is […] shown to play a major role in enabling 
social interactions after dark and establishing new social opportunities and as such 
also acts to build social capital. Street lighting in the cases involving electrification 
show this most clearly. (Practical Action Consulting (2009) p.33) 
This example shows the relevance of actor-network theory, whereby agency is 
created through the assemblage or network of human and non-human actors and 
the interactions taking place between them. It goes beyond the human-only notion 
of social capital and demonstrates the significance of material aspects of 
configurations.  
As well as being able to describe market ‘actors’ as socio-technical assemblages, the 
market system in its entirety can also be described as such. 
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Economisation and performativity  
An important aspect of seeing the market and market actors as socio-technical 
assemblages is that it allows tools, terms and techniques derived from economics, 
the main descriptor of market activities, to be integrated into those entities and 
recognised as contributing to their agency. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) describe this 
as the ‘performativity’ of economics and highlight the importance of allowing “the 
reflexive or theoretical activity increasingly involved in market design” (ibid., p.4) 
to be incorporated into the analysis of marketisation, something that can be 
restricted within other conceptualisations. The ‘economics’ in question includes 
both academic economics and “the array of knowledges and the know-how on 
markets that non-academic agents elaborate and employ” (ibid., p.4). Callon 
summarises this as ‘economics at large’ (Callon (2007) p.330). 
Polanyi (1957) again helped lay the foundations of this new area of thought, 
economic performativity, by linking up economic theories, such as those of British 
economist Ricardo’s, with subsequent economic practice. Çalışkan and Callon (2009) 
discuss how rather than having an intrinsic ‘economic’ quality, things such as 
‘behaviours, organisations, institutions and objects’ that are labelled as economic are 
in fact rendered so by ‘processes of economisation’. Equally markets are rendered 
economic by the study and application of economic theory related to markets: 
“Markets are both the objects and the products of research” (Callon et al. (2007) p.5). 
This process can be termed more generally as ‘performativity’ since, as Callon (1998) 
posits in earlier work: 
[…] economics, in the broad sense of the term, performs, shapes and formats the 
economy, rather than observing how it functions. (ibid., p.2) 
As MacKenzie et al. (2007) describe, the concept of performativity originates from 
the British philosopher of language J. L. Austin (1962), who identified ‘performative 
utterances’ such as “I apologise” that enact the process through the saying of the 
statement. Various developments of the concept within sociology illustrated that 
wider conditions than simply the speaking of a statement also contribute to whether 
utterances are successfully perfomative or not. The performativity of discourse has 
been particularly prominent within gender studies, with Judith Butler (1990) as a 
key proponent of the theory that gendered identities are ‘performed’ partly through 
particular use of language. This focus on the power of narratives embodies a social 
constructivist approach. People’s identities become socially constructed through 
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how they talk and how they are talked about, rather than through any inherent 
characteristics (Paltridge, 2006).  
In Markets of Dispossession, for example, Elyachar (2005) particularly critiques the 
‘economisation’ and thus appropriation of the poor’s social networks when NGOs 
encourage newly framed ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ to render their relationships into 
‘economic’ resources. It highlights the extent to which ‘social’ networks become 
‘economised’. The term ‘actor-networks’ shows how crucial networks are seen to be 
in the creation of agency, and this is equally the case in the construction of economic 
actors. The economisation of social ties through market-based approaches and the 
impacts that has should be considered, as per Elyachar and others such as Dolan 
and Scott (2009). 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010) argue that the contributive work of ‘economics at large’ 
should be considered when analysing economic activities, including as a central 
part of any research into marketisation processes; they call it the ‘performativity’ 
programme. They also separate it from social constructivist approaches because of 
the application of the socio-technical assemblage concept described earlier. Some 
examples of the performativity of economics are more overt than others. MacKenzie 
(2006) provides the example of the Black-Scholes model, developed by the 
economists Black, Scholes and Merton. Through the widespread use of the same 
model amongst traders, patterns of prices were in fact shifted towards the model. In 
this way the market starts to respond in the way that it is modelled or conceived 
due to the influence of that model or conception, rather than due to any ‘naturally 
occurring’ movement towards a universal market form. It is equally seen in 
Çalışkan’s (2010) account of cotton farmers undertaking market exchanges with 
traders. Farmers ‘perform’ characteristics that they are assumed to have – such as 
ignorance and stupidity – as a mechanism for empowering themselves against the 
people they interact with.  
Çalışkan and Callon (2010) suggest that co-performation3 affects all stakeholders in 
the marketization process, with NGOs and international agencies specifically 
included, depending on the market under consideration. Much of the literature on 
performativity in markets relates to economic models used within financial markets, 
however. Although little covered in the literature, it is possible that use of euro-
centric (Njoh, 2006) or pure capitalist (Miller, 1997) market models as development 
                                                      
3 ‘Co-performation’ is used to acknowledge the collective endeavour of performativity. It cannot be attributed to 
the work of individual entities or bodies, but rather: “[…] it is collectives that innovate. In these collectives there 
is no point in opposing those who articulate statements to those who make them function.” (Callon (2007) p.334-
335) 
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tools also entails performativity and thus risks excluding more locally relevant 
market structure options. Elyachar’s (2005) critique of market-based development 
approaches in Cairo applying ‘western’ capitalist market principles seems to 
support this and sets the case for stepping back from a narrow perception of 
markets and their value basis. 
The discourse around ‘development’ as a concept can also be described as 
performative more generally. Smith (2009) highlights this in relation to technology 
for development: “Prevailing thought regarding development, technology and 
modernization shaped the way in which development practitioners perceived the 
world, and influenced the solutions they sought.” (Ibid., p.47). Mowles (2010) 
describes how: 
[…] the grids and frameworks currently in use in most [international] NGOs are 
abstractions from a rich hinterland of lived experience: they are simplifications, 
sometimes reductively so. They are representations of reality, but ones which can 
cover over the messy business of trying to square experience with theory. Rather 
than merely reflect experience, when taken up uncritically by staff in INGOs they 
actively shape reality, as the abstractions take on a life of their own. (Ibid., p.762) 
This phenomenon is similar to what post-development writers such as Sachs (1992), 
discussed in the previous chapter, have drawn attention to: how the language and 
tools of development perpetuate its practice. Crewe and Harrison (1998) provide 
direct critique of the simplistic dichotomy usually applied in development projects 
which splits those involved into “…developers and developing, donors and 
beneficiaries, rich and poor…” (Ibid., p.4). They argue that this in itself is 
detrimental, causing the idea to be continually reproduced or ‘performed’ through 
being a central underpinning of development programme design.  
Calculative agency and market devices 
In order for exchange to occur, buyers and sellers must have the ability to calculate 
what outcome they would find satisfactory. Callon (1998) describes two traditional 
views of how calculative agencies are produced: through cognitive psychology, or 
through cultural influence. While cognitive psychology is seen as too simplistic and 
to ignore the material tools needed for calculation, cultural influence is found 
lacking in explanation of differing calculative abilities and trends. Callon et al. (2007) 
term the pragmatic tools and systems that allow markets to function, in particular 
through configuring calculative capacities, as ‘market devices’ and suggest that this 
is an often overlooked area within social science. They define market devices as “a 
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simple way of referring to the material and discursive assemblages that intervene in 
the construction of markets” citing examples “from analytical tools to pricing 
models, from purchase settings to merchandising tools, from trading protocols to 
aggregate indicators” (ibid., p.2).  
‘Device’ is again a translation of a French word, this time ‘dispositif’ coined by 
Foucault and alternatively translated into ‘apparatus’. Foucault (1980) describes it as: 
[…] a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said 
as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself 
is the system of relations that can be established between these elements. (ibid., 
p.194) 
Much like the critique of social constructivism, Callon et al. (2007) stress the need to 
add material objects to this, showing that they act together with people and 
discursive elements to produce agency through their ‘compound’ capacities. Some 
examples studied in their book Market Devices include the tools used in financial 
markets, such as securities analysts’ reports and financial charts, consumer-focused 
devices such as merchandising techniques and supermarket shelving patterns, 
devices for information gathering such as focus groups and consumer tests, product 
qualification devices such as classification systems and standardisation for 
pharmaceutical products, and price-setting devices such as those used by cotton 
traders. This last example is based on Çalışkan’s (2010) research examining the 
construction of cotton prices through focussing on the large array of price-making 
devices evident across the global cotton value chain, all contributing to the final 
price realisation. 
These kinds of market devices can already be seen to be of importance to the 
development of markets for sustainable energy products. Systems of quality 
standards for both products and the processes associated with their manufacture 
and sale can be described as market devices, for example. Analysis of case study 
bioenergy initiatives in developing countries for a Policy Innovations Systems for 
Clean Energy Security (PISCES) project showed that product standards were a key 
ingredient in developing trust amongst consumers. Having applicable standards for 
manufacturing processes was also seen to be important and an absence of these 
made it difficult for sustainability criteria to be adhered to, a key issue for the 
bioenergy sector.  
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Power struggles 
Through his multi-sited global ethnography of cotton and how it is traded, Çalışkan 
(2010) concludes that the most appropriate conceptualisation of markets is as ‘fields 
of power’. His work includes analysis of cotton trades in rural villages in Turkey 
and Egypt, where Çalışkan finds that notions of power are a key factor in producing 
differing perspectives of exchange from the farmers’ versus the traders’ vantage 
point. He therefore highlights an “…urgent need to study relations of 
economization as fields of power made and maintained by various human and 
nonhuman agents that confront each other on asymmetrical platforms.” (Ibid., 
p.188). Çalışkan particularly highlights the importance of knowledge to cotton 
traders and the resulting focus put on activities such as networking in order to 
obtain knowledge. He also conceptualises pricing models as prosthetic tools 
deployed by traders to enhance their agency. On the other side of the global market, 
cotton farmers have limited access to knowledge of wider market activities and are 
excluded from market devices such as the pricing tools, resulting in their 
marginalisation in market exchange processes. Power asymmetries can thus be seen 
in the relationships between farmers, local merchants and global traders.  
Foucault was a founding analyst of the relationship between power and knowledge, 
primarily focussing on the emergence of societal institutions such as prisons and 
mental health facilities. He particularly drew attention to the role of discourse in 
maintaining the power and control of the institutions whose history in society he 
documented. For example, in Madness and Civiliation: A History of Insanity in the Age 
of Reason (Foucault, 1967) he traces the emergence of the medicalised discourse 
which now shapes madness. This ‘expert discourse’ is perpetuated by a network of 
healthcare professionals and their associated institutions and can only be countered 
with competing expert discourses, thus giving experts in the field the power to 
shape attitudes more widely and restrict other ways of thinking as a form of control. 
As Lukes (2005) summarises: 
[…] the power of domination requires, where it is not coercive, the compliance of 
willing subjects. Foucault’s massively influential work purports to address the rich 
topic of the mechanisms by which that compliance is secured. (ibid., p.88) 
Lukes describes how Foucault’s analysis of power goes beyond formal or open 
conflicts. Foucault argued that examining only the repressive nature and examples 
of power leads to a very limited analysis and he instead advocated seeing power as 
productive and not held by elites, but acting through all individuals that operate in 
fields influenced by elites. In this way individuals are constituted as both the 
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products and vehicles of power, with power being anchored in the daily 
‘micropractices’ of social life. Where individuals fight against power, the margins of 
power are set, but where subjects are susceptible to it they are shaped by it, 
responding to and perpetuating ‘norms’ of behaviour and regimes of truth, thus 
leading to unchallenged and covert control and regulation.  
This explanation of power and Çalışkan’s (2010) recognition of power assymmetries 
in market activities link us back to the importance of considering the performativity 
of processes of ‘economisation’ and ‘marketisation’. It shows that the ‘macro-actors’ 
of market-making activities have greater control over market discourses and the 
emergence of market devices, leading to their inevitable empowerment in ‘economic’ 
contexts. It is again also relevant to the notion of ‘development’ and the post-
development argument that ‘development experts’ hold power and control over the 
development industry and are able to shape and perpetuate its existence. Meagher 
(2005), for example, advocates for power issues to be considered when examining 
relationships in the context of development initiatives and social capital.  
In practice, power struggles can be seen through the role of donors and their 
relationships with NGOs and recipients. Reith (2010) focuses on the movement of 
money through the aid chain to show the power imbalances between donors and 
NGOs that are caused by unequal access to capital. Based on the specific case of a 
small British NGO working in Uganda, she demonstrates how money is valued 
differently by each, with the NGO seeing it ‘as essential for their ability to work 
towards their missions and ultimate survival’ and the donors valuing it for ‘the 
ability it gives them to influence development in the direction of their own agendas’ 
(ibid., p.447). In their book on studying African NGOs, Igoe and Kelsall (2005) 
discuss the ‘knowledge’ surrounding NGOs and the organisations’ own necessary 
roles in creating it. They again describe how the problem is reinforced by the 
pressure applied by donors that need to see justification for and efficacy of NGO 
approaches. These examples identify a need to challenge not only the success of 
development programmes in achieving their aims, but their broader ontological 
underpinnings associated with power and value (Practical Action Consulting, 2009).  
Black boxes 
The term ‘black box’ is a useful concept that appears in Latour and Callon’s writings 
in science and technology studies and actor-network theory. It helps to describe 
how actors gain power through expert discourses, technologies and practices. In 
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Unscrewing the Big Leviathan (Callon and Latour, 1981), black boxes are shown to be 
a key part of the process by which macro-actors emerge in society.  
A black box contains that which no longer needs to be reconsidered, those things 
whose contents have become a matter of indifference. The more elements one can 
place in black boxes – modes of thoughts, habits, forces and objects – the broader the 
construction one can raise. (ibid., p.285)  
In this way, the creation of black boxes is what allows micro-actors to gain power 
and grow into macro-actors. In Science in Action (Latour, 1987) the term is 
introduced as a reference to pieces of machinery or sets of commands that have 
become too complex to explain, resorting to a simple focus on what goes in and 
comes out (inputs and outputs) of the black box. The double helix shape of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and a computer developed to model the shape of 
DNA on a screen are given as examples. Despite both this ‘fact’ of DNA shape and 
this piece of electronic equipment having long, complex and often controversial 
histories, they have become stabilised as cold ‘black boxes’ that are unproblematic. 
Latour and Callon see black boxes remaining closed within sociological analyses. By 
comparison MacKenzie (2009b) highlights how analytical techniques derived from 
science and technology studies show the importance of opening up normally 
opaque black boxes: “to investigate the contents, normally hidden, of successful 
procedures and successful machines” (ibid., p.34).  
Various procedures developed within carbon finance frameworks provide examples 
of ‘black-boxing’ that are particularly relevant here. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, under the UN’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and various 
voluntary carbon offsetting frameworks, theoretical reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions can be commoditised for monetary exchange as ‘offsets’ in the global 
carbon markets. In order to commoditise reductions in different greenhouse gases, a 
common benchmark of the estimated 100-year global warming potential (GWP) of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) has become the reference point. All other greenhouse gases 
accepted within carbon offsetting frameworks are thus translated into the unit 
‘tonnes of CO2 equivalent’, or tCO2e (Bumpus, 2011). GWP is measured through a 
combination of measurements and models of atmospheric and terrestrial carbon 
exchanges and long-term climatic impacts of gases. Although there have been 
varied estimations of and revisions to the GWP of different greenhouse gases in 
relation to CO2 over time, the particular figures that were published by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996) when carbon finance 
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systems emerged in the 1990s continue to be used. Already a black box has emerged 
which is rarely delved into, let alone contested, by anyone other than the experts 
that created it (MacKenzie, 2009a).  
In order to calculate reductions made by a particular project, such as the 
deployment of renewable energy technology, the tCO2e that would have been 
emitted under a hypothetical ‘business as usual’ baseline scenario must first be 
calculated. Then the lower level of greenhouse gas emissions produced through use 
of the cleaner technology is calculated and the number of ‘offsets’ generated is the 
difference between these two scenarios over time. As Bumpus (2011) clearly 
explains, the materiality of technologies being deployed and their local ‘socionatural 
context’ contribute greatly to whether the carbon reductions are able to be 
commoditised or not. The problem of measurement ends up selecting those project 
types that are easier to measure. This partly explains the relatively late recent entry 
of cookstove projects, for example, into the world of carbon finance. On the other 
hand, Bumpus also posits that the need to engage local stakeholders to help solve 
the problem of monitoring the use of cookstoves (crucial for verifying the 
generation of offsets) reduces some of the assymetries in “power and bargaining 
positions between northern carbon capitalists and southern NGOs or groups in need 
of finance for their development projects” (ibid., p.629). 
The market devices developed for framing and formatting greenhouse gases as 
carbon offsets are clearly highly complex and the black boxes that have emerged 
have given power to particular ‘macro-actors’ that created them. However, they also 
allow environmental pollution to be commoditised and thus absorbed and 
responded to within capitalist systems that might otherwise exclude the 
environment from economic valuations, providing calculative tools to do this. 
3.3 Marketisation research agenda 
Based on the conceptualisation of markets and market actors as ‘socio-technical 
assemblages’ and the notions of performativity, market devices and power, Çalışkan 
and Callon (2010) identify the need for an associated study of ‘marketisation’, a term 
used to describe “…the entirety of efforts aimed at describing, analysing and 
making intelligible the shape, constitution and dynamics of a market socio-technical 
arrangement” (ibid., p.3). To help frame the research agenda, they provide further 
conceptual basis by outlining three market characteristics. These are similar to those 
cited previously from Carruthers and Babb (2000) but incorporate the material and 
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technical aspects of markets, in addition to power considerations, in order to 
provide a more comprehensive picture: 
1 Markets organize the conception, production and circulation of goods, as well as 
the voluntary transfer of some sorts of property rights attached to them. These 
transfers involve a monetary compensation which seals the goods’ attachment to 
their new owners. 
2 A market is an arrangement of heterogeneous constituents that deploys the 
following: rules and conventions; technical devices; metrological systems; logistical 
infrastructures; texts, discourses and narratives (on the pros and cons of 
competition, for example); technical and scientific knowledge (including social 
scientific methods), as well as the competencies and skills embodied in living 
beings. 
3 Markets delimit and construct a space of confrontation and power struggles. 
Multiple contradictory definitions and valuations of goods as well as agents 
oppose one another in markets until the terms of the transaction are peacefully 
determined by pricing mechanisms. (Çalışkan and Callon (2010) p.3) 
This three-part definition is used to show that despite markets taking many forms in 
practice, they all have some fundamental characteristics in common. In order to 
study and understand the diversity of markets, Çalışkan and Callon (ibid.) suggest 
five ‘frames’ which can be used to focus research towards the specific elements of 
markets that lead to their unique shaping. These are: 
1 Pacifying goods 
2 Marketizing agencies 
3 Market encounters 
4 Price-setting 
5 Market design and maintenance 
The pacification of goods and the nature of marketising agencies are described in 
more detail below, due to their particular relevance to this research.  
Pacification of goods for exchange 
Markets are not possible without generating and then reproducing a stark 
distinction between the ‘things’ to be valued and the ‘agencies’ capable of valuing 
them. (Çalışkan and Callon (2010) p.5)  
The first step of the emergence of a market construct is the creation of a product to 
be exchanged, around which process a market forms. Çalışkan and Callon (ibid.) 
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call this the pacification of goods, or ‘objectification’ – the work of making objects. 
This work is carried out both in the literal sense and in the framing sense. For 
example, innovation and development of new technologies leads to the physical 
creation of a new potential product, while numerous actors involved with the 
product in different ways confer multiple meanings and values on that product. 
This is not a simple, linear process however: product development and the 
emergence of meaning represent complex and continuous, dynamic, non-linear 
systems of interweaving technological and social processes. Using anthropology, in 
The Social Life of Things, Appadurai (1986) shows how commodities and humans are 
inter-twined in the processes of exchange and global circulation. Goods for 
exchange do not have to be physical and inert, however, but can cover a huge range 
of forms from knowledge and services to biological entities such as cells. 
Although the specific materiality of objects does apply certain constraints, goods do 
not have pre-defined meaning or values (Çalikan and Callon, 2009). In Callon’s 
terms (2002), we can describe the processes of trying to fix these and thereby 
stabilise an object for exchange as ‘qualification’ and ‘requalification’, whereby the 
list of qualities attached to goods are repeatedly “attributed, stabilized, objectified 
and arranged” (ibid., p.199). An important part of the qualification process is the 
initial ‘problematisation’ (Cross, 2013). ‘Problématisation’ was first used by Foucault 
in discussions about the history of thought (Rabinow and Rose, 2003). In an applied 
use of the term, technology is developed in response to a highlighted ‘problem’ that 
frames the emergent technological solution. What problem is perceived and drawn 
attention to that a new product can solve? In their illustration of the social 
construction of technology through the example of the bicycle, Pinch and Bijker 
(1987) highlight the various problems presented and then ‘solved’ by different 
variations of what finally evolved as the bicycle. They show that there are numerous 
problems that might be identified, yet depending on the social group being 
considered with regards to the technology and the meanings that they associate 
with it, certain problems come to the forefront as the problem(s) to be solved. For 
instance, the perceived function of the bicycle varied from sport to transport, and 
the issues to be solved with earlier designs varied along with the perceived function, 
ranging from a desire for increased speed to demand for increased safety and 
reduced vibrations from cobbled streets.  
Alongside problematisation and the presentation of an object as a solution, there are 
numerous ways in which the product and its value is further stabilised. These 
qualification processes often involve numerous market devices, from 
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standardisation and quality frameworks that lead to consistent products and quality 
assurance labels, to packaging and marketing materials, to contracts for the 
longevity or replacement of the product through warranty schemes. Successful 
application of market devices can help increase the perceived value of a product for 
sellers and buyers. Both sides of the market exchange also draw on price-setting 
devices that help translate value into monetary terms, named ‘valorimeters’ by 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010). An example is the classic ‘cost + margins’ formula (ibid., 
p.18). Price construction is part of a negotiation process, which is momentarily 
resolved at the point of exchange.  
Marketizing agencies and the creation of entrepreneurs 
A multiplicity and diversity of actors compete to participate in defining goods and 
valuing them. (Çalışkan and Callon (2010) p.8) 
These actors come together to create a market socio-technical assemblage around a 
specific product, and indeed each actor can be conceptualised as a socio-technical 
assemblage as well as constituting a part of the overall market socio-technical 
assemblage. Since they have ‘marketising agency’ they will be referred to here as 
‘marketisation actors’. Although the list of those involved in any one market may be 
huge, they suggest that studies of marketisation cases should start by identifying 
some of the relevant stakeholders. NGOs are included in Çalışkan and Callon’s list 
of as one of the “well known forces that set markets in motion” (ibid., p.8). They cite 
Elyachar’s (2005) ethnographic work on micro-entrepreneurship development 
programmes in Cairo in the 1990s as one example of development intermediaries 
being analysed as marketisation actors.  
The entrepreneurship approach is being seen increasingly commonly in 
development approaches, as discussed in the previous chapter. It involves 
development intermediaries supporting local entrepreneurs to become economic 
actors within market chains, ‘economising’ them through enabling their acquisition 
of ‘the competencies and skills’ which Çalışkan and Callon (2010) describe as a 
constituent of effectively functioning markets. Once the ‘entrepreneurs’ have been 
endowed with the necessary market tools, they can render their own activities, tools 
and networks ‘economic’ and become actors of marketisation themselves.  
If some marketisation actors are training ‘entrepreneurs,’ it seems useful to consider 
further the history and application of this term and particularly how it relates both 
to African contexts and to the field of international development. Hart (2000), in his 
anthropological work on the Ghanaian Frafra and their relationship with money, 
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notes that: “The term ‘entrepreneur’ is used in social science and history to denote a 
bewildering variety of types” (Ibid., p.104). This includes its wide use within 
anthropology to describe anyone who does something novel to generate money; 
within this definition he identifies many of his research subjects within the informal, 
and often illegal, economy of the Frafra community as exhibiting entrepreneurial 
characteristics.  
Roy and Wheeler (2006) found that entrepreneurship in West Africa seemed to 
derive mostly from necessity and a lack of alternatives. “In UFWA [Urban French 
West Africa], the basic physiological and safety needs of many of the poor are 
neither adequately met nor secure. Thus the primary motivation of most micro-
entrepreneurs whom we interviewed, particularly the poorest, was first to provide 
for their own physiological needs and those of their family, and then to provide a 
home (or at the very least roof) and security for the household.” By contrast, in 
industrialised countries where basic needs are already met, entrepreneurship has 
been found to be motivated by higher-order needs such as self-esteem and self-
realisation (Mulvehill, 2003). 
Callon (1998) reminds us that through literal translation of the term, an 
entrepreneur can be described as a person who creates profit ‘from being between 
others’. He cites Burt’s (1993) work on entrepreneurs using structural holes within 
networks as a business opportunity: a lack of existing connectivity between entities 
is an opportunity for brokerage. This builds on Granovetter’s (1982) theory of ‘the 
strength of weak ties’.  
Hart (2000) highlights that the classical definition is associated with the creation of 
enterprises that combine the factors of production (land, labour, capital, technology). 
This draws from Schumpeter’s (1934) identification of entrepreneurial innovation as 
a main factor in economic development, leading to the term ‘Schumpeterian 
entrepreneur’. This does suggest that there may be other types of entrepreneur too, 
but in general neither these nor a more general definition have been forthcoming. 
Despite entrepreneurship’s increasingly accepted pivotal role in a market economy, 
therefore, the questions of who is an entrepreneur and what does their 
entrepreneurship entail remain unanswered (Hébert and Link, 2009). 
Interestingly, Schumpeter’s conception of entrepreneurs identifies them as 
individuals of ‘supernormal ability and ambition’ (cited in Preda (2009) p.80), able 
to generate trust through their charisma. Preda (ibid.) suggests, however, that this is 
only relevant within legitimate and well-structured exchange where marketing and 
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advertising devices play an important role. In less formal economic activity, by 
contrast, entrepreneurs are likely to rely on existing social networks to find business 
opportunities as seen in Hart’s (1973) analysis of the Frafra in Ghana .  
Davidsson (2004) provides a useful overview of the varying definitions of 
entrepreneurship and suggests that the term should be restricted to market-relevant 
contexts, so that entrepreneurship entails “…the introduction of new economic 
activity that leads to change in the marketplace” (ibid., p.8). A key aspect here is 
‘new’, which could range from offering a new product or a new package of a pre-
existing product, to adoption of a new business model or entry of a new competitor 
or start-up into a market. Since this research focuses on relatively new products and 
encouraging new competitors to provide them, it could perhaps give validity to 
development intermediaries referring to the individuals they support as 
‘entrepreneurs’. It also makes the process by which these entrepreneurs are 
identified and picked out for support of particular interest. Are the development 
intermediaries looking for certain characteristics?  And what entrepreneurial aspects 
might they subsequently demonstrate? 
Actors and agents 
In the literature reviewed, the terms ‘actor’ and ‘agent’ are both frequently used, 
often interchangeably. For example, an entrepreneur might be described as an 
economic actor or a market agent. Giddens (1984) defines an agent as an individual 
or entity with ‘transformative capacity’, thus using agency in reference to 
capabilities. Defining an agent in terms of their transformative capacity helps make 
further sense of the actor-network concept that the networks an agent is a member 
of actually constitute the agent’s characteristics. To avoid confusion with more 
colloquial uses of the term ‘agent’, however, the commonly used sociological word 
‘actor’ will be adhered to in the analysis work of this thesis.  
3.4 Chapter summary 
This chapter has outlined the conceptual framework that will be used to position 
this research within the study of marketisation processes. It describes Çalışkan and 
Callon’s (2010) call for a research programme for the study of markets, built on 
foundations of the socio-technical study of markets, including within economic 
sociology, anthropology of objects and science and technology studies.  
Although detailed ethnographic and other academic research into development 
interventions has been relatively prevalent over recent years, there appears to be 
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limited analysis specifically targeting development intermediaries as having a role 
in marketisation processes. Elyachar’s (2005) book Markets of Dispossession is one 
example and there has also been interest in the recruitment of local ‘entrepreneurs’ 
to serve ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP) markets and the harnessing of their social 
networks for selling products. 
This thesis will frame development intermediaries using market-based approaches 
as marketisation actors that actively configure and sometimes participate in markets 
for ‘humanitarian goods’. Conceptualising markets as socio-technical assemblages 
brings to the forefront notions such as market devices, black boxes and the 
pacification of goods for exchange. These terms and more of those described above 
will be used here as tools for the analysis of ethnographic data on marketisation 
processes.   
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4 Methodology 
This research uses ethnographic methods to gain insight into development 
intermediaries’ efforts to establish and grow rural markets for domestic-scale clean 
energy products in sub-Saharan Africa. Participant observation was undertaken for 
five continuous months each within two case study organisations in order to 
examine the design of their market-driven programmes and the socio-technical 
structure of the emerging markets. The research can be termed as inductive, which 
is typical for ethnography (O'Reilly, 2005). Mosse (2001) explains inductive research 
as: “an open-ended concern with project contexts and happenings rather than the 
modelling of expected change from known inputs” (ibid., p.164). While 
ethnographic research therefore does not start from a rigid hypothesis, a point 
highlighted by classical ethnographers such as Malinowski and Humphreys as one 
of its advantages (O'Reilly, 2005), it still requires guiding questions that draw from 
the existing literature and theory. These are outlined below, followed by further 
detailed discussion of the methods used to respond to them.  
4.1 Research questions  
The research and this thesis are shaped around four main research questions: 
1. What marketisation activities are the case study development 
intermediaries undertaking? 
This question has partly been answered through the creation of market maps that 
indicate how the development intermediaries sit within the markets for clean 
energy products that they are involved with. This follows Çalışkan and Callon’s 
(2010) recommendation that studies of marketisation cases should start by 
identifying relevant stakeholders, even if it is impossible to identify all of those 
involved. Market maps following Albu and Griffith’s (2005) template (Figure 14) 
were developed to illustrate the market actors and linkages, enabling environment 
and supporting service providers.  
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Figure 14: Market mapping template (Albu and Griffith, 2005) 
  
Chapter 5 starts the response to the first research question by identifying the initial 
‘findings’ of the research. The case studies are attended to independently of each 
other, describing the country contexts, the organisations and their market-based 
programmes in detail. The market mapping is used as a presentation tool to help 
demonstrate general observations of programme structure, in addition to being a 
preliminary analysis tool. The question is then more extensively answered within 
the responses to the other research questions, which form three ‘frames’ that guide 
the in-depth analysis. 
2. How are the clean energy products stabilised, qualified, valued and priced 
for exchange as market goods? 
For the second question, the clean energy products themselves are framed at the 
centre of the analysis and their stabilisation as ‘humanitarian goods’ is detailed. This 
is followed by an examination of the processes of qualification (in Callon’s sense of 
the term), valuation and pricing that occur through the application of cognitive and 
technical tools by various market actors. A particular focus is on the role of market 
devices that are used to add value to products, such as warranties and carbon credit 
methodologies, and the power dynamics that emerge through market actors’ 
differing levels of access to them.  
The question is responded to primarily in Chapter 6. From here onwards the 
analysis of the two case studies is combined in order to draw out common 
characteristics and contrasting features.  
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3. What processes render people into ‘local entrepreneurs’ and thus economic 
actors? 
The focus is then shifted to the ‘local entrepreneurs’ as the next frame of reference. 
The local entrepreneurs and dealers are those actors who are drawn into the 
development intermediaries’ marketisation programmes as participants in the 
distribution chains of clean energy products. Their recruitment, training and 
evaluation are specifically focused on, with the availability and utility of cognitive 
skills, social networks and technical tools analysed at each stage. Consideration is 
also given to beneficial and negative aspects of the ‘economisation’ of these local 
actors by external forces. Chapter 0 addresses this research question.  
4. What factors affect the agency and actions of the development 
intermediaries as marketisation actors? 
For the final question, the framing is shifted to the development intermediaries. The 
different demands put on them and their responses to roles as both development 
actors and marketisation actors are considered, with some comparative analysis 
made between the two case study organisations. The wider impacts of a shift 
towards market-based approaches within international development are also 
analysed and more practical lessons for policy and programme design sought. The 
question is responded to in Chapter 0.  
Chapter 0 brings out the main points identified in the analysis within each chapter 
and synthesises them into one set of conclusions. It also includes a discussion of the 
limitations of the research and recommended further research.  
4.2 Epistemological overview 
Undertaking participant observation within development-related organisations as a 
research method draws on the field of development anthropology. Gardner and 
Lewis (1996) note that the late 1980s and 1990s began to see development 
anthropology “treating institutions, political processes and ideologies as valid sites 
of ethnographic enquiry in themselves” (ibid., p.68). This thesis examines the role of 
development intermediaries in helping facilitate markets for domestic-scale clean 
energy technologies. The aim is not to add to the critique of development as an 
industry or academic field, but rather to analyse the role of different actors and 
processes in market-building efforts.  
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The boundaries of this research varied according to the different levels of analysis. 
As described by Geertz (1973), ethnography is inherently microscopic. Although the 
participant observation took place within a fairly limited spatial area at the ‘micro 
level’, however, the research still needed to take into account macro-level influences 
(Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, 1981) such as international carbon finance frameworks, 
for example. The research was also inevitably bounded by time. Blaikie (2010) terms 
short-term, ‘snap-shot’ research as ‘cross-sectional’, meaning that it is restricted to 
the present time, as opposed to ‘longitudinal’ (extended over a period of time). 
Ideally, the fieldwork period would have been long enough to bring a longitudinal 
aspect to this study, but the five-month timeframe available for each case study is 
acknowledged as a limitation. It was not possible to address specifically 
longitudinal questions such as ‘are the programmes successful over time?’ 
The research is based on two case studies. Some suggest that case studies should be 
chosen with the aim of making generalisations (Gerring, 2004) but this is not an 
intention here. Although development interventions often follow similar trends or 
‘paradigms’ in their design, two case studies cannot be representative of all market-
based development interventions involving small-scale energy products. This 
follows Hancké’s (2009) assertion that: “Case studies are not made for 
generalizations, should therefore not be used for that purpose, and intellectual 
honesty suggests that you simply avoid any reference to that possibility altogether.” 
(ibid., p.61) 
A further issue of generalisability is the broad geographical area covered: sub-
Saharan Africa. Keller (1991) notes that:  
Academics who express views on Africa always do so on the basis of limited 
empirical experience. They generalise according to the small corner of Africa with 
which they are familiar to a greater or lesser extent. In fact, nowhere does the 
temptation to succumb to such continent-wide generalisations appear to be as strong 
as it is for Africa. (Ibid., p.50)  
While it seems excessive to suggest that all academics base views on Africa on 
limited empirical evidence, Keller’s overall message is valid. The decision to focus 
on sub-Saharan Africa here is due to its common use as a geographical remit for the 
development intervention programmes being studied. Many of the programmes 
identified in Chapter 2 apply the same basic design across numerous sub-Saharan 
African countries. However, the analysis has again tried to avoid generalisations 
and keep the unique context of each case study location in mind, with Chapter 5 
describing these. It is acknowledged, though, that the depth of analysis in this 
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regard has been restricted by the research being so multi-sited (taking place in 
multiple locations across Kenya, Uganda and Malawi), so that it was not possible to 
thoroughly explore every context and its specific influence within the boundaries of 
this thesis.  
The two case studies for this research are: 
• Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) International’s Developing Energy 
Enterprises Project (DEEP), focusing on its implementation in Kenya and Uganda 
• SolarAid’s social enterprise SunnyMoney, focusing on its implementation in Malawi 
The case studies are presented fully in the following chapters; how the number of 
cases was chosen and the process of case selection are described in Appendix A. 
They were essentially self-selected on the basis of suitability and accessibility, but 
there were some unintended yet interesting contrasts and similarities between the 
two cases that subsequently benefited the analysis: 
• GVEP International is a charitable organisation, whilst SunnyMoney is a social 
enterprise registered as a for-profit business – albeit one owned by a charitable 
organisation (SolarAid) and with a socially motivated agenda. This contrast between 
the two case studies allowed for a greater breadth of observation of different 
organisational set-ups across the development and business spectrum.  
• Both organisations are headquartered in the UK, a factor that was probably 
instrumental in being able to gain access to them through existing connections and 
visits to their London offices, and useful for ongoing contact following the 
participant observation periods.  
• All three of the countries of focus are ex-British colonies, useful from a practical 
point of view due to English being widely spoken.  
A more detailed description of participant observation is also provided in Appendix 
A. My participant role within both organisations was ultimately akin to being an 
unpaid ‘intern’. When with GVEP International, I was specifically tasked with 
supporting the new Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, a position that gave me 
access to their monitoring data and facilitated direct observation of the collection 
process. It also provided a useful reason for visits to the numerous ‘entrepreneurs’ 
that they supported as part of my data collection and checking activities.  
For SolarAid, I had several roles but the one that became most prominent was again 
supporting their collection of ‘social impact’ data. For this I specifically had to 
engage with some of the schools and market areas that they had been or were about 
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to sell solar lanterns in. Once again this gave me detailed access to certain aspects of 
their programme activities. The particular roles I undertook inevitably had an 
influence on the viewpoints I had of the organisations, but being able to observe 
more general day-to-day activities in the offices and on work trips helped broaden 
out the findings.    
4.3 Data collection 
A fundamental element of ethnography is data collection. Participant observation 
traditionally uses fieldnotes as the main means of recording data and these were 
certainly the primary tool for this research. Observations were recorded without too 
much pre-selection of what was important and what was not, although since it was 
impossible to record everything observed some level of selectiveness was inevitable. 
The first step for recording an activity was noting systematic characteristics, 
specifically time, location, people present and primary language used. The next step 
was to record the activity itself. Recording conversations was the most difficult 
aspect but seen as important both for subsequent analysis and for enriching the 
written analysis with conversational extracts. Conversations were therefore noted as 
fully as possible. A recording device was not used because it was felt that producing 
one would have reduced the natural feel of otherwise informal conversations, 
possibly producing a more guarded encounter.  
For conversations that involved local languages, I had to consider whether or not to 
engage a translator. For various reasons, however, the most practical solution was to 
allow the staff of the organisations to act as translators when necessary. Thankfully 
they always seemed willing to do this. Inevitably it meant that the translated 
versions I received may have been abbreviated and/or altered to some extent, but 
on the whole it felt that this was minimal and from the expressions of the people 
involved it was generally possible to verify that the translation was in the right vein 
at least. There was also never any particular reason to assume it would not be, as 
colleagues seemed perfectly willing to translate negative comments from people 
dissatisfied with their involvement with the organisations where necessary.  
One of the reasons for avoiding use of an independent translator was that it might 
have appeared as mistrust of my new colleagues. Maintaining good relations with 
them was felt to be more important to gaining a deep insight into the organisations 
than the benefits that may have been gained from using an independent translator. 
Furthermore, having a translator present would have added to the number of 
people present at each interaction. Like the point about using a recording device, it 
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was felt that this could create an increased level of unnaturalness compared to 
myself being the only ‘additional’ person. The third reason was that the research 
ended up involving conversations in a large range of languages, often at short notice, 
so that it would have been very complex to make sure that an appropriate translator 
was always found and made available at the right time.  
Obviously there were certain limitations to the approach, however, such as detailed 
discourse analysis becoming effectively impossible. In order to reflect the approach 
used, in the analysis chapters no direct quotations have been provided from non-
English conversations due to them only being heard second hand. I was also unable 
to talk to some people out of the presence of colleagues from the case study 
organisations. This is seen as a relatively minor limitation though, since I felt that I 
was seen as part of the organisations in any case – hence there was no reason for 
responses given to me to be any different to those given to the staff members.  
Fieldnotes were written as frequently as possible, either as the activity occurred or 
as soon after as possible. As highlighted by Hammersley and Akinson (1995) (p.176): 
“Most fieldworkers report that while they can train themselves to improve recall, 
the quality of their notes diminishes rapidly with the passage of time; the detail is 
quickly lost, and whole episodes can be forgotten or become irreparably muddled.” 
Due to the overt nature of the research, it generally felt acceptable to take notes 
during observation, but in some cases the activities I was carrying out on behalf of 
the organisations made simultaneous note-taking difficult. In these cases they were 
made as soon as possible thereafter. The initial fieldnotes were handwritten in 
notebooks and then type-written each evening or at the earliest opportunity, with 
any previously omitted observations added in.  
In addition to fieldnotes, other documents and artefacts were collected where 
relevant and available, such as training manuals and newspaper articles. I used a 
camera as frequently as possible for taking still photos, seeking permission 
beforehand. Many of these photos have been used for illustration in this thesis. 
Where the analysis has drawn on collected artefacts, these have been referenced as 
appropriate.  
Semi-structured interviews 
The participant observation included numerous informal conversations where I 
generally had the opportunity to ask questions at will. More formal semi-structured 
interviews were also used, primarily to engage with representatives of other 
organisations outside of the case studies. These were useful for finding out about 
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their perceptions of and interactions with the case study organisations, and detailed 
information about their own approaches. Semi-structured interviews were also 
undertaken with individual members of staff of each of the case study organisations 
in the country offices. They were conducted towards the end of each fieldwork 
period once knowledge gaps or issues needing clarification had been identified. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) note that combining participant observation with 
interviews allows the data from each to illuminate the other. 
The full list of interviews undertaken with external organisations has been provided 
in Appendix B. Each interview has been given a number that is used for reference 
within the analysis chapters where possible. However, in some cases this would 
have contravened confidentiality requirements, so for this reason not all direct and 
indirect quotations have been referenced. The interview list only includes the name 
of the organisation and the general job description of the person or people 
interviewed; no names of individuals are given. At the beginning of each interview 
every respondent was asked if the name of the organisation needed to be kept 
confidential or not. All responded that confidentiality was unnecessary, but where 
particularly sensitive issues are discussed the organisations have been kept 
anonymous by lack of specificity or use of a pseudonym (Agency A, Agency B etc.) 
In total, it is estimated that 40 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with 
respondents from outside of the case study organisations (as listed in Appendix B) 
and 28 with staff working directly for the organisations. These have not been 
itemised for anonymity purposes, but all semi-structured interviews are 
summarised by respondent type in Table 2 below. The total number is given as an 
estimate because in some cases it was hard to decide the boundary between an 
extended informal conversation and a semi-structured interview. Because of the 
nature of the participant observation, I often asked interview-type questions during 
encounters that had not specifically been arranged as ‘interviews’. Whenever I met 
DEEP entrepreneurs, for example, I asked them questions from a pre-determined 
list (provided in Appendix C) even though it was not possible to arrange more 
formal interviews with them. Even where an interview had purposely been 
arranged, the setting available to hold it in often determined the level of formality. 
Some were conducted during a Malawian trade fair next to the responding 
organisation’s stand, for example, whereas the majority were carried out at 
organisations’ own offices. The lengths of interviews varied from as short as half an 
hour in a couple of cases where an unforeseen interruption cut it short, to up to 
three hours or more. It often took longer when there was more than one respondent. 
 77 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews give some level of consistency between 
interviews in order to obtain comparable data, but at the same time still allow each 
interview to develop over its course (Wisker, 2001). The specific questions were 
formulated during the fieldwork period once the programme context had become 
familiar and varied according to the organisation or interviewee type. Examples of 
the core questions asked for some of the main types are given in Appendix C. 
Transcripts have not been provided for anonymity reasons.  
4.4 Data analysis  
All semi-structured interviews and key informal conversations are shown in Table 2. 
Where relevant the data was in some cases summarised into Excel spreadsheets in 
order to analyse further and generate basic quantitative data, such as the number of 
times similar key phrases or responses were mentioned. However, since this data 
was based on limited, convenience samples it is acknowledged that it is not 
necessarily representative, but simply attempts to illustrate some of the general 
trends amongst those I talked to.  
For the ethnographic data a ‘spiralling’ process (Silverman, 2005) was used to draw 
out common themes and start to respond to the set research questions. Spiralling 
involves repeatedly reviewing the collected data, initially to draw out more general 
observations but leading to increasingly specific ones with each iterative analysis. 
This included coding activities where particular themes were highlighted and data 
organised into those different themes. It was found that this was easier to do 
manually rather than using qualitative analysis software.   
The particular vantage point offered by the positioning of the participant 
observation inevitably led to a bounded primary data set. The coding and spiralling 
approach used for data analysis then led to key themes developing that were carried 
forward as the main findings presented in the following empirical chapters. This 
resulted in specific components of the market assemblages being singled out for 
detailed exploration, such as particular ‘market devices’ and specific types of 
market actor. The selection of these was therefore a product of the research 
methodology that was applied, rather than determined by deliberate pre-selection. 
The number of aspects focused on was also restricted by the necessity to rationalise 
the scope of analysis within the thesis. It is acknowledged, however, that there are 
numerous other important features of these markets that could merit from further 
research; several examples are identified within the concluding chapter.   
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Table 2: Key respondents engaged with during research 






DEEP management GVEP Semi-structured 
interviews 
7 
DEEP business mentors GVEP Semi-structured 
interviews 
8 
DEEP technical mentors GVEP Semi-structured 
interviews 
1 
DEEP entrepreneurs GVEP Informal 
conversation 
30 (groups 
counted as 1) 
SolarAid management SolarAid Semi-structured 
interviews 
4 
SolarAid staff SolarAid Semi-structured 
interviews 
8 
SunnyMoney entrepreneurs SolarAid Informal 
conversation 
4 







Health clinics – 5 
Schools – 6 
Individuals – 15  





Market traders in Karonga, northern 
Malawi 
SolarAid Trader survey 47 
School children SolarAid Homework study 116 in 2 schools 
Solar manufacturer / assembler / 





Cookstove manufacturer / assembler 





Briquette manufacturer / assembler / 





Development intermediary involved 
with clean energy products generally 




Carbon finance organisations Both Semi-structured 
interviews 
7 
Government agency Both Semi-structured 
interviews 
Kenya – 1 
                                                      
4 Because of the differing levels of formality, the encounters with corporate customers have been classified as 
semi-structured interviews, whereas the encounters with other bulk customers (e.g. schools, health centres, 
hospitals) have been classed as informal conversations. 
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Malawi – 2  
 
4.5 Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is a particularly important concept when using ethnographic methods 
(Fife, 2005). The researcher reflects on how their own actions during the research 
period and their broader background (e.g. education, nationality, ethnicity, previous 
work or research experiences) may have affected both the research findings and the 
analysis of those findings. This fits with O’Reilly’s (2005) definition of ethnography 
given above that states that ethnographic work must acknowledge the researcher’s 
own role. In fact, the researcher is such an inherent part of ethnographic research 
that they are often described as the ‘research instrument’ (ibid.). Ensuring reflexivity 
in the associated written work also allows others to take this into account when 
applying the lessons learnt or using the study for secondary analysis. 
Reflexivity related to personal subjectivity 
Although I tried to make the fieldnotes as objective as possible, the data collected is 
inevitably my own account of events that occurred. Furthermore, this effect is likely 
to have escalated when interpreting the observations during data analysis. As 
described by Wisker (2001) (p.178): “Your previous experience of observation and of 
observing something similar will affect how you ‘read’ situations and behaviours…”  
Fife (2005) describes reflexivity as the personal and professional position of the 
researcher and how this may have affected the research, analysis and conclusions. 
He suggests that good practice is to ensure your own awareness of any possible bias 
you may have and then to make the reader of the subsequent written work also 
aware of it, but without distracting too much from the main focus of the work. As 
DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) (p.94) describe: “We need to be aware of who we are, 
understand our biases as much as we can, and understand and interpret our 
interactions with the people we study.” In their ethnography of development 
organisations, Crewe and Harrison (1998) (p.19) also clearly advocate reflexivity: 
“Many would agree that it can be important to contextualise observations within 
one’s own personal and social history. While the novelist should leave much to the 
imagination of the reader, the ethnographer should leave as little as possible to 
guesswork.”  
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Reflexivity related to organisational positioning 
Another key aspect of reflexivity here is how involvement with an organisation 
influences an ethnographic account of that organisation. Although I theoretically 
acted as an independent researcher, I assumed active roles within the case study 
organisations and was therefore most likely seen as part of their ‘machinery’ by 
those associated with or affected by the programmes.   
David Mosse is one of the most extensively written sources on the relative benefits 
and disadvantages of undertaking anthropology from different positions within or 
without development-related organisations. He discusses, for example, the trade off 
between being an employee and enjoying access to internal workings of an 
organisation, versus having no constraint to your analysis when not under an 
organisation’s command or possible retribution (Mosse, 2001). 
Mosse’s work has helped highlight both how fieldwork relations shape writing, and 
how writing now alters relationships of the field. Mosse (2006) describes the 
controversy created by his book Cultivating Development that gives a detailed and 
often critical ethnographic account of his multi-sited work in the development field, 
mainly focussing on a DFID-funded agricultural project in western India. He 
circulated the manuscript for comments prior to the book’s publication and received 
many strong objections, including from previous colleagues who objected: “on the 
grounds that the book was unfair, biased, contained statements that were 
defamatory and would seriously damage the professional reputation of individuals 
and institutions, and would harm work among poor tribals in India” (ibid., p.935). 
He ultimately published the book without any significant amendments, however, 
because of it being a ‘true ethnographic account’, in the literal sense of the word, 
that made him feel morally obliged to publish it so that lessons could be learnt 
(Mosse, 2005). A side-effect was that it negatively impacted some of his 
relationships with former employers, colleagues and friends, and moreover may 
have affected the ability of other researchers to gain access to undertake similar 
work.  
Practical application of reflexivity 
The following discussion is an attempt to apply the lessons learnt above to this work, 
framed as responses to two key questions.  
To what extent did my presence as a female British university researcher affect how the work 
of the organisations was portrayed to me?  
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It is impossible to know definitively, but it did not appear that any of the 
organisation staff were consciously changing their normal practices because of my 
presence as a researcher. My particular research aims were relatively loosely 
defined and I was kept busy with the activities I was undertaking on behalf of the 
organisations; it therefore felt like I was seen primarily as an intern or volunteer. 
Both organisations had hosted such roles on numerous occasions previously so this 
seemed to help avoid colleagues feeling that I was there to scrutinise their work, 
something I had been concerned about in advance. The organisations also employed 
female graduates as permanent staff, so I have no reason to think I experienced any 
unusual moderation of behaviour on that account.  
What did clearly impact the work of the organisations was what I chose to do 
myself. I was undertaking activities that were part of the organisations’ overall 
work programmes: this is an inevitable and in fact essential feature of participant 
observation. How I chose to carry out tasks and the impression I gave of the 
organisations in doing them would become part of what I was analysing, if not at a 
detailed level then at least by the contribution made to their overall work and its 
perception by others. I would like to think that I was able to keep this in mind when 
observing because I felt I could generally separate what was happening anyway 
with the particular activities that I was organising or influencing, especially in the 
early stages of the research. However, I was a very active participant in some 
activities that later became particular features within the analysis. I hope that I have 
given an honest account of my integral part in making those activities happen 
where applicable. My own feelings as an ‘NGO worker’ rather than as a researcher 
also, I feel, helped enrich some of the analysis.    
Being an ‘outsider’ in the countries I was based in must have also had various 
impacts, not because of being a researcher but because of being a British ‘mzungu’ 
(Swahili for ‘white person’). It often seemed that for the staff I represented an 
association with senior management back in the UK or at the regional headquarters, 
less so for GVEP in Nairobi where there was already a greater presence of other 
Europeans and high-level managers, but certainly for the GVEP Kampala office and 
in Mzuzu for SolarAid. Things I was told by colleagues were sometimes geared 
around me being able to take a message back to ‘management’ in the Nairobi or UK 
offices and initiate changes as a result. I ended up feeling quite guilty that this was 
unlikely to be the case, at least certainly not in a direct fashion. Additionally, it is 
inevitable that some information might have been withheld or activities restricted in 
my presence, even if not overtly or consciously, on the same basis.  
 82 
For the entrepreneurs and customers I spoke with, it would have been hard for 
them to separate me from the organisations I was there with. My role as an 
‘independent researcher’ would most likely have been an unknown and certainly an 
irrelevant distinction, even if the interviewees were nominally told about it as part 
of the informed consent process. Again, information I received from them often felt 
shaped towards me being perceived as a communication tool to get feedback into 
the organisations. I would hear complaints about high prices or lack of larger 
systems for solar lantern customers, or frustrations with promised loans not coming 
to fruition for GVEP entrepreneurs. This will certainly have had a knock-on impact 
on the overall shape of the information set I was receiving. The other key impact of 
my background was my inability to speak any local languages and therefore 
reliance on staff from the organisations acting as translators.  
To what extent did my subsequent attachment to the organisations impact my ability to 
analyse their work objectively? 
I am aware that by the end of both research phases I felt part of the organisations 
and may have become more inclined to interpret and present their work positively 
to others. This was in part because of the gratitude I felt for having been allowed to 
undertake the research with them at all, and more significantly due to the continued 
support and openness that all of the staff showed me during my time there, with 
many of them becoming good friends. I was lucky, however, that in all honestly I 
was mostly impressed with the integrity of both organisations and their staff. There 
were often things that did not work out as planned, could have been done better or 
at least tried in different ways, or prioritisations given to things that seemed less 
important and other areas neglected, but there were never instances where I felt 
shocked or appalled by the approaches taken. 
Furthermore, both organisations asserted willingness to receive feedback regarding 
any constructive findings, positive and negative. They made it clear that they 
wanted to learn from hosting me as a researcher and expressed willingness for 
transparency and non-anonymity; therefore I have not felt restricted in instances 
where the analysis has been critical of aspects of their work. All critique was made 
on the basis of evidence collected and fully explained in both the thesis and with the 
organisations directly where appropriate.  
The openness aimed for at all levels within the organisations was seen in various 
ways. Managers at GVEP, for example, were honest about where financial 
irregularities had been uncovered during the early stages of the project. They had 
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taken action to resolve it and keep the donors informed of the situation and its quick 
resolution. The strong talk on tight financial control and the expectations made of 
individual staff given by the Financial Director at the Naivasha workshop was not 
for my benefit to give a squeaky clean impression of the organisation, but a clear 
part of trying to disseminate their stated ethos of rigorous transparency. Staff at 
SolarAid in Mzuzu were seen to work incredibly hard at times, particularly given 
limited pay for the non-permanent staff, yet equally were able to relax and enjoy 
themselves at other times, in the same way that staff from any office might do. For 
both organisations everything appeared to be done with the motivation of good 
intentions, alongside the degree of self-interest that is inevitable in everybody, not 
least myself. I do not think that people working in the field of ‘development’ should 
be expected to behave altruistically. 
Mosse (2005, 2006) discusses how he felt he had to be true to himself as an 
ethnographer despite knowing he was creating intense friction with prior colleagues 
and friends. Admittedly it was a relief to find that no huge exposés seemed 
necessary here. I hope, however, that I have given an honest account of the case 
studies observed. The aim is to at least remove the gloss that is so often spread 
across the websites and marketing material of development intermediaries, and 
indeed every organisation – all must market themselves to their stakeholders in 
order to perpetuate their existence. I also hope that my time with the organisations 
and the output from it will be seen by their staff as useful and fairly portrayed, and 
that it does not jeopardise their willingness (or that of other development 
intermediaries) to host further researchers on a similar basis.  
4.6 Ethical issues 
A basic self-assessment of ethical risks was carried out as per the research ethics 
policy of the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh. 
The research was made overt where possible, in that those clearly involved or 
affected by it were informed of its existence and purposes and asked to verbally 
give their informed consent. It is recognised, however, that achieving this was 
compromised by various factors, including difficulties in identifying those involved 
or affected in the first instance, and more generally the practicalities of describing 
my research to numerous people daily with whom I did not share a common 
language. Again, my colleagues within the organisations kindly helped with this.  
Due to these difficulties, the default approach in writing up this thesis has been to 
give anonymity to most individuals mentioned in the research. The exceptions have 
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been the DEEP and SunnyMoney entrepreneurs who expressed consent to be 
named. This is in order to be able to identify the same people in case further 
research might be possible in future. Anonymity of whole organisations was 
discussed with the relevant entities. In preliminary discussions the two case study 
organisations stated that they did not require confidentiality due to their 
transparency policies, but before submitting this thesis I sent them a summary of its 
main findings in order to check their continued willingness for non-anonymity.  
The reviewers (both managers from the organisations’ London HQs) commented 
that they felt the thesis to be a fair portrayal and in general agreed with the findings 
made. Their specific feedback led to some details being changed in order to improve 
accuracy and take confidentiality into account where this might have been 
jeopardised. One did question a particular part of the analysis that they felt came 
across as too accusatory and suggestive of dishonourable intentions. Since this had 
not been the aim of my writing, I amended the section in terms of the way it was 
written but so that the originally intended point was still made. I do not feel that 
this compromised the analysis in any way.  
Communication and transparency has been key for maintaining a good working 
relationship between me as an independent researcher and the development 
intermediaries as research subjects. For any subsequent articles for publication, 
anonymity or otherwise will be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
4.7 Limitations  
The limitations of the research design have been integrated in the discussion above 
and will be mitigated as far as possible with the measures identified, such as 
incorporating reflexivity. An extended discussion of the limitations and boundaries 
of the overall research is provided within the conclusions in Chapter 0. 
 !
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5 Case study overviews 
The first development intermediary that I undertook research with was the British 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) Global Village Energy Partnership (GVEP) 
International; the programme focused on was their Developing Energy Enterprises 
Project (DEEP). Participant observation was carried out in Kenya and Uganda over 
five months between October 2011 and February 2012. 
A second research phase was undertaken in Malawi over five months between 
March and August 2012. The organisation was again a British NGO, SolarAid; its 
new social enterprise ‘SunnyMoney’ that imports and sells pico-solar products was 
the specific focus of the research.  
This chapter provides a detailed overview of the case study organisations and their 
activities. It also describes the contexts within which the development 
intermediaries were working and my research was carried out. Through the 
discussion and presentation of four market maps (three for GVEP, one for SolarAid), 
the first research question is addressed:  
What marketisation activities are the case study development intermediaries 
undertaking? 
5.1 Case study 1: GVEP International’s Developing Energy 
Enterprises Project (DEEP) in Kenya and Uganda 
On 7th October 2011 I arrived at Nairobi airport and in a taxi negotiated the city’s 
infamous traffic to reach the neighbourhood of Kilimani, directly west of downtown. 
Sitting in the traffic I saw many large white four-wheel-drive vehicles, generally 
Toyotas, with various names of international NGOs written across the sides. It 
provided a clear reminder that Nairobi is the capital of development industry 
activities in eastern Africa, hosting the regional headquarters of many organisations 
including the United Nations (and various of its individual agencies such as UNEP 
and UN-Habitat), international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Oxfam, 
and countless regional and country-specific development related organisations. I 
was there to start my fieldwork with the British charity Global Village Energy 
Partnership (GVEP) International, which likewise has its Africa Regional Office in 
Nairobi.  
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GVEP is registered as a charity but it has a specifically business-based approach, 
working across Africa and the Caribbean with all of their programmes involving 
support of start-up or existing micro, small and medium-sized businesses that 
provide clean energy products and services in rural and peri-urban areas. From the 
moment I landed at Nairobi airport, businesses of a whole range of sizes could be 
seen everywhere: all of the services you would expect at the airport were present 
and being frequented, and the main highway into the city was unsurprisingly lined 
with kiosks, shops and offices. Even the vast amounts of produce arriving in trucks 
at the airport and being flown out in cargo planes and the holds of passenger flights 
illustrated Kenya’s strong export markets for coffee, tea and horticulture (flowers, 
fruit and vegetables). After being in the country a few days, these industries also 
became visible in trips beyond Nairobi. My first excursion with GVEP was to a 
training workshop on the shores of Lake Naivasha around two hours west of the 
capital, with the chartered bus taking us past rows and rows of large white 
polytunnels. My new colleagues explained that they were full of Kenya’s famous 
roses, mostly destined ultimately for the European cut flower markets that supplies 
stores such as Marks and Spencer. 
Existing business services specifically targeting small and medium-sized enterprises 
were also evident: large billboards on the roadside advertising “Diamond Bank – 
the best bank for SME lending” were just one example. Any concerns I had arrived 
with (as part of my readiness to extend critiques of the notion of ‘development’) that 
a small British NGO might be helping to ‘import capitalism’ into Kenya could be 
dismissed – simply looking around made it clear that trading systems had been 
present a long time.  
After an insightful introduction into the world of a development intermediary in 
Kenya, two months later, in December 2011, I left the country temporarily to spend 
two months at GVEP’s smaller Ugandan office in Kampala. Like Nairobi, I found a 
thriving city with many signs of a rapidly growing business environment, such as 
numerous large hi-tech office premises under construction. Kampala’s infamous 
extensive bustling markets, particularly for food and second hand clothing, were 
another reminder of the well-established presence of markets in the country, in this 
case in the very physical sense. Uganda’s main source of foreign exchange is coffee 
exports (Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012), with the country being the eleventh 
largest coffee producer and exporter in the world and second largest in Africa 
(second to Ethiopia) (International Coffee Organization, 2013). It therefore felt apt 
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that GVEP’s office was located in the administrative building of the Uganda Coffee 
Development Authority. 
Although the GVEP offices are based in the two capital cities that have just over 6% 
of the countries’ populations living in each (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 
2010, Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2012), I also spent a significant amount of the 
research time in peri-urban and rural areas while shadowing GVEP’s staff and 
meeting the ‘entrepreneurs’ they were supporting. I was particularly struck by the 
similarities between areas of rural Kenya and rural Uganda; a large part of my 
experience was in western Kenya (around Kisumu) and in eastern Uganda (around 
Jinja), which are neighbouring regions of similar topography. In fact, Kisumu and 
Naivasha province were originally included within the British protectorate of 
Uganda until they were transferred to Kenya in 1902 (Hornsby, 2012). The two 
countries also had various commonalities in ethnic history, including a 
predominance of Bantu-speaking people and a later arrival of Nilotic people such as 
the Luo (ibid.), although there were still considerable differences in the two 
countries’ overall histories.  
I observed much greater diversity within each country, particularly between 
western Kenya and the coastal region around Mombasa (Photo 1), another area that 
featured heavily in my fieldwork. This is probably unsurprising since once its 
borders were finalised, Kenya had became home to one of the most varied 
landscapes of any African country, including five different types of climatic zone, 
and populated by five distinct ethnic groups and over 40 smaller communities (ibid.)  
Photo 15: Photos of rural areas around Kisumu (left) and Mombasa (right) in Kenya, 
illustrating differences in topography and vegetation 
 
                                                      
5 All photos used in this thesis were taken by the author, except where a source is specifically cited.  
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For this reason the presentation of my analysis of GVEP’s work in Kenya and 
Uganda has not been separated along national boundaries. Instead, examples from 
different areas within the two countries have been used as applicable and the 
impact of national context highlighted where necessary. The overall country 
contexts within which my fieldwork was undertaken is also further described below 
in order to set the scene. 
5.2 Kenya 
When I arrived in Kenya the predominant issue in the domestic media was the 
increasing security concern relating to Kenya’s border with Somalia. Several tourists 
and foreign humanitarian aid workers had recently been kidnapped from Kenyan 
territory by suspected Somali pirates and/or militants, with a knock-on impact on 
the tourist industry. A few weeks after I arrived, the Kenyan government declared 
war on the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab and sent troops into neighbouring 
Somalia. Grenade attacks in Nairobi followed a week later with a similar attack in 
Mombasa in January 2012.  
The second major news story was the concern over whether the next general 
election, at that time planned for August and then December 2012 but later 
postponed until March 2013, would lead to civil violence again; the previous 
elections at the end of December 2007 had led to tribal clashes and over 1100 deaths 
(Hornsby, 2012). The current leaders of Kenya were Mwai Kibaki (Party of National 
Unity) as President and Raila Odinga (Orange Democratic Movement) as Prime 
Minister. These men originated from the two largest ethnic groups in Kenya: the 
Kikuyu and Luo tribes respectively, a factor at the heart of the post-election issues.     
Having been brought under British administration in 1895 when the East Africa 
Protectorate was established, Kenya gained independence in 1963 with a population 
of 8.6 million under the presidency of Jomo Kenyatta (Photo 2). It has retained a 
capitalist stance since and economically is seen as one of the relative successes of 
post-colonial Africa, having a rising middles class and strong performance in its 
predominantly privatised industries (Hornsby, 2012). By 2012 the population was 
estimated at 43 million (World Bank, 2013).  
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Photo 2: View of central Nairobi (left); statue of Jomo Kenyatta (right), October 2011  
 
Going beyond its apparent economic success, in 2012 Kenya ranked 145th in the 
UNDP’s Human Development Index with a score of 0.519, out of a total of 186 
countries in the index. The scores are out of a possible maximum of 1 and based on 
four indicators in three areas: life expectancy at birth to indicate health; mean years 
of schooling for adults and expected years of schooling for children, to indicate 
education, and; gross national income per capita, to indicate living standards 
(UNDP, 2013b). Of course this is just one indicator and is limited by the quality of 
data available (Jerven, 2013). It takes into account the non-economic issues of health 
and education, but can still be maligned for taking an income-based indicator as a 
proxy for living standards. It is widely acknowledged that while per capita GDP has 
risen in Kenya, disparity has grown between rich and poor and much of this is 
based on urban/rural divisions (although there has also been significant and swift 
growth in the number of urban poor, particularly youth) (Hornsby, 2012). Overall, 
however, Figure 15 shows that nearly 79% of Kenyan urban residents are in the 
highest wealth quintile, whilst just 6% of rural residents are. Conversely, only 0.5% 
of urban Kenyans are in the lowest wealth quintile, as opposed to 25% of rural 
dwellers.  
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Figure 15: Wealth quintiles in Kenya (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010) 
 
This wealth variation manifests itself in various ways, such as the relative building 
materials of houses: brick and concrete are the used in the majority of urban 
dwellings, and traditional constructions using wood and mud or dung are prevalent 
in rural areas. The country’s most recent Demographic and Health Survey, 
undertaken in 2008 to 2009, showed that just over 50% of both men and women 
living in rural areas who had been employed in the last 12 months worked in 
agriculture. Much of this was declared as ‘self-employed’ work or ‘employment by a 
family member’, indicating subsistence farming. By contrast, professional, technical 
or managerial work was the most common in urban areas (Kenya National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2010).  
As well as its exports in agricultural products, Kenya also has one of the strongest 
manufacturing sectors in the region and manufacturing contributed 11% of Kenya’s 
GDP in 2008 (ibid.) In terms of renewable energy, Kenya is a leader in 
manufacturing: the region’s first solar photovoltaic assembly facility was due to 
open in Naivasha shortly after I arrived in the country. The government is 
supportive of renewable energy installations, offering a feed-in-tariff for renewable 
electricity – another first in the region. All of the Kenyans I met who I talked with 
about GVEP and its focus on renewable energy were familiar with solar power, 
often commenting on their own or neighbours’ experience of it.  
Kenya has various rural electrification programmes established and governed by 
the Rural Electrification Authority, mainly focusing on providing electricity access 
to public facilities such as trading centres, health clinics and schools identified 
under its Rural Electrification Master Plan published in 2009 (Rural Electrification 
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Authority, 2013). The 2008/2009 Demographic and Health Survey (Kenya National 
Bureau of Statistics, 2010) found that 23% of Kenyan households had electricity 
connections, an increase from 16% at the time of the previous survey in 2003. 
However, whilst 66% of urban households were seen to have electricity access, the 
figure was only 8% for households in rural areas. Both Kenya and Uganda have 
featured within the top 10 countries worldwide in terms of absolute number of 
people without electricity access, as shown in Figure 16. 
Figure 16: Countries with the largest population without access to electricity, 2010 
(OECD and IEA, 2012) 
 
For cooking, 84% of Kenyan households use solid fuel (often referred to as 
traditional biomass), including coal, charcoal, wood, straw, shrubs and agricultural 
residues. This number increases to 97% in rural areas, where 83% use firewood. In 
urban areas, the most prevalent solid fuel is charcoal, used by 41% of households 
(Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). 
5.3 Uganda  
In 2012 Uganda reached a population of just over 36 million (World Bank, 2013). It 
ranked 161st in the Human Development Index, joint with Haiti, both scoring 0.456 
(UNDP, 2013b). Politically, at the time of my arrival Uganda was known for having 
one of the longest serving presidents in Africa, Yoweri Museveni of the National 
Resistance Movement. He has been in power since 1986, enabled by his party’s 
abolition of presidential term limits. With allegations of foul practice during the 
previous election in 2011 there had also been some associated civil unrest. It 
thankfully resulted in significantly fewer casualties than the Kenyan violence, but 
once again elections were a hot topic in the press. Uganda gained independence 
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from Great Britain in 1962 and suffered a turbulent political history, particularly 
through the renowned presidency of Idi Amin.  
During my research in Uganda, energy issues were also a prevalent topic for the 
media, for a number of reasons. Firstly, significant oil resources had been identified 
in the country in preceding years and there were ongoing legal disputes over the 
issuance of contracts for their extraction, with accusations of related government 
corruption. There were also huge concerns over environmental implications as the 
reserves were partly located under the country’s largest conservation area, 
Murchison Falls National Park. Secondly, at the start of 2012 the Ugandan 
government announced a reduction in electricity subsidies amounting to a 36% rise 
in bills for those with connections. Although it was naturally resulting in objections 
from many people who would be affected, others, such as ubiquitous political 
commentator Andrew Mwenda (2012), were arguing that the tariffs should be 
removed altogether due to the inequity of such large amounts of government 
funding being spent on subsidising a service available to very few Ugandans. 
Energy access is a particularly pertinent issue in Uganda with one of Africa’s lowest 
rates of household electricity access (Brew-Hammond, 2010). The last Demographic 
and Health Survey was conducted in 2011 and found that just 15% of Ugandan 
households had electricity connections overall, with this increasing to 55% in urban 
areas but reducing to 5% in rural areas. However, this had increased from 42% and 
less than 3% respectively at the time of the previous survey in 2006 (Uganda Bureau 
of Statistics, 2012). 
Figure 17 shows the percentage of Ugandan ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP) 
households with access to electricity in urban and rural areas. BOP500 denotes those 
with annual incomes below US$500 (in local purchasing power), BOP1000 is those 
between $500 and $1000, and so forth. The BOP characterisation is given an upper 
limit of $3,000 annual income. For the BOP500 and BOP1000 in rural areas of 
Uganda, Figure 17 shows that electricity access is close to zero percent. 
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Figure 17: Percentage of Ugandan households with access to electricity (Hammond et 
al., 2007) 
 
According to census data, solid fuel is used for cooking by 96% of households, with 
rates of 98% in rural areas and 85% in urban areas. As for Kenya, wood was the 
main cooking fuel in rural areas (85%) and charcoal in urban areas (68%). Although 
the wealth disparities are not quite as marked as in Kenya, there is still only 2% of 
the urban population in the lowest wealth quintile while 75% are in the highest, 
compared to just 10.6% of rural dwellers being in the wealthiest quintile (Uganda 
Bureau of Statistics, 2012).  
In both Kenya and Uganda, the typical cooking fire for rural areas is called a three-
stone fire, built out of three stones or bricks (or piles of bricks as in Photo 3 below) 
to balance a cooking pot on. I saw these in use in many households, both indoors 
and outdoors, generally being fed by a very careful placement of consistently sized 
wood in order to minimize fuel consumption. For urban cooking the predominant 
method is a charcoal stove. These can either be built into brick and concrete kitchen 
units, or are more commonly small stand-alone stoves made locally out of sheet 
metal. Because of their lack of any insulating material they are known to have very 
low thermal efficiency. Cooking on inefficient stoves and open fires has also been 
linked to respiratory problems through smoke inhalation, particularly when 
cooking is carried out indoors, since cooking fires emit “primarily carbon monoxide 
and small particles, but also nitrogen oxides, benzene, butadiene, formaldehyde, 
polyaromatic hydrocarbons and many other health-damaging chemicals” (WHO 
(2006) p.8). Women and children can end up being exposed to the equivalent of 
smoking two packets of cigarettes per day (ibid.) Recent research suggests that 
smoke inhalation during cooking “is the fourth worst risk factor for disease in 
developing countries, and causes four million premature deaths per year – 
exceeding deaths attributable to malaria” (GACC (2013) citing the Global Burden of 
Disease study 2012) and is linked to tens of millions of cases of related illnesses. 
Europe and with higher variance across measured countries. High access 
rates occur in Brazil, where coverage in BOP500 is 85%, and in Indonesia, 
with 82% in the same segment. 
Africa, in contrast, has severely depressed rates of access to electric-
ity. Gabon has the largest share of BOP500 households reporting access, 
at 54%. But only 16% of all BOP households in Sierra Leone have access 
to electricity, and less than 10% in Burkina Faso, Malawi, Rwanda, and 
Uganda. The situation is most extreme in Africa’s rural areas: the share 
of BOP households with access to electricity in rural areas is only a fifth 
that in urban areas. 
Bringing electricity to low-income communities involves inherent dif-
ficulties. But new solutions are emerging for at least some of the problems 
related to the BOP penalty (case study 7.3).
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Photo 3: Traditional three-stone wood fires for cooking in rural Uganda 
 
5.4 GVEP International 
It was in the context described above that I worked with GVEP’s teams based in 
Nairobi and Kampala. The Nairobi office was in a fairly unassuming building in the 
leafy suburbs of Kilimani to the west of downtown, at the end of a quiet tarmac 
road before it turned into a brief section of dirt track. Although there was little 
traffic, it seemed to be along a common cut-through for people walking to work 
after alighting from matatus on the nearby and extremely busy Ngong Road. The 
office was on the second floor and after climbing the bright white tiled stairs you 
came across the small reception desk. Opposite it, a glass cabinet hinted at GVEP’s 
core business, displaying various solar lights, ‘improved’ cookstoves, bags of and 
individual cooking fuel briquettes and some small bottles of different shades of nut 
and seed oils intended as biofuels. Most of the office was open plan with around ten 
staff in the main area, with a separate office for the Financial Director and his 
administrator and a similarly sized office smartly furnished for the overall Regional 
Director.   
Contrary to suggestions from other analyses of international development 
organisations (e.g. Crewe and Harrison (1998), Carr et al. (1998)6) the majority of the 
staff working in the Nairobi and Kampala offices were national citizens. Although 
four expatriates (three British and one Swiss) were currently based in the Nairobi 
                                                      
6 Carr et al. (1998) describe how in sub-Saharan Africa a quarter of overseas development assistance was being 
spent on technical assistance, with a large proportion of it being on ‘expatriate’ aid – at an average annual cost of 
US$300,000 to fund just one expatriate. 
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office working on other projects, they only represented around 20% of the total 
employees and none were in senior management roles. They were not working on 
the particular programme (DEEP) that I was there to research.  
In both the Nairobi and Kampala offices most people spoke proficient English, with 
English being the official language of communication. However, Swahili and 
Luganda were also spoken more informally between staff, and often those 
originating from the same areas used their local languages (e.g. Kikuyu and Luo in 
Kenya), provided that everyone participating in the conversation was conversant in 
it. Since I always undertook field visits with one or more members of GVEP staff, 
they kindly acted as my interpreters if they engaged in local dialect or Swahili / 
Luganda with the people we were visiting. The methodological reasoning for this 
has already been discussed in Chapter 0.  
GVEP International was first officially established at the 2002 World Summit for 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg as a partnership between the World 
Bank, UNDP and a large number of other development actors. GVEP started off as a 
trust fund under the auspices of the World Bank with a main role of promoting 
policy debates around energy access, and providing donor funds for related 
programmes. It was governed by a Partnership Board representing a wide array of 
stakeholders. In 2006, however, the partners decided to establish GVEP as a separate 
NGO. The UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) pledged core 
funding for 5 years and GVEP the charity was registered in the UK with an 
independent board of trustees. It began with a global remit for its programmes but 
the charity subsequently became focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean, 
employing around 85 staff across the London headquarters and its various country 
offices.  
In 2012, GVEP’s annual report indicated that its specific operations were now 
funded by a wide range of donors, with grant income totalling around £3.15 million 
in the financial year 2011/2012 (GVEP International, 2012a). From the outset of my 
research, it was clear that finances were extremely tightly controlled, both for 
operational and overhead costs. The in-office Financial Director was a strong 
character with very clear rules on issues such as reclaiming expenses, offering a 
system that had evidently been thoroughly scrutinised for any loopholes. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2012 puts Kenya and 
Uganda 139th and 130th out of 176 countries respectively, with scores of 27 and 29 out 
of a possible 100. These scores are based on perceptions of public sector corruption 
levels elucidated from a range of independent surveys (Transparency International, 
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2012). Both within the offices and more widely amongst people and in the national 
media, corruption cases or speculations of corruption were frequent topics of 
conversation.  
GVEP had previously been subject to one severe case where an individual managed 
to establish a system to illicitly transfer money out of GVEP accounts. Before it was 
uncovered, the motivation of other staff was seriously being affected as they 
suspected that something was awry but could not establish exactly what. When the 
discovery was made, the individual was dismissed. The financial managers 
undertook a complete audit of the project and GVEP as an organisation and invoked 
the much-tightened controls now apparent. The money was repaid and the issue 
was fully aired to the donors who were satisfied with how it had been followed up 
and with the new conservative measures put in place. Ultimately, the experience 
appeared to have led to some valuable lessons being learnt and improved 
operational procedures as a result, giving the staff confidence in the organisation's 
management. 
Figure 18 shows a schematic of the operational structure of GVEP International and 
how it relates to the funding and financial management of DEEP. It highlights its 
hierarchical structure from the headquarters in London, through to the East Africa 
regional office in Nairobi and field offices in Mwanza and Kampala. While the 
Kampala office was engaged only in DEEP related activities, the other offices were 
all also hosting other project activities.    
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Figure 18: Schematic of GVEP and DEEP operational structure (Source: Author) 
   
5.5 DEEP East Africa 
GVEP has a number of different projects operational at a time, always focussed on 
promoting local sustainable energy businesses through initiatives ranging from 
business plan competitions and providing financial linkages, to more 
comprehensive support of the type provided by the Developing Energy Enterprises 
Project (DEEP) East Africa - the focus of this case study. DEEP involved the 
recruitment of new and existing energy ‘entrepreneurs’ in Kenya, Uganda and 
Tanzania. They then received training, one-to-one mentoring, marketing and 
networking support, and linking to financial institutions in order to help them build 
up their businesses and reach more consumers.  
DEEP was the first project to be launched by the newly independent GVEP 
International and one of the managers described it as GVEP’s ‘biggest and most 
important programme in East Africa’. Project documentation shows that it is 
financed with €4 million of donor contributions: €2 million each from the European 
Union (under its African, Caribbean and Pacific Energy Facility) and the Dutch 





























of Trustees  
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Although DEEP was conceived as an idea prior to 
GVEP becoming independent in 2006, the length 
of time to develop an application, secure funding 
and launch the programme meant that DEEP 
officially started on 1st March 2008. It had an 
expected duration of 5 years, with donor reporting 
requirements splitting the project into 20 quarter-
years. The research for this thesis was carried out 
during the 15th and 16th quarters of the project, 
after the project had been in operation for 3 and a 
half years. By the end of the research period there 
was just over a year left to go.  
My induction into DEEP was fortuitous since the 
start of my research period coincided with an 
internal workshop for all DEEP staff from across 
the three East Africa offices of GVEP (and 
implementing partners IT Power). It was held at 
the end of October 2011 near Naivasha in Kenya 
and was the first workshop that included the entire key and associated DEEP staff, 
rather than just the management level. GVEP’s operations manager explained that it 
was to allow the different country staff to meet each other and develop a shared 
understanding of and motivation for the project. The workshop ultimately appeared 
successful in this regard. It was also a useful opportunity for me to learn in-depth 
about DEEP and meet the majority of staff involved (Photo 4).  




Most DEEP funding came from its donors – the EU and the Dutch government – but 
in reality their funding package could not be entirely separated from core funding 
for GVEP operations such as day-to-day office functions. Until the end of 2012 
(when their core funding agreement expired) these funds came primarily from 
DFID; to a lesser but ongoing extent they also came from non-tied charitable 
donations (GVEP International, 2013a, GVEP International, 2012a).  
Core funders for GVEP appeared to have limited influence on specific programmes. 
The detailed role of the DEEP donors in formulating its preliminary design and 
operational activities was difficult to elucidate fully during the research due to the 
time since project inception and lack of opportunities to engage with the donors or 
observe interactions with them. The original DEEP proposal was written in response 
to a request for proposals from the EU’s Energy Facility and had to gain the 
approval of both donor bodies. However, a GVEP senior manager stated that 
beyond this: “The donors don’t tend to get very involved. GVEP’s quite transparent 
in quarterly reports – if something isn’t working we say that and what we’re doing 
about it. The EU wouldn’t intervene unless there were clearly big problems and 
nothing being done to sort it out.” 
Senior managers did mention the Dutch government’s influence on the technologies 
focussed on under DEEP. Biogas, for example, was excluded at their request due to 
their heavy focus on it under other initiatives. It was observed that several small 
biogas enterprises were being supported in Uganda under DEEP, however, so it 
was unclear whether their power was usurped or they had more recently rescinded 
this specific restriction. Some entrepreneurs involved in fossil-based energy 
activities such as kerosene and charcoal supply or charging batteries from the main 
electricity grid these activities were initially recruited for DEEP with the intention of 
helping them to diversify into more sustainable energy sources, but again at the 
Dutch government’s specific request (based on concerns over supporting non-
renewable energy) they had to be excluded from the programme.  
DEEP partners 
The initial plan was for DEEP to be run by a consortium of organisations led by 
GVEP in order to bring together a wider range of technical and geographical 
expertise, providing: “essential enabling capacity in energy sector expertise, 
community mobilisation and business management.” (GVEP International, 2006). 
Seven different organisations were therefore involved in the first phase of recruiting 
 100 
enterprises and entrepreneurs, but by the time of this research the international 
consultancy IT Power was the only remaining partner. DEEP managers said that the 
logistical difficulties of co-ordinating so many different organisations had ultimately 
outweighed the benefits of diverse expertise once the programme was operational. 
However, some institutional memory of the former partners’ work was retained as 
several staff from these organisations subsequently became GVEP employees. 
During the operational phase, GVEP was responsible for overall project 
management, business training and mentoring, and linking with financial 
institutions, while IT Power was responsible for energy technology training and 
ongoing technical support. IT Power is similar to GVEP in that it is headquartered in 
the UK with smaller international offices. However it is a private technical 
consultancy rather than a charity. Since IT Power did not have a management role 
in DEEP there is limited further discussion of the company here. 
DEEP targets 
The main project document for DEEP is the application form written in 2006 for EU 
funding and this describes the aspirational design of the project. It describes the 
‘target group’ and ‘final beneficiaries’ of DEEP as shown in Figure 19.  
Figure 19: Target group and final beneficiaries of DEEP as set out in donor application 
form (GVEP International, 2006) 
 
By the end of December 2011, in the middle of the research period for this thesis, the 
quarterly donor report (GVEP International, 2012b) stated that a total of 772 
enterprises (both individuals and groups of entrepreneurs) were being supported 
under DEEP. In fact, staff noted that around 1400 businesses had received initial 
training by that point, but the current number was significantly lower than the 
original target (1800) due to some having to be dropped (such as the ‘non-renewable’ 
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enterprises described above) and some choosing to leave (for example, on realising 
that grants would not be provided). Despite the lower figures, these 772 DEEP 
enterprises had collectively sold over 616,000 clean energy products in the 
preceding three months, a 25% increase on the previous three-month period. It 
brought the total estimated number of beneficiaries to over 1.18 million people for 
the programme thus far. Since this was around two thirds of the 1.8 million target at 
a point three quarters of the way through the programme timeframe, the managers 
were generally satisfied that DEEP was on track.  
DEEP enterprises and entrepreneurs 
The initial recruitment of entrepreneurs into DEEP was carried out by GVEP and its 
original partners, often utilising their existing networks. The process is described in 
Chapter 0. During the research period, recruitment for DEEP entrepreneurs was still 
continuing due to the shortfall in supported enterprises compared to the target 
number. An overall strategy change for DEEP halfway through the project led to 
GVEP working alongside various ‘associate partner’ organisations that were 
themselves needing individuals or groups to become part of their distribution 
chains. GVEP signed agreements with these new partners, shown in Table 3 for 
Kenya and Uganda, to help train their ‘entrepreneurs’ and in some cases also help 
with recruitment. Interestingly some of the new partners were DEEP enterprises 
themselves (e.g. the ‘Keyo Women’ group of entrepreneurs) or had previously been 
supported by similar programmes to DEEP (e.g. Solar Sister, previously supported 
by E+Co).  
Table 3: DEEP associate partners in Kenya and Uganda (GVEP International, 2012b) 
Country Associate Partner Technology 
Kenya 
 
Keyo Women Cookstoves 
SCODE Cookstoves & Solar 






Barefoot Power Solar 
Solar Sisters Solar 
Up Energy Cookstoves 
Heifer International Biogas  
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DEEP staff and structure 
Figure 20 shows the operational arrangement of DEEP. After their recruitment, 
DEEP entrepreneurs received three days of intensive business and technology 
training. They then received ongoing support from DEEP business mentors who 
visited them between weekly and monthly. The DEEP technology mentors, who 
were local IT Power employees, also made less regular visits. The business mentors 
were therefore at the ‘front-line’ of DEEP, having the most frequent interaction with 
the entrepreneurs. There was initially a huge body of part-time mentors recruited, 
with an original aim that DEEP would “train, qualify and employ a cadre of 300 
business mentors” (GVEP International, 2006). However, a new streamlining 
strategy in 2011 had reduced the number to only four business mentors in each 
country and made them permanent full-time employees of GVEP.  
Figure 20: Schematic of DEEP staff structure (Source: Author) 
 
Financing under DEEP 
At the proposal stage DEEP was envisaged to be accompanied by a 
“complementary GVEP Energy Access Fund for East Africa, a €11.8M investment 
fund that will provide business finance in the €75 to €75,000 deal range to viable, 
small-scale enterprises” (GVEP International, 2006). This fund did not subsequently 
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whereby GVEP acted as a loan negotiator and guarantor. GVEP negotiated with in-
country microfinance organisations and banks, including local savings and credit 
co-operatives7 (SACCOs), to make micro-loans available to DEEP entrepreneurs that 
were deemed suitable by both GVEP and the financial institutions. GVEP then used 
ring-fenced funds on a revolving basis to guarantee any loans provided. DEEP staff 
considered financial linkage an important aspect of the project within a context of 
high and variable interest rates for business loans. The reduction of risk for the 
financial providers meant that they could provide fixed and lower interest rates 
than those offered to non-DEEP customers. 
DEEP technologies 
The DEEP proposal describes the project as ‘technology neutral’; although this is not 
strictly true (since fossil-based energy services were not supported) it could be 
considered technology neutral across loosely defined ‘sustainable’ energy. Within 
this definition the project covers a fairly broad spectrum of technologies, but some 
have ended up being more prevalent than others. The most commonly observed 
energy enterprises during this research were efficient cookstove production and 
distribution, briquette production from charcoal dust and organic-waste, and using 
or selling small-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) technology.  
Three market maps have therefore been created for the GVEP case study, one for 
each of the main technology types. The market maps are considered sufficiently 
generalised to be relevant to both Kenya and Uganda. The specific actors in each 
country context were different, but on the whole the activities observed in both 
countries showed similar supply chain structures, supporting service providers, 
enabling environment factors and persistent barriers. It should be noted that these 
are highly simplified and are by no means comprehensive market maps, but instead 
are intended to present some of the primary observations made during the research 
period before more detailed discussion in the following chapters.  
5.6 Clean cookstoves market 
Clean or ‘improved efficiency’ cookstoves have been the subject of development 
programmes since the 1980s. Having evolved from different designers and for 
different needs, there are now numerous designs in production in, and imported 
into, sub-Saharan African countries. For example, for a particularly mountainous 
                                                      
7 A Savings and Credit Co-operative (SACCO) is effectively a co-operative bank where its members, drawn 
together by a common factor such as same employer or religious organization, make savings and draw loans. It is 
usually member managed and democratically governed. 
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area of Kenya one development intermediary stated that they were specifically 
designing a stove to emit large volumes of heat so that they could replace open fires 
as the main source of household heating and cooking. DEEP was generally 
operating in warmer areas of Kenya and Uganda, however, so in general the aim 
was to minimise heat loss from the cookstoves in order to maximise cooking 
efficiency and reduce fuel consumption. There are two main types of improved 
efficiency stove: portable and built-in. DEEP was predominantly supporting 
production of the former. The next main distinction was fuel type: firewood or 
charcoal/briquettes. Most stove-makers made several designs of each, with charcoal 
stoves relevant for urban and peri-urban areas and firewood stoves for rural areas 
where firewood tended to be more accessible.  
In Kenya the most popular charcoal stove design is the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ, 
Photo 5, left). In Uganda, a similar design but with straight vertical edges (Photo 5, 
right) has emerged from development intermediaries working with the largest 
cookstove making outfit there, Ugastove. Other cookstove makers have since been 
trained to make Ugastove-style cookstoves so that the design has become 
increasingly widespread. For firewood stoves there are several popular designs, 
including the ‘rocket’ stove in both Kenya and Uganda and the ‘upesi’ (meaning 
‘quickly’ in Swahili) in Kenya. All of these stoves have two main components: a clay 
liner that provides thermal insulation, and a metal cladding that sits around the 
liner and forms the main structure of the stove. Many DEEP entrepreneurs made 
full stoves but there was also a significant level of disaggregation, primarily for KCJ 
stoves in Kenya, where the liners would be made separately and sold to metal 
workers who made the cladding and assembled the full stove.   




The cookstove market map (Figure 21) uses colour-coded arrows to show the flow 
of materials, information and finance along the generalised cookstove supply chain 
being supported by DEEP, and from and to the support service providers. A key 
omission to this is that wherever material is illustrated flowing along the main 
supply chain, money is inevitably moving the other way – yet the financial flow has 
not been illustrated in order to reduce visual complexity. The activities directly 
associated with DEEP are shaded in pink. The loan guarantee services of DEEP are 
also shown as offering ‘risk reduction’ to financial institutions.  
Within the main supply chain, makers of metal moulds used for making cookstove 
liners have been included within the ‘artisans’ category as they are seen as key to 
the quality of liners and viability of disaggregated manufacturing. It is recognised 
that many other tools are also used but these are less specific to this particular 
market. Within the ‘customers’ category, ‘relatives’ have been included since many 
cookstove sellers said that their customers were often buying on behalf of their 
relatives in other locations.    
In addition to GVEP/DEEP, other support service providers to the cookstove 
markets in Kenya and Uganda include the Ministry of Energy in each. These are the 
ministerial departments responsible for promoting suitable energy sources. For 
example, the Ministry of Energy in Kenya has set up local energy centres known as 
‘Mtwapa’ to promote awareness of and training in locally viable energy solutions. 
Carbon finance companies have also been included as support service providers 
since they facilitate the collection of carbon credits where activities are eligible for 
them, along with carbon credit buyers and the main carbon finance regulatory body, 
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
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Importers have been included on the cookstoves market map as service providers to 
their distributors in Kenya and Uganda, who may or may not also be distributors of 
locally made cookstoves. Imported products inevitably provide competition to local 
cookstoves, however. The National Standards Boards and test centres potentially 
allow local cookstove makers to gain quality certifications for their products, 
although barriers to this are discussed in the following chapter.  
In terms of the main enabling factors for the cookstove market, demand is created 
by high prices and/or limited availability of the main cooking fuels (firewood and 
charcoal) so that people are incentivised to reduce their consumption. Availability 
of the raw materials needed to make the cookstoves (primarily clay for the liners 
and sheet metal for the cladding) is also key. Some persistent barriers observed, by 
contrast, were the limited extent of forestry regulations to control firewood 
collection and charcoal making, meaning that the price of these fuels remained 
lower than they might have been (or even free as is often the case for firewood). At 
the same time the limited awareness of health risks of smoke inhalation and low 
levels of disposable income of potential cookstove buyers meant that buying a 
higher cost efficient cookstove was not necessarily a priority, and cheaper metal 
cookstoves (with no clay liner) were often bought or three-stone fires used instead. 
High interest rates were also seen as a barrier for actors in the supply chain wanting 
















































5.7 Biomass briquettes market 
Briquettes are concentrated fuel pellets that can be made out of a variety of organic 
materials. Ideally waste materials are used so that the briquettes become a more 
sustainable alternative to firewood and charcoal. The main ingredient tends to 
depend on what resources are available locally. Many DEEP entrepreneurs involved 
with biomass briquettes in Kenya and Uganda started off making waste charcoal 
dust briquettes (Photo 6). They would collect or buy sacks of leftover charcoal 
scrapings and dust from charcoal sellers, then crush it and mix it together with 
binder material such as fine clay and/or cassava starch. The individual briquettes 
could then be made by hand or in manual or automated machines before being put 
out to dry. The final briquettes are cheaper than charcoal and have longer burning 
capabilities due to the high density of material.  
Photo 6: Machine-made (on table) and hand-made (in hand) charcoal dust briquettes 
in Uganda (left); coconut husk briquettes in Kenya (right) 
 
Photo 6 (right) also shows a sack of briquettes made from waste coconut husks by 
DEEP entrepreneurs living in the coastal region of Kenya where there is a large 
coconut processing industry. The coconut husks were first carbonised in steel or 
brick kilns or traditional earth pits in order to remove any moisture and increase the 
energy density – the same process used to make charcoal. It also made the final 
briquettes burn without producing smoke, providing a health incentive compared 
to firewood or non-carbonised biomass. Other material that can be made into 
briquettes includes organic food waste, agricultural residue, animal dung and waste 
wood scraps or sawdust. If it is not already fine-grained, the material is crushed or 
chopped before carbonisation; again, this can be done by hand or using machinery 
with varying levels of automation.  
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Figure 22 shows the generalised market map and DEEP involvement in production 
and sale of charcoal dust and organic waste briquettes in Kenya and Uganda. 
Overall it is much simpler than for improved cookstoves as the production tends to 
be done by single entities rather than being disaggregated. Carbon finance actors, 
standards boards and testing facilities are not shown as supporting service 
providers either as most DEEP briquette-makers had had limited engagement with 
these. Similar enabling factors and persistent barriers were found as for cookstoves, 
since demand for alternative fuels is again dependent on the relative availability 



















5.8 Solar phone-charging market 
The third market map shows provision of phone charging services from solar PV 
systems in Kenya and Uganda (Photo 7). Due to the high and increasing levels of 
mobile phone ownership in sub-Saharan Africa but limited prevalence of electricity 
connections, there is considerable demand for phone charging. Grid connected 
shops or kiosks often provide such services, but use of solar panels make it a viable 
business opportunity more widely. Solar equipment clearly needs to be purchased 
in the first instance and this is becoming increasingly available in East Africa, if still 
costly. Kenya, in particular, has one of the most mature and well established solar 
PV markets in Africa (Integrated Energy Solutions, 2009).  
Photo 7: Solar phone charging operations from a DEEP entrepreneur’s house, Uganda 
 
 
The simplified market map (Figure 23) shows a relatively straightforward supply 
chain compared to the cookstove and briquette markets. Solar phone chargers buy 
solar PV panels and associated equipment (e.g. car batteries, inverters, cables) and 
may enlist the services of solar technicians for installation and maintenance. They 
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then provide charging services to mobile phone owners. The enabling environment 
includes government support policies for solar technologies, such as zero import 
duties and VAT on solar equipment in Uganda and Kenya at the time of research. 
However, this subsequently changed in September 2013 when the Kenyan 
government removed its VAT relief on solar products altogether, instantly adding 
16% to the cost of solar products and removing one of the conditions that had been 
seen as instrumental in making Kenya’s small-scale solar market one of the most 
developed in Africa. 
Other enabling factors include the high and increasing rates of mobile phone 
ownership and the limited availability and high costs of electricity grid connections. 
A solar charging station can also be used to provide other paid-for services such as 
barbershops. Despite fiscal policies to promote solar, the equipment prices remain 
relatively high for ‘BOP’ entrepreneurs, however, and again high interest rates on 
loans limit the viability of going into debt in order to make the necessary purchases. 





















































5.9 Case study 2: SolarAid’s SunnyMoney in Malawi 
After a brief trip back to the UK, I arrived in Malawi in March 2012 and instead of 
staying in its capital city, Lilongwe, this time I took a much longer first journey by 
dusty AXA coach to the country’s third largest city, Mzuzu. Although it is the 
fastest growing city in Malawi, a population of only 134,000 in 2008 (National 
Statistical Office of Malawi, 2009) makes it considerably smaller than either Nairobi 
or Kampala and it certainly had a much more relaxed and rural feel to it. In fact the 
rest of Malawi also invoked a similar feeling, with a limited network of tarmac 
roads, little traffic and the tranquil turquoise of Lake Malawi never far from view, at 
least in the north and central regions where I spent the majority of time.  
In addition to the different country context, the second case study made for a very 
interesting comparison with GVEP International’s work in Kenya and Uganda. 
SolarAid, as its name suggests, only works with solar technology so thoughts of 
cookstoves and briquettes were pushed aside to focus on pico-solar products for 
lighting and other purposes. SolarAid had become the primary importer and 
reseller of these in Malawi through its recently formed social enterprise 
‘SunnyMoney’. The focus here was on pushing sales directly, not just providing 
support to supply chain entrepreneurs. In SolarAid’s Mzuzu office the month-to-
date sales figure was written in large black digits across a whiteboard and updated 
each week. Unlike at GVEP, I was not here to help support market actors, but to 
actually be part of one. 
5.10 Malawi 
Malawi, first demarcated as the British protectorate of Nyasaland in 1907, became 
an independent country in 1964 under the leadership of Dr Hastings Banda. Two 
years later it became a republic and Banda its first president (Phillips, 1998). Not 
long after my arrival, the Malawian president since 2004, Bingu wa Mutharika, died 
unexpectedly. A couple of days of uncertainty ensued as there were rumours that 
Mutharika’s political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), were planning 
to by-pass the terms of the Malawi constitution that give the Vice President power if 
the incumbent dies mid-term. The then-Vice President Joyce Banda had been 
expelled from the DPP two years previously. However, a peaceful transition did 
follow and Joyce Banda (no relation to Dr Hastings) was sworn in as the fourth 
president of Malawi on 7th April 2012, becoming the second female leader of an 
African nation.  
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Malawi had a total population of just less than 16 million people in 2012, resulting 
in a population density of 169 people per km2. This is less than Uganda but double 
that of Kenya. As a comparator, Malawi’s population density is still significantly 
lower than that of the UK, however, which in 2012 was 261 people per km2 (World 
Bank, 2013). Malawi showed 5.1% GDP growth between 2000 and 2012 but in 2012 
Malawi ranked 170th out of 186 countries in the Human Development Index, with a 
score of 0.418 (UNDP, 2013b). Foreign aid was a popular topic of conversation 
amongst both locals and the expat community, with people regularly commenting 
that Malawi has one of the highest rates of NGOs per capita in the world.  
Agriculture accounts for 30% of Malawi’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), primarily from 
exports of tobacco, tea and sugar which 
together account for 85% of the country’s 
export revenues (National Statistical Office of 
Malawi, 2011). This makes the country’s 
economic situation in any year highly 
dependent on climatic conditions that affect 
crop growth and global prices of the three main 
commodities. The Malawian national budget is 
also still heavily dependent on direct foreign 
aid. In objection to the previous president’s 
economic policies and associated human rights 
abuses, however, foreign aid for budgetary 
support had been withdrawn during his 
second term (Wroe, 2012). One of Joyce Banda’s first activities as the new president, 
therefore, was to commence dialogue with the IMF and other international donors 
to resolve the situation. This did result in a reinstatement of foreign aid, but only 
alongside a huge deflation of the Malawian kwacha (Photo 9) in order to appease 
donors.  
The freeze in aid had also led to a significant shortage of foreign exchange, which in 
turn had a real impact on fuel availability. With no domestic oil resources, all of 
Malawi’s fuel is imported and the lack of foreign exchange with which to buy it had 
led to a critical shortage. This affected transport as fuel stations had no petrol or 
diesel and drivers resorted to sourcing fuel from the black market. Remote areas 
needing diesel for generators (for example, Photo 8 shows diesel being delivered to 
Likoma Island in Lake Malawi to power its mini-grid) and kerosene for lighting 
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were also seriously affected. Fortunately the main centralised electricity generation 
in Malawi is from hydropower so this could continue as usual. 
Photo 8: Diesel being dropped from the Ilala ferry in Lake Malawi to power diesel 
generators on Likoma Island 
 
Again, however, relatively few people are connected to the main electricity grid. In 
2010, 9% of households were found to have access to electricity, with a higher 
proportion in urban areas (35%) compared to rural areas (4%) (National Statistical 
Office of Malawi, 2011). This leads to low overall electrification rates since 85% of 
the population live in rural areas and only 15% in urban areas (National Statistical 
Office of Malawi, 2009) The Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi is a state-
owned organisation responsible for grid electricity generation and supply. Other 
than some relatively small solar pilot projects it has had limited involvement in off-
grid generation. Figure 24 shows that paraffin (referred to as kerosene elsewhere in 
this thesis) is the most commonly used source of energy for lighting in Malawi 
(86%). In urban areas 46.5% of households used paraffin for lighting and 92.6% in 
rural areas. The third most common source for lighting after paraffin and electricity 
is candles, used by 3.2% of the population overall. 
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Figure 24: Main sources of energy for lighting (National Statistical Office of Malawi, 
2009) 
 
Figure 25 shows how reliance on kerosene for lighting reduces as households 
increase in income level, so that around 90% households with annual incomes of 
US$1000 (in local purchasing power) or less (BOP1000 and BOP500) use kerosene 
and virtually none use electricity, whilst at income levels of US$2000 the 
percentages are roughly equal at around 40% of households using kerosene and 40% 
electricity.  
Figure 25: Percentage of Malawian households using kerosene and electricity as 
primary lighting source (Hammond et al., 2007) 
 
Since low-income households in rural areas evidently have the lowest levels of 
electricity access, low cost pico-solar technology has been recognised as offering a 
viable solution. Furthermore, where they are available, limited reliability of 
electricity connections and frequent blackouts provide further demand for stand-
alone back-up options. The Millennium Cities Initiative, for example, undertook a 
survey in October 2010 of the willingness of low-income residents in Blantyre to buy 
a d.light Nova 200 solar lantern at a price equivalent to US$40 at the time, 
Patterns of fuel use vary across income groups as well as between 
rural and urban areas. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America firewood is the 
main fuel source used for cooking in the lower BOP income groups. In 
Thailand firewood is reported as the primary source by 79% of house-
holds in BOP500, 45% in BOP1000, and 27% in BOP1500. 
Far more rural than urban BOP households—in all income seg-
ments—use firewood as their primary fuel source for cooking. In Gabon 
48% of urban households in BOP500 report firewood as their primary 
fuel source, while 86% of their rural counterparts do. Across all BOP in-
come segments, however, only 20% of urban households use primarily 
firewood, compared with 76% of rural households—a share nearly four 
times as large. 
In higher income segments propane or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) 
becomes the most common substitute for firewood. In Bolivia this is the 
primary fuel source for 87% of households in BOP2500, 87% in BOP3000, 
and 93% in the mid-market segment (compared with 13% in BOP500). 
Use in Nepal is reported by 60%, 75%, and 94% in the same groups (<1% 
in BOP500). In African countries fuel sources used in the mid-market 
segment are more varied, with the most prevalent being propane or LPG 
in Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Malawi, and Rwanda; kerosene in Burundi, 
Djibouti, and Nigeria; and electricity in Malawi and Uganda.
For lighting, kerosene is the predominant fuel source in lower BOP 
income groups in Africa and Asia. In Malawi 89% of households in the 
BOP500 segment report it as their primary lighting fuel, compared with 
only 7% in the mid-market segment. In Bhutan the share for BOP500 
households is 64%, while there is no recorded use in the mid-market seg-
ment.
Electricity replaces kerosene in the mid-market segment, where it is 
predominant across regions. In Burkina Faso electricity is the primary 
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approximately a 45% mark-up from the estimated import cost of US$22. 70% of off-
grid households and 37% of grid-connected households surveyed thought that they 
would buy one (Brailey et al., 2010).  
5.11 Introduction to SolarAid 
Headquartered in the UK, SolarAid is a non-profit organisation registered with the 
UK Charity Commission. It was founded in 2006 after the director of British for-
profit solar company Solarcentury dedicated 5% of company profits for the purpose. 
SolarAid aims to eradicate the kerosene lantern from Africa by the end of 2020. In 
2012 it was working in Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi and in the financial 
year 2011/2012 it spent just over £3 million on charitable activities in those countries 
(Charity Commission UK, 2013).   
In 2008 SolarAid installed their first macro-solar system in Malawi and set up a 
training programme for HIV/Aids-affected youth to assemble and sell pico-solar 
panels. The organisation subsequently decided to phase out local production in 
favour of imported products, however, due to quality, cost and scale-up issues 
encountered with their initial approach (SolarAid, 2010). They moved to recruiting 
sales people for pico-solar lanterns and until 2011 continued to install larger solar 
systems at health clinics and schools on a cost-share basis funded by specific donor 
packages. By the time of this research, these ‘macro-solar’ projects had been 
completed other than ongoing administrative work, and the focus was on 
SunnyMoney, a new ‘social enterprise’ established to import and distribute solar 
lanterns on a commercial basis, with the ultimate intention of financial sustainability. 
Figure 26 illustrates the organisational structure of SolarAid and SunnyMoney. Due 
to the nature of SolarAid as a charity and SunnyMoney as a social enterprise, it 
shows both donors and investors. At the time of research, investors were still being 
sought so that SunnyMoney operations remained almost entirely dependent on 
SolarAid, besides the surplus generated from solar sales. 
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Figure 26: Schematic of SolarAid / SunnyMoney organisational structure (Source: 
Author) 
 
SolarAid Malawi organised its activities from several small offices within the smart, 
concrete facilities of the Mzuzu Sunbird hotel. As the main hotel for officials and 
business people coming to the city, it provided a professional feeling environment 
and, perhaps more importantly, a reliable electricity supply and internet services. 
This SolarAid office employed around ten people at the time of research, with six 
permanent staff and four interns that worked on an ad-hoc basis. When I arrived in 
March 2012, all of the staff working there were Malawian nationals. An Irish 
expatriate had set up the office in 2008 and subsequently been in a senior 
management position, but had left in 2011. Most NGOs in Malawi tend to locate 
themselves in the capital of Lilongwe or the bustling city of Blantyre in the south of 
the country, but Mzuzu had become SolarAid’s home because existing connections 
with a local community group had led to them being trained as SolarAid’s first solar 
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Photo 9: SolarAid staff having a meeting in the Mzuzu office, May 2012 
 
5.12 SunnyMoney 
SunnyMoney is registered as a social enterprise. As is written on the separate 
website dedicated to it: “SunnyMoney is owned by the charity SolarAid – but it is a 
business with the social goal of increasing access to solar lights and reducing 
reliance on kerosene lamps” (Sunny Money, 2013). SunnyMoney is registered as a 
private limited company with Companies House after its incorporation in 
September 2011 (Companies House, 2013). Its core business is to import pico-solar 
products into SolarAid’s countries of operation and establish extensive sales chains, 
particularly to reach low-income households in rural areas where there is least 
access to modern electricity services. 
Photo 10: SunnyMoney kiosk in Mzuzu market 
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In its first financial year (2011/12) SunnyMoney estimated that an average of 142 
lights were sold a day, equivalent to just under 18 lights per working hour. By 
January 2012 over 50,000 solar lanterns had been sold in total (SolarAid, 2012) and 
this increased to over 500,000 by June 2013 (SolarAid, 2013a). Direct sales were 
made from their offices, events and travelling staff, and indirect sales via local 
dealers and newly recruited and existing solar ‘entrepreneurs’. In Malawi, two 
entrepreneurs who had previously been trained as solar assemblers were supported 
to set up SunnyMoney kiosks in Mzuzu (Photo 10) and Nkhata Bay, around 40 
minutes east of Mzuzu on the shore of Lake Malawi.  
Partnerships were also made or strengthened with other organisations that had 
access to particular groups of people, including hospitals and health centres, 
religious groups, schools and businesses. Companies such as sugar and coffee 
estates in Malawi, for example, were found to be able to overcome customers’ 
financial hurdles if they were willing to support credit-based purchases, whereby 
the company paid for solar lantern orders up-front but employees paid 
retrospectively via salary deductions. On Mafia Island in Tanzania, a pilot campaign 
proved particularly successful. It targeted schools in new market areas by offering 
every student the opportunity to buy a discounted basic lantern. This lead to 40% of 
the island’s school students ultimately buying a light and catalysing huge interest 
and additional purchases amongst other residents. This sales model was quickly 
transferred to operations in the other countries; during my research period in 
Malawi a strong focus was being put on the new ‘schools campaign’.  
SunnyMoney technologies 
The solar lanterns sold by SunnyMoney in Malawi could all be classified as pico-PV 
systems, based on this term being applied to systems of up to 10 Watts (Table 4). 
The information and marketing material from SolarAid, SunnyMoney, the solar 
lantern manufacturers and other development intermediaries working with pico-
solar products promote them as providing clean and good quality light at a low cost 
with simplicity of installation and operation. These advantages tend to be 
juxtaposed with the disadvantages of traditional lighting alternatives, including 
health and safety issues (poor light quality, smoke inhalation and household fire 
risk) and the ongoing payments required. For example, the German development 
agency GIZ cites research that finds: “The cost for running the typically used low-
efficiency kerosene wick lamps and candles is up to 150 times higher than for 
premium-efficient fluorescent lamps [powered by grid electricity.]” (2010 p.6) 
 122 
Table 4: Classification of solar systems (GIZ, 2010) 
System Name Number of 
Households 
Power (Watts) 
Multi-user system (MUS) 2 to 400 200 to 5,000 
Solar home system (SHS) 1 10 to 200 
Pico PV system  1 Up to 10 
SunnyMoney’s products were being sourced from four companies, all self-described 
as for-profit social enterprises and variously originating from Australia (Barefoot 
Power, Photo 11), the UK (ToughStuff, Photo 12, left) and the US (Greenlight Planet, 
Photo 12, right and d.light design, Photo 13). D.light design’s S1 solar lantern held 
particular importance as the discounted lantern offered to students under the new 
schools campaign. Overall the products ranged from fully integrated solar lanterns 
like the S1 where the solar panel was incorporated into the body of the light, to 
single and multi-light kits with separate panels, as well as separate battery packs for 
the larger systems. Many of them also had mobile phone charging capability and 
some of them could power small radios. All of the lanterns and lighting kits were 
manufactured in China. Although none of these companies had direct presence in 
Malawi, many had their own operations in Kenya and Uganda and it was therefore 
possible to interview representatives from all except Greenlight Planet.  
Photo 11: Barefoot Power 1.5W Firefly (left) and 2.5W Powerpack Junior (right) 
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Photo 12: ToughStuff 1W panel and light (left); Greenlight Planet 2.5W Sun King Pro 
(right) 
  
Photo 13: 0.5W d.light S1 being displayed by SolarAid staff 
  
5.13 Solar lantern market 
Figure 27 shows the market map constructed for SolarAid’s SunnyMoney activities 
based on the period of participant observation. Again, the market map uses colour-
coded arrows to show the flow of materials, information and finance. Whenever 
material is illustrated flowing one way, money is flowing the other way – yet the 
financial flow has not been illustrated on the main supply chain in order to reduce 
visual complexity. Unlike for the GVEP market maps, here the activities directly 
related to the SunnyMoney initiative have not been colour-coded, since 
SunnyMoney is an integral market actor and therefore interacts with the majority of 
the rest of the market chain in some way. This illustrates an important difference 
between the two case study approaches. 
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Although carbon finance actors have been included on the market map, they have 
been put within dashed lines to illustrate the complexity of efforts to obtain carbon 
credits from SunnyMoney’s supply chain that became evident during the research, 
as described further in Chapter 6. Other supporting service providers include the 
Malawian National Standards Board that instigate and check the standards of 
imported products, and Lighting Africa, a World Bank/IFC funded initiative that 
has developed international standards and testing procedures for pico-solar 
products, as well as undertaking other support services such as research studies.  
In terms of the enabling environment, the relative availability and price of kerosene 
has a key impact on making pico-solar products a viable alternative. The Malawian 
government has exempted solar lamps from import duties, which helps to increase 
the imported products’ ability to compete with other lighting options. 
Unfortunately the devaluation of the Malawian kwacha that occurred in the early 
parts of the new presidency caused a huge increase in the local prices of imported 
products, particularly a barrier in the context of limited levels of customer savings. 
Trust of solar technology also appeared to be an issue for some potential customers, 
generated from earlier experiences of limited technical support and in some cases 










































5.14 Chapter summary 
This chapter has described the case study organisations, the country contexts that 
their activities and this research were undertaken in, and the marketisation activities 
that they engage in. Market maps have been created to show the market systems 
that the development intermediaries are trying to shape. These have become a 
popular tool in market-based development approaches and the format used here is 
derived from Practical Action’s market mapping framework (Albu and Griffith, 
2005). Responding to Çalışkan and Callon’s (2010) recommendation of firstly 
identifying marketisation actors, it has provided a platform for considering the main 
market actors within the product supply chains and those providing supporting 
services. Some of the enabling factors and ongoing barriers to marketisation 
activities around sustainable energy products and services have also been identified 
on the maps.  
Latour’s (1987) writings highlight, however, that this type of simplification involves 
depicting a market system as a ‘cold’ stable object. While it can be argued as a useful 
way to provide a visual overview of the case studies, which is the intended purpose 
here, the next step is to consider how this stabilised conceptualisation has come into 
being and to acknowledge that it is not necessarily an accurate or complete 
portrayal of the situation. Instead its constituent elements have been, and are 
continually being, produced and performed and the system is in constant flux over 
time. Different actors within or outside of a market can also see it in very different 
ways. These market maps are based on a specific time period of observations made 
primarily from the vantage point of the development intermediaries being studied. 
The market systems conceptualised should therefore be treated as warmer, unstable 
socio-technical assemblages that vary over time and depending on observer 




6 The energy products: how their meanings and values are 
produced 
Nothing moves on its own. If a good is produced it is because it has a value for its 
producer; if it is distributed it is because it is a source of value for its distributor; and 
if it is consumed it is because it has a value in its consumer’s eyes. (Çalikan and 
Callon, 2009 p.389) 
SolarAid’s success in offering a product that numerous consumers can be persuaded 
to buy is evident with their sales of over 500,000 solar lanterns (SolarAid, 2013a) 
over the three years since they started importing ready-made lamps and lighting 
kits in to their four countries of operation. These sales show that the characteristics 
seen in the products by prospective consumers match some of their personal needs 
and desires. Success is similarly evident for GVEP: during the last 3 month period of 
my research, they calculated that their 300 or so efficient cookstove entrepreneurs 
generated a combined gross income of just under US$310,000 from selling complete 
cookstoves, or parts thereof (GVEP International, 2012c). Again, the products now 
clearly had local relevance.  
This chapter puts the key non-human actors at the centre of the marketisation 
process: the products themselves. As discussed in Chapter 3, work by Latour (1992, 
2005) and others has shown the pivotal role that the capabilities of technologies and 
meanings people associate with them have in how market processes unfold. 
Everyone who interacts with the same product does not necessarily see the same 
characteristics. A particular buyer may be persuaded by different attributes of a 
product than those that entice another buyer. Equally, along the product’s journey 
from designers, importers (where relevant), local distributors to end-users, the 
meanings associated with the product will vary significantly, affecting how people 
choose to act. As Appadurai (1986) shows in his seminal work, all objects have a 
social life.  
Given the wide variety of values that products are assigned over their lifetime, 
efforts must be made to qualify their characteristics in an apparently objective, 
scientific manner in order to make them of consistent design and quality and 
comparable against competing designs or products. Using Callon’s (2002) 
terminology, this is the continuous qualification and requalification of evolving 
products. The processes involved require a broad toolset of ‘market devices’ (Callon 
et al., 2007) such as measuring and testing procedures, generic standards and 
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certification bodies, before the products’ characteristics are communicated to end-
users through artefacts such as advertising materials and instruction manuals. 
Combined with external factors, meaning and value is thus shaped and feeds into 
pricing negotiations. As Çalışkan and Callon (2009) highlight, no value is pre-
determined or fixed, and the price point for exchange depends on a product’s 
relative valuation by different stakeholders along its socio-technical history.  
This chapter examines these processes in detail and addresses the second research 
question:  
How are the clean energy products stabilised, qualified, valued and priced for 
exchange as market goods? 
It starts by describing how these products come into existence through their 
‘problematisation’: their ability to solve a particular ‘problem’ for developing 
country contexts that allows them to be framed as humanitarian goods. This 
framing incentivises marketisation efforts, but it does also place restrictions on what 
products emerge, and at the same time displaced technologies remain out of sight 
from the positive ‘development’ conceptualisation. Although job creation is not 
specifically the central problematisation here, local manufacturing of cookstoves is 
seen to more easily lead to locally appropriate innovation, due to greater access to 
end-user feedback and understanding local resource availability. Where products 
are imported they do clearly now have local relevance through considerable efforts 
to set up similar communication channels. Subsequently the products’ optimal 
usage also requires communication from absent manufacturers, however, and it is 
argued that there remains room for simple improvements; even translating 
instruction sheets into local languages can help bring cursory materials to life.  
The detailed processes of qualification are examined here, and it is shown that 
market devices for processes such as standardisation vary greatly according to the 
market context and level of formalisation. Even simple standardisation tools such as 
specifically sized cookstove liner moulds have been significant for market growth of 
particular cookstove designs, by facilitating disaggregated manufacturing. By 
comparison, some ‘imported’ market devices such as warranty card schemes require 
extensive social and technical configurations to complete them and even absence of 
a paper receipt can immediately make them defunct. Devices for quality testing, 
standards certification, patenting and generating carbon credits may be inaccessible 
to local manufacturers for similar reasons. The ‘informal economy’ can find its own 
solutions to some of these issues, but power asymmetries arise when ‘macro’ actors 
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can attach greater value to their products out of access to the ‘black boxes’ of such 
devices.  
6.1 Problematisation to create humanitarian goods 
Both of the development intermediaries I worked with were keen to highlight from 
the outset that, while employment generation through enterprise development was 
certainly a benefit of their work, the key challenge being addressed was provision of 
clean energy products to those currently without access to safe, reliable and 
appropriately priced solutions. The organisations’ existence and indeed the 
products they promoted had emerged from the context of just under 1.3 billion 
people having no access to electricity and 2.6 billion relying on traditional biomass 
for cooking (IEA et al., 2010). 
The problem of kerosene 
At my first meetings with SolarAid, and indeed in all of their publicity material, it is 
clearly stated that ‘eradicating the kerosene lantern in Africa by the end of this 
decade’ (i.e., by 2020) is their primary goal. In fact it is such a challenging but key 
focus for them that they have called it their ‘BHAG’ for ‘Big Hairy Audacious Goal’. 
They use the negative health impacts and continuous costs of using kerosene as a 
lighting fuel to underpin their promotion of solar lanterns as a better solution.  
598 million off-grid Africans have no access to electricity and many rely on toxic 
kerosene for lighting. These brutal lamps emit noxious black smoke and burn up to 
20% of the household income – locking millions into poverty. (SolarAid, 2013a)  
Cross (2013) identifies the same starting point for other actors in the solar lantern 
industry, referring to the identification of a central problem that a ‘humanitarian 
good’ is designed to solve as ‘problematisation’: “The significance of the solar light 
as a humanitarian good has come to hinge on the ‘problem’ of kerosene” (ibid., p.14).  
This problematisation is strategic for products specifically depicted as solving a 
‘development problem’, as they tend to rely on the engagement of donor agencies 
and individuals wanting to identify the product’s humanitarian benefits. Of course 
all products need to engage prospective consumers by demonstrating how they 
solve a specific problem through use, and most also need to engage investors by 
further identifying the commercial potential of solving this problem for consumers. 
In this case, however, the buy-in of a third type of stakeholder is also key. SolarAid 
still rely on individual donations, grants and awards for their core funding for 
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operations. For example, they recently won an International Gold through the 
Ashden Awards, leading to a further £40,000 of funding and extensive publicity. 
The Ashden Awards specifically seek out and exemplify “practical, local energy 
solutions that cut carbon, protect the environment, reduce poverty and improve 
people’s lives” (Ashden, 2013). 
For SolarAid the humanitarian perspective is also important in encouraging non-
charitable investment. Originally they considered engaging standard venture 
capitalists to provide the working capital needed to expand their commercial 
venture SunnyMoney (having used SolarAid’s charitable funds for preliminary 
start-up investment). However, more recently they were exploring crowd-funding8 
and impact investment9 options (Leggett, 2012), both of which require a business to 
demonstrate its added social benefits to potential investors, as well as its profit-
making potential.   
The problem of employment 
SolarAid’s original approach prior to importing solar lanterns manufactured in 
China or India was local assembly of ‘Kadzuwa’ (meaning ‘little sun’ in Chichewa) 
solar lighting kits from local and imported parts: solar glass, wood for frames, 
electrical wires, rechargeable LED lights, mobile phone charging connectors and 
other small components, to create a simple solar kit that could be used to charge 
LED lights, mobile phones and other small electronic devices, as well as power 
radios. My first encounter with SolarAid was actually several years prior to 
embarking on doctoral research, during a visit to a crafts workshop for disabled 
people established by Christian missionaries in the small high-altitude town of 
Iringa in western Tanzania. Neema Crafts had grown into an enterprise employing 
around 100 people and branching into various activities, including a solar kit 
assembly operation following training from one of SolarAid’s founders in 2007. 
During a visit there I was proudly shown the solar-assembly workshop where 
several disabled people were making the same kits mentioned above (Photo 14). 
Interestingly here, although obviously the benefits of replacing kerosene with solar 
were recognised, it was not the primary problematisation of the solar initiative: 
[…] while this is all great, the real reason why Neema Crafts makes these Solar kits 
is different. In Tanzania disabled people are often looked on as a burden on their 
families and communities; as people who cannot contribute to society in any way. 
                                                      
8 Online crowd-funding platforms allow individuals to make micro-investments in businesses of their choice. 
SolarAid was already participating in SunFunder’s solar investment platform (www.sunfunder.com).  
9 Impact investment is the term given to funds selectively investing in activities with high levels of social or 
environmental benefits.  
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When our disabled workers take the solar panels and kits out to the villages to sell 
and people learn that these disabled people made this, it quite simply blows their 
minds. They had never thought it possible that a disabled person could make 
something so sought after and so useful! It is a tremendous advocacy tool for us in 
our work trying to promote deaf and disabled people in the community. (Neema 
Crafts, 2013) 
Similarly SolarAid started its operations in Malawi by training local groups of HIV-
affected youths to undertake the same type of solar kit assembly, again with a 
second problematisation of the need for employment opportunities for this group of 
actors.  
However, in terms of their primary aim of replacing kerosene, SolarAid 
management later stated that local assembly made it too difficult to ensure quality, 
to scale-up production sufficiently and even to be cost efficient, given import tariff 
discounts for complete solar products but not their component parts. The approach 
was therefore halted in favour of importing externally manufactured solar lanterns 
that, it felt, would allow greater sales to be achieved more quickly and thus replace 
more kerosene lanterns. On a visit to the SolarAid warehouse in Mzuzu I could see 
boxes of these original kits left unsold (Photo 14). I also heard that Neema was 
considering stopping their production after other initiatives had started up locally 
to sell the same imported solar lamps that SunnyMoney now focuses on, making the 
locally made kits unable to compete.  
Photo 14: Neema Crafts solar workshop, 2009 (left); unsold Kadzuwa solar kits in 
SolarAid Mzuzu warehouse, 2012 (right)  
  
From a social benefit perspective, it can easily be argued that SolarAid’s first 
approach in fact had more diverse impacts per number of sales made, providing 
jobs for local people beyond simply the role of selling imported products. A 
monitoring report from SolarAid Malawi in 2009 highlights the diverse benefits to 
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the local solar trainees. It states that out of 227 trainees, 157 said they were still using 
their solar technical and business skills, with many finding the pico-solar business 
lucrative and feeling a sense of job fulfilment. In particular, focus groups had found 
that the solar entrepreneurs’ employment in pico-solar: 
[…] was a key survival strategy over the ‘hunger season’ (the period from 
November to March following the planting season, waiting for the harvests). The 
income generated from microsolar sales and assembly enabled individuals (most of 
whom are dependent on the tobacco harvest) to buy basic food and medicine over 
this normally difficult time.” (SolarAid (2009) p.9) 
Some individual case studies of solar assemblers are also provided in the report, 
such as that of Gloria Mgala shown below. 
Figure 28: Case study of solar assembly trainee in Malawi (SolarAid, 2009) 
 
However, employment was never SolarAid’s primary aim and the goal of 
eradicating kerosene lanterns was always dominant. It is not inconceivable that, had 
they wished to continue with their initial approach, the ‘problem’ of kerosene could 
have been in combination or indeed overshadowed by the ‘problem’ of limited local 
employment opportunities, particularly for specific groups. This problematisation 
would have identified solar kit assembly and sales as a viable income-stream for all 
types of people and may have secured enough development sector support to scale 
up and formalise the local assembly model. Fortunately the most active solar 
Gloria Mgala, Solar Assembly trainee, Chikangawa, Malawi
This is Gloria. She is  19 years old and a volunteer teacher in a small remote primary school in an impoverished area near the Raiply wood 
processing plant.  She  is a volunteer because the school cannot afford to pay her, so the children bring small donations of money and food 
from their parents. This is just enough to support herself, her widowed mother, elderly Grandmother and 5 brothers and sisters.
Gloria recently received solar assembly training from SolarAid. She  is currently assembling 20  panels a month  and plans to increase 
production to 100 in order to support her families income and save up to study mathematics and computing.
“Most  of  the  villages  in  this  area  do  not  have  light  because  they  can  not  afford  to  pay.  When  I  show  people  they  Kadzuwa they are excited that 
it is so affordable to them.  They also do not believe me when I tell them that I made it - many people think that we girls are not supposed to 




assemblers were able to be absorbed into the new approach, selling the imported 
lanterns instead of assembling and selling home-made kits, but few ‘entrepreneurs’ 
have been recruited and trained by SolarAid in the same way since.  
The problem of education  
A variation on the kerosene issue for SolarAid is the need for good quality and 
affordable lighting (i.e. not kerosene or candles, as shown in Photo 15) for children 
to use to study after school. This has become an increasing focus in the way they 
frame solar lanterns as humanitarian goods. It is particularly strategic since their 
search for new distribution channels now targets schools as networks through 
which to advertise and sell the lights. End-users I spoke to had many uses for pico-
solar systems, particularly for lighting sales kiosks at night and charging mobile 
phones. However, SolarAid now put education opportunities top in the list of 
reasons for purchase, followed by money saving and creation (Figure 29). Equally 
their winning Ashden Award application prioritises education: “The immediate 
benefits are immeasurable: children are able to study in the evening, polluting and 
dangerous kerosene is avoided, and families save money.” (Ashden, 2013)  




Photo 15: Classroom in Karonga, northern Malawi, with children studying using 
candles and kerosene lamps 
 
This leads the framing of solar lanterns as humanitarian goods to be hinged on the 
problem of lighting for children’s education. Visits during the research showed that 
this was clearly a legitimate issue, as Photo 15 demonstrates. The need to reinforce 
the humanitarian application of products can lead to a narrow portrayal of a 
technology’s diverse local applications, however. The key focus is always on finding 
and highlighting examples of the product being used in a way that show the 
consumer as an idealised development beneficiary. When visiting the house of a 
solar lighting system customer in Mzuzu, for example, I asked whether the owner’s 
children used the light to study at night, in the hope that some photos could be 
taken as a case study to demonstrate its use for education purposes. He obligingly 
said ‘Yes’, and asked his son to come and sit on the floor under one of the light 
bulbs and read a schoolbook for the photographer. Shortly before leaving the house, 
the father was engaged in conversation with another staff member so I asked the 
boy where he studied in the house, thinking it strange that he would always sit on 
the floor. He led me to a different darker room where there was a dining table and 
chairs but no light bulbs. I asked him how he could see to study and he showed me 
a candle. His father clearly knew that we hoped to see the solar lighting system in 
action aiding his son’s schoolwork and had obliged accordingly, even if it was not 
actually its primary or even common use in this particular case.  
The point is not to suggest any misrepresentation on the part of SolarAid, since his 
son did not get used as a case study, and by contrast I also saw plenty of situations 
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where children were legitimately using solar lights to study with. Rather it shows 
how the need to portray products as humanitarian goods still narrows the 
conceptualisation of end-users (at least in reports, articles and other marketing 
material destined for supporters’ eyes) into development beneficiaries. Efforts are 
made to identify and showcase examples of products being used in ways that 
reinforce the consumers as idealised development beneficiaries. While this is 
arguably a necessity for any organisation dependent on engaging socially conscious 
donors or investors, it also leads to the continuous production of a development 
‘need and solution’ scenario.  
Restricted ‘development’ view of technologies 
Other technologies can also be subject to similar patterns, with mobile phones, for 
example, often being conceptualised in development literature as development tools. 
Indeed in many ways they offer relevant benefits, such as facilitating entrepreneurs’ 
connectivity with suppliers and customers, as I discuss in the following chapter. 
However, the conceptualisation does not provide a complete picture. Molony (2008) 
illustrates this with ethnographic research from Tanzania which leads him to argue 
that “in much of Africa mobile phones are more commonly put to a 
nondevelopmental use“ (p.340). Recent research by Pierskalla and Hollenbach (2013) 
finds that in some African countries mobile phones have in fact escalated incidences 
of violence due to the increased capacity to co-ordinate violent episodes: “cell phone 
coverage has a significant and substantive effect on the probability of conflict 
occurrence” (p.220). They note that mobile phones have also been seen to help co-
ordinate counter-insurgency or terrorism efforts and that overall the many benefits 
of increased connectivity are not negated. However, this example helps highlight 
that the ‘mobile phones for development’ rhetoric produces a very narrow view.  
Similar occurs with the subject of internet provision. Mercer (2006) states that within 
some development literature “the Internet is presented as a technological panacea, 
able to solve all manner of ‘development problems’” (p.245) yet her research shows 
that Tanzanian activities in internet cafés is broadly in line with global trends: the 
amount of time spent emailing friends and ‘surfing’ for general entertainment is 
similar to ‘developed’ countries. It was estimated, for example, that pornography 
accounted for a quarter of internet usage at one ICT centre in the study, something 
that could sound shocking if juxtaposed with ‘internet for development’ rhetoric, 
but is in fact not surprising when compared with global internet usage statistics.  
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As Ferguson (1994) so clearly highlighted, the development industry has a need to 
produce an image of development needs and solutions that continuously validate 
and perpetuate its existence. Older models of free allocation of humanitarian goods 
in particular could be argued to subjectify people as beneficiaries at the same time 
as denying them agency to value goods themselves and perform consumption 
activities based on that valuation. My findings here are less critical: solar lamps do 
replace kerosene and can be used for children to study by, and these applications 
are focused on as a marketing tool in order to attract continued investment from 
socially conscious stakeholders. At the same time, prospective customers are able to 
make their own evaluative judgements and decide to purchase or not based on their 
own problematisation. There will inevitably be uses of solar lighting, and the mobile 
phones and radios that are charged by solar systems, for less honourable purposes 
that do not fit with development rhetoric. ‘Consumers’ are still free to make that 
choice, but clearly this is less represented in both the information gathered by solar 
lamp distributors and the stories fed back to existing and potential supporters.  
As I became increasingly absorbed into the development world I inadvertently 
found myself also wanting to represent prospective consumers as development 
beneficiaries. One of the problems that efficient cookstoves aim to solve is the smoke 
inhalation caused by their rural alternative, open three-stone fires, as described in 
Chapter 5. During my time with GVEP I visited many producers of the cookstoves 
and some of their happy customers, but it was some time before I had the 
opportunity to see a traditional three-stone fire in use in a rural home in western 
Uganda. I naturally asked to take a photo, excited that I would finally be able to 
illustrate my thesis with a poor Ugandan farmer being exposed to smoke inhalation 
in his home, thus reinforcing efficient cookstoves as humanitarian goods. However, 
my host Jared happily and perhaps unsurprisingly does not always have this 
problem at the forefront of his mind, and in fact seemed to be enjoying using his 
fireplace to cook me a tasty meal of local crayfish caught in Lake Bunyoni which his 
house was on the shores of. Each time I tried to take a photo of him cooking over his 
dangerous and burdensome fireplace, he gave me a beaming smile. For a moment I 
thought of asking him not to smile, but I realised that this would be asking him to 
perform the role of prospective development beneficiary in order to create an 
unfairly narrow conception of him. 
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Photo 16: Jared happily demonstrating his three-stone fire at his home in western 
Uganda 
 
Difficulties could also occur with regards to future applications of energy products 
that do not fit as neatly into development rhetoric as provision of lighting for 
students to study by or avoiding smoke inhalation. One example is the possible 
future development of solar television systems. 
In his work on solar markets in Kenya, Jacobson (2006) identified a perhaps 
unexpected prioritisation of television over lighting amongst end-users of solar 
home systems: “Importantly, most rural Kenyans who can afford a solar PV system 
choose to buy a TV set before they purchase lights” (ibid., p.148). He found the 
desire for television in rural homes to be a central driver of the rapid growth of the 
Kenyan solar market and notes that other studies from China, Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
and Zimbabwe had similar findings. 
On numerous occasions when talking to prospective solar lantern customers, I was 
asked whether systems to power televisions were available. When visiting Sangilo 
primary school in Karonga, northern Malawi, for example, a teacher came 
purposefully over to me to ask for an appropriately sized system to power a 
television: “You know, teachers live in remote areas, they can’t watch TV. These 
[panels for charging solar lanterns] are too small, but the ones at the schools [macro-
solar panels] are too big.” Another solar lantern customer, Mr William Sanudi at 
Citrefine estate in Malawi, said he was very happy with his solar lighting system 
but just wished he could use it for more applications like powering a television. Of 
course solar systems that can power televisions are readily available, including in 
most African countries, but the necessary size and complexity makes the retail price 
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a huge step-change from that of the pico-systems that can power lights and a radio. 
Quoting a rough price estimate to a solar lantern customer would generally result in 
a low whistle and a shake of the head in response.  
The technical solution could be for a low voltage direct curent television set (i.e. one 
that does not require an expensive inverter) to be specifically designed for low-
income rural customers and my interviews with the solar lantern manufacturers 
found that several10 are already pursuing this. However, will it be hard to create a 
problematisation around lack of television access and successfully convert such 
solar television systems into humanitarian goods? For this to happen, the general 
acceptance of what constitutes a ‘development problem’ may need to expand. It is 
also interesting to ask at what point do we move away from conceptualisation as a 
humanitarian issue and simply focus in on mainstream consumer demand for 
standard domestic products? Presumably this can only occur when the need for 
buy-in from stakeholders in the international development sector reduces. The 
African mobile phone industry, for example, is now so profitable and sizeable that 
company marketing, such as websites, tends to focus entirely on mobile phones and 
related services as consumer products, leaving the humanitarian goods perspective 
tucked away on the corporate social responsibility (CSR) pages (e.g. Safaricom 
(2013), Airtel (2013)). This is despite a relatively recent history of development 
sector support for some aspects of their services, such as the funding provided by 
the UK Department for International Development (DFID) for Safaricom to develop 
and trial its mobile banking service M-PESA. However, this then became a fully 
commercial venture for Safaricom from 2006 (Hughes and Lonie, 2007). 
Locally relevant technologies 
Of course the need for clean energy products to be framed from a humanitarian 
perspective is just one aspect of the creation of meaning associated with them. Since 
the focus has now mostly shifted away from handing these types of products out for 
free to selling them to end-users, it is equally important that they are valued by end-
users who will then be willing to exchange money for them. Creating relevance for 
potential customers is therefore a key component of the design process, as Akrich 
(1992) and Crewe and Harrison (1998) demonstrated in their analyses of products 
developed without end-user involvement. Recent successes, conversely, can be 
partly attributed to the intensive engagement of prospective end-users in design 
activities, illustrated in Cross’ (2013) work on d.light solar lanterns.  
                                                      
10 Organisation names kept confidential 
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There are several ways in which end-user engagement can occur, depending on the 
locality of design and manufacturing activities. Barefoot Power (Interview 14), for 
example, finds that their integrated supply chain11 makes it easy to receive feedback 
from customers to input into their design iterations. One example is that earlier 
versions of their solar lantern system could charge mobile phones from the same 
panel that charged the light. However, they received feedback from customers 
saying they need to be able to charge the lantern battery during the day and plug 
their phone into the battery at night, since most people work during the day and 
have their phone with them. This was therefore incorporated into the next version 
of the system.  
ToughStuff (Interview 17) equally obtained feedback from end-users via their sales 
network, but in their case through the NGOs that work to train and support solar 
entrepreneurs since they do not have integrated sales channels. The main difficulty 
they found with their first design of solar lantern was that it was not bright enough, 
particularly when compared with competitors. This was leading to fewer sales 
compared to other manufacturers’ products, a clear manifestation of end-users’ 
feedback. Their new design has therefore been doubled in brightness, from 10 
lumens to 20. Obviously this feedback and acting on it is key to sustaining market 
growth, yet the more different organisations that lie between designers and end-
users, the more complex and restricted the feedback channels become – such as in 
Malawi where SolarAid import and sell other products made by other organisations 
that have no direct presence in the country. This is where field trials and 
strengthening communication lines along the supply chain become increasingly 
important; without this Malawians have limited opportunity to have products 
tailored to their needs and desires. SolarAid staff stated that a specific reason for 
setting up a social impact and research function within the organisation was to be 
able to follow up with solar light users and get feedback on product usage, 
perceived benefits and suggestions for improvement. This is then communicated 
back to manufacturers, albeit in condensed form and further shaped by 
SunnyMoney requirements. Of course the designs are not only developed based on 
customer feedback, however, as there are many other factors like availability and 
cost of different materials, manufacturing techniques and so on.  
Locally made products such as many types of efficient cookstoves facilitate a much 
more direct link between designer/manufacturer and end-user, and the fieldwork 
                                                      
11 Barefoot directly trains local solar sellers in their countries of operation and has 21 customer service centres 
across Uganda alone (Interview 14) 
 140 
with GVEP showed many examples of the energy entrepreneurs adapting and 
developing on the designs of efficient cookstoves and biomass briquettes they were 
originally trained to make. Sometimes this was in conjunction with the DEEP 
technical mentors deployed to support the entrepreneurs in their product 
development, but in many cases it was also entirely self-led initiatives.   
One particularly innovative entrepreneur I was introduced to in Kenya was Patrick 
Mwenge (Photo 17). He had set up a briquettes business called Alfastar Industries 
with a strong focus on developing new types of briquette from different organic 
materials and new types of briquette making tools and machines. He had become a 
key collaborator with GVEP staff on finding new designs and providing 
increasingly efficient tools that could help other DEEP entrepreneurs. For example, 
GVEP staff used his premises for testing briquettes and collaborating to make a 
carbonation kiln design out of old oil drums.   
Photo 17: Patrick Mwenge at Alfastar Industries in Nyeri, Kenya 
 
In the majority of cases DEEP entrepreneurs had been trained to make a particular 
design of cookstove or briquette by GVEP, another entrepreneur or another NGO. 
However, five out of nine (56%) briquette makers I talked to had subsequently 
adapted the original design to suit their own resources, needs and customer 
demands, and similarly six out of 14 (43%) cookstove makers had also introduced 
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design adaptations. Further examples are given below (Box 1), with each change 
meaning a divergence of product form from the limited selection of designs initially 
introduced by GVEP and other NGOs. 
Box 1: Examples of local adaptation of cookstove and briquette designs 
Mr Herbert Bogezi, stove maker, Uganda. His original training was from an NGO in 2007, 
but he adapted the design of the portable stoves to have three doors instead of one so that 
users can regulate the heat produced – to cook quickly the user closes two of them, to cook 
slowly has all three open. Also instead of having sheet metal at the top of the stove for the 
pot to rest on, he changed to three hinges. These last much longer as the metal on top got 
spoilt quickly with the previous design. It also means the cladding can easily be removed for 
replacement of the liner and insulation. He had one cladding that had been used for 3 years, 
after which the customers brought it back to be fitted with a new liner. He is now looking to 
get UNBS (Ugandan National Bureau of Standards) certification so it may require further 
changes to meet the standard.  
Farouk, stove maker, Uganda. After finishing school in 2006 he paid Ugastove (local family 
business with own design supported by GIZ) to train him in making stoves. The training 
was quite expensive but he saw it as good business opportunity. A German man from GIZ 
now comes to help him with the materials such as clay mix and designs. He has kept the 
same design he was trained in; Ugastove have changed their design a bit since (e.g. with 
door modifications) but he doesn’t see these changes as necessary. However he has changed 
the mica ratio in liners in order to make them more durable. This was after Impact Carbon 
(who are obtaining carbon credits on his behalf) did a test to heat liners to 800oC and put 
them in water to see if they break. They failed with the previous mica ratio so he changed it.  
Mr Mawanda, briquette maker, Uganda. A former baker, he switched to charcoal dust 
briquette making in 1995 after training from an NGO. He had to change mix he was shown 
to use because the dust was making him ill, so now he adds water. After basic training in 
biochar making from another NGO he is collecting all types of local organic waste (see Photo 
18) to add to his briquettes mix. He is working on what inputs work best and what ratio to 
mix with charcoal dust.  
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Photo 18: Mr Mawanda showing the organic matter he has collected locally in order to 
create biochar  
 
 
Mr Edward Oliech Gwara, cookstove maker, Kenya. Previously mango grafting, he 
changed to cookstove making after training from Practical Action. Because he does not live 
near a market to buy sheet metal for making the cladding, he can only make liners and sell 
them to a cookstove assembler. He therefore designed his own cookstove made entirely from 
clay.  





It is interesting to note the wide variety of reasons cited in Box 1 for inspiring these 
entrepreneur-led innovations, again clearly showing that end-user feedback is only 
one part of the story. Other influencing factors included: 
• the need to increase durability for carbon credits application (Farouk); 
• a general desire to improve flexibility and durability; taking it for testing to get 
certified with UNBS may lead to further changes (Bogezi); 
• avoidance of health impacts of working with dry charcoal dust; to make use of free 
‘waste’ products that should not be discarded and are available locally (Mawanda); 
• the added value of being able to make the entire product (instead of only part of it) 
by developing a complete design that can be made with locally available materials 
(Gwara). 
In many cases, rather than specifically getting feedback from customers who had 
purchased the product, improvements were made on the basis of the entrepreneurs 
themselves also being users of the products they make and therefore finding out 
their limitations themselves. This can negate the need for the complex laboratory 
tests and carefully designed field trials that tend to be used in the development of 
imported cookstoves and solar lanterns, yet are often inaccessible to the local 
entrepreneurs. It also means that there is not necessarily the clean separation 
between manufacturer and consumer depicted in the market maps: in reality these 
boundaries are blurred. Adding to this the external influence of NGOs, standards 
bureaus, carbon credit applications, locally available materials, health 
considerations and so on, the design of the products at any moment in time has 
emerged from a long history of interactions between people and materials.  
Often the first design for a clean energy product for local manufacturing comes 
from external training, generally by development intermediaries, but the design 
may subsequently be modified at each new locality. The number of different designs 
in existence thus increases, and new versions might become more widespread as the 
designers start to give training to other people. Out of the 11 briquette and 
cookstove entrepreneurs found to have adapted their initial designs, eight of these 
(73%) said that they were training other people. Which designs are dominant in any 
place at any point in time is therefore determined by a whole complex array of 
factors. To help simplify this conceptually, some of those factors can be categorised 
as relating to innovation, transfer or continuity of output:  
• Innovation activities: how people develop designs based on customer feedback and 
for other reasons 
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• Transfer activities: whether designs are transferred through training or copying and 
if standardisation tools are developed, e.g. to allow disaggregation of manufacturing 
(discussed later on) 
• Continuity of output: whether certain designs continue to be manufactured or not, 
which in turn depends on sales success and other reasons for businesses continuing 
or otherwise 
SolarAid’s design for a locally assembled Kadzuwa solar lighting kit was available 
in Malawi until 2010 and offers a useful example. The first design introduced in 
Malawi was adapted after some customers complained to assemblers/sellers about 
the lack of light dispersal, so a technique of grinding the nib of the LED to disperse 
light was found. A second design iteration arose when the battery holders, 
originally made from locally available PVC pipe and paper clips, were found to be 
difficult to connect to the solar panels. Pre-manufactured battery holders were 
therefore imported and introduced to the design instead. However, rather than a 
linear progression of Kadzuwa designs being available in Malawi as these changes 
occurred, different groups of solar assemblers could be found making the different 
versions depending on when they had had their training and which materials (e.g. 
home-made or manufactured battery holders) were available to them. A third 
iteration also briefly existed when one end-user was seen to be using the end of a 
torch to cover the LED in order to further increase light dispersal, so SolarAid 
looked at implementing this as a more widespread design feature. It was never 
transferred, however, because no groups were trained in it before the whole 
programme was stopped. Once this had happened, with time all of the designs 
eventually ceased to be available because without support from SolarAid to secure 
materials there was no further continuity of output. Different designs of imported 
solar lanterns then started to become available instead as SunnyMoney became 
established.  
Displaced technologies 
As new technologies are developed and start to be circulated, other technological 
solutions to the same ‘problems’ can be made obsolete over time. The aim of many 
solar lantern manufacturers and distributors, for example, is to put the kerosene 
lantern out of use. However, as the quotation from Çalışkan and Callon (2009) at the 
start of this chapter highlights, nothing moves in a market unless it also holds value 
for the manufacturers and distributors. Kerosene lantern technology does not exist 
as a technology separate from human activity. Lanterns and their feedstock cannot 
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simply vanish without any impact on the people that interact with them, those that 
turn the technology and fuel into mobile market goods.  
During a visit with SolarAid to collect marketing material in northern Malawi, the 
current fuel crisis had seriously reduced the availability of kerosene and inflated its 
prices where it was available. With most of the rural population still relying on 
kerosene for lighting and therefore being forced to spend increasing time searching 
for it and amounts of their limited income buying it, this was a situation that 
SolarAid was naturally keen to highlight. Mr Patrick Gondwe (Photo 20), a kerosene 
seller in a small local market, was approached and agreed to film a short interview 
about the ‘problem’ of kerosene. However, when the filming started he proceeded 
to explain the ‘problem’ of the increasing availability of solar lighting systems 
stealing his market and putting him out of business, and the knock-on effects this 
would have on his family. Of course he was politely thanked for his interview and 
we continued on our way to find other sources of marketing material to promote the 
problematic solar technology.  
Photo 20: Mr Patrick Gondwe, kerosene seller in front of empty jerry cans in Hara 
Trading Centre, northern Malawi 
 
Another example was a group of kerosene lantern makers living in the outskirts of 
Mzuzu in northern Malawi. Their parents were originally trained by missionaries 
from Zimbabwe who had presumably identified a ‘problem’ of limited income-
generating opportunities, and similarly seen that people needed a cheap and 
accessible form of lighting. All of the local women wore white scarves and shirts as 
part of the religious affiliation also passed on by the same missionaries. The 
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particular woman we spoke to described how her mother had taught her to make 
lanterns, and that it was the only activity she had ever done to generate an income. 
Some members of the group also made metal cake tins and other artefacts from the 
same sheet steel used to make the lanterns. They sold their wares in their local 
neighbourhood and in town for 80 kwacha (around 15p/25c12) each. The women 
were very friendly and happy to tell us about their lantern business and let us take 
photos, yet I wonder if they realised that we were effectively hoping to put them out 
of business. It was comforting to know that they also made steel cooking 
implements, knowing that the market for those was safer. 
Photo 21: Women demonstrating (left) and making (right) kerosene lanterns and 
cooking materials in Malawi 
    
When GVEP set up DEEP, they initially recruited kerosene sellers in order to train 
them in selling other lighting options such as solar lanterns. This would have 
allowed them to diversify into solar if they saw that they were losing out to it. 
However, the international donors would not allow it and required the kerosene 
sellers to be dropped from the programme. Those people were associated with a 
dirty technology that the donors did not want to be seen supporting in any way, 
even if they would have had an existing network of energy customers who could 
then be exposed to solar technology. Charcoal makers were also initially asked to 
join the programme, with the intention of training them in biomass briquette 
making. Again, the donors insisted that they were excluded from the programme.  
                                                      
12 Exchange rates used: £1 = 550 Malawian kwacha; £1 = US$1.67 
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Photo 22: Charcoal sellers in western Kenya 
 
Inevitably any technology may displace another that serves the same purpose; it is a 
process that has occurred many times with resultant impacts on the market actors 
for the displaced technology. It might be argued that development intermediaries 
specifically aim to enhance people’s livelihoods and should therefore support or at 
least acknowledge those that are negatively impacted by related marketisation 
activities. This is a point that is discussed further in Chapter 0. 
6.2 Qualification and requalification 
Standardisation 
While the number of different designs of a particular product or solution to 
a ’problem’ can theoretically be infinite, standardisation of particular aspects 
increase their utility and opportunities for successful marketisation. For example, 
solar lantern systems that charge mobile phones need to come with appropriately 
designed connectors that fit into the commonly available types of phone. Improved 
cookstoves need to be sized appropriately to take the common sizes of cooking pots. 
Equally, for modular manufacturing it is important that different parts fit together, 
even if made in different places.  
The most prolific design of efficient cookstove for charcoal or briquettes in Kenya is 
now the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (‘jiko’ meaning cookstove in Swahili), commonly 
referred to as the KCJ. These can be made in any size the manufacturer chooses and 
indeed this is sometimes the case where one manufacturer is making the entire 
stove. However, a system of standard sizes has become common that has facilitated 
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growth of a market for liners only. Measured in inches, the liners range in diameter 
from 8 inches up to 12 inches. Each diameter of liner also has a relative height and 
thickness of clay. A key component of achieving this standardisation is the ability to 
measure. Although liner makers may not necessarily own a ruler, an essential tool 
for making liners is a mould (Photo 23, left) that turns out a specific size and 
consistent thickness of liner. The metalworkers that make these moulds are often 
also the stove cladding makers, so they know the standard sizes that are required. 
This simple factor allows cladding makers and liner makers to work separately 
while knowing that the different parts will still fit together. It is a significant 
contributor to the KCJ becoming one of the most prolific stove designs in East Africa. 
Liner makers in clay-rich areas, but without metal-working skills or sheet-metal 
sources, are able to sell their products to cladding makers and full stove assemblers 
in clay-poor areas, thus producing country-wide market assemblages.  
Standardisation of products also makes sure that they all perform equally. It is very 
difficult to provide accurate performance information if every product sold is 
slightly different, even if only in subtle ways. One group of ladies making cookstove 
liners, for example, had started off arbitrarily putting air vent holes in the base of 
the liners, which is usual practise and what they had been trained to do. The air 
holes were at least all the same size because of a common tool used make them, but 
the pattern and number of them varied considerably. However, they subsequently 
realised that since the air holes affect the fuel burning process, it was making the 
efficiency and burn rate of every stove different. They therefore changed to a 
systematic number and arrangement of holes in order to ensure consistency (Photo 
23, right).  
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Photo 23: Mr Herbert Bogezi in Wakiso, Uganda, showing different sized moulds for 
cookstove liners (left); improved cookstove liners with consistent number, 
arrangement and size of air holes (right) 
  
The ability to standardise is heavily affected by access to measuring equipment or 
tools that are already made to standard sizes. In local artisan manufacturing, by 
comparison with advanced mechanised manufacturing, even basic tools needed for 
standardisation are not always available. For biomass briquettes, many briquette 
makers do not have weighing scales. Instead of selling by weight they instead sell 
by container size, such as a plastic bag, small bucket or large bucket. These 
containers obviously vary between sellers, however, making it difficult to accurately 
compare the price being offered by different sellers. Equally for GVEP trying to 
collate data on total briquette sales across DEEP, ‘three bucket loads’ is unhelpful 
information. Unfortunately when weighing scales are not readily available it is the 
only information provided and weight estimates for typical bucket loads have to be 
applied. Equally for the individual briquettes, where these are made by manual or 
automated machines it is easy for them to be produced in relatively consistent 
shapes and sizes. Where people are making them by hand due to lack of machinery, 
however, the shape and size will vary to a much greater extent and this will affect 
the burn time per briquette.  
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Testing, standards certification and patents – market devices with varying 
levels of accessibility  
Beyond being able to recognise that a product in general will fulfil requirements, its 
specific capabilities need to be known more exactly so that people can accurately 
evaluate it and compare it to other possible solutions for the same need. Even a 
weighing system that can be described as a simple market device involves a much 
broader assemblage of human and non-human components than perhaps first 
envisaged: to be useful it must be of an appropriate design and calibrated at some 
point for accuracy, there must be a user with the necessary technique to use it in the 
correct way, a way of recording the weight for later reference is desirable, and so on, 
and all must eventually come together in a particular configuration at a precise 
moment of time for the act of weighing to be carried out. More complex market 
devices for evaluating product properties thus require almost inexhaustible lists of 
materials, tools and techniques. Figure 30 shows a flyer that a Kenyan solar lantern 
seller produced to advertise one of the lanterns it sells. As well as information on 
the electronic characteristics, such as Wattage and Voltage, and the materials it is 
made from, it provides very specific data about the light’s performance in the 
following aspects: 
• intensity of the light it gives out, in lumens;  
• length of time the light can be operated for in different modes, in combination or 
otherwise with mobile phone charging; and 
• overall battery life, in months. 
These characteristics are provided in both absolute and relative forms (i.e. in 
comparison to other lighting options). Verbal descriptions are also given 
summarising the product’s uses and highlighting a 1-year warranty in case it does 
not meet the descriptions given. Similar information is also given on the packaging 
of the lighting kits themselves. 
None of the performance values provided in such advertising materials or product 
packaging are immediately obvious from looking at the product alone. Establishing 
these values requires a vast complex system of laboratory and field tests, data 
collection over time, numerous measuring and recording devices, calibration 
equipment, testing protocols, trained staff, and so forth. This is not just for the 
product itself but also for those it is being compared with. It perhaps starts to 
highlight why SolarAid found that locally assembled solar lanterns were unable to 
compete with the imported products that emerge from these complex systems to 
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ensure standardised, quality products and that come complete with such detailed 
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Many of the energy product sellers interviewed (e.g. WEDI, Interview 4; Up Energy, 
Interview 12) had found that customers were willing to make a purchase if they 
could see that a product was good quality. For local manufacturers it was therefore 
important to find ways of creating high quality and aesthetically-pleasing products 
as far as possible, even if the more complex market devices of advanced 
manufacturing and testing processes were inaccessible. GVEP trains its 
entrepreneurs in improving the visual appearance of their products, promoting 
packaging and labelling to give a professional appearance. It also links them with 
local testing facilities where available, such as for cookstoves at the Centre for 
Research in Energy and Energy Conservation at the University of Makerere in 
Kampala, Uganda. Where this was not possible, in some cases entrepreneurs 
undertook their own qualification processes. For example, cookstove seller Naaman 
Justus in Mombasa said that he had undertaken his own research in order to inform 
his customers, and found that improved cookstoves made a bag of charcoal last 15 
days longer than a standard metal one (45 days instead of 30).  
Photo 24: Painted and labelled cookstove made by Farouk, Kampala 
 
The consumer’s experience of the technology will also be highly dependent on them 
understanding how it works and how to use it optimally. A solar lantern is not 
inherently a provider of light; instead, it must be used by someone with the 
cognitive understanding of how it works who then applies that understanding to 
use it. As well as DEEP entrepreneurs and SunnyMoney sellers being trained to give 
as much information as possible to their customers, some product manufacturers 
provide instruction sheets and/or instructions written into the product or its 
packaging. These instruction sheets and labels are vital channels of communication 
between the designer and the user. They combine with the product to enhance its 
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potential and value. Simple ways of promoting that communication line, such as 
making sure instructions are in the local language or clearly embedded into the 
product (Photo 25), can therefore add considerable value.  
Photo 25: d.light solar lantern with embedded instructions  
    
Quality can also be demonstrated more systematically through a quality assurance 
scheme. For solar lights that are imported, they are theoretically checked for quality 
by customs and have to meet the standards required by the national bureau of 
standards. These are generally in line with international standards for the specific 
product in question. The Malawi Bureau of Standards (MBS) describes the process 
as follows:  
All importers of designated products […] are required to register with the MBS on 
the scheme. The designated products list is based on published mandatory Malawi 
standards. Pre-shipment samples of potential imports are demanded by the MBS 
from the manufacturer in the countries of origin for the MBS to ascertain compliance 
to respective Malawi Standards of the product before the consignment is allowed to 
depart the country of origin for Malawi. Consignments of products for registered 
importers are then quickly checked at the border point for compliance to the 
relevant Malawi standard, before they are cleared. A letter is then issued to MRA 
[Malawi Revenue Authority] indicating compliance or non-compliance of the 
consignment for clearance purposes. (Malawi Bureau of Standards, Date unknown) 
Although this system appears a good start, interviews with solar home system 
sellers in Kenya (Kenital Solar, Interview 24; Sollatek, Interview 26) found that a 
similar set-up in Kenya has been problematic in terms of enforcement. Perhaps 
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unsurprisingly, it was suggested that if people really wanted to import something, 
there were ways of bypassing the quality requirements or even customs altogether. 
An example was known where someone selling Sharp photocopiers had bought lots 
of sub-standard solar panels in to the country and put the Sharp stickers on them. In 
other cases the stickers showing panel wattage had been swapped or added 
subsequent to import, showing a much higher wattage than the panel actual had – 
such as a 20W panel being rebranded at 40W. The standards system for imported 
solar panels was introduced in 1999, however, and since then various improvements 
to make some of these activities more difficult had been observed. After legitimate 
solar importers pointed it out, the import legislation was changed to make sure that 
sizing stickers are embedded in the panel underneath the glass so that they cannot 
be removed or changed. The limitations of the system more generally are still 
widely recognised though. One solar lantern importer noted that despite all of their 
products having met the required standards of the Ugandan National Bureau of 
Standards (UNBS), they deliberately did not put UNBS stickers on them: “as other 
products we know are no good still have UNBS stickers – so we don’t feel it’s 
necessary or useful to put stickers on ours.” (Village Energy, Interview 21, 2012)  
Since state enforcement of quality standards for solar lighting products may be 
perceived to have weaknesses or have not yet been established in some countries, 
the quasi-World Bank organisation Lighting Africa has been setting up a non-state 
framework for solar lighting kit quality assurance. It is often used by development 
intermediaries involved in distributing solar lanterns in order to have confidence in 
the products they choose to deal with. This in turn encourages manufacturers such 
as Barefoot and d.light (Interviews 14 and 29) to engage with the system.  
No solar customers who I talked to knew of Lighting Africa or had used it to gain 
information on the quality of potential purchases. However, adherence to Lighting 
Africa standards was advertised on some locally-made marketing materials for solar 
products in Kenya (Figure 31, left) so that it may become more known of over time. 
In general, engagement with final customers during this research was too limited to 
be conclusive, but from those talked with and from conversations with local 
manufacturers (cookstove makers only) the significance of products having met 
national quality standards seemed to be variable for individual buyers. By contrast, 
for larger wholesale buyers (e.g. supermarkets) it was often a requirement for any 
products they bought. The advertising materials shown in Figure 31 are perhaps 
overly-optimistic of the wider knowledge of specific quality frameworks. However, 
the official-sounding and positive language used, extensive list of standards 
adhered to (right-hand example) and mention of associated international 
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institutions (IFC and World Bank in left-hand example) undoubtedly increase the 
impact made.  
Figure 31: Quality assurance indications on solar lantern advertising materials 
  
For locally-made products such as cookstoves and briquettes, certification with the 
national standards bureau is sometimes also available (although not always easily 
accessible) but is not mandatory. The only time it might be required is when selling 
to large distributors who have incorporated national standards into their 
purchasing policy. Some cookstove makers in Kenya, for example, had gained KEBS 
(Kenyan Bureau of Standards) certification in order to sell to supermarket chains. 
They found that being able to put the KEBS logo on their stoves had also improved 
consumer trust more generally and allowed them to put the price up due to the 
improved quality it represented compared to competitors. This also helped cover 
the monthly fees needed to be paid to maintain the KEBS certification and the initial 
costs of carrying out of the required tests. 
Some issues were identified with the standards required, however. For example, 
one entrepreneur (Farouk) failed to achieve certification for his cookstove under the 
UNBS framework as the standard was only relevant for one specific design. This 
was for a 3-stand stove that rested on 3 metal legs attached to the bottom of the 
stove. However, Farouk’s experience was that this design is not strong enough for 
making ‘posho’ on, the maizemeal that is the main staple of Ugandan meals and 
requires vigorous mixing. He therefore makes flat-bottomed stoves and is unwilling 
to change this design to meet the UNBS standard when it would in fact reduce the 
functionality of the stoves. The standard therefore has very restricted application 
and in fact restricts the potential for innovation.  
The Kenyan standard for improved stoves is entitled KS 1814-1:2005 and sets 
minimum standards for their performance. It is applied in combination with 
international guidelines for evaluating cookstove performance, ICS 97.040.20. 
Testing to these standards often requires very advanced facilities with suitably 
trained laboratory staff and authorisation to undertake certifications, all further 
socio-technical components needed to complete the market device. However, such 
facilities are not necessarily readily available locally. Associated with the standard is 
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an amendment to the Energy Law that was being developed in Kenya in 2013 to 
require people importing, manufacturing, distributing, and/or installing improved 
cookstoves to be registered as such. Registration involves an application process and 
declaration that only stoves meeting the standard will be handled (Authority of the 
Republic of Kenya, 2013). It will be interesting to see how this is enforced for the 
large array of small-scale producers currently in existence in Kenya.  
For cookstoves that can also be subject to large-scale fully automated manufacturing 
abroad and then imported, the testing standards are being developed even further 
and becoming increasingly inaccessible for local artisan cookstove makers. Colorado 
State University Engines and Energy Conversion Lab, for example, is developing 
advanced durability testing with automated testing rigs as part of their product 
development. They are also working with the US-based Global Clean Cookstove 
Alliance to develop an associated testing protocol, in turn leading to a laboratory 
standard for rating cookstove durability (Colorado State University, 2013). The 
complex and extensive socio-technical arrangements needed for such market 
devices, however, makes them unavailable in many countries and inevitably leads 
to power asymmetries between local artisans and increasingly ‘macro’ market actors 
such as those involved in advanced cookstove design in US institutions, despite 
their apparently similar market roles.  
Although briquette-makers have limited competition from international 
manufacturers, Patrick Mwenge in Kenya encountered a problem when a large-
volume buyer of his briquettes asked him to obtain a KEBS standard: one has not 
yet been developed. He therefore had to subject his briquettes to the same tests 
required by the relevant South African standard. The briquettes failed, yet the tests 
were unrealistically stringent for the much less developed Kenyan briquette market. 
GVEP staff had heard that the Kenya Industrial Research and Development Institute 
was developing a Kenyan standard, but no further information was found.  
As a designer and maker of briquetting machines, Patrick also considered patenting 
his designs. However, he felt that the process was too onerous in terms of both 
administrative requirements and costs. Without the protection of patenting, he 
found that people often copied his machines, although he stated that since he was 
always improving his design he was in fact not as concerned about it as he had 
initially expected. Again, patenting is an inaccessible market device for many local 
innovators. Ability to obtain patents increases the power of those organisations 
relative to other market actors. Here, however, trading within the ‘informal 
economy’ does offer advantages through the lack of adherence to formal regulation. 
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One cookstove entrepreneur, for example, described how he would look for 
‘patented’ cookstove designs on the internet that he could copy. Furthermore, the 
limited complexity and rapid advancements of designs and manufacturing 
processes in these contexts perhaps makes patenting less relevant by comparison 
with hi-tech industries.  
6.3 Valuation and price-setting 
Attaching a value to an object transforms it into an ‘economic good’ for exchange. 
Valuation by international development stakeholders is heavily linked to the 
problematisation described at the start of this chapter. For end-users, however, it is 
linked to various factors associated with purchase and use, and how the available 
alternatives compare; hence the importance of the qualification processes described 
above. In idealised economic terms, people weigh up the immediate cost of a 
product against the savings it will incur in the longer term and undertake a cost-
benefit analysis. However, even where the performance of products can be 
measured ‘scientifically’ and presented to potential consumers alongside 
comparative data for competing solutions, their valuation will be a much more 
complex and unique process that leads to a different value being ascribed to the 
same product by every potential end-user.  
Valuation embodies wide desires, influences and experiences. For example, in many 
rural areas of the three countries I worked in, there seemed to be a strong desire to 
emulate the ‘modern’ ways of life seen in urban areas. Attaching modern as a 
meaning to products is seen as very positive. One person talked about his 
grandmother getting a large solar panel for her rural home, bought for her by her 
children who saw the danger of her using candles: “She got a TV and radio with it. 
She was so impressed; she saw life was joyful with it. It was in the village but life 
became more like in the town.” This had inspired him to set up his solar phone 
charging business. There was similarly higher value put on externally manufactured 
cookstoves versus locally-made ones.  
Value is also associated to prior experience, even where it may have no direct link to 
the specific product in question. People were sometimes mistrustful of solar because 
of having experienced directly, or having heard of, a solar product malfunctioning. 
Equally I saw various examples of a mistrust and lack of value associated with 
Chinese-made products. This is seen in people willing to spend as much or more 
money on second hand European clothes in the large marketplaces specifically 
dedicated to selling them, than brand-new clothes imported directly from China. 
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One solar manufacturer commented on the difficulty of persuading people that 
even though the solar lanterns are manufactured in China, they are designed in 
Australia and meet international quality standards.  
The development intermediaries promoting clean energy products recognise that 
customers are interested in a variety of factors related to the product, and not 
necessarily the same features that development stakeholders are interested in. In 
order to encourage the valuation process, they have developed a variety of 
advertising materials that highlight benefits of the products being promoted (Figure 
32 and Figure 33). These tend to focus on monetary value (particularly versus 
competing products), health and safety aspects, and diversity of applications.  
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Figure 32: Flyers for solar lanterns by GVEP (left) and Solar Sister (right) 
 
Figure 33: Flyers for improved cookstoves by GVEP (left) and GIZ (right) 
  
As well as written descriptions of the products, all of the advertising material 
includes drawings or photos of them and in most cases people using them. The 
representations of end-users all have happy, smiling faces that entice the 
prospective consumers to visualise themselves in idealised situations such as 
pristine smoke-less kitchens or a well-lit sitting room where their child reads a book. 
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The flyers attach these lifestyles to the products, providing not just a useful 
description but performing the readers as users of the products. Related to this, a 
member of staff observed of the GVEP flyers that they offered limited portrayal of 
the ‘modern’ and sophisticated lifestyle that were known to appeal to potential 
customers.  
Direct health impacts, such as reduced smoke and no fire risk, are clearly values 
perceived as shared across end-users and development stakeholders. By contrast, 
across the marketing material there is limited explanation of wider environmental 
benefits – unlike development-related literature for the same products, which 
focuses extensively on the problems of climate change and deforestation. Further 
research would be needed to determine if this is only a perceived difference or a 
reality. Certainly some DEEP entrepreneurs claimed that their involvement in these 
markets was motivated by environmental concerns and deliberately communicated 
environmental benefits to their customers. In Kenya I helped to promote GVEP’s 
work at a national climate change ‘expo’13 and talked to other exhibitors, purposeful 
visitors and others that had just been ‘passing by’. I was impressed by the level of 
awareness of climate change issues and related concern amongst Kenyans, with 
much higher levels of engagement than I have generally experienced in the UK. This 
is perhaps unsurprising given recent episodes of drought in the Horn of Africa and 
flooding in Kenya, with widespread adverse impacts on vulnerable communities. 
Numerous representatives from Kenyan civil society organisations were there to 
circulate petitions calling for a strong agreement at the forthcoming international 
climate change negotiations in Durban.  
Interestingly, a ToughStuff poster was also seen on display in one solar lantern 
seller’s kiosk. It showed photos of the products but did not describe the various 
benefits specifically, instead simply summarising its inherent value by suggesting: 
“Use ToughStuff Solar products to improve your life”. 
Warranties 
Part of the valuation process of a product involves considering the length of time for 
which it will be able to serve its intended purpose. Unsurprisingly, there is little 
reference in the marketing material to the fact that these products, and components 
thereof such as batteries, have a limited lifespan. Partly to give prospective 
consumers confidence that their new purchase will perform as advertised for at least 
a minimum duration (and partly for other reasons discussed in the carbon finance 
                                                      
13 Kenya National Climate Change Expo, Kenyatta International Conference Centre (KICC), Nairobi, 13th – 15th 
October 2011 
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section later), most solar lanterns and cookstoves imported by development 
intermediaries are distributed with warranty certificates.    
All of the products sold by SunnyMoney, for example, are sold with a piece of paper 
or card in the packaging that describes an after-sales service promise from the 
absent manufacturer to the buyer, in the form of a list of legal terms and conditions 
of their mutual obligations written in English. An example from a Barefoot Firefly 
solar lantern is shown in Figure 34. However, these are a contract with the 
manufacturer that has no physical presence in Malawi, except via SunnyMoney as 
importer, and represent only part of a larger market device. They only become more 
than a passive piece of card if they exist alongside the full human and material 
capacity to fulfil them.  
Figure 34: Warranty card for Barefoot Power solar lantern 
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Figure 35: Inside warranty card for Barefoot Power solar lantern 
 
One of the first challenges to the successful operation of the warranty market device 
is that in order to validate a warranty, customers need to prove the date of purchase. 
Initially SunnyMoney provided their entrepreneurs and dealers with receipt books 
for this purpose, a pad of specially marked papers with differently coloured carbon 
copies for each, but since the start of 2012 it was decided that the cost and 
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responsibility of providing receipts should lie with the sales people. Operating with 
varying levels of formality, many have not continued this. Increasing numbers of 
problematic products were being filtered back to SunnyMoney’s Mzuzu office, 
without indication of whether they were still bound by the theoretical warranty 
contract. If giving the date of purchase for a time-bound warranty becomes trust-
based, it arguably negates the whole purpose of introducing a physical paper-
printed warranty to formalise the agreement in the first place. 
At the same time, the manufacturers whose products SunnyMoney import do not 
yet offer a service of providing replacement parts, only full replacement of faulty 
products once they are sent back. SunnyMoney are stifled in their efforts to develop 
capacity to mend faulty products or equip the actors in their sales networks with 
spare parts. For the most vocal or significant customers, the easiest or sometimes 
only option is to provide a brand new replacement product, depleting 
SunnyMoney’s stock while the manufacturer is informed and asked to send extra 
products to fulfil their side of the warranty promise in the next consignment, up to 
six months away.  
Other broken products stay with dissatisfied customers who are not aware of the 
rights that their warranty certificate apparently gives them. Even where a customer 
can read these promises written in English, they have no way of proving that the 
warranty period has not expired yet and limited ability to make a claim against the 
warranty in any case. Their supposed humanitarian good sits uselessly in the 
meantime, bereft of its ability to perform as such. The concept of a warranty, 
developed for very different looking markets, does not seem as well suited to the 
rural African context. Firstly there may be a long sales chain to go back through 
(Figure 36), often with extensive geographical distances between each actor that take 
significant time and money to deliver a product back across, with no available 
recompense; a solar lantern cannot simply be posted back to the shop in prepaid 
packaging.  
Figure 36: Example of solar lantern sales chain along which warranty promise is made 
 
Furthermore, in Malawi and other African countries there is often limited history of 
warranty systems, perhaps because of the predominance of informal market 
exchanges. In northern Malawi we interviewed 47 market traders and only 7 (just 










would replace an item if it came back to them damaged. One of those commented, 
however, that no one did ever come back with a problem and if they did it was bad 
luck that the manufacturer had made a bad product, not the responsibility of the 
stockist. Customers would be more likely to accept the problem as entirely separate 
from the product sale and find a way to fix the issue themselves. 
In essence, market devices such as warranties are stifled in this context by a hybrid 
system of formal contracts and informal sales, and limited opportunity for actors to 
know or fulfil their sides of optimistically worded contracts. If the marketisation 
approach aims to create a functioning formal market system with effective market 
devices, and thus gain the trust of customers so that they and their networks are 
enticed to participate in the new market over the long term, it is still a work in 
progress. What appears particularly problematic in the example of SunnyMoney is 
that the manufacturers have already incorporated the value of the warranty device 
into their price setting calculations, yet that value is rarely getting experienced by 
the end-users and is unlikely to be considered in their own valuations. In essence 
they are forced to pay for an aspect of the product that they cannot easily benefit 
from, creating a power asymmetry in favour of the manufacturer during the market 
exchange. Although it is a system that may work well in places such as Uganda 
(where Barefoot had 21 service centres at the time of writing), in Malawi there were 
undoubtedly better solutions. Photo 26, for example, shows local repair people in 
northern Malawi demonstrating that they already had the skills to fix faulty solar 
lanterns.  
Photo 26: Local radio (left) and mobile phone (right) repair people demonstrating that 




In order for a market exchange to take place, value is quantified in monetary terms. 
Ultimately a price is established through negotiation, which can vary in its visibility, 
between buyers and sellers. Both sides will be equipped with their valuation, 
discussed above, and with various calculative devices, named ‘valorimeters’ by 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010), which can help turn that valuation into a price. On the 
seller side, the simplest ‘valorimeter’ is “the gold strategy of marking up” (ibid., 
p.18) whereby the price of a product is based on the cumulative price of raw 
materials plus overheads (such as labour, transport) and a suitable profit margin. 
This is discussed further in the next chapter in the context of the price setting 
processes of the ‘local entrepreneurs.’  
Price setting is affected by a seller’s knowledge of price setting techniques and their 
cognitive and technical ability to apply them; for example, poor record keeping can 
make it difficult for an artisan manufacturer to know the actual cost of input 
materials. Additional costs such as payment for quality testing and registration with 
a standards board also feed into the seller’s price, whether or not a buyer takes any 
notice of that standard when doing their own valuation. As discussed above, a 
warranty system is similarly incorporated into a price even if a buyer cannot utilise 
it. Formalising a business and complying with regulations also involves expenses, 
leading to cost advantages for products made in informal conditions.  
The seller’s price is then adjusted when other factors are taken into consideration, 
including the social interaction at the point of exchange where negotiation occurs. 
One solar powered barber in Uganda described his prices as: “1500 [Ugandan 
shillings] per person, or if they complain a lot they might get it for 1000.” As a seller 
of solar lanterns, SunnyMoney staff have frequent and extensive management 
meetings about pricing structures that follow a similar basic pattern of ‘costs plus 
profits’. As a larger, more formal seller, however, they try to be less swayed by 
individual negotiations and follow set rules about the prices offered to different 
types of buyers. Since they are the only importers of many types of solar lanterns 
into Malawi, they have relative power to fix prices at their desired level.  
Where price-setting starts to divert significantly from the materiality of products it 
can cause difficulties in the overall marketisation process. The existence of subsidies, 
grants and carbon credits for environmentally friendly ‘humanitarian goods’, for 
example, can cause the price set by sellers to deviate significantly from the 
calculated value of a product, as discussed further below and in Chapter 0. The 
price may be set by means detached from the production of the goods, such as 
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‘willingness to pay’ studies. They could also become distortedly low, or non-existent 
in the case of free allocation, removing the buyer’s opportunity of being involved in 
the conversion of value into price and choosing their actions on this basis, and 
diminishing the opportunity for other market actors to sell competing products.  
On the buyer-side, cash availability was seen as a significant determinant of 
purchasing decisions in the contexts analysed in this research. Solar lantern sellers, 
for example, found that visiting areas just after the local harvest time when people 
had cash in hand was most profitable, with people more readily agreeing to buy at 
the first price proposed. External influences such as prices of competing products 
again affect the buyer’s price-setting processes. The competition for solar phone 
charging, for example, is grid charging and as one provider stated: “The price is 500 
[Ugandan] shillings for 2.5 hours of charging. That’s the same as people charging 
from the grid. It’s the standard price, people would complain if it gets increased.” A 
briquette seller in Kampala struggling to find buyers at the price they needed to 
cover operational costs suggested that: “One of the things that is missing in Uganda 
is regulation of charcoal to make it higher cost relative to briquettes.” (Green 
BioEnergy, Interview 16, 2012)  
Another classic ‘valorimeter’ is cost-benefit analysis: customers ideally consider 
what they will be replacing and how they value the new product by comparison. 
Here cookstoves and briquettes are at a disadvantage compared to solar because 
they are often replacing something that is, in monetary terms at least, freely 
available – stones and firewood. Although there may be health impacts and 
deforestation issues, numerous people in rural African settings are accustomed to 
using open fires and would not necessarily prioritise paying for a stove instead. 
Someone trained in economic tools, however, might be able to use long-term cost-
benefit analysis to demonstrate that the future costs to a family of significant health 
problems from smoke inhalation in fact outweigh the initial cost of an efficient 
cookstove. Since they also reduce the amount of firewood needing collection, 
further savings are made if the economic value of their time is considered. At a 
much greater stretch, the potential cost of damage caused by climatic changes that 
the deforestation could contribute to can even be incorporated into the calculation.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, application of these types of extensive calculations by 
potential customers were not observed. It might be argued that low numeracy levels 
and low education levels more generally make such cognitive tools inaccessible. For 
example, many solar lantern sellers stated that they find it difficult to persuade 
people that the high up-front cost of the system is worth it based on the savings 
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made over time. Although kerosene is relatively cheap to buy at the time of 
purchase, once successive daily or weekly purchases are added up it eventually 
becomes an increasingly expensive option by comparison with the one-off purchase 
of a solar lantern. Difficulty in explaining this to potential customers is explained by 
sellers as the customers’ limited understanding of cost-benefit analysis and ‘pay-
back’. However, it could also be argued that these are idealised tools for someone 
who has both adequate market information and, perhaps more importantly, the 
ability to pay for a more expensive product that only becomes cost-effective over the 
longer-term. Limited access to the necessary funds to buy the solar lantern in the 
first place, due to prioritisation of more directly obvious needs, can make certain 
‘valorimeters’ irrelevant or a luxury at best. The ability to fully render people into 
rational ‘economic’ actors is essentially limited. This is why emerging products such 
as pay-as-you-go solar (discussed further in Chapter 0) may be highly significant, 
even if the users have to pay higher overall costs for the same system in the long-
term.  
6.4 Carbon finance 
Another aspect of the kerosene problematisation that is used to garner wider 
support for solar lighting technology is the climate change perspective. Again, this 
can be used to appeal to environmentally-conscious donors, investors or consumers. 
It also, importantly, is required in order to benefit from a specific type of revenue 
stream for projects to distribute solar lights: revenue from the sale of carbon credits. 
Greenhouse gas emissions have been ‘marketised’ so that price-setting for products 
which also generate carbon credits depend in turn on the inter-relation between the 
value of the original product and the value of the carbon credit, which is about to 
embark on its own journey of exchange within a market system. 
Figure 37: The exchange and use of sustainable energy products interlinks with the 










SolarAid advertise carbon savings as one of the benefits of solar lamps on their 
website, as shown in Figure 29 above. However, at the time of the research they 
were not in the process of collecting ‘carbon credits’. In 2008 SolarAid had 
registered its Malawi SunnyMoney operations as a Gold Standard voluntary market 
carbon project, specifying that 39,000 1.8W solar lighting kits would be sold and 
used to replace kerosene lanterns, leading to a total reduction of 1,901.72 tonnes of 
CO2 equivalent per year for a period of 10 years (SolarAid, 2008). However, this was 
based on locally assembled solar lamps, and since moving to imported lanterns 
SolarAid had acquired the complication of the lantern manufacturers potentially 
already claiming carbon credits for the same lanterns. Photo 27 shows a d.light S1 
solar lantern, a key SunnyMoney tool for their schools marketing campaigns, with 
the following carbon credit statement printed in to the plastic cover of the light: 
“Lamp used for d.light Rural Lighting Project claiming emission reductions. Not to 
be sold or used under other carbon projects.” 
Photo 27: D.light S1 solar lantern with carbon credit statement 
 
This statement is used to indicate that d.light already uses the quantified carbon 
reductions to sell as carbon credits and help finance their products. They also link 
the carbon reduction aspects of their products with their social benefits marketing, 
putting a specific number on the extent to which they are helping to protect the 
environment through avoidance of greenhouse gases.  
The d.light website provides a statement of the current levels of reductions achieved. 
On 2nd July 2013, for example, it stated “1,047,505 tons of CO2 offset” (d.light design, 
2013). There are several reasons that this is a particularly interesting statement. 
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Firstly, the level of known accuracy it suggests is surprising. This also applies to the 
figure of 1,901.72 tonnes of CO2 equivalent per year that were the calculated 
reductions for the original SolarAid Gold Standard carbon project. For carbon 
finance calculations, an exact number of tons of CO2 must be estimated as this will 
define the number of carbon credits awarded as ‘certified emission reductions’ 
(CERs). However, there is a whole host of estimations and calculations undertaken 
to achieve this figure, discussed to some extent below, that make the error margins 
of such calculations very high. The calculation tends to be ‘black-boxed,’ to use 
Latour’s term, leading those who cannot see inside it to assume that the figure 
produced is a cold, stable piece of information.  
Secondly, d.light’s statement could be seen as misleading due to the confusing use 
of ‘offset’. If the carbon credits ‘generated’ by the lanterns are all sold, those buying 
the credits are buying the opportunity to emit the equivalent amount of CO2 at the 
buyer end and state their overall ‘carbon neutrality’. The net result of the carbon 
reductions being sold as offsets, therefore, is zero reduction in CO2 emissions overall. 
Theoretically d.light has not ‘offset’ any CO2 as their statement suggests, they have 
only enabled buyers of the offsets to produce the equivalent volume of CO2. This 
situation, however, has become inaccessible to most lay people, again because of the 
way that carbon market processes have been ‘black-boxed’.  
Standardisation and accessibility  
As well as excluding the readers of ‘impact’ statements on websites, the system of 
generating carbon credits has become so complex that it is also inaccessible to many 
potential participants. Chapter 2 describes how Africa as a region has historically 
had limited participation in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and slightly 
higher representation in the voluntary mechanisms. Where projects are registered, 
however, they tend to be above a certain size and have involved an organisation 
with some expert knowledge in the carbon markets. For GVEP, most of their DEEP 
entrepreneurs have not heard of carbon credits and even where they have, do not 
have the necessary expert knowledge to actually develop a carbon finance project. 
Only two out of the 30 (7%) I spoke to mentioned carbon credits at all and just one 
had been able to access them via a different NGO’s project. Furthermore, the DEEP 
entrepreneurs tend to manufacture and sell products in far too small quantities to be 
able to benefit from the carbon markets on their own. The transaction costs of 
registering a project, obtaining credits and organising their sale are high and need to 
be outweighed by the volume of credits obtained.  
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Even for a large company like d.light, the costs are huge. Cross (2013) states that: 
“The project registration process involving third party assessment, validation and 
certification is extremely expensive and bureaucratic, and it took d.light design 18 
months at an estimated cost of US$500,000.” (p.382) However, it can still be worth it 
financially: “Over the first two years, the project stood to displace some 80,177 tons 
of CO2. With each ton trading at an average price of US$15 between 2009 and 2010, 
d.light design was set to raise around US$1.2 million” (ibid., p.383). 
Although local sellers of imported solar lanterns may be excluded from the carbon 
markets due to manufacturers already claiming credits, as in the d.light example, in 
principle the benefit still trickles down through the retail price of the lanterns being 
lowered by this extra income stream. Where there appears to be a more problematic 
exclusion is where individuals or groups such as DEEP entrepreneurs are 
themselves manufacturing and selling ‘low carbon’ products, such as clean 
cookstoves, yet are unable to compete with larger manufacturers or project 
developers. Unlike the local artisans, those larger actor-networks embody the 
technical, cognitive and financial capacity to access complex and high cost carbon 
finance mechanisms. A specific example of the distorted competition this leads to is 
given in Chapter 0 (Section 8.7).   
My fieldwork period coincided with the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 
Durban; since the University of Edinburgh has ‘observer’ status I was able to attend. 
Having the COP in an African country led to many discussions on what carbon 
finance meant to local people there. As the South African Minister for Science and 
Technology expressed at a side event14, the carbon markets are full of acronyms and 
there is very rarely an appropriate translation in the vernacular, increasing the 
difficulty of explaining their purpose, let alone detailed methodologies, to 
newcomers. As well as the inexhaustible supply of acronyms, terms such as 
emission factors, fugitive emissions, leakage and credit fungibility were discussed at 
length in COP negotiations aimed at making carbon mechanisms more transparent 
and inclusive, yet very few people outside of the meetings would be able to explain 
the meaning of most of the terms or acronyms used. Those not conversant in the 
new language face a significant barrier to entering the carbon markets. At another 
side event a representative of the Ugandan Carbon Bureau described how difficult it 
                                                      
14 COP 15 side event, 29th November 2011: ‘Social sciences in a changing climate,’ organised by the Human 
Sciences Research Council and International Social Science Council, with guest speaker Naledi Pandor, South 
African Minister for Science and Technology. 
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is to explain the concept of carbon finance locally in Uganda, where it ends up being 
known as ‘smoke money’ because of the association with the reduction of gases.   
A Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) Methodology is a registered document 
that sets out the process that must be used in order to ‘create’ saleable certified 
emission reductions under the UNFCCC’s CDM. CDM Methodology AMS-II.G 
(UNFCCC, 2012), for example, is used to estimate the volume of emission 
reductions from clean cookstove projects and sets out other requirements such as 
how the achievement of reductions over time should be monitored. Version 5 of 
AMS-II.G became valid on the 7th December 2012 after its approval at the 70th 
meeting of the CDM Executive Board, held during the 18th COP in Doha. The first 
version of the same methodology was adopted in February 2008 but only one 
project was registered under it. Based in Nigeria, it is likely that the German 
partners in that project (the carbon consultancy ‘atmosfair’ and the NGO ‘LHL’) 
were the prime developers of the original methodology since this is how they 
commonly arise. Subsequent revisions were then made following requests from 
various other project developers, looking to make the methodology more 
compatible and favourable for their own projects.  
The key formula for estimating emission reductions using the AMS-II.G 
methodology is shown in Box 2 below. In summary, it states that the emission 
reductions generated in a year is equivalent to the volume of non-renewable 
biomass that each stove saves, multiplied by the emissions factor per unit of that 
biomass and the number of stoves in the project. In order to determine the savings 
of non-renewable biomass per stove, there is a choice of a further three different 
equations, each requiring some form of test procedure to be followed15. Even once 
the emission reductions have been estimated and the rest of the CDM project 
registration process completed, every two years similar tests must be carried out on 
a ‘representative sample’ of the stoves that have been sold to ensure that they are 
performing as expected, involving development of random sampling methodologies, 
identifying and visiting customers and further complex test procedures. Even the 
most basic monitoring plans require receipts with customer contact details to be 
able to identify a sample to survey in the first place, and more advanced projects 
now use GPS technology for marking the location of each stove sold. As described 
by one company: “The stove serial number is photographed and linked up with 
Google Earth via GPS, for easy identification at the monitoring stage.”  
                                                      
15 The choices include a Kitchen Performance Test (KPT), Water Boiling Test (WBT) or Controlled Cooking 
Test (CCT) and it is stated that relevant national standards or international guidelines (e.g. as developed by the 
Partnership for Clean Indoor Air www.pciaonline.org/testing) must be adhered to. 
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Box 2: Emission reductions calculation for a clean cookstoves project under CDM 
Methodology AMS-II.G (UNFCCC, 2012) 
 
Aggregation for access 
In summary the scale, complexity and technical tools required to engage with 
carbon market devices make them inaccessible to most informal producers, 
resulting in further power asymmetries between different types of market actors. 
There have been some initiatives to try and address this balance. Impact Carbon is 
an NGO that originated from the Center for Entrepreneurship in International 
Health and Development, a research centre at the University of California, Berkeley. 
It has an office in Uganda which has set up and manages a Gold Standard carbon 
finance project on behalf of a local cookstove producer, Ugastove. Half of the 
income gained from credit sales is invested back in Ugastove, particularly to 
upgrade their manufacturing facilities. The remainder goes towards the NGO’s 
administrative costs and to pay for external support from a for-profit carbon trading 
company. In this way the local manufacturers receive some of the credit value that 
they are unlikely to be able to access otherwise.  
Another solution is the aggregation of projects under larger umbrella programmes, 
known as Programmes of Activities (PoAs). Uganda Carbon Bureau (UCB) has 
ERy = Emission reductions in year y (tCO2e/yr) 
By,savings = Quantity of woody biomass that is saved in tonnes per device 
fNRB,y = Fraction of woody biomass saved by the project activity in year y that can be 
established as non-renewable biomass using survey methods or government data or 
default country specific fraction of non-renewable woody biomass (fNRB) values available 
on the CDM website 
NCVbiomass = Net calorific value of the non-renewable woody biomass that is substituted 
(IPCC default for wood fuel, 0.015 TJ/tonne, wet basis) 
EFprojected_fossilfuel = Emission factor for the substitution of non-renewable woody biomass by 
similar consumers. Use a value of 81.6 t CO2/TJ 
Ny,i = Number of project devices of type i operating in year y, determined as per paragraph 
22 [of methodology document] 
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taken this approach by using donor funding to establish an Improved Cook Stoves 
for East Africa PoA under which local cookstove manufacturers and projects can 
acquire carbon credits again without having to undertake the process themselves. 
As a member of their staff described: “Carbon finance can last for 21 years so it goes 
beyond donor money or government programmes. It used to be very difficult to 
keep a donor project going for more than 3 or 4 years. Carbon finance gives 
longevity.” (UCB, Interview 15, 2012) 
Valuation and ownership (property rights) 
Although there appear to be various solutions to make carbon market devices more 
accessible to local producers, interviews showed that proponents of the different 
approaches were having some debate over the relative equity and feasibility of each. 
Representatives of UCB (Interview 15) asserted that Ugastove did not receive an 
appropriate share of the credit revenue from Impact Carbon and complained that 
stove users, who were in fact the legal credit owners, were excluded altogether. By 
contrast, UCB would only allow projects to join their PoA where the majority of 
revenue was being channelled back to both manufacturers and end-users, with 
suggestions of using mobile cash transfers or investment in community water 
projects to fulfil the latter requirement (although since the PoA was still being 
established there were not yet any examples of this). UCB also stated that each stove 
buyer under their PoA must have the concept of carbon credits clearly explained to 
them, despite the difficulties described earlier, prior to being asked to give informed 
consent for credits to be claimed on their behalf.  
By contrast, representatives from Impact Carbon (Interview 13) felt that the 50% 
revenue-share passed to Ugastove was appropriate and the maximum possible, and 
did trickle down to consumers through reduced stove prices. Unlike UCB which 
used over US$250,000 in donor funding to set up their PoA and only required a 
small proportion of the credit revenue to pay for subsequent administration costs, 
Impact Carbon had taken a loan to establish the costly carbon finance project on 
behalf of Ugastove and was therefore needing to repay it, in addition to covering 
other ongoing costs. Managers from GVEP also agreed with this approach, one 
asserting that: “there is no way carbon finance can appeal to the private sector if it is 
not allowed to work in the way that Impact Carbon and Ugastove do it.” Another 
carbon finance organisation working in Uganda (Interview 20, Carbon Africa, 2012) 
highlighted the complexity and risk inherent in promising to pay stove users over 
time, particularly given that carbon credits involve a huge amount of uncertainty in 
 175 
how many will be obtained and when and are subject to variable market prices that 
at the time of research were particularly low. 
Carbon credits add to the complexity of valuation by attaching another, often silent 
and invisible, benefit to low carbon products. It is only visible to those that have 
been taught to see and value it. In essence, during the act of consuming a product 
such as a solar lantern or cookstove, an end-user is producing a new commodity of 
which they are theoretically the legal ‘owner’ even if they generally do not realise it. 
Value can also be created beyond the greenhouse gas emission reductions. The Gold 
Standard, for example, requires higher levels of ‘social benefits’ to be delivered by 
its projects than other carbon finance mechanisms and thus Gold Standard credits 
are sold at higher ‘premium’ prices.  
So how should it be explained to a local stove or lantern user that this additional 
value exists but that it has already been incorporated into the price of the products, 
and in return they must agree to give up legal ownership of the credit rights? And is 
this even really necessary for a market-based mechanism that is essentially a 
replacement for a more straightforward subsidy system? Within the carbon finance 
world it is seen as an important component of a project – demonstrating that the 
credit ‘generators’ have not covertly been stripped of their legal entitlement. 
Çalışkan and Callon (2010) note that even where property rights are relatively 
straightforward to ascertain, they require a suite of “specific technical, material, 
textual and legal devices” (p.7) for owners to be identified and to establish a process 
for change of ownership. Various methods have developed over time to transfer 
ownership of greenhouse gas emission reductions that themselves cannot be 
physically exchanged. The example of d.light’s carbon credit statement on many of 
their lights has already been shown in Photo 27 above. As SolarAid initially 
intended to collect carbon credits, they have a ‘rights waiver’ printed on the receipts 
(Figure 38) that they previously issued in bulk to lantern sellers to give to customers. 
Above the customer name, a sentence states: “I agree to hand over the carbon credit 
rights to Solar Aid”.  
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Figure 38: SunnyMoney cash receipt with carbon credit rights waiver encircled 
 
Ugastove also put a carbon waiver on their combined receipt and warranty cards, as 
do Up Energy, another stove distributor in Uganda that Impact Carbon was in the 
process of registering a carbon finance project for at the time of this research. When 
a stove sale is made, if the new owner wants to be able to take advantage of a free 
one-year warranty then they must sign the documents shown in Figure 39 (Up 
Energy) and Figure 40 (Ugastove), and thus the carbon waiver. Ugastove provide a 
Lugandan translation on the same warranty card; Up Energy did originally make 
some cards in Luganda, but since it is not spoken in all regions it was decided to 
keep them in the official language of English. Copies of these warranty cards are 
also very important for the sales companies as they provide user contact details 
which are needed for carrying out the monitoring requirements of the carbon 
finance projects. This also is part of the reason for the statement made in bold 
beneath the Ugastove carbon waiver (Figure 40), highlighting that the 
environmental benefits only come from regular use and displacement of the 
previous less efficient cooking method. The monitoring visits will partly be to assess 
that this is happening; if it is not, the number of carbon credits claimed have to be 
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This method of waiving carbon credit rights was another point of dispute with staff 
at Uganda Carbon Bureau (Interview 15, 2012), who felt that “some people are 
getting ripped off, the women who produce the emission reductions from 
cookstoves have to sign their rights to carbon credits away on the warranty without 
realising it.” They also said that they had written to the Gold Standard to highlight 
the inadequacy of this method, using the metaphor of selling agricultural 
equipment: “you don’t sell a plough then say you own the coffee produced in the 
field that it ploughed.” When I asked them about this in a follow-up interview, Up 
Energy managers responded that they had already heard these complaints and had 
therefore tried to meet with UCB at various times to ask for their ideas for an 
improved method, yet none was ever provided: “it’s not constructive criticism, they 
don’t follow it up with suggestions of how to do it differently” (Interview 12, 
follow-up, 2012). Up Energy managers also stated that they gave thorough training 
to their sellers on communicating the carbon credits waiver, but in reality spending 
enough time with each buyer to explain this complex financial mechanism would 
jeopardise their ability to make sales and thus lose any direct benefits that the stoves 
were there to provide in the first place.  
Relevance of carbon  
From talking with various stakeholders in carbon finance projects in Kenya, Uganda 
and Malawi, it seemed that these market devices may have had limited impact on 
the emergence of the solar lantern market, mainly because the number of carbon 
credits it was possible to obtain per lantern sold was not enough to provide a 
significant revenue stream, once transaction costs of activating the market device 
were taken into account. Nevertheless, many solar lantern manufacturers have 
established projects, or were in the process of doing so. ToughStuff was undertaking 
a stakeholder consultation in Kampala for their regional CDM PoA at the time of 
research. They were particularly keen to obtain the carbon credits in order to 
subsidise their lanterns for entering new markets such as Ethiopia with competitive 
and locally affordable prices. For clean cookstoves, it was commonly felt that carbon 
credits had been a significant driver of the resurgence of interest. After a first wave 
of donor-funded projects in the 1970s and 1980s, donor interest had waned due to 
the apparent lack of overall market growth (Crewe and Harrison, 1998). More 
recently there had been a huge increase in the number of related projects and, as one 
carbon project developer asserted: “cookstoves wouldn’t have taken off without 
carbon finance.”  
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This market growth impact has been reliant on market actors that have the 
necessary financial, cognitive and technical tools to bring carbon finance devices to 
life. The issues discussed earlier in this chapter, however, also demonstrate how 
unequal access to these market devices leaves local manufacturers reliant on carbon 
‘brokers’ that employ varying approaches. It also possibly makes them, including 
those that have had ongoing support from donors over numerous years, vulnerable 
to market actors that are empowered by their ability to harness these market devices 
for their own activities, for example importing heavily subsidised stoves and steam-
rolling local market activity. This point is taken up further in Chapter 0.     
The significance of carbon finance devices also ultimately depends on the price that 
carbon credits obtain in the global carbon markets: a process that just like the 
valuing and pricing of energy products involves a plethora of associated actors, 
activities, discourses and devices. Without exploring these further here, in summary 
the price of carbon credits was falling throughout the research period and 
subsequently, particularly for credits in the ‘compliance’ market driven 
predominantly by international agreements to reduce greenhouse gases under the 
Kyoto Protocol. The key reason for falling prices was the lack of progress made in 
agreeing a successor to this framework that ended in December 2012. In November 
2012, a CDM newsletter produced by the climate programme of the German 
development agency GIZ stated that: “in October, for the first time ever, CER prices 
have fallen below 1 Euro. This means prices are currently able to roughly cover 
transaction costs for project registration and issuance. This decline undermines trust 
in carbon markets and will surely not mobilize new additional CDM projects that 
really depend on CER revenues.” (Sehlleier and Michaelowa, 2012) By March 2013, 
the price had dropped further: “the market is essentially deadlocked, with prices 
persisting at a level of around 0.3 €/CER and project inflow for validation having 
fallen back to a level last seen in 2004. This situation is unlikely to change anytime 
soon.” (Blank and Michaelowa, 2013)  
As highlighted by many countries at COP17 in Durban, discussions of the 
technicalities of the CDM are irrelevant without demand for the carbon credits they 
produce. There are similar mechanisms that have a more promising outlook, 
however, such as those that provide credits for the voluntary market that is not 
dependent on an international climate agreement; one carbon finance company said 
they were focusing on these because voluntary credit prices were currently three 
times the price of ‘compliance’ credits. There is also potential for other similar 
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mechanisms in the future16, for which some of the arguments made here about their 
costs and complexity and thus unequal access and power asymmetries for different 
market actors are also likely to be relevant.  
6.5 Summary of findings 
This chapter has placed the energy products themselves at the centre of the 
discussion in order to address the research question: 
How are the clean energy products stabilised, qualified, valued and priced for 
exchange as market goods? 
The findings are summarised below, divided into key themes. 
Emergence of products with meaning and value 
The interest of development intermediaries in energy products is driven by their 
conceptualisation as humanitarian goods. This in turn is derived from their 
‘problematisation,’ whereby the ability of a product to solve a specific development-
relevant problem establishes the case for investment of time and money into its 
design, production and distribution to those that ‘need’ it. The discussion here has 
shown that problematisation is multi-dimensional and depends on the targeted 
investors, proposed approach and intended ‘beneficiaries’. For example, kerosene, a 
common but hazardous lighting fuel, is now key to engaging development 
stakeholders in solar lantern projects, but as discussed here this has not always been 
the case. SolarAid also previously concentrated on the need for local employment 
that could be provided through their locally assembled solar kits. This later dropped 
in priority as they moved to imported lanterns and then even away from solar 
‘entrepreneurs’ to already established ‘dealers’ in order to increase the efficiency of 
sales. The problem of kerosene had become the bigger issue, needing to be tackled 
at all costs. More recently, needing good quality lighting for education purposes has 
also become central to SolarAid’s framing of their work.  
Literature promoting market-based approaches to development (e.g. Prahalad, 2010) 
promotes moving the conceptualisation of the poor away from charity to potential 
consumers. However, analysis here finds that the continued focus on appealing to 
‘development’ stakeholders stops the targeted end-users of solar lanterns moving 
entirely away from been seen as charity beneficiaries. They have not yet fully 
                                                      
16 Delving into the language and acronyms of international climate negotiations, these future devices may include 
a ‘New Market-Based Mechanism’ (NMM), a ‘Framework for Various Approaches’ (FVA) or credited 
‘Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions’ (NAMAs) (Blank and Michaelowa, 2013). 
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achieved the status of modern consumers that market-based approaches apparently 
aim to serve. Since development funds are clearly still needed, this 
conceptualisation is not necessarily problematic, but it does provide a restrictive 
lens for viewing the applications of these products and places limits on which 
technologies can be suitably ‘problematised’. Can solar-powered televisions, for 
example, be framed as humanitarian goods? At the same time, other technologies 
are displaced with knock-on impacts on local market actors working in those supply 
chains. This is something rarely acknowledged or addressed by ‘development’ 
programmes as they are left outside of the programmes’ boundaries.  
An object can only become an exchanged ‘economic good’ when it is positively 
valued by both buyer and seller. This means that energy product designers and 
distributors must still put considerable emphasis on creating value for end-users, 
regardless of how they conceptualise those end-users. It is a clear benefit of the 
move away from ‘free hand-out’ models towards market-based approaches. 
Valuation is unique for every actor and product they engage with and goes much 
further than simple ‘economic’ value. For example, in the countries focused on for 
this research, connotations of modernity were seen to be important.  
Two-way communication channels 
Marketing material provides a communication channel from manufacturer to 
prospective end-user that draws on their aspirations, by visually and descriptively 
illustrating contented customers using a product to fulfil their lifestyle desires. In 
the material observed this has been done to mixed extents, perhaps indicating the 
fairly recent engagement of traditional development intermediaries with core 
‘business’ skills such as marketing techniques. The marketing examples observed 
here also show that development-stakeholders perceive different reasons for 
potential end-users to value clean energy products, but further research might 
explore the accuracy of some of these perceptions; environmental benefits may be 
more valued by consumers than assumed, for example. 
After its exchange, a product can only solve its designated ‘problem’ if the buyer 
knows how to use it in they way intended by the designer. Again communication 
channels from the manufacturer to the end-user must therefore exist, this time in 
parallel to the product exchange. Local sellers can act as human communication 
channels, but material artefacts such as instruction sheets can also provide the same 
facility. For the imported energy products observed during this research, the lack of 
translation of instructions into local languages was therefore surprising, although 
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more widely accessible pictorial instructions were more common. Product quality 
can also be communicated to users through standards certifications, often stamped 
onto goods or their packaging. The significance of adherence to quality standards 
for individual buyers in these markets is unclear, however, and again merits further 
research. 
Given the need for products to have meaning and value for end-users in market-
based approaches, communication channels in the other direction are also essential: 
the ability to successfully gather and incorporate end-user feedback into design 
processes appears to be marking out the competitive edge of manufacturers. Where 
manufacturers have no presence in a country, such as no solar lantern 
manufacturers having their own distribution chains in Malawi, the feedback 
channels are inevitably more limited. If imported products are the only option 
available, this unfortunately restricts the emergence of designs that are specifically 
tailored to local contexts. 
By comparison, locally made products offer the advantage of direct communication 
channels between makers and users; the makers are often even end-users 
themselves. As has been shown in the examples of local cookstove and briquette 
innovations in Kenya and Uganda, this leads to a much larger range of local 
adaptations that can better suit local use patterns and resource availability, all 
without any complex field trials or laboratory tests. 
Market devices for standardisation, quality assurance and consumer 
protection 
Another determining influence of which energy product designs have become 
dominant over time is the evolution of standardisation tools. For example, a 
standard size system and metal liner moulds were instrumental in the emergence of 
disaggregated manufacturing of KCJ cookstoves, which in turn contributed to the 
design’s dominance in Kenya. Standardisation tools are also a fundamental element 
of creating consistent product quality, but material tools are needed for this. Local 
briquette manufacturers in Kenya and Uganda do not always have access to 
weighing scales, for example, leading to alternative systems such as selling 
briquettes ‘by the bucket’.  
This inaccessibility of a relatively simple market device may not be an issue for 
briquette makers who are not trying to compete with imported goods. However, 
high technology products such as solar lanterns result from engagement with a 
much greater array of more complex market devices. These ensure that lanterns are 
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of high and consistent quality and enable them to come with detailed evaluative 
information such as ‘brightness in lumens.’ Market devices cannot function if part of 
the necessary assemblage is incomplete, however, showing why African-made 
products can struggle to compete when significant components of these market 
devices, such as luminosity test facilities, are unavailable locally.  
Due to the increasingly complex and extensive socio-technical components of 
quality assurance schemes, these also represent another market device that local 
artisan manufacturers can struggle to access. Successful engagement with a quality 
device may only manifest itself as a simple but important-sounding statement on 
marketing and packaging materials, but they in fact require access to complex 
systems of testing equipment, standards specifications, certification bodies and 
more. If a quality mark does have limited meaning for a local buyer, as suggested 
above, then artisan manufacturers are not necessarily disadvantaged by a lack of 
access, but when larger formal buyers such as supermarkets will only buy quality-
assured products then there is a clear narrowing of opportunities for local 
entrepreneurs.  
Patenting frameworks are another example of a frequently inaccessible market 
device, although the ‘informal economy’ does offer opportunities for usurping the 
power of those actors that are able to engage with such devices. Similarly, the utility 
of quality standards can also be diminished by the evident ways in which quality-
checking of imported products can be by-passed in countries such as Kenya, 
Uganda and Malawi. This continues to be a problem for solar equipment and means 
that in fact even those actors than can and do engage with quality devices may end 
up being disadvantaged by their adherence to these systems. A resultant lack of 
trust from consumers in both the product type and quality standards is also perhaps 
unsurprising. This continued issue highlights the need for enforceable and 
continually updated legal frameworks to maintain integrity of such market systems; 
unfortunately this is something that continues to be problematic in many African 
countries. While Lighting Africa has established a state-independent quality 
assurance system that other development-related organisations have engaged with, 
as a voluntary scheme its impact is inevitably constrained. 
Warranty systems are again also inaccessible to many, particularly to SunnyMoney 
customers in Malawi where manufacturers have no in-country presence and do not 
help SunnyMoney to fulfil warranty obligations. Furthermore many of the socio-
technical components needed to complete the warranty device can be missing: a 
receipt to demonstrate purchase date, a common understanding of the warranty 
 185 
concept, the physical means to easily pass faulty products back along a 
geographically extensive supply chains. Overall, it is clear that more locally 
appropriate solutions are required.  
Price-setting tools and market distortions 
Qualification and valuation processes ultimately lead to seller and buyer price-
setting activities that only finally converge at the moment of exchange. Calculative 
tools known as ‘valorimeters’ can range from simple ‘costs plus profit’ models to 
‘cost-benefit analysis’ and ‘willingness to pay’ studies. During this research, the 
more complex of these were perhaps unsurprisingly observed being utilised by 
larger organisations rather than individual buyers or sellers, suggesting limited 
extents to which the latter have been rendered ‘economic’ actors. Practical 
considerations such as lack of access to capital suggest that complex economic tools 
could be a luxury for those with greater financial power, however, rather than a 
cognitive inability. When market ‘macro-actors’ are able to deviate significantly 
from pricing models directly related to the production of goods, for example 
through access to subsidies and grants, they gain the power to restrict other 
marketisation processes by dominating the market with high value but distortedly 
low-priced products.  
This last point is particularly illustrated by a focus on carbon finance mechanisms 
that have ‘black-boxed’ processes of calculating and ‘monetising’ reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions as carbon credits. They have created a resurgence in 
interest in cookstoves amongst donors and development intermediaries through 
offering a significant potential income stream to marketisation projects, but 
unfortunately the material, financial and cognitive complexity of these market 
devices make them once again inaccessible to many local artisans, and thus again 
empowering of larger actors that do have the agency to engage with them. There are 
some solutions where small projects can be aggregated and development 
intermediaries act as carbon finance ‘brokers’. The local actors are dependent on this 
opportunity being available and have to accept the specific set-up employed, but it 
has helped some gain access.  
The requirements of carbon finance mechanisms also add a complex scenario of 
nominally transferring ‘property rights’ for carbon credits using various convoluted 
means that appear more confusing than transparent, and far removed in 
significance from the daily priorities of cookstove end-users. The relevance of 
‘regulatory’ mechanisms such as the Clean Development Mechanism is reducing 
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due to lack of a replacement or extended international climate change agreement 
beyond Kyoto, but there remains potential from voluntary markets. Like the other 
market devices described in this chapter, modification work is necessary to allow 
greater equity in access and reduce the power asymmetries that continue to 




7 The entrepreneurs: their conversion into ‘economic’ 
actors 
Subjectification implies that, if some modes of valuation are seen as economic and if 
they are related to behaviours also considered as economic, it is because agents have 
been configured and formatted as subjects who are technically and mentally 
equipped to enact these valuations. Instead of being driven by forces which are 
above or beyond them, subjectified agents are actively engaged with the very 
cognitive and material devices that enable them to participate as economic subjects. 
(Çalışkan and Callon (2009) p.389) 
While the previous chapter focused on the creation of ‘products’ and their valuation, 
this chapter examines in further detail some of the people who are integral to this 
production, valuation and exchange process. Although the focus is on people, it is 
not to say that their agency is created only through their human characteristic. As 
the above quotation highlights, economic actors are actively engaged through 
forming and applying cognitive and material devices that shape their activities as 
market actors. Yearley (2005), for example, also reminds us that the technologies 
and scientific (in this case economic/business) concepts, techniques and tools that 
bind society together cannot be ignored. These non-human components of society, 
or ‘dark matter’ (Latour, 1992), should not be separated from a social analysis. As 
MacKenzie (2009b) describes, a human with a calculator may undertake very 
different actions to someone without one.  
The markets in these case studies are not tangible entities in themselves: if people 
stopped performing their roles ‘the market’ would no longer exist. Instead they are 
systematic ways in which everyone learns to interact with each other, with products 
and money being circulated, using tools and devices to support their flow and 
following certain ‘rules’ and types of ‘economic behaviour’. In essence, collective 
performance of everyone fulfilling a particular economic role is what creates the 
market. This chapter examines some of the processes of ‘economization’, or more 
specifically ‘marketisation’, whereby the case study development intermediaries 
(marketisation actors) intentionally select, train and support local people to 
‘perform’ a role in the supply chain of clean energy products. It addresses the third 
research question:    
What processes render local people into ‘entrepreneurs’ and thus economic actors? 
 188 
It is argued that ‘conversion’ into the specific type of economic actors that the 
intermediaries require starts with the application and absorption of the 
‘entrepreneurship’ discursive device. The one-to-one relationships at the 
intermediary-entrepreneur interface are found to be key in facilitating and building 
on this. However, these are not passive actors to be newly economised; their 
existing skills, networks, ideas, tools and facilities, sometimes already ‘economic’ 
and sometimes not, can be drawn on at will to make each market performance 
unique. It also means that there is no foolproof method for determining which 
individuals will best ‘perform’ a market role in the specific way envisaged by the 
development intermediaries. This means that increasingly those already with more 
market agency are being selected, perhaps representing a shift away from true ‘BOP’ 
entrepreneurs.  
The main components of an entrepreneur’s agency are discussed here in turn: their 
knowledge and application of ‘economic’ tools; their technical capacity and the 
physical tools and facilities required, and; their agency as created by the networks 
they are part of. Where entrepreneurs already have relevant skills, tools and 
networks, the development intermediaries encourage their incorporation into 
economic activities and promote moving from informal to formal practices. Where 
they are lacking, support is provided to develop or acquire them.  
This ‘economisation’ of entrepreneurs can be problematic, however, such as 
entrepreneurs becoming reliant on formal indebtedness without exploration of 
alternative options, and putting strain on their existing trust-based relationships. 
However, it is argued that development intermediaries acting as ‘brokers’ can also 
benefit the entrepreneurs. Helping them to form new relationships, for instance, can 
enhance entrepreneurs’ agency, not just in economic terms. Ultimately, the 
entrepreneurs become marketisation actors themselves through their performance, 
for example using marketing techniques to persuade consumers to ‘buy in’ to the 
framing of products as outlined in the previous chapter. 
7.1 Entrepreneur recruitment 
With an initial target of recruiting and supporting 1800 micro and small enterprises 
(MSEs), the lynch pin of GVEP’s Developing Energy Enterprises Project (DEEP) is 
the ‘entrepreneurs’ who run these businesses and receive support under DEEP, 
primarily in the form of business and technical training and mentoring. By 
December 2011, there were 772 individuals or groups being supported by the 
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programme, attributed to selling over 616,00 clean energy products in total in the 
preceding three month period (GVEP International, 2012b). 
From the outset the strategy for recruiting entrepreneurs had a strong focus on 
existing connections, with the project plan outlining that: “all partners will 
participate by reaching out to their contacts and networks within East Africa” 
(GVEP International, 2006). From talking with those involved in the start-up phase 
of DEEP, the recruitment had indeed been highly dependent on the networks of the 
partner organisations involved. Some of the staff at those organisations already 
knew of people or groups who would be suitable, having made contact with them 
as part of previous development initiatives. Existing or specifically made 
connections with local government structures were also utilised. In Kenya, for 
example, the Ministry of Agriculture’s Home Economics department was able to 
provide the Aga Khan Foundation and Practical Action (DEEP mobilisation partners) 
with lists of known groups in each area who had done pottery training under a 
Ministry scheme previously, so were known to them and had an existing skill that 
could be adapted to making liners for efficient cookstoves.  
Individuals and groups that had business permits for energy-related businesses 
were found via the relevant local authorities. Connections were also made through 
the local Energy Centres (“Mtwapa”) established by the Ministry of Energy. These 
knew of further energy-related businesses or interested people, since their role was 
to promote awareness of locally viable energy solutions. All of these initial 
connections then led to a snowball effect: once a few groups and individuals were 
known to DEEP recruiters, they were able to suggest others who might be interested 
in taking part. On top of this there were also some unrelated ‘chance’ encounters, 
such as when GVEP staff saw a briquette-making machine in a restaurant one 
lunchtime and found that the restaurant owner produced, used and sold biomass 
briquettes to other restaurants. He was soon recruited into DEEP. 
People interested in setting up energy businesses that had not yet done so were also 
sought so that DEEP could add to the total number of energy enterprises as well as 
support those already existing. DEEP recruiters explained how they went to 
marketplaces to see if anyone there had already set up some form of energy 
business or would be interested to do so. A detailed example of this is given in Box 
3 below. They also undertook some door-to-door mobilisation and advertising via 
poster and local radio (Photo 30). 
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Box 3: GVEP solar phone charging entrepreneur recruitment around Mombasa, Kenya 
During the fieldwork, additional entrepreneur recruitment was being undertaken to bring 
the total numbers closer to the target level. I joined a recruitment day for new DEEP solar 
phone charging entrepreneurs in the coastal region of Kenya. Our team consisted of a GVEP 
business development officer, the GVEP business mentor for the region, and a representative 
from Sollatek – a recently made associate partner organisation of GVEP. Sollatek import 
solar panels into Mombasa and had agreed to provide a discount for the new DEEP solar 
entrepreneurs.  
The first point of contact was John, a solar salesperson and technician working in Taru, a 
small village about half an hour’s drive west of Mombasa. He took us round Taru 
introducing us to his customers who already had solar panels for their kiosks. The idea was 
to bring these people under DEEP in order to further their market understanding and thus 
help them expand their business. We then proceeded to a village further afield, Kinango. 
Being well off the main Mombasa-Nairobi highway, it involved about an hour’s drive down 
a long dirt track in the pick-up. The GVEP staff explained that the village already had some 
DEEP cookstove entrepreneurs there but no one doing solar charging. The cookstove sellers 
had been recruited during a marketplace seminar by one of the DEEP implementation 
partner organisations back in 2008. 
A large sound-system had been rented and put in the back of a second pick-up that followed 
us down the dirt track. Once at the village, the GVEP business development officer was 
driven round in it while he introduced DEEP over the PA system and told people to gather 
in the village centre if they wanted to hear more about it. Their announcements were 
interspersed with very loud Nigerian pop songs that seemed to help catch people’s attention 
and resulted in several groups of children dancing enthusiastically.  
Photo 28: Sound-system used to introduce DEEP and announce the recruitment event 
 
At the allocated location and time, the music went quiet and the DEEP staff made their 
presentation about the virtues of solar systems, the viability of using it to charge phones as a 
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business, and asking for anyone interested to step forward. The requirement was that they 
had the capital to buy a solar system at the special discount rate being offered by Sollatek 
and some sort of kiosk or other business to put it on and operate from. In return for joining 
DEEP they would receive business and solar technical training, as well as regular visits from 
the business mentor. Around 14 application forms ended up being filled in and the 
applicants were given the mobile phone number of the solar sales rep. However, as it was up 
to these prospective entrepreneurs to subsequently arrange a solar purchase, the GVEP staff 
would only find out the actual number of new DEEP entrepreneurs at their next visit to the 
village and/or by making follow-up phone calls to the applicants over the next few weeks. 
Photo 29: DEEP business development officer describing DEEP to assembled 




Photo 30: Poster for DEEP recruitment, pinned to the kiosk of a DEEP solar lantern 
seller in Mombasa, Kenya  
 
The geographical selection of marketplaces and radio stations was always 
dependent on the partner organisations’ locations, as were the recruitment activities 
for existing businesses. This led to distinct pools of entrepreneurs in specific clusters 
across each region (Table 5). Once one individual or business heard about the 
scheme they would often tell friends and neighbours about it, adding to the 
clustering effect. Equally, the regions covered by DEEP in Kenya and Uganda were 
very specifically linked to the geographical locations of the partner organisations 
during the start-up phase. There was by no means even coverage across the 
countries and at first glance the location of DEEP entrepreneurs on a map looks 
randomly clustered; at closer inspection, it illustrates how the recruitment phase 
evolved and which organisations were involved.  
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Table 5: Geographical distribution of DEEP entrepreneurs in Kenya and Uganda, 
December 2011 (GVEP International, 2012b) 
Country Region/Cluster Areas served Number of entrepreneurs 
Kenya 
Cluster 1 - Coast Taita, Mariakani, Mombasa, & South Coast 47 
Cluster 2 - Central Central Kenya and Nairobi 58 
Cluster 3 - Kisii Kisii, South Nyanza, Nakuru & Naivasha 31 
Cluster 4 - Kisumu Kisumu, Siaya, Webuye, Busia, Kericho 58 
Uganda 
Cluster 1 - Wakiso Nangabo, Nsangi, Katabi/Sissa, Luwero, Katikamu, Busoke,Latisi 121 
Cluster 2 - South Buganda Kalungu, Kifuuta, Kyotera and Njale 51 
Cluster 3 - Eastern Uganda Mbale & Lira 41 
Cluster 4 - Kampala 
Kampala, Mukono, Katoosi, 
Kasubi, Namanve, Kyewatule 
and Mbeya 
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SolarAid’s entrepreneur recruitment could also be linked to encounters through 
existing networks, often with no obvious relevance to ‘economic’ activities. The first 
entrepreneurs were recruited when the Irish founder of the Malawi office made 
contact with a community group in Mzuzu called ‘Ungwera’ through connections 
his uncle had made as a visiting Catholic priest. This group became the first to be 
trained in assembling pico-solar products and some of them became involved in 
selling them. One was a woman called Mrs Msewa, whose husband Kingsley then 
also started selling the lights. He subsequently rented a kiosk in Mzuzu marketplace 
and over time, as his relationship with SolarAid strengthened, became the primary 
SunnyMoney salesman and technician in Mzuzu.  
Around the same time a similar shop was established about a 40-minute drive east 
from Mzuzu, at the lakeshore town of Nkhata Bay. One of the other Ungwera 
members, Brave, came from Nkhata Bay and had started selling the solar lights in 
his home region. He made contact with a woman there who was well known for 
making and selling fruit juices from her kiosk, initially to sell her a light for her 
business at night but she then also started to help him sell them by displaying them 
at her shop. On seeing the lights, one of her customers asked her if Brave could 
come to his village to demonstrate them to his church group and tell them how they 
too could make a business out of making and selling them. Brave obliged and the 
church group also became trained as solar ‘entrepreneurs’. One of those in the 
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group was JB Nwende, formerly a dairy farmer, who turned out to be particularly 
good at sales. He was subsequently introduced to the core SolarAid staff and when 
they wanted to set up a shop in Nkhata Bay, they helped him move 30 kilometres 
from his home village to the town to set up the shop there. Three years later, during 
my fieldwork period, he was still there running the shop. Again, these distinct 
events led to an unplanned clustering effect of SunnyMoney entrepreneurs.  
Local individuals have clearly not become involved in the marketisation activities of 
these development intermediaries through a cold, systematic process. Their 
awareness of the case study initiatives was through a web of relationships or 
networks, often entirely separate to economic activities, and the chance of an 
encounter at the relevant time. There are undoubtedly numerous people who might 
have excelled under DEEP or SunnyMoney but for whom no encounter ever took 
place. Equally the agency of the development intermediaries, GVEP and SolarAid, 
as marketisation actors, able to find people willing and appropriate to be part of 
their new market visions, has been seen to rely heavily on their own networks with 
other organisations, government bodies and so on. Even staff from GVEP 
coincidently eating in a restaurant that turned out to be owned by a briquette-maker 
led to the owner being recruited as a DEEP entrepreneur. This very ‘weak’ 
connection, to use Granovetter’s (1982) term17, added to the agency of both GVEP 
and the restaurateur as market actors. 
7.2 Entrepreneur selection 
After becoming aware of and interested in the initiatives, in order to be absorbed 
into the full process of ‘marketisation’ local actors were nominally subjected to a 
screening procedure to check if they would fulfil the required ‘entrepreneur’ roles. 
For SolarAid, it seems that this selection was fairly limited and informal: willing 
groups of prospective entrepreneurs were automatically trained in assembly and 
sales of pico-solar products. Following the phase-out of the assembly side there was 
then a significant element of self-selection through previous good performance, 
since those that had shown themselves to be willing and adept at selling the 
products (such as Kingsley and his wife and JB Nwende) continued to be engaged 
with as sales entrepreneurs.  
SolarAid’s limited more recent recruitment of solar ‘entrepreneurs’ has used more 
formal entrepreneur screening methods. A partnership with the MicroLoan 
                                                      
17 ‘Weak’ ties are social connections that occur through mere acquaintance with another person, perhaps only on 
one occasion, rather than stronger and continually reinforced connections such as friendship.  
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Foundation (MLF), a microfinance organisation headquartered in the UK, was 
arranged between the London offices of SolarAid and MLF after their respective 
managers met at a networking event. This led to nine ‘solar women’ being recruited 
as part of a pilot project. Staff in the Malawi SolarAid office found that: “it is a 
favourable scheme so we are looking to extend it, because MLF has detailed 
selection that identifies the best entrepreneurs.”  
One of the MLF solar entrepreneurs, Mrs Sofileti Nkhata from the village of 
Kamphalika in Kasungu district, told me how she was first contacted by MLF 
officers who visited her village and gave her forms to fill in for a loan. She was told 
to create a women’s group with other women from her village, ending up with a 
group of 23 who were all given a small cash loan and training in business skills. 
Before the loan Mrs Nkhata said she had been buying two to three bags of maize at 
a time for onwards sale. With the loan she had bought 20 bags in one go and scaled 
up her business. When SolarAid subsequently linked up with MLF, they came back 
to the village to ask all the women about how they had used that initial loan and 
how it had benefited them. Those that were judged to have used their loan 
effectively were selected for the solar entrepreneur programme, with herself and 
two others from her group making it through. Although MLF asked for various 
pieces of information such as highest education level achieved, the selection process 
was regardless of this. She said that she had got as far as finishing Standard 5 of 
Primary School, which is the fifth year of primary education and is normally 
completed at the age of 11 years, although she did not specify at what age she had 
reached it. 
Under GVEP’s programme DEEP, once the initial encounter with a DEEP recruiter 
had occurred, prospective entrepreneurs were also asked to fill in an application 
form (Figure 41). Again this collected general information (name, gender, education 
level, date of birth and contact details) stored as data but not used for the selection 
process. It also asked for information about their current or proposed business, 
including business type, monthly sales and expenditure (if applicable), local sources 
for necessary materials, and where the finance came from or would come from to 
start the business. The application form then went on to a skills self-assessment, 
asking the applicant to rank their skill levels in various business activities such as 
marketing, book-keeping and legal issues. Lack of these skills did not lead to refusal 
of an application, however; instead the purpose was to assess their training needs.  
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Figure 41: First two pages of original DEEP application form as filled in by prospective 
entrepreneur (crosses in margins made by DEEP recruiter to highlight incomplete 
sections) 
  
What did lead to applicant selection was evidence that the applicant either had an 
existing business that fitted with GVEP’s definition of clean energy, or an idea for 
one, along with the necessary materials available locally and some form of capital to 
get started with. Although GVEP was able to link entrepreneurs to loans, this was 
only on the basis of some existing business activity needing to be scaled up; if 
someone only had a business idea and no financial means to kick-start it, they 
would not be able to participate in DEEP. Financial means, either through having 
adequate savings or access to money through networks, inevitably equates to 
agency, and in this case GVEP was unable to address power imbalances against 
those with neither. This did mean, however, that indebtedness was only encouraged 
where some level of income was already being earned (a point taken up later in this 
chapter) and in fact different types of energy businesses were more or less accessible. 
Making biomass briquettes could require very little financial input as, for example, 
they could be made by hand out of waste charcoal dust, fine clay and/or another 
binder. One couple in Uganda said that they took clay for free from the nearby 
riverbank, paid between 1000 to 4000 Ugandan shillings (24p to 96p / 40c to $1.6018) 
for a sack of charcoal dust and 1200 (29p/48c) for a sack of cassava starch as an 
                                                      
18 Exchange rates used: £1 = 4,140 Ugandan shillings; £1 = US$1.67 
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additional binder. They had some additional transport costs, but they could 
produce more than £10 ($16.70) worth of briquettes with these materials and despite 
having started with very limited savings had still been able to build up their 
business.  
Selection is also a two-way process: those fitting GVEP’s requirements for 
entrepreneurs were not always interested in being involved, for example if they did 
not see any benefits of participation. Staff who participated in the recruitment 
efforts said that existing business people would often ask lots of questions around 
the possible benefits of joining the project. Sometimes it became clear from their 
questions that their primary interest was a grant, and if this was not available then 
they were not interested in DEEP. This reciprocal aspect of the selection process 
seemed to naturally create an upper limit in terms of business size, with DEEP not 
appealing to more formal and extensive businesses.  
Where people with more established energy businesses have engaged with DEEP, it 
is as ‘associate partners’, signifying that they are already seen as appropriately 
‘marketised’; DEEP support is not offered to their core staff but instead to the new, 
independent supply chain actors that these partners are recruiting. Similarly 
SolarAid distinguishes between entrepreneurs and ‘dealers’, the latter being existing 
businesses that are already considered capable of selling solar lanterns without 
additional business training (but technical training about the products is still 
provided). The development intermediaries have therefore both kept the term 
‘entrepreneur’ for those that have been selected as potential market actors but are 
considered to require further support to become so. The term is used to give a sense 
of the entrepreneur’s potential ability to establish a successful business, if the 
development intermediary helps them to acquire the necessary skills, tools and 
networks to do so. 
Examples of other development intermediaries selecting entrepreneurs 
Within the fieldwork countries, various other development intermediaries were also 
using the entrepreneurship concept to establish supply chains for clean energy 
products. A summary of findings from interviews with some of these organisations 
in Uganda is shown in Table 619. Solar Sister, ToughStuff and Barefoot have also 
become ‘associate partners’ of GVEP so that their entrepreneurs can receive DEEP 
business training. Additionally Living Goods and Solar Sister both supply 
                                                      
19 Information about these approaches are from only one interviewee per organisation and were not directly 
observed, so may be less systematic in delivery than suggested in Table 6. 
 198 
ToughStuff and Barefoot solar products to their entrepreneurs, showing the 
interconnectedness of these organisations.  
The table shows how the selection process for ‘entrepreneurs’ varies, with some 
looking for more evidence of existing entrepreneurial characteristics than others. 
Living Goods claims to have a very systematic and rigorous recruitment that 
restricts selection to one woman per community. She must be both nominated by 
that community and also meet Living Goods’ own criteria, including being of a 
certain age, having good English language and interpersonal skills, and being 
‘energetic’. Solar Sister has a process that is more clearly based on social connections 
and trust, recruiting recommended ‘anchor’ women first and using them to identify 
trusted women from their existing networks.  
Barefoot Uganda, by comparison, is not concerned with particular criteria, but the 
applicants must be able to pay for their induction. Since this self-selects only those 
with financial means and willingness, it inevitably restricts accessibility for people 
really at the base of the economic pyramid. From a market-building point of view, 
however, it is a successful approach. Solar Sister also asks for a smaller deposit 
(about one quarter of that taken by Barefoot) to cover the first consignment of stock. 
All of the organisations provide some business and technical training either directly 
or indirectly via partner organisations, again highlighting the aspirational nature of 
the ‘entrepreneur’ label and the sense of it being something that can be developed 
with support. In all cases, however, some level of proven agency was also necessary 
for selection as a market actor in the first instance, be it financial (e.g. training fee for 
Barefoot, stock deposit for Solar Sister, business start-up capital for GVEP), 
cognitive (e.g. good level of English required by Living Goods), social (e.g. 
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7.3 Entrepreneur training  
SolarAid and GVEP both provide technical and business training for their new 
entrepreneurs, although because of SolarAid’s focus on pre-marketised ‘dealers’ by 
the time of the research period, this was easier to observe within the GVEP case 
study. Under DEEP, the idea of a new recruit being an ‘entrepreneur’ and thus 
being expected to have various characteristics and act in certain ways associated 
with good entrepreneurship is introduced from the start of the engagement and 
continually reinforced as a key point, with the notion of entrepreneurship being 
used as a central discursive device when shaping the entrepreneurs for their market 
roles. The training manual provided to and used for training DEEP entrepreneurs 
contains an introduction (Figure 42) to how the new recruits are expected to 
perform their new role. 
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Figure 42: DEEP entrepreneur training manual p.47 (GVEP International, 2010b) 
 
The DEEP training manual suggests that entrepreneurs have some specific personal 
characteristics, although it proposes that these are ‘helpful’ rather than ‘essential’ to 
starting and running a successful business, in order not to disillusion those who 
might feel they do not yet have these characteristics. Furthermore, all of the assets 
listed on the page can be developed and manifested through adopting specific ways 
of working, rather than being personality traits that someone either has or has not. 
Again this maintains the sense of entrepreneurship being achievable for all with 
support and hard work. In this way it also conceptualises entrepreneurship as 
performance.  
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Following the description of characteristics, the training manual (Photo 31) provides 
further indication of what is expected of DEEP entrepreneurs in terms of the 
activities they should undertake. They are then asked to undertake an exercise to 
think about what ‘entrepreneurial’ skills they have that can help them to develop 
their business, initiating the process of self-reflection and application of the training 
to their performance as an energy entrepreneur. 
Photo 31: Training manuals developed and used by GVEP International (left-hand 
manual used for DEEP entrepreneurs) 
 
Photo 32: DEEP training session for new Barefoot entrepreneurs  
 
The training sessions themselves are carried out in groups of varying sizes, 
depending on the specific training event. Grouping people together in order to 
share from each other’s ideas and experiences is used both in training and once the 
energy businesses are in operation (the utility of this is discussed later on). Photo 32, 
for example, shows a DEEP training session for newly recruited Barefoot solar 
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entrepreneurs in Kampala. This was their first of three days of combined technical 
and business skills training. They were told to firstly develop a business plan that 
GVEP would help them work on, secondly to put this into practice by using it to 
develop their solar sales businesses, and thirdly to think about how to get financial 
help for expanding their business further. They were also told that only six out of 
every ten new DEEP recruits continue as entrepreneurs, highlighting that it is 
something that takes hard work and dedication.   
Ongoing training: being treated as an entrepreneur  
The term ‘entrepreneur’ features in the majority of conversations about and within 
DEEP operations: not one day of fieldwork passed without the term being used, and 
each day it was heard on numerous occasions. The entrepreneurs are very rarely 
referred to as anything else, except for when their individual name or business 
name is used, or very occasionally when someone uses ‘beneficiary’ when talking 
about them indirectly – using the more traditional non-market language of 
international development programmes. Calling people entrepreneurs and treating 
them as professional business people was in many cases seen to be performative in a 
constructive way: the entrepreneur concept is used as a training and motivational 
tool to help them perform as such. 
After training, the primary contact point between GVEP and the entrepreneurs is 
their DEEP business mentor. The mentor-entrepreneur relationship therefore 
facilitates the continued application of the entrepreneurship discursive device over 
time. The mentors equally have a clear awareness of the entrepreneurship concept, 
all having a business background (in most cases both university training and 
practical experience) and a strong, albeit varied, idea of what it means to be an 
entrepreneur. I asked all eight DEEP business mentors in Kenya and Uganda what 
they felt were the particular abilities of successful entrepreneurs. Their answers and 
the number of mentors that mentioned each skill or approach are shown in Figure 
43 below.  
 205 
Figure 43: Entrepreneurial characteristics mentioned by DEEP business mentors 
 
Figure 43 again highlights the repeated narrative of entrepreneurship, with buzz 
words and phrases such as ‘aggressive strategy’, ‘innovative’, ‘willing to take risks’ 
and ‘focused’ all portraying entrepreneurship as an attitude that can be adopted by 
all. Practical business skills were also seen as important, such as doing ‘professional’ 
business activities and undertaking marketing activities. Driving through a town in 
the GVEP vehicle, one of the mentors pointed out a man painting a sign on the wall 
of his kiosk and laughingly said: “look at that man, he is putting up a sign to 
advertise what he sells – he is an entrepreneur”. During DEEP, the mentors were 
continuing to instil in entrepreneurs the sense of what it means to be one and 
helping them perform as one. They were constantly monitoring their success in 
achieving this or otherwise, guiding them along the path of what being a successful 
entrepreneur is taken to mean by DEEP management and DEEP mentors.  
When asked how they benefitted from DEEP, just under half the entrepreneurs (13 
out of 30, 43%) specifically mentioned the support provided via mentoring. One 
stove maker in Uganda said he had become good friends with his mentor who 
visited him each month; outside of these visits he said they also talked on the phone 
regularly, about work and other things too. The mentors were asked how they 
would describe their relationships with the entrepreneurs they were responsible for. 
Extracts of their responses are provided in Table 7 below, with each table row 
containing the response from a different mentor. 
















Table 7: DEEP business mentors’ comments on relationships with entrepreneurs 
Country Mentor comments on their relationships with entrepreneurs 
Kenya 
“It’s very important that mentors are local. Some entrepreneurs have limited or no 
literacy. Their expressions are difficult to understand if you’re not local. It’s 
important that we can mingle and become used to the clients – some are shy. As 
mentors we come to understand them very well.” 
Kenya “My relationship with the entrepreneurs is very good. We know each other as we see each other frequently. They know that DEEP provides support to them.” 
Kenya “It’s a cordial, good relationship.” 
Kenya 
“They’re our people, we understand each other. I did the initial business training 
for them so I’ve known some of them for 1 and a half years, so it’s a very good 
relationship, I know them well. None of my entrepreneurs have dropped out – I 
had to explain financial aspects, about the lack of grant, but not all of them are 
about the money.” 
Uganda 
“We speak in Luganda. Some of them aren’t strong in English. I don’t speak any 
other local language, so couldn’t be a mentor in regions where they don’t speak 
Luganda. I speak Swahili but often people don’t trust you if you speak Swahili, 
especially the older generation, because it is associated with the war and 
therefore has negative connotations.” 
Uganda 
“I see them each month, but some I’ve only been seeing for 3 months because 
before then I was a voluntary mentor in another region. For [name of an 
entrepreneur], he’s become a good friend, we even talk on the phone sometimes 
about other things besides GVEP. I try to help them out, like getting them orders 
from wholesalers or shops in town. I got an order for 150 [cookstoves] recently, I 
gave the order to 2 women [entrepreneurs] as they were earlier in their business 
and needed it more than others.” 
Uganda “The relationship is built over time, but it’s only been 3 and a half months so it’s still developing. I can’t say that I know them really well. Out of 10, maybe 4 or 5.” 
The mentors suggested that a key determinant of being able to build successful 
relationships with their entrepreneurs was coming from the same geographical area, 
or at least speaking the same language: “They’re our people, we understand each 
other.” It was noted that this was a specific consideration within GVEP’s business 
mentor recruitment strategy, with an ability to speak the same language being 
considered crucial: “When recruited they specifically took mentors from the local 
area who speak the local language. Some of the entrepreneurs don’t speak Swahili 
or English so it wouldn’t work otherwise.” Some noted that Swahili, Luganda or 
English may be used with particular entrepreneurs proficient in a second language, 
or if visitors were there, but generally the local language was used “to make it easier 
for them [the entrepreneurs]”.  
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Photo 33: Cookstove maker Edward Oliech Gwara in western Kenya with his DEEP 
business mentor 
 
Photo 34: A DEEP mentor checking the sales figures of cookstove entrepreneur 
Herbert Bogezi in Wakiso, Uganda 
 
Another evident point from Table 7 is that the mentors felt that the longevity of the 
relationship was inevitably a deciding factor in the strength of their relationships 
with entrepreneurs. Due to the implementation of the new strategy, some of the 
mentors had only been with their current entrepreneurs for about three months. The 
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frequency of visits varied between one per week and one per month. Most mentors 
noted that they intended to visit every week, but sometimes it could only be 
fortnightly or monthly due to the number and geographical spread of entrepreneurs 
they were responsible for.  
GVEP staff also felt that, partly because of the mentor-entrepreneur relationships, 
the entrepreneurs were responsive to the mentors’ hopes and expectations of them 
performing well. The DEEP financial manger in Uganda described how the 
entrepreneurs:  
[…] often say that by the mere fact that you’re expecting a mentor to visit it pushes 
you to do your best, because they’re going to ask to see the records. So it’s pushed 
them into good record keeping, which is really lucky for people at that level. So it’s 
simply that visit that motivates and challenges them and makes them improve.  
One of the mentors described: “we give them targets and every month track their 
growth, then tell them to make a little bit more to meet the next target.” An 
entrepreneur subsequently explained how when he is set these targets by his 
mentor, he feels he has to meet them so as to not get embarrassed. Another noted 
that the confidence his mentor appeared to have in him and his business efforts had 
changed his own attitude: “DEEP supported my confidence - I was very deflated by 
the poor briquettes I made at first, so I may have given up altogether otherwise.” 
Another mentor said of the entrepreneurs: “Those who’ve been successful, it’s been 
out of their hard work and constant support from mentors.” The strength of the 
relationship between mentor and entrepreneur, in turn affected by the ability for 
them to communicate effectively and the frequency of the mentor’s visits, are 
therefore seen as one of the crucial aspects of the DEEP programme design. 
It is useful to note that there is no particular translation for entrepreneur in some of 
the local languages used by the field offices, suggesting that the value of the 
entrepreneurship concept is not necessarily linked to the specific wording. In 
Malawi, the women who sell solar with dual support of SunnyMoney and the 
MicroLoan Foundation are referred to as entrepreneurs in English, but ‘wazimayi 
wamalonda’ in Chitumbuka or ‘azimayi amalonda’ in Chichewa – both simply 
meaning ‘business women’ because there is no exact translation for ‘entrepreneur’ 
in either language. GVEP staff told me that the Swahili word they used for 
entrepreneur(s) was ‘mjasiriamali’ (singular) or ‘wajasiriamali’ (plural), with ‘mali’ 
meaning wealth, possessions or assets, and the full word being similar to “one who 
works for profit”. Although this is not necessarily how entrepreneur would always 
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be translated in Swahili (a more typical translation again being simply ‘business 
person’) its origins within DEEP were unknown and it is possible that a term that 
particularly elevates the aims of successful business people (working for profit) was 
specifically adopted for the programme.  
Treatment of the DEEP entrepreneurs appears to instil a feeling that with GVEP’s 
support, they can become successful business people. Similarly, the organisations in 
Table 6 above also operate on the basis that through training, people can be formed 
into the market actors needed to sell products. Terms such as “Business-in-a-bag” 
(Living Goods, Interview 18) and “Business in a box” (ToughStuff, Interview 17) are 
used to denote that, given the appropriate attitude and aptitude, everything needed 
for someone to become a successful salesperson can be provided by a development 
intermediary. 
7.4 Performing as entrepreneurs 
The DEEP entrepreneurs I met were found to have adopted the same market 
language as their training manuals and mentors used. They could immediately say 
what their profit margins were and how they calculated it, talk about any quality 
issues of their products and discuss their customer base and marketing strategy. For 
example, one briquette maker in Uganda described how his business was doing 
very well but “there are still challenges that need to be worked on – our 
manufacturing capacity is not sufficient, the technology we use can no longer match 
demand.” Later he spoke of the business potential if this barrier could be overcome: 
“Our branding is good, the product is good and the market is there”.  
A member of a cookstove-making group in western Kenya mentioned how “quality 
is very important – bad products don’t move in the market but good ones definitely 
will” and how other groups often had not had as much success as them because 
“lots aren’t serious with the work … we recognise this as a good income generating 
business.” The following day I spoke to a briquette-maker who talked about the 
“niche market for briquettes” but that “competition for resources is becoming an 
issue”. He also described how he gives out samples in order to promote awareness 
of his charcoal dust briquettes, which he hopes will become his “core business”.   
These uses of economic terms are not just convenient descriptions but are actually 
performing the entrepreneurs as market actors. Clearly, adoption of the language of 
markets is not sufficient in itself for the entrepreneurs to be able to successfully 
perform a role within their chosen market system. The training applied by the 
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development intermediaries is also about creating understanding of those terms and 
concepts and their utility, and ensuring that the entrepreneurs will have the ability 
and willingness to apply them. For those who were speaking in their local language 
when I met them, it was not clear if the exact vocabulary used by them was the 
business language that would be expected, but certainly the business principles 
asked about or voluntarily mentioned, such as profit margin, seemed to be clearly 
understood and fluently spoken about. Some examples of discussions about price-
setting with the entrepreneurs are given in Box 4 below. 
Box 4: Examples of price-setting processes applied by DEEP entrepreneurs 
 
The DEEP entrepreneurs were also seen to put other advice received during their 
DEEP training and mentoring into action, like getting their businesses formally 
registered with the local authorities. Edward and Nora Mukasa talked about their 
intention and reasons to do this: “Our business is not registered yet, that is the next 
step, as otherwise we will not be recognised as businessmen. It is good for getting 
trust, as then we will be known by the local and district council, so customers know 
we can be found again if necessary.” 
One of the partner organisation staff involved in the start-up phase of DEEP saw a 
clear difference between some of the entrepreneurs before and after their training 
(Practical Action, Interview 28, 2012). “Initially they would all laugh when you told 
them you’re an employee of your business, you need to pay yourself a salary. I told 
Farouk, cookstoves, Uganda - He takes cost of materials and adds on transport costs plus a 
profit margin. However, when asked he’s not sure how much the profit margin is exactly - 
it varies depending on the negotiation with the buyer, he has no strict amount. He’s very 
aware of the material costs though and when they change he makes an equivalent change 
in the prices he sells at. 
Mr Mawanda, briquettes, Uganda – He calculates inputs (direct and indirect – transport 
etc.) and adds about 10% profit. He’s going to increase the profit margin over time though 
as he’ll be adding more value as the quality increases.  
Edward and Nora Mukasa, briquettes, Uganda – The price depends on the cost of raw 
materials, then they add 10% for profit. All members in the local area sell at the same price. 
They sit and have meetings to discuss the price if the material or transport costs change.  
Peter Obel and Bibian Obambo, cookstoves, Kenya – The profit margin is a minimum of 
20% but can be up to 30%. The price is calculated on the costs of production but then 
there’s some negotiation when they sell so the exact final price depends on each customer. 
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them not to keep saying you don’t have the money for that, as that’s what they’d all 
say. Instead I said, the money needs to come from your business.” She noticed that 
once the entrepreneurs had done their training: “they began to run their businesses 
as businesses, whereas before they often were just doing it as even as a social thing, 
not a business.” She saw them keeping production and sales records, treating it as a 
business and keeping money for it, paying themselves a salary and investing the 
rest back in their business. “So they started to be able to see how their business was 
working, they could tell you how much they were making – they couldn’t do that 
previously. It meant the businesses were bound to grow.” 
Adoption of the discursive and cognitive tools of business and markets seems to be 
an important element in the marketisation process. Insights into this can perhaps be 
taken from work carried out on religious conversions, in particular Susan Harding's 
(2000) assertion that "speaking is believing" and that a key part of the conversion 
process is adopting the religious language of the converter: “The process starts 
when an unsaved listener begins to appropriate in his or her inner speech the saved 
speaker’s language and its attendant view of the world” (ibid p.34). Findings from 
this research suggest that similarly a key part of the marketisation process is the 
immersion of the entrepreneurs in economic language and principles, leading to the 
partial or full adoption of them for their everyday business activities. In fact in some 
ways markets could be described as the new religion of development intermediaries. 
Elyachar, for example, talks about USAID in Cairo ‘preaching’ about the family 
being an enterprise and the home-worker being an entrepreneur (quoted in Ismail 
(2006) p.91). 
Scott and Dolan (2009) also use religious assimilations in their observations of South 
African women talking about the impacts of becoming market actors for the 
cosmetic company Avon. “Throughout the first stage of our research, the emotive, if 
not evangelistic, zeal of Avon representatives was striking. Women frequently 
narrated stories of personal transformation, recounting their journey from the 
destitution of homelessness, squatter camps, and AIDS-ravaged families to the 
community of hope and possibility afforded through Avon. Many spoke fondly of 
the revival-style gatherings, where women were honoured with corporate 
‘recognition’ for their sales and recruitment accomplishments, and were visibly 
moved by the self-esteem they had gained through Avon.” (ibid., p.214) 
Of course there were also plenty of examples where DEEP entrepreneurs had much 
further to go in their market ‘conversion’ process. Concepts were not always clearly 
understood or even where they were, not put into practice. Some were only carrying 
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out their energy business activities part-time while maintaining other jobs, evidently 
not fully ‘converted’ into energy product market actors. There were also many that 
had not separated themselves from their businesses financially, so rather than 
paying themselves a salary would use business income as personal income and vice 
versa. Although discursive tools could easily be applied, the ability to use cognitive 
tools such as price-setting models was often hampered by a lack of information or 
technical tools, not limited understanding or willingness. Poor record-keeping of 
raw material, transport and other input costs, for example, limited the possibility of 
accurately using a ‘costs plus profit’ model. Furthermore in many cases the DEEP 
entrepreneurs did not have a calculator, and they certainly did not have resources to 
do extensive pricing studies as required by other pricing models. Record keeping 
and the material assemblage to do it is therefore an important component of being 
able to engage with price-setting models, and indeed many other market concepts 
or skills require technical tools to be utilised. This is discussed further on in this 
chapter.  
Varying performance of entrepreneurs 
Despite evident successes in inducting some of the entrepreneurs into the language 
and toolset of markets and helping them to believe in themselves as entrepreneurs 
(as also shown by the reported overall success of DEEP in increasing energy product 
sales), there was clearly also some disappointment for both GVEP and SolarAid 
when entrepreneurs did not appear to suitably perform their new market roles.  
This was particularly following GVEP’s initial strategy of recruiting people 
sometimes completely new to business. One member of staff outlined the high drop-
out rate of the programme, with less than half of the trained entrepreneurs still 
being involved. Large amounts of money had therefore been spent on training that 
was subsequently seen as ‘lost’ – at least in the eyes of GVEP staff. Those dropped 
entrepreneurs may well have used some aspects of the training and advice received 
under DEEP for other businesses, with augmented agency to perform a business 
role within another market system, but since that would not be captured by DEEP 
monitoring and evaluation such a potential benefit must be entirely discounted. 
Unless the entrepreneur counted as an additional number on the DEEP records and 
their sales contributed to the overall tally of DEEP energy product sales, the 
expenditure was considered entirely wasted.  
An example is a youth group in Kenya called ‘Jungle Magnetic’ (Photo 35) that had 
been recruited under DEEP to produce briquettes out of waste charcoal dust, yet 
 213 
were having difficulties raising production levels due to not having any kind of 
machine, manual or automated, for production. They were even having trouble 
selling their limited output of briquettes due to a lack of marketing activities. 
However, their main business of a snake park with a small entry charge for tourists 
seemed to be doing reasonably well. It seems likely that the snake park had 
benefited from the business training received under DEEP, but this was hard to 
confirm and certainly from GVEP’s perspective the group was not considered a 
successful example of entrepreneurship.  
Photo 35: Jungle Magnetic group members demonstrating their enterprises: charcoal 
briquettes (left); a snake farm for tourists (right) 
  
DEEP staff gave various reasons to explain the poor performance of some 
entrepreneurs. Since one of the parameters for measuring their performance was 
product sales, inaccuracy of sales data often made it difficult to get a clear indication 
of performance levels in the first instance (discussed further in Chapter 0). Some of 
the business mentors attributed relative levels of performance to attitude: “If they 
have a good attitude then they’re successful” and “They can generally meet their 
needs through their business so are entrepreneurial in that respect. Some are more 
aggressive than others though.”  
Another reason offered was that the initial recruitment strategy did not sufficiently 
look to identify existing agency to perform market roles. Someone having interest 
and capital to start an energy business was considered adequate and able to be 
shaped into an ‘entrepreneur’ by training, but some staff felt that over time it had 
become evident that this often was not the case. The easiest way to ensure that 
people did have both the ability and the physical means to run a business was 
therefore to move away from finding people to develop start-up businesses towards 
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those that could already demonstrate some success within a market system. As the 
DEEP programme manager explained: “That’s why we’ve moved away from 
complete start-ups, just picking people up off the side of the road! Our approach 
going forwards for recruitment is more criteria and an application form, and 
properly filtering to get the best ones.” Another member of staff felt that this was 
particularly important in the clean energy sector compared to more traditional 
sectors such as groceries because: “every family may be a potential customer for 
energy products, yet they have to be convinced to change their behaviour, that’s the 
major challenge.”  
Equally SolarAid had had some disappointments with entrepreneurs during the 
previous phase of local assembly of solar kits. A monitoring report from 2009 found 
that after a year, 157 out of 227 trainees were continuing in microsolar, meaning 
around 30% had discontinued (although some were unable to be contacted) 
(SolarAid, 2009). From focus groups it was found that reasons included female 
entrepreneurs, upon whom a focus had been placed on recruiting, were unable to 
continue after training due to family commitments and/or lack of support from 
their husbands. SolarAid’s response to the drop-out rate was to ensure commitment 
from the local community before training women in future and to implement “a 
more robust process for selecting the most dedicated entrepreneurs”. This had 
resulted in the detailed recruitment processes undertaken via the MLF partnership. 
At the time of research SolarAid had only recently moved away from a donor-
funded model to a social enterprise approach and there was often a grey area where 
the two approaches overlapped. This ended up with ‘entrepreneurs’ being talked 
about, but the recruited sales people sometimes being treated more as development 
‘beneficiaries’ with a lack of autonomy. Under an original donor commitment from 
the Body Shop, for example, the main SunnyMoney salesman in Nkhata Bay, 
northern Malawi, was continuing to have his shop rent and watchman paid for by 
SolarAid and received all solar stock on credit. As highlighted by the SolarAid staff, 
this was not supporting him to become an independent entrepreneur. Luckily in 
this case he was timely paying back his debts in order to receive further stock and 
maintain his relationship with SolarAid. However, many of the initial pool of sales 
entrepreneurs had become untenable as they were allowed to generate excessive 
debt by continually receiving new stock on credit, despite lack of repayment. A 
SunnyMoney kiosk in Lilongwe, for example, had to be abandoned because the 
‘entrepreneur’ running it ended up in very large debt.  
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SolarAid staff recognised that this duality of approach (beneficiary and 
entrepreneur) was not working and hence increased their repayment requirement 
for existing entrepreneurs, freezing their stock if debts were unpaid. They decided 
to stop further recruitment of new entrepreneurs (other than via partner 
organisations such as MLF) and only use ‘dealers’ able to buy stock up-front. They 
were also looking at ways to stop paying the rent of the Nkhata Bay kiosk while still 
honouring the donor commitment made. One option included paying the remaining 
funding to the entrepreneur in one final lump sum, on the condition that he used it 
to build his own shop.  
There was certainly also successful evidence of the entrepreneur approach working 
for SolarAid, however. Mrs Nkhata (Photo 36), the MLF solar saleswoman with 
limited formal education, said that she had made so many sales that she had ended 
up being able to build three houses: one in her village, one for her family and one in 
her parents’ village. SolarAid staff told me that she came three or four times per 
month to the Mzuzu office to buy more stock. Photo 36 shows her holding up the 
cash receipts from these visits. It was clear that she had been to the office frequently 
and was very comfortable there, with all of the staff recognising her and engaging in 
informal chat with her. She said that the two other women from her village selected 
as solar sellers were likewise still continuing two and a half years after the initial 
training, but that they also focused on other businesses so were not as successful. 
Kingsley, in charge of the Mzuzu SunnyMoney kiosk, was also seen to be making 
regular sales and had additionally become a solar technician, fixing some of the 
broken products under a separate paid contract with SolarAid. He had also 
developed some of his own ‘entrepreneurial’ approaches to increasing sales, such as 
developing a network of sub-dealers.  
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Photo 36: Solar entrepreneur Mrs Nkhata showing receipts from repeat solar stock 
purchases 
 
The key performance indicator for entrepreneurs or dealers for both GVEP and 
SolarAid is, as with all the other organisations using this approach, the number of 
sales achieved per person and the rate of growth of sales. GVEP also monitors other 
data about the size of businesses such as number of employees. It could perhaps be 
argued that these are narrow indicators, however. A development programme 
overall may be claimed as successful if many products are distributed in a short 
space of time, yet it gives no indication of the longevity of the programme. Equally 
the approach that an entrepreneur is taking to make sales, the consistency of sales, 
the geographical range of sales, the energy input to sales ratio, the use of business 
income and so on might also be important factors in assessing entrepreneurs in their 
roles as market actors. Lessons can perhaps be learnt from monitoring subsistence 
agriculture programmes where increased yield per hectare has often been used as 
an indicator of success, whereas yield to energy input ratio would perhaps be a 
more revealing and sustainable indicator. 
The activities of entrepreneurs tend to be evaluated on a personal level and there is 
little separation between person and business. This is both on the entrepreneur side, 
with few paying themselves a salary from their business rather than just using 
income as personal monetary gains, as described previously, and also on the 
support programme side. At both GVEP and SolarAid, questions were always asked 
about whether the entrepreneurs and dealers were performing well or not, not 
whether their businesses were doing well. Staff at GVEP also highlighted that this is 
often the case more widely in the countries they work in, with small businesses seen 
as the activities of individuals rather than entities in their own right and therefore 
not necessarily being attractive to others such as their children to take over. GVEP 
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was therefore keen to monitor the age profiles of their DEEP entrepreneurs as if 
there was a predominance of older people the programme’s impacts could have 
limited longevity. It is possible that this individualistic nature of small businesses is 
a more general characteristic of informal economic activities, but further research 
would be needed to ascertain this. 
The value of entrepreneurship as a ‘discursive device’ has been seen for 
development intermediaries that use it to demonstrate and entice the artisans and 
sellers they support into performing their market roles, giving them confidence and 
motivation through strong mentoring relationships and useful language and 
cognitive tools. However, this is clearly not enough in itself. Some recruited 
entrepreneurs perform better in their expected roles than others, with a whole array 
of factors influencing this and depending on the metrics used to measure 
performance; limiting recruitment to those that appear to have dedication and 
inherent ‘entrepreneurial’ characteristics and instincts seems to unfairly simplify the 
complex reasons for people becoming effective market actors or otherwise. As one 
DEEP mentor commented:  
The environment and finance can affect them too. They don’t have any money for 
when times are difficult, so if they struggle or aren’t successful it doesn’t mean 
they’re not a real entrepreneur. 
Table 8 shows the success factors of other entrepreneurs undertaking energy 
product sales as stated in interviews with these organisations. The respondents of 
all three organisations cited the importance of existing networks, along with 
marketing techniques to persuade buyers. Financial experience bringing 
competence and access to capital also appeared to make a difference, helped by a 
reasonable level of education. These findings have led to the organisations tailoring 
their recruitment strategies as described earlier (Table 6). 
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Table 8: Success factors and sales figures for other development intermediaries 
distributing clean energy products in in Uganda 
Development 
intermediary 
Success factors Sales figures 
Living Goods 
(Interview 18)  
Enterprising ones add in own capital and build it 
up more quickly. Most successful are above 35 
already with a network e.g. been in other 
women’s organisations, table banking groups 
etc. Also women with small family, more 
educated (at least O level) and long-term bank 
account/own savings (more financial literacy), 
and those with natural marketing skills. 
Solar – about 3 
sales/month/franchisee 
(up to 800 women total) 
Cookstoves – about 3 
sales/month/franchisee 




Difficult to categorise who is most successful, 
but motivation is key. Entrepreneurs have to go 
through calculations and teach customers that 
solar is more economic in long-term vs. 
kerosene. About 5 to 10% drop out due to 
capital issues or other commitments. Chains 
keep growing as entrepreneurs start to sub-
deal, and recommend friends etc. 
150 entrepreneurs, total 
sales not disclosed. 21 
service centres across 
Uganda. 
Solar Sister 
(Interview 19)  
Use social networks to grow sales. Neighbours 
trust them as they know them. Also Sisters use 
products themselves, others see it and want it. 
Many are primary school teachers, this is a very 
rich avenue, they take 5 mins after class to 
show kids, then kids go to parents. Most 
successful sellers have a little bit of education 
and may already have a small shop, so 
experienced with money. Also they have good 
ideas like selling solar when people come to buy 
candles. 
Sisters should always 
have 10 lanterns when 
they go out. Sales target 
is 10 per month, best 
performing sell 15, 
others target 5. If they’ve 
not sold enough they get 
taken off programme. 
Currently have 123 
Sisters in Uganda. Want 
to grow to 500 by end of 
2012. 
In essence these organisations have found that the best performers, on the whole, 
are those who already demonstrate potential agency as market actors, particularly 
through cognitive, network and financial abilities and resources, hence their 
recruitment strategies now try to ‘cherry pick’ people fitting those descriptions. 
However, it does lead to the question of whether supposed ‘BOP’ approaches are in 
fact engaging BOP entrepreneurs or are instead favouring those already able and 
well placed to run a business. If only the latter strategy had been adhered to from 
the start in GVEP and SolarAid’s programme, many of their ‘successful’ 
entrepreneurs may not have been selected at all. However, management from 
Barefoot Uganda tackled criticisms that they were not offering income opportunities 
to the poorest by noting that the supply chain still often then developed beyond 
Barefoot’s own recruitment.  
Over time we realised that the people we started with were mostly 
secondary/primary school drop-outs, whereas now we train secondary/university 
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graduates and even other business people already well established, so it’s a learning 
curve. We’re not exactly moving away from the BOP [bottom of the pyramid] 
because they’re still taking the energy services to the grassroots and still spreading 
the chain further. We recently trained a uni graduate for example, but they’re then 
training other people at the grassroots, so the chain keeps growing. (Barefoot Power, 
Interview 14, 2012) 
The agency of a market actor comes from being a socio-technical assemblage, closely 
bound up with other humans, material objects, information and techniques, and 
affected by the constant changes that alter that assemblage. It is not a static or 
prescriptive form, so if an applicant entrepreneur cannot demonstrate some 
particular component it may not be a critical or permanent omission, but the 
recruiting agency may decide not to take that risk. Equally, however, those that may 
appear as ideal actors for a specific market on paper may not choose to, or may be 
unable to, perform that role for various reasons. The processes of marketisation are 
unique for each actor, so that there can never be a perfect recruitment and training 
strategy. There was no evidence, however, of any discussion about approaches to 
establishing entrepreneur-based distribution chains between the various 
organisations interviewed for this research. This is perhaps an area where more 
exchange of experiences would be beneficial, if the competitive relationship 
between such organisations could be negotiated. 
Further discussion of some of the social and technical components of the marketised 
actors in these case studies is provided in the following sections.    
7.5 Entrepreneurs, tools, techniques and facilities 
The training of entrepreneurs inevitably has limited utility if they do not have access 
to the necessary technical tools to make or sell products. These range from tools 
such as calculators to help make profit calculations and telephones to communicate 
with suppliers and customers, to the equipment associated with actually making 
products such as briquettes and cookstoves. Behind each tool or piece of machinery 
there is as much history of reiterative processes of problematisation, design, 
qualification (to use Callon’s term), valuation and so on as the final energy products 
themselves. Without going into the details of these processes (since this has been 
done in the previous chapter) some observed highlights are given here.  
Although some aspects of the energy products can be made by hand, such as 
biomass briquettes and clay liners for cookstoves, the quality and rate of production 
can be increased by using specifically designed tools and techniques. The metal 
 220 
moulds used to make clay cookstove liners more efficiently and of the right size, 
shape and thickness to fit pre-made cladding is one example. Rather than starting to 
design tools for this purpose from a relatively ‘blank canvas’, as might be the case 
where advanced product manufacturing facilities are available, many of the tools 
seen in use by DEEP entrepreneurs were adapted from other tools that were already 
available locally. For example, in Photo 37 (left) Edward and Nora Mukasa use an 
‘omulawo’ (stick) and ‘kasepikyi’ (bowl), commonly used to make ‘posho’ (maize 
meal) in Uganda, to mix charcoal dust, cassava starch, clay and water together for 
making into charcoal-dust briquettes. They also had a meat-mincer that had been 
adapted for making briquettes out of the resultant charcoal dust mixture (Photo 37, 
right). Because of its design, the briquettes come out in tubular shapes instead of the 
round shape of hand-made briquettes.   
Another DEEP entrepreneur had designed the adapted meat-mincer for briquette 
making; he had then extended his business into making and selling these tools. 
Other entrepreneurs also made their own tools depending on their needs, or 
modified designs that GVEP technical trainers showed them. Most of those making 
cookstove liners, for example, fired them in kilns made of brick and cement, but one 
entrepreneur, Farouk, stood out for having created a kiln from oil drums and sheet 
metal; these materials were more readily available in his area (Photo 38, left). 
Edward and Nora Mukasa were also keen to tell me that after being trained by 
GVEP in how to make drying racks for briquettes, they made their own using a 
modified design to make them stronger (Photo 38, right). The GVEP trainers were in 
turn able to learn from this modification and pass it on to their other trainees.  
Photo 37: Edward and Nora Mukasa in Uganda with omulawo and kasepikyi (left) and 
meat-mincer adapted locally into a manual briquette maker (right) 
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Photo 38: Kiln for firing cookstove liners made out of oil drums and sheet metal (left); 
briquette drying racks made to be stronger than the design shown by GVEP (right) 
   
Of course, none of these technical tools can serve their intended purpose without a 
basic level of ability to use them appropriately. Having access to relevant 
information and an opportunity and cognitive ability to develop proficient 
technique is therefore key, with these being further components of the socio-
technical assemblage that gives a market actor their agency. Under DEEP, a huge 
focus was placed on training the entrepreneurs in practical skills. Techniques were 
always as individual as the energy products themselves, never being exactly the 
same in two places, and many different levels of sophistication and efficiency were 
seen and constantly being developed. In the same way that makers of tools could 
then sell these as an added business component, those with proficient techniques 
could become training providers. Their services would be subject to the same 
processes of qualification, valuation and price-setting as any other market good.  
For each type of energy product there was a hierarchy of equipment from tools used 
to help make products by hand, to hand-powered machines (such as the converted 
meat-mincer) to full ensembles of automated machinery. Entrepreneurs were able to 
climb this technical ladder when they set aside enough profit for the next 
investment or obtained other sources of finance. Each new level of automation led 
to higher output levels and a greater impression of business sophistication and 
formality, increasingly far from the basic set-up of individual artisans making 
products by hand.  
 222 
Photo 39: Ugastove clay mixing using a conveyor belt and automated mixer system 
 
Photo 40: Ugastove metal cladding manufacturing 
 
For cookstove manufacturing, the most sophisticated tools I saw were at Ugastove 
in Kampala where conveyor belts and automated mixers were used for clay mixing 
(Photo 39) and large clamps and automated sheet metal cutters for shaping the stove 
cladding (Photo 40). This business was deemed advanced enough to be taken on as 
a DEEP partner, so GVEP was helping to train their independent sales 
representatives.  
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Another interesting aspect of Photo 40 is the evidence of safety equipment, again 
something less common in the smaller, less formal businesses. Some briquette 
makers, for example, mentioned how mixing charcoal dust was notably bad for 
their health and that therefore they avoided doing it on a windy day, but although 
investment in dust masks was seen as a viable solution it was not a priority. The 
reason for ear defenders being used at Ugastove was likely to be partly due to its 
registration as a carbon finance project, which would have brought with it various 
stipulations such as concerted efforts to ensure safe working environments. Photo 
39 and Photo 40 also highlight another key material feature of energy product 
businesses: the premises available for undertaking activities. The location and size 
of the facilities make a huge difference to the potential for manufacturers to install 
and operate their equipment, and store materials and part-built and finished 
products.  
Similarly, product sellers need somewhere to store and possibly display stock for 
sale. 12 out of 30 (40%) DEEP entrepreneurs spoken with, for example, cited space 
and facilities as key limitations, particularly for cookstove liner makers and 
briquette makers who needed to let their products dry out but were often unable to 
do this outside because of rain. One cookstove liner maker in western Kenya 
explained that they had been forced to limit their production of cookstove liners 
because of storage issues. Already their adult children had needed to move out of 
their sleeping rooms because they had been taken over for liner storage (Photo 41). 
Added to this are the services that facilities require, such as lighting and an 
electricity supply if automated machinery is going to be used. Given the energy 
access situation summarised in Chapters 5, this can often be a limiting factor to the 
level and type of automation able to be achieved.  
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Photo 41: Room previously used for sleeping taken over for drying cookstove liners 
 
Photo 42: Solar phone charging records, Uganda 
 
Tools are not just necessary for making things or protecting people when doing so, 
but also for allowing market actors to perform related aspects of their roles. Their 
agency as market actors overall is again affected by what tools and information they 
have access to. In the discussion above, the difficulty in setting prices was often 
hampered by a lack of records. The simplest material objects of a notepad and pen 
for recording data such as sales over time generated vital information to feed into 
pricing and other economic models. Photo 42 shows a solar phone charging 
entrepreneur’s sales records, used to calculate his monthly income and the payback 
of his solar system over time.   
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A significant recent example of technology enhancing agency, particularly for those 
working in the informal sector in African countries where there may be limited 
access to land-based communication infrastructure, is mobile communication 
devices. The high and rapidly growing levels of mobile phone ownership in Africa 
and the impacts on business activities have been discussed in Chapter 2, and 
throughout the fieldwork these technical devices were reinforced as key for 
entrepreneurs to give and receive information and build and maintain relationships 
with suppliers and consumers. Their utility also went beyond communications with 
phones being used as, for example, visual aids, information storage, calculators and 
mobile banking devices. Photo 43 shows a DEEP entrepreneur in Uganda, Mr 
Herbert Bogezi, being shown a photo of other cookstoves on his DEEP mentor’s 
Blackberry. Phones had even become essential for the case study programmes 
overall, with DEEP mentor-entrepreneur meetings always being set up by phone 
and these crucial relationships being maintained by phone outside of personal visits.    
Photo 43: DEEP mentor showing a DEEP entrepreneur a photo of other stoves on his 
Blackberry 
 
Living Goods summarises the key role of mobiles for their female entrepreneurs on 
their website: “Simple phones are quickly becoming the single most transformative 
tool for our success: empowering our agents to earn more, delivering targeted 
health messages, dramatically lowering our cost to market and monitor, enabling 
real time salesforce management and igniting social connections that drive impact 
and business success.” (Living Goods, 2013) They note, for example, that sales 
representatives give their number to every customer so that they can call and 
request a home visit any time they need. Similarly GVEP and SunnyMoney 
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entrepreneurs were observed to frequently talk with both existing customers and 
prospective customers on their phones. One SunnyMoney saleswoman explained 
that she would often receive calls from people who had obtained her phone number 
from her friends and other clients; they would call her to arrange coming to her 
village to buy a solar lantern next time they were passing.  
Many of the entrepreneurs in Kenya and Uganda also said that they often used M-
Pesa (Kenya), MTN Money (Uganda) or competing mobile money transfer systems. 
None said that they had received payment from customers in this way, but some 
had paid suppliers of materials or stock. A survey by Gallup (Godoy et al., 2012) 
found that mobile phone-based transactions are now widely used to send domestic 
remittances in Kenya and to a lesser extent Uganda, reflecting the fact these two 
countries (along with Tanzania) “have three of the most developed mobile money 
markets in the world” (p.23). As shown in Figure 44, in Kenya, 90% of the survey 
respondents who had sent money domestically in the previous 30 days had done so 
via a mobile phone; this was also the case for 68% of Ugandan respondents. During 
the time of research there was not yet a widespread mobile money transfer system 
in Malawi, but this is likely to change in the near future.  
Interestingly, Godoy et al. also show in Figure 45 that rather than being an elite 
technology, mobile money transfer services in sub-Saharan Africa are used 
relatively evenly by rich and poor. By comparison, banks are used much more 
commonly by rich sub-Saharan Africans than by poor, illustrating the relative 
inaccessibility of formal banking facilities by comparison with mobile phones.  
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Figure 44: Channels used to send domestic remittances (most recent transaction) 
(Godoy et al., 2012) 
 
Figure 45: Channels used to send domestic remittances across income groups (same 
countries as Figure 44) (Godoy et al., 2012) 
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This importance of mobile phone technology also offers myriad new opportunities 
for ‘entrepreneurs’ looking to provide related services. Obviously mobile phones 
become defunct without battery power to run them, providing DEEP solar phone 
charging entrepreneurs in areas without electricity grid connections with numerous 
customers (Photo 44).  
Photo 44: DEEP entrepreneur in Uganda receiving payment for charging a mobile 
phone from his solar system 
 
In the same way that there is a hierarchy of more advanced tools, machinery and 
facilities for making products, there are always more extensive materials and 
technologies to be engaged with more generally. Having talked with a SunnyMoney 
entrepreneur about how she would find new customers, I left her to talk with 
SolarAid staff. One of them later remarked that the entrepreneur had subsequently 
said to her: “Ask that lady to buy me a car, so that I can move about to sell more!” 
7.6 Entrepreneurs and their social networks 
In addition to tools and techniques (both material and cognitive), connections with 
other humans are a fundamental component of market agency. The connectivity of 
the entrepreneurs and the characteristics of the networks they are already 
embedded in form part of their ability to perform the entrepreneur role. This agency 
is by no means static, however, as the making of new connections or breakdown of 
existing ones (e.g. through a perceived breach of trust) will undoubtedly occur over 
time. A focus in both development and entrepreneurship literature on the possible 
benefits of social networks mean that they have often been termed as ‘social capital’. 
Similarly, initiatives to sell products to people at the bottom of the economic 
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pyramid (BOP) often acknowledge the opportunities available from harnessing the 
social capital of BOP entrepreneurs. There are some strong critics of such 
approaches to render social relationships ‘economic’ in this way, however, such as 
Elyachar (2005) who uses the term ‘dispossession’ to describe how microenterprise 
initiatives in Cairo ‘appropriate’ the relationships on which the poor rely to survive 
and arbitrarily incorporate them into market development projects.  
Both of the case study initiatives are equally relying on this aspect of their 
entrepreneurs’ agency as market actors in order for clean energy products to reach 
as many people as possible. SunnyMoney entrepreneur Kingsley, for example, said 
that as well as selling from the kiosk in Mzuzu market, when he does not have 
many customers he moves around town to visit different offices. In the evening he 
also makes some home visits. He arranges the visits via friends and previous 
customers who let him know when people are interested. He does get people 
walking past his kiosk in the market and stopping, but its location in the food 
market is not always so good for that and often it is when people have already been 
told where to go to buy a lantern. One evening I visited the homes of some of the 
customers in his local neighbourhood to see their solar lights in action. The 
description of how they came to buy their lights is shown in Box 5.  
Box 5: Visits to some of Kingsley’s solar lantern customers in his neighbourhood 
Mr Daudi Matola in Massasa has a Barefoot Senior Powerpack (4 bulb system) that he 
bought 2 months ago. It’s his first time to have a solar product. His son is a friend of 
Kingsley’s and has a Barefoot Firefly (one bulb desk lamp). 
Mrs Enala Chirambo in Chiwanga also has a Senior Powerpack. She bought it last year in 
December 2011. Her daughter is the owner of the kiosk that Kingsley uses. Her neighbours 
don’t have solar, but one guy has seen her system and now wants the same – he’s asked to 
be introduced to Kingsley. 
Mrs Nyirongo again has a Barefoot Senior Powerpack. She’s a neighbour to Kingsley. 
Another neighbour also has the same one and some more have been asking – about two or 
three more people seem likely to buy. 
Mr Mhone has a Barefoot Senior Powerpack. He saw the same system at Kingsley’s house 
then decided to buy one too. One person from work has already asked him about it and is 
thinking of getting one.  
All of the customers in Box 5 were found through Kingsley’s existing social 
networks. The customers’ social networks have then been recruited into the ongoing 
quest for more customers. That is not to say that existing networks are his only sales 
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channel, and it is likely that it was easier to arrange for me to visit those customers 
with whom he has frequent contact. He did acknowledge some passing trade from 
his kiosk and new connections made through office visits, and he was unaware of 
many connections until they came to him to buy a lantern. However, Granovetter’s 
(1982) ‘strength of weak ties’ concept is evident here, as well as the principle of 
‘social capital’ more generally.  
During the research, I was given many examples of social networks being used for 
both finding customers and for recruiting onward chains of sellers. Kingsley had 
started using some of his friends as sub-dealers on an informal basis. If his friends 
found buyers, Kingsley would split the sales profit with them. His friends inevitably 
had access to more people who Kingsley might not otherwise reach (again invoking 
the ‘strength of weak ties’). However, Kingsley had access to the products, and both 
Kingsley and his friends were incentivised to utilise those connections through the 
profit available.  
Another example of a friend being brought into a supply chain was seen in the 
coastal region of Kenya: a woman in a shop in Mariakani, Lucy, was selling d.light 
solar lights that she was buying from a friend who worked for Total, the petroleum 
company that had started selling pico-solar products at their garage forecourts. 
Although it was not an arrangement that Total necessarily knew about, she bought 
them in bulk and sold them for a small profit. Another example was a charcoal dust 
briquette seller in Uganda, Mrs Margaret Kisakye, who had started her business 
after her friend attended a DEEP training event and gave her the information about 
it. She joined herself and subsequently received the training in 2009. Since then she 
had trained over 50 other briquette makers, around 30 of whom then also become 
DEEP entrepreneurs. Mrs Kisakye said that these people had originally been a mix 
of friends and customers.  
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Photo 45: Mrs Margaret Kisakye (left), a briquette maker from Masaka, Uganda, with 
one of the 50 friends and customers that she trained to make briquettes  
 
Perhaps the key question being posed when recruiting entrepreneurs should 
therefore be ‘how well connected are you?’ instead of ‘are you motivated and 
entrepreneurial?’ The Solar Sister method (Table 6) of recruitment described earlier 
is one example: ‘anchor women’ are nominated and they in turn recruit other sellers 
they trust from their existing networks. The US cookstove manufacturers Envirofit 
were also overt about their use of social ties to set up distribution channels in Kenya. 
The head of their distribution partner in Kenya, East Africa Energy, specifically 
stated: “Team leaders with very good social networks are recruited” (East Africa 
Energy, Interview 6, 2011). These people then quickly find distributors, with the aim 
of disseminating both the product and a share of sales profits to the “bottom of the 
hierarchy”. During the pilot phase of this approach they said that they had never 
seen such demand for a product, quoting the example of one team leader who from 
a standing start had sold 800 stoves in four weeks, simply utilising her networks. 
She subsequently had a significant backlog of orders.  
The debate in academic literature around the ethics of ‘appropriating’ poor people’s 
social networks in order to sell products offers several arguments against it, such as 
inadequate recompense (Elyachar, 2012). This particularly addresses imported 
products that do not offer the added benefit of local manufacturing. Although 
SunnyMoney imports solar lanterns, it was clear that solar entrepreneurs such as 
Kingsley, and the sub-dealers who he has in turn recruited through his network of 
friends, are incentivised to sell products to their existing social networks because of 
the profit share they gain. This acts as financial recompense for the ‘marketisation’ 
of their social infrastructure. In Kingsley’s case the sub-dealer recruitment was 
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organically grown out of Kingsley’s own initiative, not out of any pressure or 
suggestion from staff at SolarAid, suggesting that the financial incentive is enough 
to promote entrepreneurs into using their existing social ties. That is not to say, 
however, that his training from SolarAid might not have helped the idea form, or 
that the sales they achieve will not end up being incorporated into SunnyMoney’s 
performance data. Furthermore, the entrepreneurs in these case studies were also 
seen (and indeed encouraged) to find new consumers by making many more 
connections than just relying on those within their existing social networks, limiting 
the argument for ‘dispossession’ in those cases. In fact, it is not inconceivable that 
some of those new or newly strengthened relationships may end up enhancing the 
agency of the entrepreneurs in ways that extend beyond the market context in 
possibly beneficial ways.  
The organisation Living Goods has put forward the argument that in order to 
maximise the efficiency of micro-distribution approaches, product distributors 
looking to target the poor should merge their efforts into one combined channel: 
“Innovators in health, energy, and agriculture often fail to scale because they try to 
build new distribution systems solely for their one new product.” (Living Goods, 
2012) This was also made clear in an interview with the manager of their Uganda 
office: “Energy products is an emerging market in Uganda, one of the best ways of 
reaching clients is using systems like Living Goods’ as we have a network to the 
grassroots – you can see it growing over time.” (Living Goods, Interview 18, 2012) 
Indeed, many product manufacturers such as ToughStuff are realising that the 
human infrastructures have already been established and ‘marketised’ by other 
organisations so their primary distribution method is to look for entries into those. 
As well as individuals and their social capital, SolarAid use other nodal points in 
order to harness existing networks. One example is large working estates, such as 
coffee, tea and tobacco farms. Schools are another increasingly important market 
entry point within their sales strategy. SolarAid is not the first to use schools in this 
way. Cross and Street (2009), for example, note that: “Unilever envisaged schools as 
‘entry points into communities’ and schoolchildren as ‘change initiators’ who would 
convey the Lifebuoy message to adult consumers in their homes.” (ibid., p.5) This 
approach has apparently been highly successful and after a successful pilot project 
on Mafia Island in Tanzania has been rolled out across SunnyMoney’s East African 
operations.  
In the country contexts in which this research was carried out, it was also evident 
that religious networks were of huge importance and many social ties were often 
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made or reinforced via activities such as church attendance. One DEEP cookstove 
entrepreneur from Uganda, Herbert Bogezi, told me that the month before he had 
been on a trip to South Sudan to train people there on making cookstoves. The trip 
was facilitated by a community-based organisation there that he had been put in 
touch with through a friend in the Lutheran World Federation. Religion was a 
regular topic of conversation between staff of the development intermediaries and 
often mention of their own contacts would be followed by ‘from church’ or ‘who 
prays at the same mosque’.  
Risks and inadequacies of ‘social capital’ approaches 
Social capital should not be over-emphasized, however, particularly if Meagher’s 
(2005) warning against undue emphasis on the utility of ‘social capital’ for fostering 
economic growth and regulation is heeded. Two aspects of this argument became 
clear from the research. Firstly, by no means were all sales or other supply chain 
connections always made through ready-made informal social networks, as 
indicated above. Secondly, where more personal ties were relied upon there were 
often associated complications. 
Regarding the first point, nearly all of the entrepreneurs were undertaking some 
efforts to market their products to new audiences, such as through going to physical 
marketplaces to sell, positioning their main business location to attract passing trade, 
advertising with flyers, or by making door-to-door visits to both homes and larger 
hubs such as churches, schools and offices. Many DEEP entrepreneurs making 
briquettes, for example, said that they would hand out free samples, while those 
selling larger products would give demonstrations. Herbert Bogezi, the cookstove 
maker in Uganda mentioned above, had deliberately located his workshop at the 
side of a main road and he sold most of his portable stoves to passers by. However, 
at the time I visited him, he was having to move his premises back from the road 
due to it being widened. He was therefore in the process of making a large sign to 
put at the roadside instead.  
It would be unfairly limited to suggest that artisan manufacturers in the informal 
sector in African countries are restricted to harnessing their existing social ties. 
Various DEEP entrepreneurs were also managing to distribute their products via 
wholesalers including hardware shops, small supermarkets, and independent 
market vendors. Another cookstove maker in Uganda, Farouk, estimated that he 
had established around 100 wholesalers by the end of 2011, having started his 
business in 2007. He explained that he had to go looking for them and present and 
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explain his product to each potential new wholesaler. Often he found that their 
main interest was price.  
Mrs Margaret Kisakye, a briquette maker in Uganda, described how she makes 
house-to-house visits and goes to local council meetings, handing out samples at 
both, and also distributes business cards that she has made for her business (Figure 
46). She often combines these activities with her existing social networks, however, 
as friends will suggest she visits their neighbourhood. There is not a clear 
distinction between different levels of personal connectivity, nor does this appear 
necessary, and again it is the complex web of people, physical artefacts (including 
briquettes, business cards and mobile phones) and the interactions between them 
that leads to her finding new customers.  
Figure 46: Business card produced by DEEP Briquette Entrepreneur in Uganda 
 
It is not simply the existence of networks between actors that is important, but how 
those network connections actually operate, such as through trust or asymmetrical 
power relations. When buying products, consumers are effectively asked to trust the 
seller. Prospective consumers need to be persuaded of the benefits of a product 
before buying it, with a good seller helping them to visualise themselves using it 
and enjoying the benefits it will bring. The existence of a trust-based relationship 
can significantly help that persuasion process. In most cases there appears to be 
limited trust extended in the other direction, however. Only two entrepreneurs out 
of thirty said that they ever offered products to customers on credit. Others had had 
to stop after debts were not repaid, and the few exceptions were in the case of long-
established relationships with wholesale dealers who were known to pay once the 
goods had been sold on.  
On the other hand, cookstove entrepreneurs often took large orders for goods to be 
made on commission on a verbal, ‘cash-on-delivery’ basis. When I asked one liner 
maker, Edwards Gwara in Kenya, if he would consider introducing written 
contracts for such large orders to reduce associated risks, he replied that it was not 
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necessary because he knew the customers well. If he suddenly asked them to sign a 
written contract, he said, they would think he had lost confidence in them and that 
would be detrimental to the relationship. Furthermore, the tools required to 
generate a formal contract in the first place (i.e., to produce enforceable written legal 
documents) are not readily available to most entrepreneurs. 
The market devices such as warranties and standards that have been discussed in 
Chapter 6 also represent ways of formalising otherwise mostly informal transactions 
between sellers and buyers, through establishing apparently binding rules set out in 
legal documents. These are attempts to move away from verbal trust-based 
contracts that are perhaps more easily broken. However, where warranties cannot 
be utilised or have no meaning for the buyer, it leaves a void between the formal 
and informal. The need to ensure products are high quality and their usage 
instructions explained well to new customers are more key than ever, therefore, as 
losing trust amongst these consumers could be much more significant than in fully 
formalised markets. During a trial of new pay-as-you go solar products that was 
highlighting some issues with the design, the SunnyMoney entrepreneur involved 
in the pilot remarked: “People need them very much, but if they see these problems 
they’ll be afraid and won’t buy.” During DEEP training, the entrepreneurs were 
taught to be conservative with the statements they make about their products. “For 
example, tell people a solar lantern will last 4 hours, even if it has been proven in a 
laboratory to last 6, because people will test it.” 
The appropriation of social networks by development intermediaries for economic 
purposes is also seen as worrisome if it means that the trust that had been 
established over time between people is jeopardised. Product manufacturers or the 
development intermediaries importing them that are specifically advocating sales 
amongst the poor’s social networks could perhaps be argued to have a heightened 
duty of care to make sure that the goods are reliable, for the sake of the 
marketisation project and for the sake of the entrepreneurs drawn into it. Strong 
relationships, on which those at the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ might rely for survival 
(Elyachar, 2005), could be put at risk if those products break or do not function as 
expected without avenue for resolving the problem. Since GVEP’s strategy is to be 
product neutral by not promoting any specific manufacturer, this was not an issue 
for the DEEP case study. As the importers of solar lanterns and distributor of them 
into ‘BOP’ networks, however, SunnyMoney does hold this responsibility to some 
extent.  
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One example of the adverse impact that can be caused was where a member of 
SunnyMoney staff had visited her aunt’s village around two hours from Mzuzu to 
sell some solar lanterns. However, for various reasons there had subsequently been 
problems with a few of the systems. Without any permanent SunnyMoney sales 
representative in the nearby area, the burden had been put on the aunt to resolve 
these problems that were seen as her responsibility. She had managed to bring some 
of the faulty products back to the SunnyMoney Mzuzu office on one of her visits 
there, but had only been allowed to leave them for fixing and several months later 
had still not received replacements. When we visited her village at a later date, she 
was clearly frustrated by the delayed response and her trust in her niece and her 
neighbours’ trust in her recommendations had been called into question.  
Co-operative working arrangements: from micro-actor to macro-actor 
Under DEEP, the networks of entrepreneurs were seen to enhance their agency 
through other ways besides expanding supply chains. Many of the artisan 
manufacturers of cookstoves and briquettes were organised in co-operative working 
arrangements through which they were able to exchange information and provide 
mutual support. The products would still tend to be made by individuals and they 
would receive the income from their own products sold; where cookstove liners 
were grouped together, for example, each had a small mark indented on it to 
distinguish its particular maker. However, the group interconnectedness meant that 
they were able to increase their marketing abilities, raw material purchasing power 
and product price setting power, by reducing the risk of prospective customers 
being able to find cheaper products nearby. In essence the bonds made between the 
individuals in each group were able to turn micro-actors into more powerful macro-
actors, to use Callon and Latour’s (1981) terminology. It also allowed facilities, tools 
and techniques to be shared, although for the material equipment this did 
sometimes lead to bottlenecks where there was greater demand than availability.  
Photo 46 shows the group structure of a cookstove-making cooperative in western 
Kenya that was being supported under DEEP. It involved a total of 15 family or 
village collectives organised into four sub-groups. Each sub-group had one 
representative that attended the monthly meetings at the rented group office, each 
having a different unpaid position such as Marketing Officer. Kariestop was 
registered as a community-based organisation in Kenya and each member had to 
pay a small monthly fee that went towards the office rent and other administrative 
costs. Customers were able to place orders at the office and these would be split 
across the group members according to production capacity and the sales income 
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also shared accordingly. As their financial officer told me: “Being brought together 
to work as a group empowers us, makes us able to fix prices better.” Interestingly 
these entrepreneurs had been formed into a group by GIZ. However, they 
commented that GIZ had no mentoring facility and this is what they gained from 
their support under DEEP, specifically to support product quality improvements 
and marketing activities. Having seen how well their group structure was working, 
however, GVEP had started to form other DEEP entrepreneurs into similar groups.  
Photo 46: Poster showing the group and sub-group structure of Kariestop cookstove 
makers in western Kenya 
 
Enhancing agency: social brokering 
The DEEP case study in particular seems to offer an interesting counter to 
arguments of micro-enterprise or distribution network development programmes 
having only negative impacts on the social ties of the poor, through various 
examples of GVEP’s marketisation efforts adding to the connectivity and thus 
agency of their entrepreneurs. The facilitation of co-operative working groups by 
both GIZ and GVEP as described above is one example. Although Prahalad (2010) 
invokes the “extraordinary powers of connectivity among poor people” (Elyachar 
(2012) p.110), there still appears to be space for such development intermediaries to 
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act as ‘ brokers’ of market relationships by facilitating new market linkages. In fact, 
based on Burt’s (1993) theory where ‘structural holes’ within networks are used as 
an opportunity for brokerage, this puts the development intermediaries themselves 
in the ‘entrepreneurial’ category, although in these cases it is for ‘development’ 
rather than business gains.  
This ‘broker’ service was often seen in cases where geographical mobility otherwise 
limited the likelihood of different actors coming into contact with each other. For 
example, GVEP staff introduced a cookstove liner trader from Mombasa to a group 
of women making liners in central Kenya. Because of limited clay availability 
around the coast, the trader had to buy liners from relatively far away, yet this 
limited the opportunities to find artisans via his social networks. Dennis (seen on 
the left in Photo 47) had managed to find a source in western Kenya via his wife’s 
family, but the increasing transport costs of crossing the whole country were 
making his business unviable. At the same time, the women in the central region 
were struggling to carry their products to the local market, so a bulk order from 
Dennis immediately strengthened the prospects for their own business.  
GVEP staff accompanied Dennis on his first visit to meet the women. Due to his 
dealings with full stove makers, he was able to instruct them in the quality required 
and techniques to achieve it. In conversation on the journey back from the visit 
Dennis stated: “I like GVEP because they are taking us slowly step by step, they are 
attached to so many people and organisations.” He also said that the women had 
mentioned they bought vermiculite, a binder material added to the clay to 
strengthen it, from the coast and struggled to transport it. He was therefore able to 
expand his own business by delivering vermiculite when he took his otherwise 
empty lorry to collect the liners. 
Photo 47: Women near Thika being trained by purchaser of cookstove liners 
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Various other examples were also observed where DEEP mentors used their own 
personal or work connections to obtain product orders for their entrepreneurs. Two 
entrepreneurs that had expanded into making briquette machines immediately 
gained access to all briquette makers supported by DEEP, giving instant demand for 
their products that would have taken much longer to build had they not had that 
connection with GVEP. Their businesses were further facilitated financially due to 
GVEP not having to pay import duty when delivering one of their briquette 
machines from, for example, Kenya to Tanzania via its offices. 
Interestingly, one of those briquetting machine makers, called ‘James’ here, had 
started off as a DEEP entrepreneur but subsequently become a paid technology 
mentor under DEEP, employed by GVEP’s technical project partner IT Power. He 
had started making the machines after GVEP staff had introduced him to the other 
machine maker who had given him the necessary training. Although in early DEEP 
promotional material James often appears as a ‘poster boy’ for the programme’s 
success, when I met him he was a programme employee; his relationship with 
GVEP had thus changed significantly over time and brought clear benefits in terms 
of his personal situation. A similar example is cited by Crewe and Harrison (1998) 
who document how a stove maker in western Kenya, ‘Alice’ (pseudonym used), 
was trained by Intermediate Technology (now Practical Action) in 1987 but by the 
early 1990s became a technical assistant to the Project Officer, thus crossing the gap 
from ‘beneficiary’ to ‘developer’ (ibid., p.185).  
Other ways in which GVEP and other organisations were seen to act as brokers 
include: 
• GVEP running marketing days and helping DEEP entrepreneurs to attend trade 
fairs. Photo 48 shows cookstove makers from western Kenya exhibiting at a trade 
fair in Kampala, Uganda. Unfortunately in this particular case, the women were 
robbed of the money that they had earned when boarding the bus back to Kenya. 
• GVEP linking DEEP entrepreneurs with institutions able to test their products, or 
organising the testing for them. This was both for certification against standards and 
in order for the entrepreneurs to know specifically how their products perform for 
marketing purposes.  
• GVEP facilitating inter-entrepreneur linkages for other reasons, such as a cookstove 
maker working with briquette producers to package and brand their briquettes for 
sale to his cookstove buyers.  
• SolarAid linking prospective buyers contacting their Mzuzu office with the local 
SunnyMoney entrepreneur or dealer in their area. 
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• Organisations such as Impact Carbon and Uganda Carbon Bureau providing access 
to carbon market devices that would otherwise be inaccessible to local stove 
manufacturers, as discussed in the previous chapter.  
Photo 48: Keyo women from Kenya at a trade fair in Kampla, Uganda 
 
A less immediately visible brokerage role is the advocacy work that development 
intermediaries are able to undertake on behalf of the market actors they support, 
who often have limited engagement with state institutions due to their informal 
economy positioning. For example, all three of the case study countries have (or had 
in the case of Kenya) reduced or zero import tariffs for solar products and this is 
also the case in many other African countries. These resulted, at least partially, from 
the advocacy and negotiation work of numerous development agencies, NGOs and 
networks thereof. It is something that individual solar entrepreneurs in each 
country are very unlikely to have had the power to influence.  
Promoting indebtedness 
Another and perhaps more easily critiqued brokerage role for development 
intermediaries is the provision of links with loan services. Elyachar (2005), Ismail 
(2006), Ly and Mason (2012) and others have found the notion of challenging 
poverty by promoting indebtedness problematic.  
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GVEP staff in fact found that already there was a tendency for entrepreneurs to 
assume that a loan or grant was the best or only solution for developing their 
business. Due to the aid legacy, they also felt that GVEP as an NGO was there to 
provide them with preferably a grant. GVEP staff had therefore often found 
themselves promoting alternatives to loans rather than promoting indebtedness. 
The operations director, for example, stated that “helping people to save is a better 
solution than immediately assuming loans are the best way forward.” I also had an 
interesting conversation with another GVEP senior manager who equally 
questioned whether a debt-centric view of growth was really appropriate for small-
scale informal businesses. Although this was common rhetoric in staff discussions, 
however, in some cases the importance of having access to finance still appeared to 
be instilled in entrepreneurs from the training stage. This was perhaps partly 
because it was one of the key features of DEEP that had helped ‘sell’ the programme 
to prospective entrepreneurs. At the end of the first day of a solar entrepreneur 
training course in Uganda, for example, the summary advice given to recruits for 
increasing their sales included “get financial help.”  
GVEP’s loan guarantee system was an important aspect of the programme within a 
context of high and variable interest rates known to be a prevailing barrier to 
growth of enterprises. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor carried out a study in 
Uganda in 2010 (Namatovu et al., 2010) and summarised that: “Inaccessibility to 
funding stems from the reluctance of financial institutions to lend money at 
affordable rates […] This may be because the credit history system is still in its 
infancy and many potential borrowers lack the requisite collateral to access money 
from financial institutions. While government grants, micro credit and Savings & 
Credit organizations (SACCOs) are attempting to fill this void, the impact is at best 
minimal and the cost of borrowing is still high.” (ibid., p.46) 
The reduction of risk for the financial providers by GVEP agreeing to underwrite 
the loan meant that they could provide fixed and lower interest rates compared to 
those offered to non-DEEP customers. The financial officer in Uganda explained the 
outcome of this: 
The interest rate with FINCA [for DEEP entrepreneurs] is 18% per annum, or 1.5% 
per month. It’s a fixed interest rate, at a time when many people are having issues. 
FINCA have just raised theirs for non-GVEP customers, from about 28% to 30%, 
sometimes 35% for group loans, but it depends on the product. The interest rate for 
SACCO loans under GVEP is also 18%; what they charge their other customers 
varies though – some are at 30%.  
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Those who did secure a loan via GVEP’s guarantee system were often seen to put it 
to good use, as shown in Box 6 which summarises some of the entrepreneurs’ own 
statements about loans they had received.  
Box 6: Examples of DEEP entrepreneurs using GVEP loans effectively 
 
For DEEP entrepreneurs to receive a loan they had to be nominated by their mentor. 
If approved by the DEEP financial officer for the country an application would be 
put forward to a relevant financial institution. The conditions of the relationship 
between GVEP and each financial institution was formalised through a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) stipulating that the institution undertake 
all the checks normally carried out for a loan (i.e., the normal due diligence process); 
if this was breached GVEP would be exempt from the loan guarantee. The intention 
Mwangaza cookstove liners (Dede family, Kenya) – Had just been approved for a loan 
from Kiva and were going to use the money to build a dedicated store for drying he 
liners and for mending the kiln roof which was leaking.  
Farouk – Used it to buy a van to reduce transport costs of picking up materials and 
delivering his cookstoves. This enabled him to reach a wider market and look further 
afield for cheap materials. 
Herbert Bogezi – Loan from FINCA, obtained with DEEP guarantee at monthly rate of 
1.5% interest (“it would’ve been 2.5% otherwise”). Used for buying moulding set for clay 
liners so can expand into making liners. Was offered 8 million loan but only accepted 1 
million. Moulds cost 100,000 for large set and 70,000 for smaller. Rest being used to build 
large kiln for firing the liners. 
Edward and Nora Mukasa – Bought manual briquette machine as too expensive to buy 
without a loan and were previously making briquettes by hand. Need carbonising drum 
but don’t want to get another loan, might be able to use savings. Very worried about theft 
so keep machine safe (it was wrapped up and tucked away in their kitchen). Difficult to 
repay loan because wet weather making it difficult to keep briquettes dry, but bank won’t 
listen to excuses about the weather. Would get a fine if they default, not sure how much 
as hasn’t happened yet. But production should be huge next month when rains stopped.  
Mrs Margaret Kisakye – Got a manual machine to make briquettes in 2011, two years 
after starting her briquette business, using a FINCA loan. Used to be a nurse but now 
only makes briquettes as better financially. It’s been fine to pay off the loan and she 
would be happy to get another in the future. She needs more than one machine in order 
to produce more briquettes. There’s plenty of market for it, no limit to demand.  
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was to make sure that only those viable for a loan would be taken on, so that a 
strong entrepreneur-mentor relationship would not be enough for an entrepreneur 
to secure a loan. This arrangement did seem to cause some confusion for the 
entrepreneurs, however, who were asked for some form of collateral against their 
loan despite GVEP claiming to be underwriting it. For one set of applicants in 
Uganda it was proposed that the land ownership certificates for their homes would 
be used as collateral and therefore they should provide a copy to the bank. They 
immediately refused to comply and their loan application had to be withdrawn. It 
transpired that despite attempts to explain the arrangements, the entrepreneurs had 
seen the prospective loans as grants with no risk to themselves if not repaid.  
This was not the intention of the loan system. Instead, it was hoped that by being 
persuaded to take on energy entrepreneurs as clients and experiencing successful 
relationships with them, the financial institutions would gain adequate information 
and confidence to no longer mark other similar actors as high risk. GVEP’s financial 
managers noted some examples of this: one SACCO was seen to develop and offer 
more widely a specific energy financial product. “They lend energy products ‘in 
kind’, as well as in cash. The ‘in kind’ method prevents a diversion of funds and 
ensures the entrepreneur is spending it on their energy business, for example, 
briquette making machines, or a solar panel. It can be for business or domestic use, 
it doesn’t have to be for commercial activity.” 
As well as the more positive examples given in Box 6, GVEP staff experienced some 
difficulties with entrepreneurs who were given loans. Early in 2012 in the Uganda 
office, for example, the financial officer returned frustrated from a meeting. It 
transpired that a group of entrepreneurs were no longer paying their loans back 
because they had not in fact invested all (or, in some cases, any) of the money 
provided in their energy businesses and were therefore not making enough income 
from sales to cover the loan repayments. Some had bought materials and machines 
but had not started using them yet. Others had only bought a limited amount of 
materials or stock that had not been enough to sell adequate numbers of products 
for loan repayment. The outcome of the meeting was that they were asked to sign a 
commitment to work harder in order to make the loan repayments by a new 
deadline date, but since it was not a financial institution and had not taken any 
collateral against the loans, the only power GVEP ultimately had to force loan 
repayments was to threaten to drop the entrepreneurs from DEEP. This would 
obviously write off the loan debts for good so was only a last resort, and it is 
unknown if this had to be done in any cases by the end of the programme.  
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Box 7 provides some more mixed statements from DEEP mentors about the 
attitudes of entrepreneurs to loans. It shows that each person would react 
differently, and their varying attitudes and circumstances would be strong 
determinants of whether the loan system was deemed to be successful for each 
individual.  
Box 7: Statements by mentors about DEEP entrepreneurs attitudes to loans 
“Mr Herbert was offered a loan of 8 million Ugandan shillings, but he accepted only 1 
million because he wanted to be serious with that first and make sure he could pay it back. 
Then he will take more next time and build it up steadily. But others are not serious, they’re 
only interested in the money. We can’t be sure that if they get a loan they’ll use it for that 
instead of something else. They don’t think about that it needs to be paid back.” 
“We had some problems where entrepreneurs used the loan to start poultry farming, instead 
of for their energy business. The environment and finance can affect them too. They don’t 
have any money for when times are difficult.” 
“Many were expecting a grant, so those weren’t so interested, they just sat there waiting. But 
the ones who got the knowledge and went and applied it, they’ve done well, and then they 
got a loan because they demonstrated their initiative and that they can pay it back.” 
Although providing access to loans was the main means of financial support under 
DEEP, some people suggested alternative models. A DEEP entrepreneur who was 
looking to buy a lorry suggested that instead of helping him get a loan: “GVEP 
should even buy a truck and sell it over time”. This system would be akin to a ‘hire-
purchase’ scheme and is similar to the ‘in kind’ loan developed by the SACCO in 
the example above. Another suggestion was put forward by one of the GVEP 
financial officers. She had previously provided training on rotating credit co-
operatives and wondered why this was not being promoted by GVEP, especially 
since many entrepreneurs were already organised into groups that would have been 
conducive to such a system. An example is a Village Savings and Loans Association 
(VSLA) that requires a locked box with three separate padlocks (Photo 49). 
Everyone in the group puts equal monthly payments into the box and loans can 
then be taken on a rotating basis. The box can only be opened when all three key 
holders are present together at group meetings. A similar concept is ‘table banking’, 
which has the same group saving and loans structure but is less prescriptive about 
the method of storing funds. Overall, however, it seemed that formalised loans and 
debt had become more legitimate; that becoming part of the formal economy meant 
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using formal channels for obtaining capital rather than the informal ones that are 
often relied on outside of development programmes. 
Photo 49: VSLA tools: member passbook (left); savings box with three locks (middle 
and right) (Gibbs, 2009) 
  
While SolarAid does not actively facilitate formal loans, it has in the past provided 
solar entrepreneurs with products on credit and in some cases they were able to 
amass huge debts. In the end, these had to be written off by SolarAid because of the 
significant administrative costs (if not impossibility) of chasing repayment. Those 
entrepreneurs may not have suffered adversely, therefore, but it did contribute to 
SolarAid’s decision to primarily focus on established dealers from thereon. With the 
remaining entrepreneurs SolarAid is now careful to ensure that previous debts are 
repaid before new stock can be ordered, similar to the method used by Avon in 
South Africa (Scott and Dolan, 2009). SolarAid also restrict supply of stock on credit 
(i.e. without full up-front payment) to people seen as trusted, either through a long 
established relationship with them or due to them being someone of particular 
responsibility within a community. As part of their schools campaign, for example, 
they leave unsold stock with headmasters or the district Primary Education Advisor 
to act as a local sales point prior to longer-term dealers being established in the area. 
7.7 Summary of findings 
This chapter has addressed the third research question:    
What processes render people into ‘local entrepreneurs’ and thus economic actors? 
The key points made in response to this question are summarised below.  
Who becomes marketised? 
From the outset, the incorporation of local actors into these specific marketisation 
activities results from the existing connections of the development intermediaries 
and their partners, along with various ‘chance’ encounters. This leads to distribution 
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networks being shaped in particular geographical clusters. Already networks have 
played an important part, and once potential entrepreneurs are found they continue 
to spread the word amongst their own networks.  
The next stage involves screening to decide which applicants will be selected for 
support. For both GVEP and SolarAid this process had previously been fairly 
limited and informal, with motivation and feasibility of participation often being 
sufficient. Over time, however, both organisations experienced some issues with 
this approach, with various DEEP entrepreneurs ‘dropping out’ of the programme 
and SunnyMoney entrepreneurs not repaying their debts for stock supplied on 
credit. On the other hand, many ‘successes’ were also seen in both case studies, with 
no obvious determining individual factors for success but a complex suite of 
interlinking conditions giving them the necessary agency and willingness to apply it. 
Even those that would not be deemed ‘successful’ according to the organisations’ 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) departments may have gained additional market 
tools to perform roles in other market systems. 
Choosing the particular actors to engage with will never be a fully systematic 
process, and equally there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach to shaping market actors. 
Furthermore, these engagements can lead to increasing strength of relationship 
between ‘developers’, now marketisation actors, and those previously referred to as 
'beneficiaries', leading to blurred or crossed boundaries in various cases. Even the 
apparent ‘developers’ are mostly local actors too, subject to similar recruitment 
processes to those on the other side of the programme.  
Although this analysis is based on a very limited sample size, it does appear that 
those at the ‘front line’ of the initiatives (i.e. directly supported by development 
intermediaries to perform market roles) are increasingly not at the ‘bottom of the 
pyramid’ (BOP) but somewhere just above it, with evidence of existing financial, 
material, social or cognitive resources (or a combination of these) being a factor in 
their recruitment. This can be defended through suggestions of a ‘trickle-down’ 
effect of ‘sub-dealer’ roles, but the next chapter provides further discussion of how 
potential ‘development benefits’ are weighed up against each other.  
How are they marketised? 
The local actors are given various forms of training and other support to help them 
‘perform’ a role in the supply chain. It is argued that even a simple shift in the 
language used, from development ‘beneficiaries’ to ‘entrepreneurs’, is the start of 
this marketisation process. The labelling and treatment of people as entrepreneurs 
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has a performative role, with entrepreneurship as a ‘discursive device' being seen as 
an important first step of the marketisation process that both GVEP and SolarAid 
are aiming to undertake. DEEP’s training material in particular presents 
entrepreneurship as something that can be acted out with the right attitude and 
through obtaining the necessary skills, conveying it as accessible to all.  
For DEEP, it appears that the relationships developed between entrepreneurs and 
their mentors are key to the success of the programme. Careful recruitment of the 
mentors is as important or even more so than selecting the trainees themselves. The 
strength of these relationships derives from frequent visits, telephone 
communications and an ability to converse in the local language. It results in the 
mentors motivating and instilling confidence in their allocated entrepreneurs. 
SolarAid does not have a mentor system or anything similar to help establish and 
maintain a close relationship between sales people and the organisation; this could 
perhaps have been why some of their entrepreneurs ended up with significant 
unpaid debts.  
The DEEP entrepreneurs were found to have become conversant in the language 
and cognitive tools of business. This is not to say, however, that they are passive 
actors subjectified by the marketisation processes of the development intermediaries, 
blank sheets that receive, absorb and act. Instead, each builds on their own existing 
skills, networks, ideas, tools and facilities to make their market performance unique. 
Equally numerous limitations to their opportunities apply: calculating a price based 
on profit margin is very difficult without records of material purchases and sales, or 
paper, pen and a calculator to help computation. Despite these restrictions their 
‘conversion’ into energy product market actors can be argued to start with their 
adoption of the language and actions of business people. Those that do not complete 
this process and maintain their energy business as a part-time sideline rarely 
manage to become significant actors in the market. Those that do complete it then 
become marketisation actors themselves through carrying out their intended role. 
This might be, for example, using marketing techniques to persuade consumers to 
place themselves within the framing of products outlined in the previous chapter. 
A closer look at the socio-technical assemblage that creates a market actor shows 
great variation in the material tools and facilities involved. As businesses are drawn 
into the formal economy, they climb a hierarchy of equipment and facilities: from 
hand making briquettes to using electric-powered machines and the related 
materials to make it function, and from selling solar lanterns from a bag to having a 
permanent shop. Innovation and production of tools provides a further business 
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opportunity for ‘entrepreneurial’ entrepreneurs. Without techniques, however, tools 
are inert objects. Again, developing and refining techniques provides a niche for 
entrepreneurs to provide training services. Mobile phones have also been seen to be 
a huge contributor to market agency, not just for facilitating communication but also 
for services such as money transfer. Inevitably there will also be numerous new 
ways in which these tools act as enablers of market activity over time. 
Is marketisation of the poor and their networks problematic? 
Lastly, this chapter has addressed the role of networks for these market actors and 
tried to respond to some of the related critiques posited in academic literature. The 
networks of the entrepreneurs are inevitably drawn into the marketisation process 
for sales, supplies, production capacity, information, general support and much 
more. This does not appear to be through any forced requirement, however, and 
various activities aim to go beyond the boundaries of existing connections, possibly 
offering associated benefits to an entrepreneur’s non-economic endeavours at the 
same time.  
Trust is a key requirement for market exchanges to take place, and where this 
already exists through social ties it may enhance the possibility for transaction – but 
equally make a relationship more vulnerable to a breach of trust. Where 
development intermediaries are promoting specific products, inadvertent 
jeopardising of trust-based relationships could be argued as problematic. This is 
particularly the case if the devices established to address faults (discussed in the 
previous chapter) are not accessible so that no means of redress are available. The 
limited willingness of entrepreneurs to engage in credit based exchanges with 
customers based on verbal agreements suggests that some have already moved 
away from the types of transactions that characterise the informal economy, yet they 
still lack access to formalised alternatives. 
Further positive aspects of networks on marketisation processes are made clear by a 
focus on co-operative working arrangements that can be seen to lift actors from 
micro to macro and empower them accordingly. Where these arrangements have 
been deliberately created by development intermediaries, they are undoubtedly an 
example of how establishing ‘market’ networks can increase agency more generally, 
not just as ‘market’ actors. Further examples of the case studies and other 
organisations filling ‘structural holes’ between people or groups of people show that 
there can be a useful role for enhancing agency via social ‘brokering’.  
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The final critique challenged is one of promoting indebtedness. Again, the desire to 
move the entrepreneurs towards formalised arrangements seems to have led to a 
focus on promoting engagement with financial institutions under DEEP rather than 
promoting more localised versions of savings and loan mechanisms. It is not clear if 
this can be categorised as positive or negative: many entrepreneurs had been seen to 
benefit from formal loans, at least from the data collected, while others had amassed 
debts or appeared to be confused at the conditions. Perhaps more flexibility to allow 
organically developed, local solutions is an answer, similar to finding product repair 
strategies that are better suited to the contexts than formal warranties. The 
engagement of GVEP with SACCOs and their related extension of services may be a 
partial step towards this.    
Overall, I would argue that the development intermediaries focused on here are not 
engendering economic subjectivities alone or enacting a marketisation process by 
themselves from a standing start. Instead they shape the actors engaged with into 
the roles needed for the market to be performed and to grow. The existing networks, 
tools and techniques of those ‘entrepreneurs’ necessarily become involved too, and 
this suggests caution where those are vulnerable to misuse, but the process can 
equally augment the social and technical resources of individuals involved. In 
general it is possible that the ‘subjectification’ of market actors is more positive than 









8 The development intermediaries: successful 
marketisation entities? 
A multiplicity and diversity of actors compete to participate in defining goods and 
valuing them. (Çalışkan and Callon (2010) p.8) 
In chapter 6 the products were put at the centre of the marketisation process, and in 
chapter 7 the process of rendering local actors ‘economic’ to become entrepreneurs 
that actively participate as socio-technical assemblages in producing, valuing, 
pricing and exchanging those products was addressed. In this chapter, the focus 
shifts to the development intermediaries. These are the key actors that were both 
central to the research in a practical sense (actually being the field sites) and central 
to the marketisation processes studied, through their formative roles in developing 
and pacifying sustainable energy products and economising local entrepreneurs to 
create or expand distribution chains.  
As described in Chapter 2, market-based approaches have become increasingly 
prevalent within the international development sector and particularly amongst 
NGOs, with origins from ‘enterprise development’ activities that started to emerge 
in the 1970s and links to the promotion of ‘sustainable livelihoods’ in the 1990s. 
Improved efficiency cookstoves, in particular, were an early subject of local market-
building programmes, with varying degrees of success. More recently Prahalad 
(2010), amongst others, promoted the involvement of business more widely in 
meeting the needs of the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ (BOP). The quasi-development 
for-profit notion of ‘social enterprise’ now features prominently in activities to 
develop and distribute products to the BOP. In these particular case studies GVEP is 
a more traditional NGO, reliant on donor funding for specific programmes such as 
DEEP, while SolarAid started as an NGO but has recently established a social 
enterprise, SunnyMoney. 
Like the local entrepreneurs, and like markets as a whole, these development 
intermediaries can be conceptualised using Çalışkan and Callon’s (2010) 
terminology as market socio-technical assemblages. This term describes how their 
capacity as marketisation actors 22  comes from their varied and dynamic 
configurations of human and technical tools, practices and networks. This chapter 
aims to explore some of the various components in more detail and address the 
fourth research question: 
                                                      
22 This term is use to describe actors that come together to create a market around a specific product; they are the 
“forces that set markets in motion” (Çalışkan and Callon (2010), p.8). 
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What factors affect the agency and actions of the development intermediaries as 
marketisation actors? 
The discussion highlights that in addition to their involvement in clean energy 
product markets, these organisations are also operating in another market: for the 
delivery of development-related benefits. The marketisation lens can be extended to 
consider how this other product, in its less tangible form, is equally subject to 
processes of qualification and valuation that are often ‘black-boxed’. It is illustrated 
that different organisations will prioritise different types of development benefits, 
but inevitably there is competition between development actors – despite them 
often being treated as exterior to market processes due to their socially conscious 
objectives. Taking account of the human component of socio-technical assemblages, 
the actions of an organisation inevitably arise from the agency and actions of the 
individuals within. Although attachment to donors will provide constraints, the 
power struggles here are less marked than perhaps expected, with the skills and 
relationships of the local employees at the ‘front line’ of the intermediaries often 
being seen to determine specific outcomes.  
More broadly, it is argued that a shift towards markets reduces reliance on the 
development discourses and practices oft-critiqued by post-development actors, for 
example tackling ‘developer’-‘beneficiary’ dualisms and reinforcement of 
‘developing’ country perceptions. However, this can be replaced by criticism of the 
power asymmetries between international macro actors able to access black-boxed 
market devices that are unavailable or inaccessible for local market actors. Non-
profit organisations have the potential to broach some of these asymmetries through 
‘brokerage’ and, it is posited, there remains a role for the state.  
Examining the diversity of actors competing to deliver humanitarian goods to BOP 
consumers overall shows that while attachment to development-related donors and 
investors imposes restrictions, it can also provide some safeguards in terms of 
reporting requirements, something that seems particularly necessary when 
targeting a vulnerable consumer group. For-profit approaches have an in-built 
feedback mechanism: whether consumers choose to participate in market exchanges 
or not. However, this leaves new BOP entrepreneurs most exposed if approaches 
fail. Overall, there have been some successes in marketisation but tensions between 
actors exist where priorities or approaches differ and have the potential to 
undermine each other.  
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8.1 Qualifying and quantifying development benefits 
Development intermediaries that are trying to facilitate markets for ‘humanitarian 
goods’ are also operating in another market for a less tangible product: the 
provision of development-related benefits (Figure 47). Although the two case study 
organisations, GVEP International and SolarAid, are using market-based 
approaches and SolarAid has even started a registered business (SunnyMoney), 
they have still emerged from the ‘development’ concept and continue to rely, at 
least partly, on grants, donations, prizes and other forms of donor funding. The 
delivery of ‘development benefits’ is the reason for donors to provide funding, and 
they need to be reassured that the service they are effectively paying for is being 
delivered as promised in programme design documents, so that they in turn can 
pass this information on in turn to their own funders where applicable (e.g. 
taxpayers in the case of national development agencies). Furthermore, to ensure that 
the inflow of development funding continues in future, the development 
intermediaries must continue to market themselves by advertising their ability to 
successfully deliver development benefits.  
Figure 47: Development intermediaries using market-based approaches are involved 
in the development benefits market(s) more generally 
 
As per Caliksan and Callon’s (2010) research programme for markets, a first step 
then is to examine how development benefits are pacified or objectified by the 
entities that engage with them in order to make them into goods for, if not physical 
exchange, at least virtual exchange in the form of reporting back to the donors who 
provided the financial means for their delivery in the first place.   
Different types of development-related benefits have varied ways of being 
measured and levels to which measurement systems have been created and adopted. 









gases, for example, now have an established method to calculate tons of CO2 
equivalent reduced (as discussed in Section 7). This is commonly known as ‘carbon 
accounting’ and although it offers plenty of complexity and controversy, it at least 
provides a system that can be applied across diverse activities to make their impacts 
partially more visible and facilitate valuation and comparisons on some 
methodological basis. It can be more difficult to make other development-related 
benefits ‘visible’, but it is still necessary to undertake some degree of qualification of 
possible benefits for donor reporting and marketing purposes more broadly. For 
this reason, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities are a significant focus for 
most development intermediaries and there is generally a dedicated individual or 
team tasked with undertaking it full-time. Their responsibility is to track progress of 
activities and the associated benefits provided, generally against a set of targets that 
have been established at the design stage of a programme. The M&E data can then 
be presented to donors and more widely as a suite of facts about the achievement 
(or otherwise) of the programme’s aims.  
As Latour (1987) reminds us, facts are often presented as “devoid of any trace of 
ownership, construction, time and place” (p.23). Yet contrary to the ‘black-box’ 
attitude to the production of facts that results in them being presented as cold, 
stable statements, facts always have a history that involves a multitude of social and 
technical processes. This has already been highlighted in the discussion of the 
scientific qualification of the products in Chapter 6. Here the facts that are created 
around development-related benefits are put under the spotlight.  
The production of the data that development organisations ultimately use to report 
on and market their activities is not dissimilar to the process that businesses selling 
products or services also undertake, except that there is no direct monetary 
exchange for each unit of development ‘service’ provided. With no way to perform 
a ‘stock-take’ or cross-reference tangible sales figures with financial records, the 
facts produced by a development intermediary are predominantly reliant on trust. 
Sometimes an external evaluator will be requested so an independent third-party 
will attempt to delve into the black box to provide verification or otherwise of the 
legitimacy of the information provided. This did not seem to be the case for GVEP 
International’s DEEP, but SolarAid did commission an external evaluation in 
Malawi shortly after my fieldwork finished, in response to reporting requirements 
set by the donor for a specific programme component.   
To give an example of the way in which development benefits are made visible, the 
CO2 reductions figure given by the social enterprise d.light (discussed previously in 
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Section 6.4) is presented on their website as part of a group of statements about their 
overall ‘social impact’. The full list of facts provided is shown in Figure 48 below.  
Figure 48: d.light statements on social impacts of their business (d.light design, 2013) 
 
Given the caveat provided below the figures, it is particularly surprising that such 
precise totals are presented. The number of productive hours is given to ten 
significant figures, for example, even though defining and measuring a ‘productive 
hour for working and studying’ can easily be subject to a wide range of approaches 
and assumptions that would offer diverse results. It is equally a difficult process to 
quantify such subjective impacts as ‘empowerment of lives’, yet d.light suggest that 
it can be calculated to the level of each individual person ‘empowered’. The number 
is in fact either a simple multiplication of the number of ‘school-aged children 
reached with solar lighting’, or the number of school-aged children reached has 
been derived from the overall number of people ‘empowered’. It is unclear, 
however, what processes lead to these relationships between the data. My only 
direct engagement with d.light was an interview with a regional director which 
unfortunately provided insufficient time or access to delve deeper into the black box 
of their development data production. However, the ethnographic research with 
GVEP International and SolarAid did provide such opportunities.   
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GVEP International 
My role to support the M&E officer at GVEP International allowed some exploration 
into how development benefit indicators are produced. In the same way that 
tangible products have standardisation and quality control frameworks developed 
by market actors over time, guidance and quality systems have also been created by 
development stakeholders to help strengthen the validity and credibility of M&E, 
often with specific guidance for different sectors. The Donor Committee for 
Enterprise Development (2012), for example, offers a standardised approach for 
private sector development programmes.  
Despite such guidance materials, during the research it became evident that M&E is 
still an extremely difficult task. The recently appointed M&E officer at GVEP 
International was quick to point out the issues during my first day of work at their 
regional headquarters in Nairobi. The first obstacle was that the programme had 
grown quickly and there had not been time to collect much baseline data before it 
was underway. There was therefore no concrete baseline to measure changes since 
the start of the programme against. Even where data had been collected from new 
DEEP entrepreneurs about the size of their business prior to any engagement with 
DEEP, sometimes these figures were later found to have been either inflated or 
under-reported. Which direction the figures were changed in depended on the 
entrepreneur’s experience or perception of NGOs and thus whether they hoped 
GVEP would be more inclined to support a thriving or struggling business. As 
Jerven (2013) highlights through detailed accounts of collecting economic data in 
sub-Saharan Africa23, people inevitably perceive incentives and counter-incentives 
when asked for data. Even without this influence, most small, informal Kenyan and 
Ugandan businesses have limited record keeping. GVEP provides training on this 
but it meant that any baseline data was generally estimated, if provided at all.  
Ongoing data collection was similarly problematic due to the long chain of actors it 
occurred through: from DEEP entrepreneurs to DEEP mentors, to the DEEP country 
office and finally to the regional headquarters in Nairobi where the M&E team were 
sat (Figure 49). Depending on the technology available, the data could be passed 
verbally, hand-written on paper, typed on paper, or emailed in the body of an email 
or in an attached spreadsheet. The long chain of people and technologies made gaps 
and inconsistencies in the data both frequent and hard to investigate. Already the 
                                                      
23 For example, the population census in Nigeria in 1952 during colonial administration was rightly assumed to be 
for calculating tax payments, whereas in 1962, post-independence, it was expected to feed into investment 
decisions and voting rights. Therefore the 1952 census figures resulted in a significant ‘downward bias’ for total 
population count, while an unexpectedly large population was counted in 1962 by comparison. (Jerven, 2013) 
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amount of data collection was seen by the entrepreneurs to be excessive, with one 
having remarked to GVEP staff that they thought GVEP was a data collection 
agency, not an NGO. Many entrepreneurs were also understandably wary of giving 
out private financial information about their businesses. 
Figure 49: Illustration of the multiple actors that DEEP monitoring data travels via 
 
Once again, all stages of data capture are unavoidably carried out with the 
expectations or requirements of the prospective recipients in mind, whether those 
expectations are imagined or real. Entrepreneurs themselves might exaggerate sales 
figures slightly in order to appear to be doing well to please their mentors and meet 
their monthly targets, or equally diminish them in the hope of being offered 
additional support. Evidence of this was seen when one enterprise being supported 
by two separate NGOs (GVEP International and another) provided a different set of 
monthly data to each, seemingly deliberately and adjusted according to the 
perceived policies of each. At the next level up, the DEEP mentors again would be 
aware that their performance evaluations are at least partly based on the evidence of 
improvements in the businesses that they are responsible for. Equally, as for any 
development intermediary, all of GVEP’s staff will be aware that the continuation of 
the programme as a whole know is highly dependent on it being reported positively 
to the donors. The purpose here is not to suggest that the data was ever 
intentionally manipulated, and indeed no observations suggested it might be. 
Rather, the aim is to illustrate data cannot be entirely separated from the context in 
which it is generated. 
On the technical side, even apparently simple information was sometimes hard to 
collect, such as the total weight of briquettes made and sold in a month: as 
discussed in Chapter 6, many briquette makers do not have any means of weighing 
their products. (A rare example is shown in Photo 50). Number of employees also 
seems a simple figure to record, but some entrepreneurs saw themselves as an 
employee of their business while others did not, and many called upon various 














Photo 50: Peter Ouko Odhiambo, one of few DEEP briquette makers who had a 
weighing device 
 
Photo 51: A DEEP mentor (right) helping an illiterate DEEP cookstove entrepreneur to 
fill in her record book 
 
During my fieldwork, the DEEP M&E systems were constantly being revised to try 
and address these issues. All of the entrepreneurs were provided with special DEEP 
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record books that had carbon copy pages for the mentors to collect and extensive 
instructions such as “number of employees (excluding yourself)” split into “full 
time” and “part time / casual labour”. These measures certainly helped, but new 
difficulties will always emerge such as low literacy and numeracy levels (Photo 51) 
making it hard for some entrepreneurs to fill in increasingly complex looking 
templates. It was also suggested that mentors be given smart phones with a special 
DEEP M&E application for them to enter data when visiting entrepreneurs, but the 
costs were found to be prohibitive. Inevitably this system would again solve some 
difficulties but bring new complexities. 
Once the data was finally with the M&E team, it was aggregated as far as possible 
and various assumptions were applied for calculating overall benefits, to be 
reported to the donors in quarterly reports. Household size, for example, was 
estimated at five people when the programme started, based on census data. The 
number of energy products sold was thus multiplied by five in order to calculate the 
total ‘beneficiaries’ of those products, assuming that everyone in a household would 
obtain at least some benefit from a solar lamp, for example. However, later into the 
programme too many people seemed to have benefited too quickly using this 
assumption and the number of beneficiaries was in danger of exceeding the 
programme’s target too early. Household size was therefore reduced to four, a more 
conservative estimate. Between one calculation and the next, suddenly thousands 
less people had apparently benefited from the programme. Statistical data can be 
used to defend an assumed household size of either 4 or 5, depending on the 
particular method used, so neither is invalid yet the decision has a remarkable 
impact on the overall picture presented.  
DEEP ended in early 2013 and GVEP summarises the benefits it delivered on its 
website, shown in Figure 50. It highlights that the target of 1.8 million beneficiaries 
was exceeded, with over four million ultimately being reached. Additionally, it 
states that DEEP created around 3,000 jobs in the region. Having delved into the 
black box of how these facts were produced turns them from cold, stable certainties 
to the hot, unstable estimates that they are. Even simply knowing that the starting 
baseline of product sales and employees prior to DEEP was hard to elucidate, let 
alone a likely growth rate of these businesses if they had not had DEEP support, 
makes it hard to accept that factors such as job creation were entirely due to DEEP 
alone and would not, at least partly, have occurred in its absence. All of the data 
collection steps I observed at GVEP were carried out transparently and 
conscientiously with continuous improvement measures being implemented, and it 
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would be hard to fault any step of the process. Yet even with this obvious level of 
integrity, the data clearly has an evolution that is intrinsically linked to the social 
and technical processes of its creation. 
Figure 50: DEEP summary on GVEP International’s website (GVEP International, 
2013b) 
 
Like shareholders of a company, the power of donors is clearly never forgotten by 
development intermediaries. At the donor reporting level in GVEP, there was 
inevitably understanding of the repercussions of not meeting targets agreed with 
the donors: “Not financial repercussions, presuming you’re not found to have stolen 
money from them. But the EU marks a project based on its success so we want to be 
in the excellent category, so they’ll come to GVEP again next time. It’s all about 
reputation. If it’s unsuccessful it might jeopardise getting aid in the future.” 
Regardless of the difficulty in collecting it or ensuring its accuracy, the monitoring 
data became an essential tool for keeping track of progress of the programme 
towards its objectives. If any obstacles came to light via this data, the management 
team were quick to respond to them. Difficulties with DEEP were always addressed 
in the donor reports with a corresponding explanation about how they were already 
being tackled. Actions taken even included a fundamental restructuring that had 
occurred just before I started my fieldwork. Its justification was described in a 2010 
quarterly donor report: 
As project monitoring showed that the outcomes were not being achieved as 
anticipated […] a thorough re-organisation and restructuring of the methodology 
and project operations was the focus of activities in Quarter 8. During this quarter, 
the project was restructured both in operational methodologies, as well as the 
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revision and update of tools being used and the development of new ones where 
necessary. (GVEP International (2010a) p.4)  
Ultimately with its successful restructuring and positive results (indeed over-
achievement against targets) to report, GVEP was able to sufficiently demonstrate to 
the donors that the development services they had paid for had been delivered. The 
success of DEEP was also marketed effectively, to the extent that CARE2 (Capital 
Access for Renewable Energy Enterprises) has since been established to succeed it.  
SolarAid 
By creating a social enterprise, SolarAid have reduced their participation in the 
development benefits market, thus reducing their reliance on the production of facts 
to feed back to donors in order to justify continued support. However, as well as 
collecting sales data for financial reporting, they do still continue to make an effort 
to collect data related to social benefits more broadly, such as improvement in exam 
results in schools where solar lights have been provided. While I was in Malawi, I 
helped gather baseline data on exam results for schoolchildren who had not yet had 
an opportunity to use solar lighting, with the intention of monitoring their progress 
over time once solar lights were made available. The social enterprise status of 
SunnyMoney and associated search for ‘social’ investors, as well as SolarAid’s 
continued legal structure as a charity, means that continued monitoring and 
marketing of impacts beyond simple product sales is still required.  
Where this results is an interesting quantification is in the link made between 
donations to the charity and the availability of solar lighting systems that they result 
in. Given SunnyMoney’s role as an importer and distributor of pico-solar products 
it is fairly straightforward for them to monitor product sales directly related to its 
work. However, a harder task is analysing how charitable donations received by 
SolarAid lead to product sales due to the marketisation activities undertaken. How 
much donor money does it currently take to make solar lanterns available to a 
family? The data used for making such an estimation has again been through 
various social and technical processes of collection, aggregation, assumptions 
applied and calculations. It is finally pacified and presented succinctly in a concise 
statement to possible donors on the SolarAid website: that a £5 charitable donation 
makes a solar lantern available to one household (Figure 51).  
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Figure 51: SolarAid website extract showing advertised link between donations and 
product availability (SolarAid, 2013b) 
 
Again, the intention is not to suggest any malpractice on the part of SolarAid. 
Though it could perhaps be better worded, they are clear elsewhere on the website 
that the solar products are sold, not given out for free, so individuals who may 
become donors should theoretically understand that they are not actually buying a 
solar lantern on behalf of a family. SolarAid staff explained the £5 figure as follows:   
The £5 is how much it costs us to get each light into the hands of a customer. So it’s 
the TOTAL SunnyMoney and SolarAid organisational costs minus any revenue 
from light sales divided by the number of products sold. So you can see it’ll go 
down in time, will fluctuate due to exchange rates and success, and will also differ 
between countries, but it gives us an idea of what we ‘subsidise’ to build the market.  
As this statement indicates, the money contributes to the operational costs of 
making the solar products available. The retail prices of the lanterns are not yet set 
high enough to reflect all of the operational costs of establishing the SunnyMoney 
supply chain to reach remote rural areas. The intention is that once the market 
infrastructure is established it will be financially self-sustainable in the longer-term, 
but currently charitable donations cover the shortfall. The prospective purchaser 
(funder) of the ‘development benefit’ is seen to require a more specific valuation of 
what their money will buy, however. By setting a price of one lantern being made 
available to one family at £5, a much more defined and marketable product is 
immediately created. As a SolarAid staff member explained “people making 
donations still love to think that they are giving things away rather than funding 
core costs or operational processes; it’s a real challenge.” 
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Positive development benefits 
Of course, a more fundamental aspect of M&E systems are that they are set up 
specifically to identify ‘benefits’ to ‘beneficiaries’, not ‘adverse impacts’ on ‘victims’ 
or any other type of discourse that might immediately set up a different picture. As 
the GVEP M&E officer highlighted “they’re always geared up for monitoring 
benefits, but we often forget to ask about potential negative impacts.” He gave the 
potential but unsubstantiated example of new solar technicians experiencing an 
increased number of electrocutions. Some illustrations of the people that might be 
adversely affected by marketisation activities through displacement of the 
technologies they are engaged with have been provided in Chapter 6. 
No company, for profit or otherwise, would advertise their activities to promote 
solar lantern sales by estimating the number of kerosene sellers they have put out of 
business, for example, as this does not help reinforce them as humanitarian goods 
and they cannot sell development ‘dis-services’. Again this is perhaps something 
that development organisations could be criticised for. Yet just like mainstream 
businesses24, they are competing in markets and, provided that the direct impacts of 
their activities are monitored and made transparent, it is perhaps unrealistic to 
expect the boundaries of that monitoring to extend to all impacts on all inter-linked 
markets. Indeed, the goal of eradicating the kerosene lantern has the removal of 
kerosene selling as a livelihood clearly embedded within it.  
Efforts to identify adverse impacts were still visible, however. SolarAid’s Director of 
Research and Impact, for example, stated in a blog post: “Some time ago, we 
committed to exploring whether there were any negative consequences of the 
School Campaign so that we could make sure we could address them if there were. 
So, we spoke to head-teachers to understand how the campaign was run at their 
school and we interviewed school committee/parent-teacher association (PTA) 
members.” (Harrison, 2013) They were asked whether students unable to afford 
lights were excluded from activities or treated differently and whether students or 
parents had been unduly pressured into making purchases. Perhaps inevitably the 
results were still close to 100% positive and there may be subversive reasons for this 
(such as respondents not wanting to jeopardise further engagement with SolarAid) 
but the questions had at least been posed.  
                                                      
24 Defined here as businesses without a specific social or development mandate 
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8.2 Comparative valuation of development benefits 
The intention of both GVEP and SolarAid is to increase energy access. While they 
recognise livelihood creation as an additional bonus, they stressed that this was not 
an explicit aim and that the main goal would not be compromised in favour of 
creating or maintaining livelihoods, despite it offering further social benefits that 
can be monitored and reported, or in effect ‘sold’ as development services. The 
benefits from delivering large numbers of energy products have therefore been 
valued more highly than the benefits of supporting individual people’s economic 
opportunities. With this in mind, the entrepreneurs or local dealers are therefore 
also continually being valued to see to what extent they are contributing to the 
overall delivery of product sales.  
GVEP International 
Depending on how DEEP entrepreneurs are valued they receive more or less 
support from GVEP, or theoretically risk being dropped from the programme 
entirely. The stated method is to value entrepreneurs according to the absolute 
number and/or growth rate of product sales. Yet it was interesting to observe that, 
contrary to management rhetoric, this did not always seem to be carried out in 
practice. The social benefits of providing economic opportunities for individuals did 
in fact seem to be highly valued by staff, particularly those closest to the 
entrepreneurs. This is best illustrated with a specific example of where low value in 
product sales did not lead to a group being evicted from the programme. 
At the DEEP team conference in Kenya, there was much discussion about a group of 
women based in a rural area of Kiimani, north of Nairobi. They were producing and 
selling very few improved cookstoves despite having been part of the DEEP 
programme for some time. GVEP management had already highlighted earlier in 
the day that if an entrepreneur was not delivering sales as expected, they should be 
dropped from the scheme in order for a more effective entrepreneur to take their 
place. However, there was clear reticence to do this from the local team that had 
come to know the women personally. From a development and personal context, 
they argued that the possible social benefits of continuing to support these women 
to increase their output and sales even slightly was high enough to justify the 
continued time and energy used in doing so. The following is a conversational 
extract from the meeting where the DEEP mentor for the group debated with a 
visiting British manager from the London headquarters.    
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Mentor: The Kiimani ladies make big liners, for upesi kuni mbili stoves. They have a 
stock of liners so they’ve stopped producing. Its 12 to 20 kms away to the market. 
They carry one but they’re very heavy so there’s a long time to recover to do it again. 
They need training and advice in making KCJ [Kenya Ceramic Jiko] liners, which are 
much smaller and more portable. That’s what we’re doing now. 
Management: Is it still worth it? They’ve already had some KCJ training and sales 
are still poor. It’s always going to be a small business. What are the viable business 
opportunities for them? Other than linking with a direct buyer who buys on bulk 
because of very good quality (and that’s probably unlikely) then it’s never going to 
be a really viable business. It sounds tough to abandon people who are struggling, 
but we need to look at the overall scale aims. 
Mentor: But it’s a hostile environment and there are limited income sources. They 
have a large stock as they work hard, it’s just difficult to get them to market and 
they get undercut by another group who do have good transport links to the market. 
We can empower them by helping them to produce better KCJ liners and link them 
up with dealers who can be the ones who take to them to market.  
This shows how the staff working directly with the women argued extensively for 
them to be kept in the programme, and although no decision was specifically made 
either way, they continued to receive GVEP support after the conference. 
A couple of months later I was able to meet the women who did indeed live in a 
difficult area to access. After an arduous drive up a steep dirt track a long way from 
the tarmac road, including several stops where all passengers had to get out and 
help the four-wheel-drive over difficult sections, we finally had to continue on foot 
up a steep rocky track. When we eventually reached the small collection of homes in 
a clearing at the top of the hill, the women were assembled under the shade of a tree, 
many with babies strapped to them in traditional wrap-around shawls. They had 
originally been trained to make large and heavy kuni mbili25 cookstoves by a 
development agency that had also helped them to build a kiln for firing the clay. 
GVEP had since trained them to make KCJ liners instead, but continued low sales 
levels were attributed to poor quality from their lack of experience with the new 
technique, as well as the ongoing market access issue. Despite the advice from 
management to drop them from the programme, the local GVEP team had 
continued to look for ways of resolving their difficulties. The purpose of our visit 
that day was to bring a cookstove dealer from Mombasa to the women in order for 
                                                      
25 ‘Kuni mbili’ means ‘two pieces of firewood’ in Swahili. 
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him to show them the quality level he needed and to place a large order that would 
be collected directly from their village.  
Photo 52: GVEP staff meeting with DEEP Entrepreneurs in Kiimani, Kenya 
 
The staff of GVEP had all been employed by a development NGO and perhaps 
unsurprisingly seemed keen to see tangible social benefits being accrued by the 
people they had developed close relationships with. The aspirations and actions of 
individual staff are a key part of the socio-technical assemblage that is GVEP 
International. At the same time, in another department within the organisation, 
GVEP marketing staff clearly understand that potential supporters or donors will 
attribute value to individual entrepreneurs benefitting from DEEP and use personal 
case studies in the NGO’s marketing material. The stories that are passed to them 
from the field staff tend to be about entrepreneurs that the mentors have developed 
the strongest relationships with, so that the strength of individual ‘social’ contracts, 
rather than more formal ones between the organisation as a whole and all of its 
supported entrepreneurs, come to both represent the project and steer its direction 
over time.  
SolarAid 
The interest of local SolarAid staff to support individuals was also apparent during 
the research and similarly recognised by SunnyMoney management, who 
specifically cited the need to convert development intermediary staff into targets-
driven sales people as a difficulty in transferring from an NGO to a social enterprise 
approach. Unlike business people, it was felt, they did not always seem willing to 
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prioritise solar lantern sales above all else. On numerous occasions, the local team 
would divert from their intended operational activities in order to install an 
individual system in someone’s house. Despite it being an inefficient use of time in 
terms of sales, and given that there were apparently sufficient instructions provided 
with the systems for the buyers to do their own installations, this may seem 
surprising. However from observation and conversations with them, it seemed the 
staff very much enjoyed enhanced levels of interaction with those that had bought 
solar products and were easily persuaded to help them on a practical level in order 
to make sure and see them benefitting from the systems as intended. They also felt 
that showing that SunnyMoney supported its customers well could only be 
beneficial for the business. 
Again the official decision had also been made to value product sales above social 
benefits of those gaining income from involvement in SunnyMoney’s supply chain. 
As discussed earlier, previously ‘entrepreneurs’ with low education levels and 
limited alternative income opportunities had been recruited and supported, but the 
cost of training people to become successful entrepreneurs was later seen to be 
excessive for the product sales achieved. The strategy was changed to only use 
already established sales people who would need minimal support since they 
already had demonstrable physical and cognitive capacity to be economic actors in a 
supply chain. Yet at the same time, relationships with the previously recruited 
entrepreneurs had already been established and these were not about to be severed. 
The staff appeared to put much time and effort into thinking about how they could 
continue to support them in a mutually effective way, in parallel with the new 
dealers.   
8.3 Competition to deliver development benefits: inter-
intermediary relationships 
The time and resources that NGOs spend on fundraising, with advertising of 
benefits delivered being an important part of this, is known to be a key concern for 
donors and the public (e.g. Aldrich, 2009). Yet in addition to providing essential 
information for monitoring and learning, the qualification, quantification and then 
marketing of development benefits is needed to compete against organisations in 
the same field. Ly and Mason (2012) suggest that competition among NGOs can 
distort incentives in ways sometimes detrimental to an organisation’s primary aims, 
causing inefficiently high spending on fundraising and diversion of funds from 
development projects. However, the market for the delivery of development-related 
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benefits is inevitably competitive, this being an essential feature of how markets 
function.  
Carr et al. (1998) use approaches from psychology to show how NGO staff also have 
a group identity: contributing to the work of an organisation that is seen to be doing 
well, including in comparison to other groups, provides important motivation. The 
actions of individuals are therefore partly driven by a desire to be proud of the 
organisation they work for. As the director of DEEP said to staff at the programme 
conference: “You should be able to be proud of saying ‘I facilitated x number of 
people to get energy access to clean energy services.’ It’s all about passion.” Added 
to the knowledge that the future of their employment relies on the success of the 
organisation in selling its development services, the competitive nature of these 
organisations is clearly established. Some specific examples of how that competition 
manifests itself are given below.      
GVEP International 
Ten DEEP entrepreneurs out of the 30 spoken with (33%) said that they had initially 
been trained under a different NGO programme related to the energy technology 
that they now worked with. Another third had only had training for the first time 
from GVEP26, but this illustrates the involvement of other NGOs over time. GVEP 
had one competitor in particular that was mentioned by many different staff 
members. This organisation (referred to here as Agency A) had supported various 
DEEP entrepreneurs either prior to or simultaneously to them being within GVEP’s 
programme. Although development intermediaries might be expected to work 
together to maximise efficiency, or at least avoid duplication of effort, there 
appeared to have been little communication between these two organisations 
working in a similar field, with a similar approach and in some cases in the same 
geographical area.  
The poor perception of Agency A was reinforced by the way that Agency A’s 
actions were talked about between GVEP staff. Under DEEP, entrepreneurs were 
strictly not offered any direct financial assistance to cover costs incurred for training 
activities, although they might occasionally be provided with transport in a GVEP 
vehicle. By comparison, Agency A had a known policy of reimbursing travel costs 
and providing food allowances for any meetings or training events they organised. 
Agency A also appeared to frequently provide necessary manufacturing tools, such 
                                                      
26 Of the remainder, four (13%) had developed their businesses under their own initiatives having seen similar 
elsewhere, while three (10%) had received training from another energy business, two (7%) from technical 
college and the last from a parent. 
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as cookstove liner moulds and kilns, free of charge, whereas GVEP promoted use of 
savings or micro-loans to finance these. This had led to some DEEP entrepreneurs 
who had been involved with Agency A understandably expecting the same 
treatment from GVEP. When it had been refused, several high-performing 
entrepreneurs had left DEEP. At the DEEP conference in Naivasha, this was 
communicated as follows to the full DEEP team by a staff member.  
[Agency A] is working in a negative way as our competitor. They told DEEP 
entrepreneurs that if they work with GVEP they won’t get [Agency A] support 
anymore. The entrepreneurs came forward and made complaints about our lack of 
grants, so we had to explain we have a better purpose and that we won’t provide 
grants just to compete with others. Those good entrepreneurs leaving to [Agency A] 
meant our overall performance dropped.  
For some other entrepreneurs who did not have the option to choose Agency A over 
GVEP, their lack of motivation under DEEP was attributed to the same reason. At a 
meeting to discuss a particular cookstove manufacturing group the following 
explanation was given.  
This group was already involved with [Agency A] and getting grants. They then 
expected the same treatment from GVEP. But then because they were with GVEP it 
meant they were pushed out by [Agency A] so now they’re a bitter group! They try 
to insist on being paid for going to meetings, even on top of being given transport 
costs, lunch and so on. Apparently [Agency A] always used to pay them for that, 
they call it a ‘sitting allowance’. But DEEP doesn’t give out fish, it shows you how to 
fish so you can do it for yourself. 
The impression of Agency A amongst GVEP staff had escalated from one of them 
covering transport and food costs, to one of them giving general payment for simply 
attending training events. By comparison, the GVEP staff were proud that the DEEP 
approach was not to provide free money, only training to facilitate entrepreneurs to 
earn money. When asked in an interview, however, Agency A stated that their 
policy was indeed to provide a lunch allowance and transport costs for meetings 
and training, but nothing further. This was also verified by some of the other 
entrepreneurs I spoke to who had previously or continued to receive support from 
Agency A. It therefore remained unclear as to whether GVEP staff had gained an 
inaccurate impression of Agency A, or whether Agency A’s policies on paying 
entrepreneurs had sometimes deviated from stated policy.  
In the example of the Kiimani women described above, Agency A had had the first 
engagement with the women nearly twenty years beforehand, building them a kiln 
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and training them to make what had since been recognised as a large, heavy 
cookstove. However, support in finding ways to actually sell the stoves did not 
appear to have been provided. After the women had struggled to get them to 
market and stopped production, the kiln had gone into disrepair. This was the state 
in which GVEP had initially found the women and the kiln, so GVEP staff naturally 
had negative perceptions of Agency A further reinforced. In interview, Agency A 
stated that they did assist in marketing and establishing market linkages for 
cookstoves but admitted that they were experts in technical aspects of stoves, not in 
business, and that in fact it was their “area of comparative advantage.” They often 
worked with local partners for the less technical aspects, so it could perhaps have 
been a failed partnership that resulted in the lack of market support for the Kiimani 
women. Other possible reasons for their apparently failed efforts include the limited 
range of efficient cookstove designs available at the time, or possibly even a decision 
to cease training the women after recognising the market access constraints. 
Unfortunately the interviewees at Agency A had not been with the organisation 
long enough to know the specific case, but it is easy to see how negative impressions 
are created between such directly competing organisations, with staff wanting to be 
proud and supportive of their own approaches. 
Although an interview was not sufficient to gain the required level of insight to find 
out Agency A’s exact impression of GVEP, an example from western Kenya given 
by a GVEP staff member illustrates that the processes on Agency A’s side could 
have been similar. DEEP had provided the technical expertise to build a kiln for a 
new group of cookstove liner makers, but for some reason it had not worked as 
expected and the group complained that almost half of the liners ended up being 
misfired and unusable, which given the cost of firewood was a significant loss. 
Hearing that Agency A provided kilns for free, the group had approached them to 
ask for help repairing it, but Agency A declined because they knew that the 
entrepreneurs had previously been under DEEP. As soon as GVEP management 
heard about this and particularly that Agency A had been informed of the poor 
quality kiln, they highlighted it as a key reputation issues and made sure that it was 
replaced with a better kiln as soon as possible.   
At the senior management level where staff were responsible for networking with 
possible partners and monitoring the overall development of sustainable energy 
product markets as a whole, it was interesting to hear that there had been high level 
meetings with Agency A that had already apparently resolved some of the issues 
described above. These had occurred some time previously and despite the 
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operational staff’s continued perception of a strong rift between the two 
organisations, GVEP was in fact collaborating with Agency A on various other 
initiatives outside of DEEP. An amusing observation, but one that was met with 
contempt from operational staff, was that the biggest poster in GVEP’s Nairobi 
office boardroom was in fact from Agency A.  
The continued feeling of animosity between GVEP and Agency A amongst 
operational staff, even with bridges apparently having been made at senior 
management level, reinforced the desire to ensure GVEP was seen to be leading in 
its field to deliver development benefits and to ensure that competitors did not get 
that accolade. During a discussion on establishing co-operatives for manufacturing 
products such as briquettes, a member of staff highlighted: 
It’s specifically in GVEP’s interest to pioneer approaches and see them through, so 
that organisations like [Agency A] don’t steal them and claim them as their own.  
SolarAid 
SolarAid’s stated aim is to eradicate the kerosene lantern by making solar an 
alternative option. They therefore want to make pico-solar products available to as 
many people as possible and it might be expected that any way in which other 
organisations can help contribute to this would be appreciated. However, again 
there were visible aspects of competition where the need for SunnyMoney to 
specifically grow their own market share was made clear. Not doing so would affect 
their own sustainability as an organisation in both the solar lantern market and the 
development benefits market more generally.  
The first time I heard what will be referred to as ‘Agency B’ mentioned was at a 
management meeting to plan for a forthcoming trade fair in Malawi’s second largest 
city, Blantyre. Agency B was an NGO established by Europeans but based and 
working in Malawi to make sustainable energy solutions available for rural 
Malawians. As part of this they were buying solar lanterns from one of 
SunnyMoney’s entrepreneurs in the capital city of Lilongwe and reselling them in 
the south of the country, the main area they worked in. The SunnyMoney 
entrepreneur was selling the lights at the standard retail price advised by 
SunnyMoney so that Agency B were having to add their own costs to this and resell 
the lanterns at a mark-up price. This had not previously been seen as a problem 
since SunnyMoney did not have entrepreneurs established yet in the south, but 
Agency B had heard of their intended presence at the trade fair and got in contact to 
ask them not to attend because Agency B was already planning to be there, selling 
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the same products at their higher prices. This was not well received by 
SunnyMoney staff, who had developed a reluctance to sell products to Agency B at 
wholesale price, citing it as a moral issue since they could not guarantee that 
Agency B would not continue to over-price them.    
At the trade fair a few weeks later, staff from Agency B came to SunnyMoney’s 
stand to pay for and collect some solar products that they had ordered the previous 
day. No mention was made of the communications a few weeks previously and 
Agency B staff said that they were happy to avoid the transport costs usually 
incurred when buying the lanterns in Lilongwe. One of the SunnyMoney staff was 
in the process of putting up ‘sale’ posters to advertise a newly discounted price for 
the same lanterns that Agency B had come to buy. However, the staff member then 
proceeded to charge the Agency B staff the non-sale price. I asked whether they 
should be offered the same sale price as all other customers would be that day, but 
the staff member replied, in front of Agency B, that they had been specifically 
instructed by management not to sell to them at reduced prices. After some debate, 
Agency B was finally sold the lanterns at the sale price; the staff member seemed 
pleased and returned several times during the day to buy more stock.  
I spoke to SunnyMoney’s country manager about the relationship. He explained 
that since Agency B was a European-backed NGO, he felt that selling them 
warehouse stock at wholesale prices might result in them developing their own 
distribution channels in the south. They could thus end up dominating the market 
there, before SunnyMoney had a chance to try and establish their own channels27. 
SunnyMoney’s smaller-scale entrepreneurs and dealers had limited capital available 
for buying stock and therefore bought in small batches. Agency B, by contrast, could 
potentially buy up SunnyMoney’s entire stock and leave them with nothing for their 
own distribution channels. Imports of solar products could take up to six months in 
total for ordering and delivery to Malawi and in the meantime the businesses and 
confidence of the smaller entrepreneurs and dealers would be jeopardised. 
SunnyMoney did have a relationship with another NGO where they specifically 
ordered consignments of stock for that NGO’s own entrepreneur network, at the 
same time as providing technical training and ensuring that products would be sold 
at the correct retail price. SunnyMoney’s manager felt that a similar arrangement 
with Agency B would be acceptable.  
                                                      
27 A SolarAid manager later commented that the Malawi country manager’s contract had been terminated shortly 
after my research and that his point of view regarding the relationship with Agency B should not be considered as 
applicable to the organisation as a whole. 
 273 
At a later meeting between the managers of the two agencies, Agency B had 
apparently declined the proposed new arrangement, stating that they did not in fact 
have the capital to buy whole consignments of dedicated stock so far in advance. 
They were therefore happy to keep buying at retail prices and selling at a mark-up, 
but now asked to establish an agreement with SunnyMoney to not sell “in each 
other’s areas”. The SunnyMoney manager responded that while they were not 
specifically targeting the south yet, if small dealers came to them to establish links 
they could not necessarily refuse. It was not up to SunnyMoney to tell their dealers 
where they could and could not sell the products and they felt that “there’s enough 
market to go round still”. Agency B responded by complaining that SolarAid was 
losing its status as an NGO, as they were now selling to anyone and everyone, 
giving the example that “they are even selling to Indians” who were perceived by 
Agency B managers to be ruthless businessmen that did not need the income and 
had “no particular interest in helping people”. Agency B’s association of 
SunnyMoney with the delivery of development benefits therefore appeared to make 
them feel that SunnyMoney should not act in the way of a standard business or 
engage with non-development actors. Only people that were also dedicated to 
delivering development benefits or had a more obvious need to find income 
opportunities should be allowed in the distribution channel. Rather than allowing 
competition with other NGOs, they should also make an agreement to segment the 
market and not “tread on each other’s toes”.  
It is likely that this example occurred between development intermediaries in 
Malawi in particular because the pico-solar market was in its infancy and 
SunnyMoney was the sole importer of most of the different brands of solar lanterns. 
By comparison, in Kenya and Tanzania all of the main pico-solar manufacturers had 
in-country presence and their own fairly well established distribution channels. 
SunnyMoney was operational in both of those countries too, but due to the higher 
levels of competition had had to develop its own niche way of establishing 
distribution through targeting rural schools in the first instance. It had turned out to 
be a very successful way of marketing the products to large audiences quickly and 
catalysing demand in new areas. Via senior management meetings this approach 
had followed through to SunnyMoney’s business strategy in Malawi, but with much 
less competition there it was taking longer to shift operational activities away from 
the more conventional but slower method of simply looking for new dealers.    
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Photo 53: SunnyMoney’s new strategy: starting with school children to catalyse 
markets in new areas 
 
There appears to be an expectation that development organisations are more likely 
to collaborate than businesses as they are all pursuing the same goal. However, their 
own success in contributing to those goals is still key in their continued existence as 
organisations and paid employees. The marketing director for d.light in East Africa 
expressed it well when describing the expectations of Lighting Africa, an 
IFC/World Bank umbrella organisation established to support rapid market growth 
of high quality pico-solar products in sub-Saharan Africa.  
A lot of other organisations that started as NGOs are turning to the same approach 
as d.light and becoming enterprises. But we are a commercial enterprise, even if we 
have the prefix of social – so we are definitely in competition with those others! 
Lighting Africa keep asking everyone to come to meetings and asking our views. 
But they don’t have any concept of competition! They can’t understand why people 
don’t want to open up when Barefoot, ToughStuff, d.light and so on are all in the 
same room! We do go together to lobby government though, on issues like VAT, 
taxes, etcetera, things that affect the market for all of us, and we would probably do 
this through Lighting Africa. But we’re not about to reveal all of our operational 
secrets to each other!  
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8.4 People and relationships: interactions and power 
dynamics 
The discussions above have shown how the aspirations, motivations and 
perceptions of individual staff and the relationships between them all affect the 
decisions and actions they can and do take. These actions may or may not be in line 
with the organisation’s official policies and strategies, yet manifest themselves as 
the behaviour of the organisation as a whole entity. Furthermore their cognitive 
skills, social networks, technical tools and operational aims in at least two different 
markets (energy products and development benefits) all combine to form the 
agency of the organisations as both development actors and market actors. 
A key aspect of viewing development intermediaries as socio-technical assemblages 
is that, as per actor-network theory, networks (with humans and non-humans) 
constitute their agency. From the human network perspective this illustrates the 
importance of analysing relationships. At the entrepreneur recruitment stage, 
outlined in Chapter 0, the networks of the development intermediaries and their 
partner organisations were seen to be crucial in finding prospective actors willing 
and suitable for being absorbed into the marketisation programmes. The 
relationships between mentors and energy entrepreneurs under DEEP have been 
seen as a key enabling and shaping feature of the programme. A focus on 
relationships can also reveal power dynamics.  
On arriving at the research sites, I found ways in which both case study 
organisations were quite different from the picture portrayed by older academic 
literature critiquing development approaches. Staff in the African offices were 
predominantly national citizens. Although there were several Europeans in GVEP’s 
Nairobi office, none were working on DEEP. In both the Ugandan GVEP office and 
Malawi SunnyMoney office I was the only non-national present. There were still 
some resemblances of the stereotypical image of development equalling expatriate 
westerners travelling in large white four-wheel drive vehicles, but since I was the 
only expat and there was only one vehicle per office, local transport such as 
motorbike taxis were used for field visits in most cases. The interaction with local 
entrepreneurs was often noticeably different depending on the vehicle used, with 
the people being visited seemingly subsuming it into the identity of the visitors. 
Two DEEP entrepreneurs making biomass briquettes in Uganda, for example, said 
that after having us visit in a big white truck, including myself being there as a 
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‘mzungu’ (white person), they were worried that they might be robbed, with people 
assuming we had brought them money.  
Photo 54: A GVEP vehicle outside the house of a DEEP entrepreneur in Uganda 
 
By having predominantly local staff, however, this type of reaction was not a feature 
of everyday practices of the NGO and rather one that made me reflect on the 
impacts of my own research. In the standard routines the mentors undertook visits 
on their own. As they had been intentionally recruited from the areas they 
supported, there was certainly no evidence of development dualisms in the 
operational activities at least, even if they remained in the underlying 
documentation (discussed below). As described in Chapter 0, one of the initial 
DEEP entrepreneurs had even subsequently become a DEEP employee, working for 
GVEP’s technical partner.  
The staff structures of the two organisations are described in Chapter 5. Because of 
their origins as British organisations and the role of staff in the London offices of 
securing donor funding, power balances were inevitably in favour of the charity’s 
directors sitting in the UK headquarters. However, examples such as the Kiimani 
women being allowed to stay in the programme is one of many examples where 
local staff were given flexibility to undertake their operations as they saw fit, within 
reason. Ultimately, the demands and expectations of DEEP donors and potential 
future donors were the overall drivers and as long as these were being fulfilled it 
seemed that staff at different levels were allowed relative autonomy. The DEEP 
conference that I attended in my first month at GVEP in Kenya showed that all staff 
members from all offices were able and willing to communicate directly with each 
other, and staff at field level, generally with the strongest understanding of local 
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contexts, appeared to be able to feed ideas for changes or future project designs back 
to senior managers either directly or via the line manager hierarchy.  
By comparison with the more senior staff, however, those specifically employed for 
DEEP such as the mentors did have reduced job stability because of the limited 
timeframe of the programme. There was a similar situation for SolarAid where, 
because of the continued need to use money from donations to cover operational 
expenditure, budget for permanent employees was restricted. Thus various staff 
were not employed on permanent contracts, despite their regular use by the 
organisation as paid ‘interns’. Their precarious positions appeared to cause 
potentially unnecessary stress but it was stated that this was only a temporary 
measure in the current absence of adequate finances for employing more permanent 
staff. Similar zero-hour contracts have been being highly criticised in the UK. 
Overall, however, the small SolarAid office in Malawi had a relatively level 
organisational structure, besides the Country Manager responsible for the team’s 
work overall.  
8.5 Discourses: from development to markets 
The guiding discourse, models and tools drawn upon by the individuals working 
for development intermediaries constitute a significant aspect of the organisations 
as assemblages. As development intermediaries in the first instance, the underlying 
documentation of both case study programmes can be argued as typical in the 
international development arena. DEEP’s over-arching guiding document was the 
proposal written for the European Union’s Energy Facility, under which it received 
half of its funding. Like most development projects, it features a ‘Logical 
Framework’. This key document (Appendix D) summarises in the rows of a table 
the programme’s overall objectives, its expected results and the activities that will 
achieve them. Each is described further under the adjacent column headings of 
‘intervention logic’, ‘objectively verifiable indicators’, ‘sources and means of 
verification’, and ‘assumptions’. The language used is clearly the current language 
of international development, with descriptions including target numbers of 
‘beneficiaries’, how ‘stakeholders’ and ‘communities’ will be engaged with, the 
design of the ‘M&E system’, and how ‘sustainable development’ will be ensured. 
The Logical Framework acts as the starting point and overall guidance for the 
programme and as such anchors its position within development discourse from the 
outset, including perpetuation of the long-critiqued dualism of developers actively 
developing and beneficiaries passively receiving (e.g. Crewe and Harrison (1998)). 
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Contrary to this, however, all of the operational staff talked about DEEP activities in 
business terms, with in fact fairly little use of these more traditional development 
terms. 
SolarAid equally has a key development document for SunnyMoney, this time a 
‘Theory of Change’ (Appendix D) that was developed in 2011 with support from a 
registered charity that provides development consultancy. The Theory of Change 
“maps a causal pathway towards a mission, defines the building blocks required, 
articulates underlying assumptions and identifies measurable indicators of success” 
(SolarAid, 2012). It is a newer model for development intervention frameworks that 
has been particularly advocated by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) since 2010 and “reflects a need to re-emphasise the deeper 
analysis that the original Logical Framework Analysis was designed to elicit but 
that has recently become a more superficial contractual exercise” (Vogel, 2012) (p.3) 
The intention is therefore to promote more awareness of underlying assumptions 
and intended pathways, moving away from a straightforward linear approach that 
shows activities inherently leading to the achievement of goals. Interestingly, 
SolarAid’s theory of change shows a shift from development discourse to market 
discourse, with no mention of beneficiaries for example, only ‘customers’. This 
change in underpinning discourse reflects SolarAid’s intention to re-brand itself 
under the SunnyMoney label, purposely not including ‘aid’ in its title, as a credible 
market participant. The rhetoric used has become ‘economic’, similar to the way that 
those absorbed into the SunnyMoney supply chain are reconfigured as economic 
actors.  
Performativity of economics 
Just as development discourse and its related theories, models and tools affect the 
perception and performance of development activities, as keenly highlighted by 
‘post-development’ writers in particular (e.g. Ferguson (1994)), so economic 
discourse affects the processes of marketisation. The way in which the local 
entrepreneurs in the new distribution networks are trained in business methods has 
already been discussed in the previous chapter. The actions of market-making 
development intermediaries were also seen being directly affected by recent 
economic theory in other ways. One example was the price-setting activities of a 
new cookstove distributor in Uganda, ‘Up Energy’, described by its business 
development manager as “a for-profit business with a social and environmental 
agenda” (Up Energy, Interview 12, 2012). Similar to SolarAid, its aim was catalyse 
the cookstove market by becoming an importer and reseller of products designed in 
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the US and made in Kenya and China. They had engaged GVEP to help train new 
sellers in their distribution network. Their business model was to receive funding 
from the sale of carbon credits (facilitated by Impact Carbon, as discussed in 
Chapter 6) that would allow the stoves to be subsidised, so they needed to set the 
level of subsidy and find a relevant initial price for the stoves. The organisation’s 
Chief Operational Officer was based in San Francisco at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and they therefore engaged a university research team to help them 
undertake pricing studies. This marked the start of a complicated system of 
‘willingness to pay’ trials that used a sophisticated second price auction system, a 
technique that has emerged from in-depth academic analysis of auction design.  
Three sites in Uganda were selected for the pricing trials, two in rural areas and one 
in a semi-rural setting in the suburbs of Kampala. Through communications with 
community leaders, groups of local women were invited to attend each event and 
asked to bring money with them. There the cookstoves were demonstrated to the 
women who were then asked to write sealed bids stating how much they would be 
willing to pay for them, firstly in one up-front payment (a ‘spot payment’) and 
secondly in a smaller up-front payment followed by additional instalments over 
time (a ‘time payment’ model.) It was explained that the second highest bid received 
in both the spot and time payment auctions would be accepted and that the women 
who had entered them would then need to pay the prices they had offered. They 
were asked to bid on three different types of stove but it was stressed that they 
would only be obliged to buy a maximum of one. In order to become familiar with 
the auction design, they practised first with small sweets.  
During the first event in one of the rural locations, various problems were 
encountered, such as confusion of the women over whether they would have to pay 
the price they offered or not and a lack of awareness (or inability) to bring money 
with them. The bids received varied hugely and this was seen to partly result from 
lacking ‘seriousness’ of the bids since many women knew that they did not have the 
money to buy in any case. The following was written in the study report: 
Despite the fact the organizers have contacted repeatedly both community leaders 
and government community organizers ahead of the event to remind them to bring 
money to the event, participants have repeatedly told us that their payments were 
affected by not knowing that they should bring money. In order to counteract this, 
the organizers could visit community leaders at least one week ahead of the event 
first to sensitize them about the importance of bringing money, then to get the 
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phone numbers of all participants, and lastly to SMS [text message] all participants 
to remind them to bring cash. (Up Energy, 2011)  
After all three rounds had been conducted, the average bids that had been made 
were found to be much lower than expected, and in many cases the women offering 
the supposedly binding second highest prices had not been able to pay. Up Energy 
management stated that the initial prices ultimately set for the stoves were roughly 
set at the level of the second highest spot payment prices from the semi-rural 
pricing study, although these were higher than those offered in the rural areas that 
were more representative of the intended customers. It was felt that this was 
reasonable, however, as the low prices offered might reflect the ‘bargaining factor’, 
whereby the final price paid could end up being lower than the set retail price in 
any case. It was also decided not to offer a time payment option as it would be too 
administratively onerous. I was unfortunately unable to observe the trials that had 
taken place a few months previously, but it was fascinating to hear of this 
juxtaposition of advanced economic theory with daily Ugandan village life, more 
commonly linked to western-originated rhetoric and models through the frame of 
international development. 
As well as seeing modern economic models being used in a possibly helpful, if 
optimistic, way, there was also a feeling amongst some staff of the development 
intermediaries that having the programmes tied to advanced economic models and 
tools could sometimes be detrimental. An example from the previous chapter is the 
interpretation of suitable credit services for DEEP entrepreneurs being in the shape 
of formal bank loans only, in line with the desire to help entrepreneurs move from 
the informal to the formal economy. This was felt to be associated with the dismissal 
of possibly more appropriate locally developed solutions such as village savings 
and loans associations.  
Performing investor-ready, not donor-dependent, contexts  
Regardless of the structure of marketisation actors, market facilitation approaches 
provide an increasing need for investors rather than donors – even if NGOs are 
seeking investment for enterprises they are supporting rather than their own 
organisations. A knock-on impact of this is a reduced need and in fact possible 
drawbacks of development discourse perpetuating a negative view of developing 
countries, as argued by post-development critics. Enough must be done to give 
meaning to goods conceptualised as ‘humanitarian’, but a conducive business 
environment also needs to be presented in order to show that market projects are 
 281 
viable. Could this help shift discourses away from the developed-developing 
dichotomy? In fact, neither case study organisation frames itself as directly 
supporting ‘development’. Besides the DEEP Logical Framework, both 
organisations’ websites limit references to development to ‘business development’ 
or within staff backgrounds highlighting their previous work experience ‘in the 
development sector’.  
Something that came to mind during the research with these ‘development’ 
organisations using market-based approaches was the similarity to experiences in 
the UK. As preparation for the fieldwork, I undertook ethnographic analysis of a 
micro-generation services company in Edinburgh in the UK. This company also 
required support from non-commercial entities in order to facilitate and become 
part of a relatively new market for micro-renewable energy technologies. They 
engaged with the development of and subsequently benefited from a government-
led quality standard system (the Microgeneration Certification Scheme) to ensure 
quality of suppliers and products, thus helping increase confidence amongst 
potential consumers. They also gained significantly from publicly funded and non-
profit initiatives such as the Energy Saving Trust and Community Energy Scotland. 
These organisations promote awareness of sustainable energy solutions for 
households and community-based organisations, link potential customers to 
suppliers, and provide various grants for energy product purchases. The company 
was a member of non-profit industry associations that promoted their technologies, 
facilitated communication channels with other market actors and provided 
government lobbying support. Although renewable energy technologies in the UK 
might not be able to be framed as humanitarian goods, they are certainly framed as 
‘environmentally-friendly’ goods, equally promoting engagement from socially 
conscious investors and grant providers.  
There are still obvious differences between market development in Africa and the 
UK (different consumer demands and existing product availability; different legal 
frameworks and extents to which they are or can be relied upon; different market 
practices such as in advertising and sales), but there are also plenty of similarities in 
the processes involved. In fact there appears to be limited benefit in overly 
grounding the case study programmes observed here in ‘development’ rhetoric 
simply because of their location. Interestingly some of the products observed that 
were specifically designed for ‘BOP’ consumers have also seen demand in western 
countries after being marketed for off-grid applications such as camping. Adoption 
of market-approaches by ‘development’ intermediaries, whilst not able to entirely 
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allow traditional development tools and discourses to be abandoned, at least seems 
to incentivise promotion of a more positive image of geographical contexts and 
favour market terminologies over development dualisms in practice. 
8.6 NGOs, social enterprises and businesses as 
development-relevant marketisation actors  
Having discussed various characteristics of the observed market actors, an overview 
is provided here of how the positioning of organisations, whether as charities, social 
enterprises or businesses, appears to affect their agency in marketisation activities 
associated with ‘development’ benefits.  
Figure 52: Different types of macro-actors undertaking development-relevant 
marketisation processes  
 
Traditional development intermediaries28 as marketisation actors  
GVEP remains an NGO, entirely reliant on rounds of development funding. The 
donors to DEEP insisted that kerosene and charcoal sellers be removed from the 
programme, even though supporting them to offer sustainable energy products to 
their existing customer base might have been an effective strategy and limited 
adverse impacts of growing markets for competing products. There will always be 
limits to what can be shaped and qualified as development-relevant, however, and 
it can be argued that reliance on donor funding will always leave NGOs constrained.  
SolarAid originated as an NGO, but has now adopted a hybrid structure of part 
NGO (SolarAid) and part social enterprise (SunnyMoney). The NGO part is reliant 
on donations, including charitable fundraising and donated profits from the UK 
                                                      
28 I have used the term ‘traditional development intermediary’ to describe organisations that do not undertake any 









company that established the NGO (Solarcentury), rather than any significant long-
term ‘development’ donors. Because of this situation, when SolarAid’s management 
felt that undertaking the dual activities of supporting local entrepreneurs who 
might otherwise have limited income opportunities whilst also catalysing a market 
for solar products was not effective, they were freely able to change strategy to 
recruit only established sales people, despite losing the ‘development benefits’ of 
providing new income-generation activities. Their new approach is in fact leading to 
more extensive sales, numerically and geographically, and a focus on school 
children needing lighting to study as an entry in to new market areas also provides 
plenty of opportunity to framing solar lanterns as humanitarian goods as necessary. 
NGOs having to frame their activities as ‘development’ relevant may restrict the 
opportunities for supporting the marketisation of products that are harder to 
conceptualise as humanitarian goods. It could be difficult to find a suitable 
problematisation for solar-powered TVs, for example. Other restrictions include the 
type of market actors supported. In his review of business in Africa and the varying 
initiatives to support it, Taylor (2012) suggests a fixation of development actors with 
small enterprises. DEEP is no exception, tied to supporting ‘micro and small 
enterprises’ by a statement in its Logical Framework. Larger organisations can be 
worked with under DEEP, but once they are a certain size and level of formality 
they are suddenly re-imagined as ‘associate partners,’ too large to be in direct need 
of development-related support. That is instead offered to the entrepreneurs in their 
newly developing supply chains instead, although this also clearly benefits them 
indirectly. Many of the new associate partners in DEEP had originally been 
constructed as ‘in need of development’ within DEEP or other NGO programmes 
but had since out-grown that conceptualisation. It appears hard to frame supporting 
larger enterprises as a development relevant activity, although GVEP is making 
progress in that since DEEP through new initiatives such as their ‘Advisory Services’ 
and ‘Supporting Energy Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises’ (ESME) initiatives. 
Within DEEP, the graduation of enterprises from small informal start-ups to larger 
capacity, multi-staffed and at least partially formalised market entities worthy of 
recognition as a ‘partner’ suggests that the marketisation aims of NGOs can be 
achieved over time, even if this might sometimes only happen over the course of 
engagements with several NGOs and/or funding cycles. Bailis et al (2009) 
demonstrate this through a description of repeated donor-funded projects that 
appear to have finally made progress in marketising the Kenya Ceramic Jiko (KCJ) 
after significant time and expenditure.  
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A reliance on fixed-term funding packages in the past has not stopped traditionally-
structured development intermediaries from performing integral supply chain roles 
on a temporary basis, distributing products such as solar home systems in bursts of 
activity before ceasing all local presence when the funding cycle ends. Subsequently 
an NGO-sized hole is left in the fledgling market infrastructure (Figure 53). This was 
another motivation for SolarAid to set up SunnyMoney, allowing it to become an 
integral part of the pico-solar market in Malawi on a hopefully more permanent 
basis. GVEP, on the other hand, has developed a marketisation approach that allows 
it to step away at the end of the funding package without taking an essential part of 
the market system with it. Instead, if successful it will leave an array of new 
economic actors performing market roles for the long term. GVEP’s role is as a 
broker and service provider, providing market-consolidating training and linkages. 
The benefit of being non-profit, of course, is that these services can be provided to 
actors who do not have the financial resources to pay for them.  
Figure 53: Illustration of why NGOs dependent on short-term funding packages 
adopting integral market roles may not lead to long-term marketisation 
During development project to distribute imported energy products… 
 
After development project has finished… 
 
 
Social enterprises as marketisation actors 
Although still operating to some extent within the market for development 
benefits29, social enterprises also have the freedom to focus on becoming financially 
self-sustainable businesses. These quasi-development actors now often employ 
reputed business people instead of experienced development actors. SolarAid 
                                                      
29 Examples from SunnyMoney and other social enterprises interviewed include: targeting ‘impact investors,’ 
seeking grants and funding awards, and looking to sister NGOs (such as SolarAid) to receive donations on the 



















management in the UK, for example, noted that the birth of SunnyMoney created a 
need for new staff training and a shift in organizational attitudes, systems and 
recruitment strategies. 
We're getting better at procurement, logistics and marketing. We've recruited top 
talent onto our board, including Derry Newman, former MD of Sony UK, who is 
bringing a rigour and analysis to our decision-making. We're now bringing in 
performance management systems, enterprise resources systems, direct marketing 
expertise; everything that will give us an edge and keep us growing faster. 
(Andrews, 2013) 
This specific attempt to convert the cognitive skills and networks of the 
organisation’s staff to those of experienced business people already conversant with 
market concepts and strategies indicates a concerted effort to enhance the agency of 
SunnyMoney as a marketisation actor. From the organisation’s sales data it would 
suggest that this is having its desired effect, as indicated in this post by the SolarAid 
and SunnyMoney CEO on the internal staff blog in December 2012. 
Two weeks ago I attended the World Bank/IFC Lighting Africa conference in Dakar 
along with some colleagues. At breakfast on the first day, we speculated as to 
whether SunnyMoney is the biggest last mile seller of solar lights in Africa; or 
whether that accolade still sits with the French oil giant, Total. Total sell portable 
solar lights in a number of African countries, through their petrol station forecourts, 
as well as via other distribution networks they’re working hard to establish. At 
SolarAid and SunnyMoney, we have huge respect for the work Total are doing – 
and will do all that we can to encourage and support it – but it’s hard not to be a bit 
competitive! So we smiled when we learnt that they have sold 111,000 solar lights in 
the last three years. Here are our latest figures: 
Sold in the last three years: 203,000 
Sold in the last seven months: 137,500 
Sold in October 2012: 35,000 
We believe this makes us the biggest last mile seller of solar lights in Africa; 
probably by a big margin if you look at our current run rate. We’re very proud that a 
small social enterprise has knocked an oil multinational into second place. We’re not 
just proving that we know how to sell solar lights; we’re proving that social 
enterprises can be an extraordinarily powerful force in today’s economy. 
(Andrews, 2012) 
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If marketisation is considered in terms of total sales of a product, the social 
enterprise model certainly seems to be working. After working hard to move away 
from its charity-based origins, the SunnyMoney team has developed a successful 
market entry approach that targets schools in order to catalyse wider interest in 
solar lanterns in new market areas. NGOs have sometimes been critiqued for their 
lack of accountability to the actual ‘beneficiaries’ of their services, instead 
prioritising donor needs in order to ensure their financial sustainability. By contrast, 
the relationship between social enterprise and ‘customers’ is based on market 
exchange; if someone does not perceive value in a product they will not engage in 
an exchange. The ability of SunnyMoney to rapidly spread awareness of the 
potential value of solar lanterns to schoolchildren and more broadly has therefore 
been key to their success.   
Following exchange, a purchased product also needs to adequately deliver on the 
value that its buyer envisaged. Only then will they be persuaded to engage in 
further exchanges or recommend others to, thus sustaining market processes over 
time. A social enterprise therefore has continued motivation to be accountable to 
consumers beyond just an initial purchase. However, it is still early in the history of 
the pico-solar market, particularly in Malawi, and it is perhaps therefore imprudent 
to cite high sales volumes as indicative of successful long-term marketisation. 
Earlier development initiatives that provided free solar systems under short-term 
projects would also have offered total numbers distributed as a straightforward 
indicator of success, yet it is now known that a lack of enduring local repair capacity 
often lead to obsolete systems in the longer term and a resultant mistrust of solar 
technology. In this current wave of social enterprises, initial distribution models 
appear to have become a central focus, but broader efforts to create the full socio-
technical assemblage needed for an enduring market in the longer-term sometimes 
seem to be limited. Barefoot Power appears to offer a potentially promising model 
of service centres in Uganda, but at the time of research in Malawi, SunnyMoney 
had not yet developed a locally viable after-sales service system. If the enterprise is 
to be successful in the longer term via its business model rather than donor funding, 
then this could be a key marketisation aspect to focus on.  
The social enterprise is a relatively new form of market entity, but one that 
continues to evade specific definition. From the above discussion, it appears that the 
language and tools used are primarily ‘economic’ rather than ‘development,’ yet 
activities can be framed in the latter context when necessary. Like SunnyMoney, all 
of the 12 social enterprises I interviewed people from (Appendix B) had at least 
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initially been, and often continued to be, reliant on some form of grant or other 
charitable funding, generally to provide start-up capital. This is a clear benefit of 
having the ‘social’ prefix before enterprise. One interviewee in Kampala30, for 
example, confirmed how difficult it was to move their briquette-making social 
enterprise from development funding (grants) to standard investment because of 
their inability to guarantee returns of 15% that investors repeatedly demanded.  
In order to be eligible for development funding, many of the organisations 
encountered had sister NGOs, registered as charities in the relevant western country 
and, like SolarAid, able to channel start-up and operational funds as necessary. For 
the social enterprise side, there is often no legal difference in structure to a standard 
business limited by shares. Instead their differentiation tends to take the form of a 
mandate written in to their mission statements. However, without specific 
regulations or accountability frameworks other than the standard financial ones, 
there are no actual requirements to provide or act on that mandate. If a business 
wants to try and market itself as a social enterprise, it can. Santander Bank PLC, for 
example, can be found listed amongst the self-declared members of Social 
Enterprise UK (Social Enterprise UK, 2013).  
A new hybrid legal form has been introduced in the UK called a Community 
Interest Company (CIC) that can be limited by either shares or guarantee and has a 
designated regulator (UK Department for Business, 2013), but there is no obligation 
for social enterprises to use this structure. Equally in the US there are now various 
options in different states, such as a Low Profit Limited Liability Company (L3C), a 
Benefit Corporation (B-Corps), or a Flexible-Purpose Corporation. The requirements 
for each vary, but all have some accountability framework (Westaway, 2011). 
Although all these structures are optional, their use does increase the credibility of a 
social enterprise, useful if they are seeking ‘impact’ or ‘social’ investors or being 
supported by sister charitable organisations. Such structures have yet to exist in 
most African countries, however.  
Mainstream businesses as marketisation actors for ‘development’ 
Due to the nature of the case studies chosen and the other organisations interviewed, 
the focus has been on development intermediaries in the form of NGOs and social 
enterprises. Some large multinational corporations were also encountered such as 
the oil company Total, mentioned in the above excerpt from SunnyMoney’s CEO as 
one of their primary competitors in solar lantern sales (in Kenya). Although 
                                                      
30 Organisation name kept confidential 
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theoretically Total’s managers could endeavour to frame their company as a social 
enterprise, this might be a difficult task. In order to differentiate, businesses without 
a specific social or development mandate are referred to as ‘mainstream businesses’ 
here. 
There has been an increasing call for businesses to become involved in what have 
traditionally been seen as development sector tasks. Some examples of business and 
development actor partnerships and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives 
have been summarised in chapter 2. Further examples were identified during the 
research of sometimes hidden roles of large multinationals in clean energy product 
markets. In some case these were through CSR initiatives kept separate from the 
central task of a business, such as the Shell Foundation, established and funded by 
the Shell Group (a global group of energy and petrochemicals companies) as an 
independent charity. It supports development of sustainable enterprises by 
providing seed funding and business support (Shell Foundation, 2005); one of its 
recipients is Envirofit International, the social enterprise that designs, manufactures 
and distributes Envirofit cookstoves. In other cases such CSR initiatives were more 
aligned with mainstream business activities. Barclays (a global banking company), 
for example, were interested in supporting GVEP entrepreneurs through reduced 
interest rate loans partly in order to secure potential future customers, and partly as 
a CSR venture to be advertised in marketing material. GVEP managers also heard 
that Unilever (a global consumer goods company) was arranging to promote their 
packet food lines by giving away free samples with Envirofit stoves, facilitated by 
their being a financial partner in a new Envirofit distribution project in East Africa. 
These types of initiatives fulfil the vision of Prahalad’s (2010) ‘interconnectedness of 
players in BOP markets’ (Figure 4 in Chapter 2) whereby private enterprises 
combine with development actors and local BOP entrepreneurs. 
Any reliance on framing marketisation activities as ‘development-relevant’ creates 
restrictions, suggesting that mainstream businesses that are not trying to straddle 
two markets may have an advantage. Without having to squeeze the products they 
supply into the label of humanitarian goods, their role is much more 
straightforward. The notion of ‘Africapitalism’ promoted by Nigerian businessman 
Tony Elumelu (2013) suggests that if mainstream business prioritise investment in 
African countries it will help bring about the ‘development’ that international 
development practitioners spend significant efforts and money trying to achieve in 
other ways.  
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On the other hand, without any need to frame their activities as delivering social 
benefits, there is equally no inherent check on the impacts of mainstream businesses’ 
marketisation activities. People can be conceptualised as at the ‘bottom of the 
economic pyramid’ because they have very limited financial resources. Encouraging 
businesses to persuade them to spend money on goods that might not enhance their 
living standards, and on the contrary may be detrimental, inevitably has risks. A 
high profile example that has been under debate since the 1970s is Nestlé’s 
aggressive marketing of baby milk formula in developing countries where it is often 
difficult to source clean water (Fitzpatrick, 2010). The issue here is not necessarily 
that powdered milk cannot be framed as a humanitarian good, rather that the end-
users do not always have the physical means to engage with the product in a way 
that allows performance of the humanitarian aspects in practice. Although this is an 
extreme example, it does offer one counter-point to the simple ‘business as 
development’ argument. Whose role is it to educate and protect ‘BOP’ end-users in 
their new economic roles as consumers? Social enterprises have an external pressure 
from their socially conscious stakeholders to monitor their impacts and ensure that 
they are not inadvertently inflicting harm. Such pressure might not be so directly 
felt by mainstream businesses.  
Even selling solar lanterns and cookstoves that do not then perform as advertised 
can be seen as irresponsible when the target market has such limited resources. If 
the market devices designed to protect product buyers, such as warranties and 
quality standards, cannot be enforced then BOP consumers are left in a vulnerable 
position. The power balance rests firmly in favour of manufacturers and importers, 
at least until the collective purchase power of consumers rebounds against them. If 
this happens, however, it is still likely to be the newly shaped micro-entrepreneurs 
that feel the impact the most.  
8.7 Implications of competing types of market-making actor  
As described earlier, competition is a fundamental market characteristic. However, 
there are some implications of having a diverse range of entities trying to establish 
markets for the same products. A standard business must be profitable to survive, 
and as long as all businesses rely on straightforward product sales and have access 
to the same resources, it helps ensure what economists call a ‘level playing field.’ 
For sustainable energy products, however, this can in fact be jeopardised by their 
status as humanitarian goods, which can be used as justification for subsidised 
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distribution approaches. As a representative of the social enterprise Solar Sister in 
Uganda commented, for example:  
Our biggest competition is the NGOs. They want to give out products for free. They 
say they want to make sure people have light. So Solar Sister women can’t do her 
business because an NGO has given them out for free or subsidised. It undercuts the 
market completely. It breaks the trust of the customers as they feel they’re being 
cheated then. (Solar Sister, Interview 19, 2012) 
The solution is not necessarily to advocate an end to all subsidisation, which can 
still be seen as a key tool for market actors and a ban on it is unlikely to be 
implementable in any case. SunnyMoney, for example, offer each school child in the 
new areas they enter the opportunity to buy one small solar lantern at a discounted 
price. This specific context and limited availability of a subsidy is designed to help 
more students afford at least a simple light, thus exposing more students and their 
social networks to solar lanterns, without distorting price expectations. Care must 
be taken, however, that this last condition holds true. A DEEP solar entrepreneur in 
Kenya explained that ToughStuff solar lights were not popular with his customers 
because of their pricing history. Their initial entry into the country was financed by 
a donor who insisted on subsidising the products, resulting in a near 50% price 
reduction for the first year. This led to sales of over 10,000 lighting kits, but when 
the donor left they had to increase the price back to the standard retail price. It 
became impossible to sell products that people had been buying for half the price 
previously. This issue is already compounded with the historical legacy of the aid 
model meaning that many Africans associate development initiatives with free 
products. 
Altenburg and von Drachenfels (2006) draw attention to a ‘new minimalist 
approach’ to private sector development that advocates abolishing programmes that 
support individual sectors or enterprises because of concerns that they do not 
ensure a level playing field for all market actors. As they conclude, however, this 
seems an extreme solution. Another productive marketisation activity, therefore, is 
to provide communication channels between market actors to discuss such issues. 
Lighting Africa provides an African-wide channel for those involved in pico-solar 
markets, and individual countries often have their own sector associations such as 
the Kenya Rural Energy Association (KEREA), an independent non-profit 
organisation for renewable energy industry stakeholders. Conferences and 
increasingly online forums provide such channels too. For all domestic-scale 
sustainable energy products, the online LinkedIn site of the UN’s Energy Access 
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Practitioners Network is particularly active, and for lighting products specifically 
‘LuminaNET’ is: “a social network for the global off-grid lighting community” 
developed by the US Department of Energy’s Lawrence Berkeley National 
Laboratory (LuminaNET, 2013).  
To give an example, an announcement by Coca-Cola to enter a partnership with a 
solar lighting company in Kenya that will provide their rural retailers with solar 
lighting (The Coca-Cola Company, 2013) led to the following post on the Energy 
Access Practitioner Network’s LinkedIn site. 
The old dependency arguments spring to mind and I don't mean caffeine addiction. 
The article does not say but I assume these are being 'given away'? This does 
nothing to create a local market for these types of products and may actually harm 
attempts to establish one. This old model of 'aid' needs to be replaced yesterday. 
(Network Member, 2013) 
A representative of the partnering company, One Degree Solar, made an 
unprompted response on the same thread the next day to resolve the issue. They 
explained that Coca-Cola were providing the introductions to the retailers, 
financing a pilot project involving 100 systems and covering the operational costs 
that would allow the bulk of the systems to be offered at standard retail price but on 
a credit basis (i.e., to be paid back over time.) 
After this clarification, others on the forum seemed appeased that in this case the 
market was not being distorted by subsidised or free products. Where this is 
currently a new concern for some market actors is in the context of carbon finance. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, carbon credits are theoretically available for solar 
lanterns, but as the administrative burden is high and the number of carbon credits 
received per product low, the impact appears to have limited effect on product 
pricing. For cookstoves, however, the situation is more complex because the 
potential income generated by each cookstove from carbon credit sales is very high. 
For cheap cookstoves it can in fact exceed their cost price, making it viable to 
establish projects that distribute cookstoves for free and still make sufficient profit 
to attract commercial investors. At the same time, without considerable external 
support the same carbon finance frameworks are virtually inaccessible for small 
local producers, disempowering them against those that do have the cognitive, 
technical and financial resources to participate in carbon credit markets.  
This has led to further interesting debates on the Energy Access Practitioner 
Network forum, particularly in response to a new thread stating: 
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Initial post, 26 April 2012: We are about to roll out 1 million cook stoves in Africa, 
but need a good reliable and cheap source of these cook stoves, anyone have any 
ideas? They will be handed out for free, so cheaper the better. (Network Member, 
2012) 
This post led to an extensive and heated debate, starting politely but showing 
increasing frustration over time. Extracts are provided below from two different 
objectors and some of the initial poster’s general responses.  
Objection, 27 April 2012: I'm a little concerned about your offer of providing 1 
million stoves for free. This will disrupt local manufacturers in Africa that produce 
energy-saving cookstoves, especially if the stoves given are imports, as local 
manufacturers do not have the capacity yet to produce that amount. Even if you are 
sourcing from local manufacturers, the market will be disrupted for future sales or 
other villages that may have heard of the "free" stoves, but did not benefit. […] This 
type of aid mentality really disrupts entrepreneurship in Africa.  
Response, 27 April 2012: Local manufacturers have the same market as we will be 
entering, if anything they are already there and have access to the same knowledge 
as we do, if anything more knowledge of the local market etc. […] We will upset the 
market, but that is the market and the other manufactures will have to adapt to the 
this new competitor on the block.  
Response, 29 April 2012: Hello all, I have been getting some interesting personal 
posts on development in Africa, they way we see it, is that is it is not some special 
market, but a potential new market […] We have a business plan that […] will 
benefit the customer and the environment they live and work in. The small 
producers will have a bad time, but they have also had enough time to scale up, but 
not done, we will be big players and employ more than 200 people, provide services 
and education, but in the end do business. 
Objection, 4 May 2012: How is it a "business" model if you give it away for free??? 
And yes, Africa IS a special case, because not only is the market for cookstoves 
young, the whole idea of a market is young. […] With cookstoves, where there are 
only 10s of thousands being sold every year, 1 million free ones completely 
overwhelms the market. […] and undercuts the new generation of African 
entrepreneurs trying to make it in private business. If you've raised donations and 
are looking to make a difference, figure out a way to use it to CREATE a market, not 
destroy one. 
Response (to another post), 9 May 2012: I may have got a bit defensive then, just I 
have had a load of personal emails as well having a go at me for what we are trying 
to do and spouting their views our project and I was just a bit frustrated by it all. 
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(Network Members, 2012) 
This conversation thread illustrates both the extent of personal feelings invoked by a 
possible threat to marketisation activities for humanitarian good that people are 
involved in, and the conflicting views that actors with contrasting income-
generation priorities can have about what constitutes a successful market project.  
Another company, this time a British carbon consultancy, was also developing a 
large carbon finance project to install 300,000 cookstoves in Kenya at the time of 
research. There were to be numerous positive impacts such as 65 people employed 
in Kenya for the project development and use of a Mombasa brickworks to 
manufacture the non-portable stoves, resulting in their employment of 100 extra 
staff and significant improvements in health and safety processes. However, the 
stove that costs around US$45 in materials and labour was to be distributed free to 
consumers, other than a $2 installation fee. The same company had similar projects 
in the pipeline for Uganda, Rwanda, Tanzania, Malawi and Ethiopia. Managers 
from NGOs such as GVEP International and GIZ stated that they this impending 
large influx of stoves was making them very nervous, however. The response from 
the carbon finance company in order to achieve maximum efficiency they were 
aiming for high levels of stove take-up in each area focused on. This meant that they 
were only working in very poor communities that were still unable to afford high 
quality portable stoves and therefore no markets for these locally. From a 
‘development’ perspective this made it a highly beneficial project, even if from a 
marketisation perspective it may be counter-productive to establishing long-term 
markets. 
It is interesting that international frameworks intended to promote low carbon 
energy markets in developing countries are causing such divisions between people 
working towards essentially similar objectives: making clean energy products 
widely available. Even where Ugastove and Up Energy were using carbon finance 
without such significant subsidies and to support local manufacturing, others actors 
were still contesting their approaches (Chapter 6). Depending on the particular 
markets they are involved in (Figure 54) and their prior experiences and expertise, 
actors can have evidently different priorities and actions. 
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Figure 54: Actors in cookstove markets may have different priorities depending if they 
also participate in markets for carbon credits and development benefits 
 
 
8.8 Marketisation actors replacing the state? 
In their very design, these objects reflect doubts about state capacity to safeguard 
populations. Rather, they are distinctly humanitarian goods, presenting themselves 
as an ethical response to failure on the part of states. (Redfield (2012) p.158) 
As this quotation shows, it has been argued that humanitarian goods can provide 
social welfare services in the absence of state ability to do so. Pico-solar products, 
for example, can replace unavailable or unreliable grid connections where states 
have failed to ensure adequate services. Similarly, promoting and facilitating poor 
people to become ‘micro-entrepreneurs’ has been described as shifting the 
responsibility for poverty reduction away from the state to individuals themselves, 
encouraging them to draw on valuable social networks to do so (Elyachar, 2012). 
Meagher (2005) argues that overly-positive social capital conceptualisations 
emphasize “the ability of social networks to provide an effective basis for economic 
development outside the framework of the state” (ibid., p.219).  
During this research, the role of the ‘state’ still emerged at various times as key to 
marketisation processes. State support was therefore as important even for market-
based, instead of state-led, approaches to delivering welfare services. Moving 
towards a more formal economy requires state entities as actors within the market 
system. Market devices such as contracts and warranties require an established and 
enforced legal framework to make them meaningful. Equally standards that 











place and regulated primarily by national standards boards. When entrepreneurs 
officially register their businesses, they physically engage with the relevant local 
government authority, visiting the offices to fill in forms that lead to information 
about their business being included on government-held databases. The act of 
formally engaging with state bodies in this way grants the entrepreneurs credibility 
and recognition and increases the confidence of those that undertake market 
exchanges with them. All these aspects of state involvement are meant to help 
protect both buyers and sellers by providing more accurate information about 
products and formal channels to address any subsequent issues.   
When outlining the specific market role of his department in Kenya’s growing solar 
PV market (Interview 30), the Director for Renewable Energy at Kenya’s Energy 
Regulatory Commission (ERC) highlighted that ERC’s work is put in statute by the 
Kenyan Energy Act, the legal instrument which in turn enforces the national Energy 
Policy, written in a government sessional paper. Both of these documents have 
emerged and are given meaning by myriad social and technical processes, 
providing the ERC with agency to perform its specific role as market regulator. 
How this is done equally emerges from a complex configuration of interacting 
people, institutions, practices and equipment.    
ERC issues the standards for renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies, 
in collaboration with KEBS [the Kenyan Bureau of Standards]. We can initiate the 
process when it seems a standard needs to be created or updated, and then KEBS 
has the mandate to develop the detailed standard. 
ERC develops regulations where needed. If we hear from stakeholders that there’s a 
need then we look to develop regulatory solutions if appropriate. We get regular 
stakeholder feedback via the Ministry of Energy, then we have meetings with 
stakeholders to discuss specific issues. […] Like currently there are many solar 
technicians trained by many people. We can’t stop businesses giving training, and 
don’t want to kick them out of business anyway. So we’re trying to take everyone’s 
curriculum and work out minimum requirements for someone to become a 
technician and make it into a recognisable certificate that people will be given a 
license based on.  
It’s technical and financial regulation for the benefit of the user and the producer. 
The aim is that the user gets value for money for whatever service they get offered, 
including products. 
(Energy Regulatory Commission, Interview 30, 2012) 
 296 
As well as this primary role of helping to protect producers and users of products 
and services, other less obvious state activities also contribute to marketisation, such 
as the collection and aggregation of data that other market actors can draw on to 
gain further agency.  
We are supposed to maintain and collect data on renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. […[ Solar PV, for example, all installers will need to file returns for the 
number of installations they’ve done, so this will create an avenue for collating 
information on totals per year. Currently this information is quite scarce.  
We must provide information to the Minister for Energy, for policy and decision-
making. We also designate energy consumers – that means, we categorise them into 
different sections. The main function is to know what type of consumers there are 
and their characteristics, to help with energy management. 
(Energy Regulatory Commission, Interview 30, 2012) 
The development intermediaries themselves were also seen to have extensive direct 
engagement with state bodies. All organisations have to be formally registered in 
their host countries in the first instance. Often GVEP’s initial contact point for 
recruiting existing energy entrepreneurs was the local office of the Ministry of 
Energy. As well as supporting enterprises directly in a bottom-up approach, 
market-making social enterprises and NGOs can take a top-down role of lobbying 
governments for supportive policies and the appropriate conditions for market 
devices to work effectively. SunnyMoney’s marketisation activities have included 
lobbying for and then benefitting from the Malawian government’s application of 
import duty relief to imported solar products.  
The activities of the state clearly have a significant effect on the activities of other 
marketisation actors. The Malawian solar tax relief, for example, only applies to 
complete solar products and not individual parts that can be assembled into solar 
lighting kits; this was a factor in SolarAid’s decision to cease local assembly 
operations. In September 2013 the Kenyan government removed its VAT relief on 
solar products altogether, instantly adding 16% to the cost of solar products and 
removing one of the conditions that had been seen as instrumental in making 
Kenya’s small-scale solar market one of the most developed in Africa. A complaint 
from a solar company also suggested that Kenyan government actions had curbed 
their efforts to create local manufacturing capacity. The UK-headquartered 
company had intended to invest in a regional assembly warehouse in Mombasa to 
serve whole of East Africa. After buying the land and equipment and building a 
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warehouse for the sophisticated plant, however, the government had requested that 
they employ three directors from Kenya, to be approved by the government. This 
was seen as too costly and unnecessary, and as requests to modify those conditions 
failed, the plant was established in Egypt to serve the African market from there 
instead. Even for carbon finance projects, a Letter of Approval is often needed from 
a designated office of the host country government before the project can be 
approved under a scheme such as the CDM. One carbon finance project developer 
stated that they had focused on Kenya and Malawi because it had been 
straightforward to obtain the approval letter from their government offices. By 
contrast, it had been very difficult with Tanzania, so this country had been excluded 
from their projects.  
If the state in African countries is not seen to fulfil its role sufficiently, non-state 
development actors sometimes try to offer additional mechanisms. The IFC/World 
Bank programme Lighting Africa, for example, has developed a more stringent set 
of quality standards and its own certification system for solar lighting products 
being sold in African countries, and collects and shares market data for African 
pico-solar lighting markets specifically (Lighting Africa, 2013). It is found in parallel 
to but not in full replacement of state activities, however, since adherence to its 
standards are voluntary and imported solar lanterns still have to go through the 
standards tests imposed by national authorities. Micro-entrepreneurs, social 
enterprises and NGOs were all observed engaging with state bodies and processes 
to some extent, and accepting this as an inherent requirement of establishing a 
formal market. Activities in the informal economy, as described by de Soto (2001) 
and Hart (1973), evolve to operate where state market structures are lacking or 
inaccessible. Development intermediaries such as GVEP that adopt a brokerage role 
are supporting informal actors to gain access to formal, state-based frameworks 
such as standards, and at the same time garner greater understanding of informal 
market activities and can incorporate this into advocacy work. Rather than 
enterprise development programmes by-passing a role for the state in development, 
these examples suggest that they in fact promote engagement with and put 
demands on state institutions to function effectively. 
8.9 Continued gaps in sustainable energy product markets?  
It has been shown that different types of marketisation actors have their own 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of their agency, but several factors have 
apparently made all actors, whether nominally development or business-oriented, 
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struggle to make significant progress. Besides the issue of market devices such as 
warranties discussed above, two such areas were made particularly apparent at 
various times during the research. These examples and related recent developments 
are discussed here. 
The first is the development of large-scale formal manufacturing capacity. Many 
pico-solar lighting organisations, including SolarAid, had initially envisaged and 
often set up some form of local manufacturing, but other than a few limited 
examples of small-scale assembly, most had resorted to importing lighting products 
designed in the US, Australia or UK and manufactured in China. For domestic-scale 
lighting this continues to be the dominant model, although excitingly Africa’s first 
large-scale solar module manufacturing units have now been established in Ghana 
and Kenya and undertake all processes except fabrication of individual solar cells. 
The Kenyan factory in Naivasha has been established by a Dutch and Kenyan 
consortium and received co-financing from a Dutch Government fund to support 
renewable energy projects in developing countries (Ubbink East Africa Ltd, 2013). 
This provides another interesting example of an international business and 
development partnership. 
For cookstoves, there is a much greater prevalence of domestic manufacturing 
capacity, with many enterprise development programmes such as DEEP having 
focused on this. It still tends to be artisanal production, however, with a clear 
difference between the products produced as shown in the photos below. The left 
hand photo shows one of the higher quality stove brands produced in Kenya, by a 
co-operative of women called Keyo who were DEEP entrepreneurs and are now 
partners. The right hand photo shows a US-designed, Chinese-manufactured 
Envirofit stove that is imported to Kenya as a competitor. There are obviously still 
huge differences, but these are also reflected in the cost to make each. As long as 
these costs are reflected in the retail prices offered to end-users, the locally made 
products can still compete, but again highlights the possible implications of 
marketisation actors significantly subsidising prices. 
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Photo 55: Keyo cookstove (left); Envirofit cookstove (right) (Envirofit International, 
2013) 
  
The second issue often raised is that of consumer finance. In order to fulfil their 
conceptualisation, it is argued that humanitarian goods should be available to the 
poorest. Micro-credit, for example, has been criticised for rarely achieving this (Cull 
et al., 2007). Although the sustainable energy products described here are 
specifically designed for the ‘BOP’, their sales prices can still be inaccessible to those 
with very limited financial resources. Besides the subsidy approaches discussed 
above, various solutions have been tried, such as provision of products on time-
based payments. Most large-scale sellers of products find offering such 
arrangements unsustainable, however, so often leave it for micro-entrepreneurs to 
offer credit to their own customers at their own risk if wished. Customers can also 
engage with more formal channels of product-based credit provided by local 
microfinance organisations. The first option can put stress on the social relationships 
of local entrepreneurs, something elucidated in Dolan and Scott’s (2009) study of 
South African women selling Avon cosmetics. The latter approach tends to result in 
elevated product prices over time. A microfinance organisation in a remote area of 
coastal Kenya was found to be selling a solar lantern for 6,600 Kenyan shillings over 
12 months once the organisation’s mark up and 20% annual interest was 
incorporated. By comparison, in larger towns it could be found retailing at around 
4,500 Kenyan shillings. On the upside, however, it was making the lanterns 
geographically and financially available to low-income rural customers and made it 
simpler (on the customer side at least) for the one-year warranty to be utilised if 
necessary.  
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Technical solutions to consumer finance limitations have recently started being 
explored, with pay-as-you go systems paid for with an initial deposit and 
incorporating mobile phone technology that uses locally bought SIM cards to 
unlock the products weekly. A system designed by the British company Eight19 was 
piloted by a SunnyMoney entrepreneur in Malawi. Although various difficulties 
were encountered with the prototype, the product seemed to offer a promising 
solution that links apparently isolated solar kits into the global communication 
network created by mobile phone companies and their technologies. Since the same 
kits can be used to charge mobile phone batteries, it creates a neatly symbiotic 
relationship where each product relies on the function of the other to fulfil its own 
purpose. It will be interesting to observe the marketisation processes around these 
products as they continue to be developed over time. 
Photo 56: Eight19 ‘Indigo’ pay-as-you-go solar lighting kit packaging and a pilot 
customer buying an Indigo scratch card from a SunnyMoney entrepreneur in Malawi 
  
8.10 Summary of findings 
This chapter has put development intermediaries and other market-making actors at 
the centre of the analysis in order to address the fourth research question: 
How are marketisation approaches integrated into the development apparatus? 
The main findings presented in the discussion are summarised below. 
Parallel participation in development benefit markets 
Organisations tied to donors or socially-conscious investors are also participating in 
markets for ‘development-relevant benefits’ that, following standard market 
principles, inevitably require service providers to compete against each other. 
Organisations interested in ‘development’ are not special cases, external to market 
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processes – even if they are sometimes expected to be. Intermediaries will prioritise 
delivery of different types of development-relevant benefits based on both their 
own relative valuation processes and the power exerted by donors and other 
stakeholders. The motivations of individuals within a development intermediary 
may not always be fully aligned with organisational goals, however. As for other 
organisations, development intermediaries are simply configurations of people, 
practices and equipment with their own actions and abilities, and continuous, 
complex interactions between them. For example, it has been shown that the 
emergence of strong social bonds between people on either side of the 
intermediary/supported local actor boundary can ultimately influence the strategic 
directions taken.  
For an intermediary to compete effectively, development benefits can be qualified, 
quantified, valued and priced like any other product or service being converted into 
an exchangeable good. The aggregated data also becomes a key tool in its own right, 
allowing the organisation to view its impacts and make necessary changes. 
However, the ‘facts’ generated can never be entirely independent of the social and 
technical processes of their generation. The ability to collect and transfer data 
depends on availability of measurement tools and sales records, for example, and 
information is always passed on with a perception of what it might be used for, 
whether or not that consciously affects the process. These factors are not often 
acknowledged outside of NGOs and social enterprises that are generating data, but 
the ‘black box’ often put around the creation of stabilised development data by 
monitoring and evaluation (M&E) departments has been partially opened here.  
The assumptions applied to aggregated data can significantly impact how a project 
is portrayed, for example. A particular area where numerous assumptions are relied 
upon is in the assimilation of fixed monetary donations leading to specific outcomes. 
Buyers of development-related benefits (donors) are often perceived to have a need 
to see their donation as a simple market exchange process, ‘£x = x people helped’, 
despite the complex non-linear processes that they are in fact supporting. Inevitably 
M&E systems are also primarily established to monitor only the beneficial impacts 
of development projects. A donation of ‘£x’ might also ‘= difficulties for x people’, 
albeit indirectly and unintentionally, yet the data and its presentation keeps these 
side-effects outside of the lens. The case study organisations are making some 
efforts to monitor unintended negative impacts, but monitoring systems necessarily 
fix specific boundaries in order to be implementable within the available budget. 
Replacement of linear logical frameworks with ‘theories of change’ as a basis for 
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modelling development impacts may help to promote the capture of diverse and 
unexpected impacts over time. 
From development to markets 
Since both case studies are of market-based approaches, the underlying discourses 
of both nominally ‘development’ organisations perhaps unsurprisingly demonstrate 
a concerted shift towards economic language instead of development rhetoric. In 
fact, it could be argued that labelling them in this thesis as ‘development 
intermediaries’ could be falsely reinforcing their connectedness to international 
development theory and practice. The continued dependence on the existence of 
various forms of development-related funding does impose various constraints, 
such as the need to present the energy products as ‘humanitarian goods’, but in 
general the influence of economic tools and discourses are becoming evident. It 
could also be supporting a move away from much-critiqued development dualisms 
and the construction of charity-dependent ‘developing’ countries that has been 
maligned by post-development writers. The move towards markets does present 
some practical challenges, such as staff trained in and motivated by social needs 
being asked to adopt business principles, but these appear to be surmountable. 
The reliance on economic practices developed in western contexts does have 
dangers, however, such as a possible tendency to neglect locally developed market 
tools. As discussed in the previous chapter, another significant issue is the 
imposition of market devices of such complexity that power asymmetries are 
created between those who can (generally international macro-actors) and those 
who cannot (local micro-actors) access them.  
Varied organisation types  
Broadening out, different types of macro-actors have particular advantages and 
disadvantages in marketisation processes due to their often fuzzily defined legal 
structures and varying levels of attachment to socially conscious stakeholders. 
Traditional non-profit development intermediaries such as NGOs have both 
restrictions (i.e., all activities must be framed as ‘development’ relevant) and 
freedoms (i.e., activities do not have to generate an income) from the use of 
charitable funding. The ‘brokerage’ activities of DEEP have shown how the end of 
funding packages does not need to mean a collapse of integral market infrastructure 
when marketisation activities by NGOs are ceased.  
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Mainstream businesses have much greater autonomy provided that there is a 
promise of profitability. However, there are particular risks caused by the power 
imbalances between large-scale product distributors and low income, low resilience 
‘BOP’ consumers that might be insufficiently protected by incomplete or 
inaccessible market devices. Social enterprises and business-development actor 
partnerships may offer some hybrid solutions, including greater accountability to 
end-users and regulatory checks that their activities are socially responsible. For the 
pico-solar market in Malawi, the social enterprise approach of SunnyMoney, 
whereby they have taken an integral role in the market as importers and 
distributors, is so far achieving high sales volumes. Their successful schools 
programme can be seen rapidly catalysing demand in new market areas. As 
SunnyMoney is intended to be a long-term market participant, not merely leaving 
after a fixed funding period is over, there are some crucial factors to consider for 
sustaining this business growth. In particular, trust in the products and brand must 
be maintained, making it vital for after-sales services to be made available through 
locally appropriate market devices.  
In addition to providing an insight into marketisation processes, this ethnographic 
analysis of two British development intermediaries challenges some older 
portrayals of international development organisations. Rather than all being highly 
paid expatriates, GVEP and SolarAid staff were primarily national citizens and, at 
least to some extent, had the autonomy and opportunity to shape the organisations’ 
activities. There were still some differing employment conditions for staff in the 
African offices compared to the UK, but these could be attributed to country-specific 
practices and long-term funding uncertainties.  
Further considerations for successful marketisation 
Such different types of market actors competing in new markets for humanitarian 
goods can cause more complex issues of competition than might be seen for other 
commodities. Although it is now commonly accepted that free distribution is not 
conducive to long-term marketisation, subsidies are still common, particularly as 
clean energy products allow their distributors to also participate in carbon credit 
markets. In some cases the different priorities of competing actors is creating new 
tensions. Another important marketisation process is therefore the creation of 
communication channels between them. It also again reinforces the need for all 
market actors, local or international, to have access to the same subsidy-generating 
market devices.  
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The examples of efforts to create energy product markets in African countries has 
also shown the necessary role of the state in marketisation processes, particularly in 
completing the configurations needed for market devices such as product standard 
systems to function. Contrary to arguments that market-based approaches by-pass a 
role for the state in development, the examples observed here found that they in fact 
promoted engagement with state bodies and processes through their 
encouragement of formalised activities, and exert pressure on state institutions to 
fulfil their roles effectively.  
Finally, the facilitation of domestic manufacturing capacity and overcoming 
consumer finance issues have been seen as particularly difficult areas for actors in 
African domestic-scale sustainable energy product markets to make progress in. 
Recent new developments suggest that they will make interesting future case 




This thesis is written at a time when recognition of anthropogenic climate change is 
stimulating interest in finding ‘low carbon’ solutions to the lack of energy access in 
sub-Saharan Africa and other ‘less economically developed’ regions. Parallel to this 
there is an increasingly blurred line between development, social enterprise and 
business actors looking to see people at the ‘bottom of the economic pyramid’ (BOP) 
as distributors and consumers, and to a more limited extent manufacturers, of goods 
that can help meet their lifestyle needs and desires.   
Ethnographic methods have been used, primarily participant observation inside two 
case study organisations, to explore the market-based approaches being used by 
broadly defined ‘development intermediaries’ to create and expand markets for 
domestic-scale clean energy products in rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa. The 
research has focused on the distribution and in some cases local manufacturing of 
clean cookstoves, biomass briquettes, solar phone charging services and pico-solar 
products in Kenya, Uganda and Malawi. The market activities under analysis have 
been presented through four generalised and simplified market maps. 
Using primarily the work of Çalışkan and Callon (2010), the markets have then been 
conceptualised as socio-technical assemblages. This has demonstrated the full extent 
and complexity of such markets and the marketisation processes that create them. It 
soon then becomes apparent that this would be impossible to represent on simplistic, 
stabilised schematics. The notion of a socio-technical assemblage draws on 
economic sociology, science and technology studies and actor-network theory; it 
highlights the technical aspects of markets and their components, and that networks 
of humans and non-humans constitute marketisation actors that perform markets 
around specific products. This conceptualisation has generated new findings and 
allowed the thesis to respond to Çalışkan and Callon’s call for research into the 
intricacies of marketisation processes in varied contexts.  
The following discussion summarises those findings, splitting them into four main 
categories by theme: power asymmetries created by unequal access to complex 
market devices; processes, problems and benefits of ‘engendering of economic 
subjectivities’ through entrepreneur recruitment and training; implications of 
overall shifts from development to market-related rhetoric and theory, and; the 
need to promote domestic manufacturing in order to redress value sharing across 
supply chains. An overview of some of the limitations of the research is then 
provided, followed by suggestions of related future research.  
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9.1 Market devices, macro-actors and power asymmetries 
As the international development community, carbon finance stakeholders, 
international and local businesses and end-users all engage with sustainable energy 
technologies for different reasons, the energy products considered here become 
evidently multi-faceted: ‘humanitarian goods’ or ‘life technologies’ (Redfield, 2012); 
‘low carbon’ technologies that generate carbon credits; income-generation 
opportunities; useful light generating, phone charging and cooking means. Once 
these products are valued by different people or groups of people, they become 
open to market exchange.  
Callon et al. (2007) find that the actual tools and systems that allow markets to 
function are often overlooked in social science studies. They term “the material and 
discursive assemblages that intervene in the construction of markets” (ibid., p.2) as 
‘market devices,’ similar to Foucault’s ‘dispositifs’ (often translated as ‘apparatus’) 
but with physical artefacts and tools incorporated. Market devices help shape the 
ways in which people and products interact in a market, for example shaping the 
processes of qualification31 and price setting. This research has identified various 
market devices that appear to play an important role in the case study sustainable 
energy product markets. These are listed below. 
• Quality assurance schemes (standards): For individual buyers the significance of 
adherence to quality standards is unclear, but successful engagement with these 
complex systems of testing equipment, facilities and skills, standards specifications, 
certification bodies and so on, can lead to more than important-sounding statements 
on marketing material. It has been shown that various macro-actors such as solar 
lantern importers/distributors (e.g. SunnyMoney) and cookstove distributors (e.g. 
supermarkets) choose to engage only with products that come with a quality mark 
attached. Being able to access these market devices can therefore contribute 
significantly to manufacturers’ agency.  
• Warranty systems: Small warranty cards are found in the boxes of many energy 
products that are imported into sub-Saharan African countries. These market 
devices only function, however, when the full necessary social and technical 
arrangements are in place. Even lack of a paper receipt to demonstrate the purchase 
date can jeopardise this. Lack of familiarity with the warranty concept, limited 
physical means to pass faulty products back along geographically extensive supply 
                                                      
31 Qualification: whereby the list of qualities attached to goods are repeatedly “attributed, stabilized, objectified 
and arranged” (Callon (2002) p.199) 
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chains, and no in-country presence of manufacturers were also found to be missing 
components for solar lantern warranties in Malawi. 
• Carbon market mechanisms: Complex systems have been devised to allow 
sustainable energy products to generate ‘carbon credits’ that can be sold in their 
own market. However, actors must have access to specific cognitive, financial and 
technical resources in order to engage with these market devices and extract that 
additional value.  
• Patenting frameworks: This is another example of market devices that can lead to 
increased agency, and thus power, for those actors that can access these formal, 
expensive and complex market devices. The ‘informal economy’ does offer 
opportunities for usurping that power to some extent, however, through lack of 
regulation.  
Çalışkan (2010) conceptualises global cotton markets as ‘fields of power’ due to the 
power asymmetries seen in the relationships between farmers, local merchants and 
global traders. He shows that cotton farmers are marginalised by their limited 
access to knowledge of wider market activities and exclusion from the market 
devices deployed by traders, such as ‘prosthetic’ pricing models. Similarly in these 
case studies, differential availability of and access to the full assemblages that make 
up market devices results in the creation of ‘macro-actors’ and subsequent power 
asymmetries. Local ‘consumers’ are made to pay for the theoretical value of 
warranty cards supplied with solar lanterns, despite having no history of such 
market devices nor the physical means to extract that value from them. Local 
artisans making efficient cookstoves are competing with foreign organisations that 
have the capacity to interact with the ‘black boxes’ of carbon market mechanisms 
and thus benefit from a value source that is left invisible to most.  
Links to dependency theory 
These market devices are all based on a history of economic thought and concepts 
that have developed in, and through study of, specific western market contexts. 
Notions such as ‘quality assurance,’ ‘consumer protection,’ ‘warranty period,’ 
‘carbon credit methodology’ and ‘international patent’ have not emerged from sub-
Saharan African countries, yet many of them have become applicable here through 
the globalisation of market activities. Çalışkan and Callon (2010) stress the 
importance of considering the role of ‘economics at large’ in analyses of 
marketisation, including both academic economics and “the array of knowledges 
and the know-how on markets that non-academic agents elaborate and employ” 
(ibid., p.4).  
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The domination of western economic tools in marketisation processes in African 
‘developing country’ contexts is to some extent reminiscent of dependency 
theories.32 These emerged between the 1950s and 1970s to challenge modernisation 
theory and the notion that free international trade, without protectionist policies, 
benefits all countries. Dependency theorists such as Baran (1957) and Cardoso 
(Cardoso and Faletto, 1979) conceptualised countries into central and periphery, and 
suggested that central countries would always manoeuvre to ensure their continued 
dominance. Similarly, market devices nominally developed to bring added revenue 
streams to low carbon energy services in developing country contexts have 
seemingly resulted in further dependency on international macro-actors, due to 
their reliance on complex economic ‘mechanisms’ that require cognitive, financial 
and technical resources to access. They thus appear to create greater power and 
income opportunities not for developing country actors, but for international 
consultancies and businesses with these resources more readily available.  
As Callon and Latour (1981) suggest, being able to generate modes of thought and 
complex processes and then pack them away into black boxes, out of reach and 
beyond challenge for others, renders entities into ‘macro-actors’. If markets for 
humanitarian goods predominantly involve design, manufacturing and managing 
distribution processes externally to the intended domestic context of their use, the 
‘value-sharing’ of these products is always going to be significantly in favour of 
such macro-actors.  
Maintaining trust or vulnerable consumers left exposed 
For the pico-solar market in Malawi, the social enterprise approach of SunnyMoney 
whereby they have taken an integral role in the market as importers and 
distributors with accompanied innovative marketing activities, is so far achieving 
high sales volumes. Ensuring that trust is maintained in both the products and 
SunnyMoney as a market actor will be crucial for sustaining business growth, yet 
inaccessibility of the warranty market device currently jeopardises this. It also leads 
vulnerable ‘BOP’ consumers exposed, reliant on the good nature of ‘socially 
conscious’ businesses. If mainstream businesses without such specific social 
mandates are going to be encouraged to engage with this consumer group, as 
advocated by Prahalad (2010) and others, there is clearly a need to ensure that 
systems designed to protect consumers do work in the contexts they are placed in.   
                                                      
32 Dependency theory emerged as a response to modernisation theory (that suggested all countries would move 
through a similar pattern of development.) It highlighted that late-developing countries were now in a different 
context, marked by the emergence of a global economy, and drew attention to the limited opportunities for 
economic gain available to countries dependent on the export of raw materials (Payne & Phillips, 2010). 
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De Soto (2001) suggests that capitalist systems are failing in developing countries 
partly because of the inaccessibility of legal frameworks for formally registering 
assets such as businesses and property, leading to large amounts of ‘dead capital’ 
and an ‘undercapitalized sector’. ‘Legal’ and ‘extralegal’ are the alternative terms 
given for formal and informal economies. It is therefore perhaps no surprise that 
formal market devices like warranty systems can be very difficult to implement. 
Even if they are offered, if a manufacturer or distributor does not follow up on the 
promises made, a consumer that is unable to access the relevant legal frameworks 
has limited agency for redress. 
Equitable, locally appropriate market devices and brokerage services 
The ‘informal economy’ can find its own solutions to some of these issues, such as 
using patents in the knowledge that it will not be noticed or anything done about it, 
but when macro-actors can attach greater value to their products out of access to 
market devices, power asymmetries become pronounced. Evidently the ideal 
situation would be to avoid this in the first instance, and within ongoing work to 
find appropriate channels for ‘low carbon funding’ priority must be given to 
creating equitable access. Where this is not the case, such as with existing carbon 
finance mechanisms, this research has illustrated some of the ‘brokerage’ services 
that non-profit organisations can provide. Impact Carbon’s work with Ugastove is 
one example; Uganda Carbon Bureau’s work to aggregate small cookstove projects 
is another. 
It should also be ensured that market devices are locally appropriate. This is not to 
say that a warranty system cannot be utilised; Barefoot Power’s system of direct 
sales people and local service centres in Uganda appears to provide the necessary 
socio-technical components to turn warranty cards into tools that most consumers 
can extract value from. However, this is certainly not the case in Malawi, and 
potentially not in other countries where Barefoot does not operate directly, or for 
solar lanterns manufactured by other companies. In these contexts there appears to 
be potential for finding more locally appropriate solutions. Perhaps this will only 
happen if the starting point is consideration of the local context instead of trying to 
import ready-made market devices reliant on western, formal modes of operation. 
There is also evidently a role for the state, particularly in completing the 
configurations needed for market devices such as product standard systems to 
function. Contrary to arguments that market-based approaches by-pass a role for 
the state in development, the examples observed here in fact promote engagement 
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with state bodies and processes through their encouragement of formalised 
activities, and simultaneously exert pressure on state institutions to fulfil their roles 
effectively.  
9.2 Engendering economic subjectivities and performance 
of market roles 
Market maps have been used present how the development intermediaries are 
undertaking marketisation activities and highlight some of the other key actors 
involved, following Çalışkan and Callon’s (2010) recommendation that studies of 
marketisation cases should start by identifying relevant stakeholders. Latour’s (1987) 
writings highlight, however, that this type of simplification involves depicting the 
market system as a ‘cold’ stable object. While the market maps are useful to provide 
a visual overview of the case studies, it should be acknowledged that the constituent 
elements of this stabilised conceptualisation only exist through continually being 
produced and performed. Markets are not fixed, specific entities but are created out 
of collective performance of different market roles and adherence to sets of tacit 
rules and practices.  
As international development has turned to new market-based approaches, the 
notion of ‘entrepreneurship’ has become particularly popular and often seen as a 
panacea for both the creation of livelihood opportunities and getting ‘humanitarian 
goods’ to people that are perceived to be able to benefit from them. A focus on the 
systems of entrepreneur recruitment, training and ongoing support in the case 
studies and other interviewed organisations show varied approaches. Analysis 
suggests that it is not possible to determine which individuals will best ‘perform’ a 
market role in the specific way envisaged by the development intermediaries; many 
‘successes’ were seen with no obvious determining factors for success, and equally 
those with potential market agency often focused on other activities not related to 
energy products.  
To reduce the risks of low apparent success rates, it appears that increasingly 
development intermediaries are pre-selecting those who already have more 
financial, material, social and/or cognitive agency, arguably representing a shift 
away from true ‘BOP’ entrepreneurs. Since getting energy products to end-users is 
the ‘development benefit’ being prioritised this is not necessarily problematic, 
however, and can also be defended by ‘trickle-down’ arguments. Inevitably 
entrepreneur recruitment and selection will never be entirely systematic in any case, 
 311 
always emerging from existing networks, encounters and perceptions. From a 
practical point of view, selection and training approaches may be an area for more 
discussion and learning between development intermediaries, although this will 
require navigation around competitive relationships between them.  
Processes of economisation  
The main components of the entrepreneurs’ agency to perform their market roles 
are: their application of ‘economic’ tools; their technical capacity and the physical 
tools and facilities required, and; their interconnectedness through the networks 
they are part of. Their ‘conversion’ into energy product market actors starts with 
their adoption of the ‘economic’ language and actions of business people. It is 
argued that even a simple shift in the language used by the development 
intermediaries supporting them, from conceptualising them as development 
‘beneficiaries’ to labelling and treating them as ‘entrepreneurs’, has a performative 
role. For this reason, it is proposed that entrepreneurship is a ‘discursive device' for 
marketisation.  
The one-to-one relationships at the intermediary-entrepreneur interface are found to 
be key in facilitating the discursive device and building on it further, particularly 
under GVEP’s DEEP where the relationships developed between entrepreneurs and 
their mentors appear to be a vital component of success of the programme. Careful 
recruitment of the mentors is therefore as important or even more so than selecting 
the trainee entrepreneurs. The purpose of the training and ongoing support 
activities can partly be framed as helping the entrepreneurs move from informal to 
formal economic practices. Given the lack of trust found by most entrepreneurs in 
their customers repaying them if they were to sell products on credit, it suggests 
that most have already left behind some of the reliance on ‘social contracts’ that 
characterises the informal economy (de Soto, 2001). Without full access to 
formalised frameworks, however, it is perhaps most appropriate to move away 
from a stark divide between formal and informal to see it as a progressive 
continuum.  
Engendering economic subjectivities: problematic? 
Although ‘entrepreneurs’ may increase their discursive, cognitive, and physical 
tools of business, it is not to say that they are initially passive, featureless actors then 
subjectified by the marketisation processes of the development intermediaries. 
Instead each builds on their existing agency to make their market performance 
unique. Their skills, networks, ideas, tools and facilities most likely become 
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involved too, if desired by the entrepreneurs, but this has been open to critique by 
some scholars. Elyachar (2005), for example, criticises the transformation of 
relationships into economic assets. Caution is certainly necessary where personal 
resources are vulnerable to misuse. If people with limited financial resilience are 
encouraged to dedicate all of their time to making a product that turns out not to be 
valued by potential end-users, or to spend a significant proportion of their financial 
resources to buy a product that breaks without opportunity for redress, that is 
problematic. This becomes even more so if they are encouraged into formal debt to 
do so.  
Promoting indebtedness as a means to achieving poverty reduction is part of a 
much wider debate, however, that is particularly explored in analyses of 
microfinance approaches. During this research, DEEP entrepreneurs were seen to be 
carefully selected for loan recommendations. Most of those put forward had then 
apparently benefited from the loan and coped with the repayment systems. 
However, a few had amassed debts or appeared to be confused at the conditions. 
Perhaps more flexibility to allow organically developed, local solutions could again 
be the answer; the desire to move entrepreneurs towards formalised arrangements 
may possibly encourage reliance on formal conceptions of ‘access to finance’ with 
limited exploration of alternative options.  
In terms of loans and more generally, in these case studies there appears to be 
limited forced requirement placed on the entrepreneurs and dealers; many DEEP 
entrepreneurs continue to do other activities part-time and never fully become 
energy entrepreneurs in order to have a safety net, while SunnyMoney 
entrepreneurs use their personal networks to set up sub-dealer systems without any 
provocation or training. Furthermore, the development intermediaries undertake 
various activities to take the market actors they support beyond the boundaries of 
existing connections, increasing their agency in economic and possibly non-
economic ways. Facilitation of co-operative working arrangements, for example, can 
be seen to lift actors from ‘micro’ towards ‘macro’ and empower them accordingly. 
Overall, therefore, it is argued that the development intermediaries focused on here 
are not engendering economic subjectivities alone, and the ‘brokerage’ process can 
equally augment the social and technical resources of the individuals involved, 
providing access to new techniques and filling ‘structural holes’ between people or 
groups. Furthermore, as the ‘entrepreneurs’ become endowed with the necessary 
market tools, they become marketisation actors themselves as they perform their 
intended roles. 
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9.3 Development !  markets 
It is also suggested here that the subjectification of market actors is preferable to 
engendering charity-dependent beneficiaries. The underlying discourses of both 
nominally ‘development’ intermediaries that formed the case studies perhaps 
unsurprisingly demonstrate a concerted shift towards economics and away from 
development rhetoric. This is a positive step in terms of its response to the 
arguments of post-development actors, for example tackling ‘developer’-
‘beneficiary’ dualisms and the social construction of impoverished ‘developing’ 
countries.  
Market-based approaches give the opportunity for people to choose to engage 
through market processes rather than simply being recipients of hand-outs. The 
meanings and values that people ascribe to objects are at the centre of rendering 
them into exchangeable products. Market exchange models of distribution therefore 
create a feedback system whereby the destined consumers must sufficiently value 
the products in order to buy them. Through the decision of whether or not to 
actively engage in market exchange they thus become inadvertent participants in 
the shaping of these products. For example, it is recognised that renewable energy is 
not always the best solution to meet rural energy needs, yet ‘low carbon’ solutions 
have sometimes previously been imposed on communities due to the influence of 
the climate change agenda. Much of the research in this field to date has focussed on 
case studies that justify sustainable energy technologies as effective rural energy 
solutions. Leaving this to purchasing decisions allows self-selection of the end-users 
instead of external prescription of technological solutions.  
The case studies also show a perhaps unexpected strength of relationship between 
‘developers’, now marketisation actors, and those previously referred to as 
'beneficiaries', leading to blurred or crossed boundaries in various cases. Even the 
apparent ‘developers’ are mostly local actors too, as this is seen as key for giving 
them appropriate support and understanding local market contexts. Reliance on 
economic theory developed in western contexts is likely to have as many dangers as 
adherence to development discourses, however, such as the market device issues 
discussed above, so it is in no way proposed as a panacea to solving global 
inequalities. 
 314 
Market actors or development actors? 
The ‘brokerage’ activities of DEEP have shown how the end of funding packages do 
not need to cause a collapse of integral market infrastructure when NGOs activities 
are ceased. However, the continued dependence on the existence of various forms of 
development-related funding does impose various constraints, such as the need to 
present the energy products as ‘humanitarian goods’. It stops the target groups for 
cookstoves and solar lanterns from moving away completely from beneficiary status, 
not quite yet reaching the modern consumer image that market-based approaches 
apparently strive for. It also might restrict the opportunities for ‘social enterprises’ 
linked to development stakeholders: can solar-powered televisions, for example, fit 
into the required ‘life technology’ conceptualisation? It will be interesting to see the 
direction that development-related actors in this field continue to move in. GVEP, 
for example, is seemingly making headway in its new programmes to detach from a 
development fixation with small enterprises.  
The move from development to marketisation actor does present some practical 
challenges, such as staff trained in and motivated by social needs being asked to 
adopt business principles. The fairly recent engagement of traditional development 
intermediaries with core ‘business’ skills such as marketing techniques is sometimes 
evident and there perhaps remains a further transition to be made.  
Although attachment to development-related donors and investors imposes 
restrictions, it also provides some safeguards in terms of reporting requirements, 
something that seems particularly necessary when advocating targeting of this 
vulnerable consumer group. For-profit approaches have the in-built feedback 
mechanism of whether consumers choose to participate in market exchanges or not, 
but where this fails it will leave new BOP entrepreneurs hardest hit. The power 
imbalances between large-scale product distributors and low income, low resilience 
‘BOP’ end-users are more accentuated where consumer protection market devices 
are incomplete or inaccessible, as discussed above. 
Based on Abu-Saifan’s (2012) entrepreneurship spectrum (Figure 5 in Chapter 0) 
social enterprises can be non-profits with earned income strategies or for-profits 
with social missions. Both approaches may offer greater accountability to end-users 
since checks that their activities are socially responsible are required, with the caveat 
that positive framing and some data bias of monitoring activities is hard to avoid. 
Where international actors are engaging in BOP markets in earned income or for-
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profit ways, therefore, increased promotion of social enterprise models and 
enhancing the related regulatory frameworks for them appears a positive step.   
This research has presented some successes in marketisation activities, but it has 
also shown that tensions between actors exist where priorities or approaches differ 
and have the potential to undermine each other. The diversity of actors competing 
in markets for sustainable energy products appears to lead to more complex issues 
of competition than might be seen for other commodities. Although it is now 
commonly accepted that free distribution is not conducive to long-term 
marketisation, subsidies are still common, particularly as clean energy products 
allow their distributors to also participate in the market for carbon credits. This 
further reinforces the need for all market actors, local or international, to have access 
to the same subsidy-generating market devices.  
This research has provided a detailed ethnography ‘inside’ two British development 
intermediaries that are prominent in the sustainable energy sector. It provides an 
update to some earlier examples of this (e.g. Crewe and Harrison, 1998) and 
challenges some of the older conceptualisations. Although white four-wheel-drive 
vehicles were still sometimes used, staff such as GVEP’s business mentors and 
SunnyMoney’s sales teams were generally hard to distinguish from any other 
Kenyans, Ugandans or Malawians undertaking their daily business activities. The 
offices were not full of highly paid expatriates; on the contrary, all in-country 
managers and directors were national citizens. Both organisations still had UK 
headquarters with oversight across all of the country offices, but this seems 
inevitable given that donor funding and product purchases (for SunnyMoney) are 
channelled through the UK. It is also something that is unlikely to change soon, 
since moving away from traditional international development models towards 
humanitarian goods markets seems to be promoting international, not African, 
products.    
9.4 Next steps: domestic manufacturing and further 
innovation 
Although job creation is not specifically the central focus here, local manufacturing 
of cookstoves leads more easily to locally appropriate innovation, due to greater 
access to end-user feedback and knowledge of local resource availability. This can 
all be done without needing to engage in the complex feed trials and laboratory 
tests developed by international actors. Even simple standardisation tools such as 
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specifically-sized cookstove liner moulds have been significant for local 
marketisation of particular cookstove designs by facilitating disaggregated 
manufacturing. Although it has taken significant time and funding by development 
intermediaries to reach this point, lessons learnt in the impacts that these seemingly 
peripheral market activities can have might allow optimism for more efficiency in 
future approaches.   
More technically complex products such as solar lanterns require engagement with 
a greater array of market devices, however. These ensure high quality, standardised 
products that come with detailed evaluative information such as ‘brightness in 
lumens’, but the extensive socio-technical configurations required for such 
qualification processes show why locally-made products can struggle to compete. 
This is why new solar assembly production facilities in African countries are very 
exciting. Not only will it increase local skills and reduce product prices, but it will 
also require related resources such as testing laboratories to be developed. 
Ultimately ‘win-win’ contexts of energy products being locally manufactured and 
distributed and used will be the manifestation of diminished power asymmetries 
between market actors.  
That is not to say that the role of socially and environmentally conscious 
organisations will soon be defunct. Even in the unlikely event that such market 
equality is achieved or its desirability even acknowledged, there will always be 
room for further innovation. For example, one of the key components of the 
humanitarian goods conceptualisation is that the goods should be accessible to the 
poorest; this reinforces the need for tackling consumer finance barriers. 
9.5 Limitations 
It is acknowledge that this research has various limitations that result from its 
chosen boundaries and the methodological approach used. For methodological 
limitations, ethnographic methods that use the researcher as the ‘research tool’ will 
always be influenced by the subjectivity of that researcher. I endeavoured to 
undertake the data collection and analysis as objectively as possible, but inevitably 
both the observations made and the interpretation of those observations will have 
been affected by my own background and values. This has been considered as far as 
possible within the ‘reflexivity’ section of Chapter 0, but ultimately this is my 
ethnography rather than a perfectly objective work. The methodology chosen also 
sets the boundaries of the research in terms of number of case studies, chosen case 
studies, length of participant observation period, and so on. Again the decisions 
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made have been explained in Chapter 4 and the subsequent limitations referred to 
where necessary within the thesis.    
In terms of the analytical boundaries, some of the key notions that this thesis refers 
to have not been fully challenged here. In particular, ‘development’ and ‘market’ 
have been accepted as utilised terms whose related activities have been explored, by 
considering how operations can and do occur within these prevalent systems. The 
question of whether such systems are fundamentally appropriate within society or 
not has not been posed, however. For example, capitalism as a mode of societal 
organisation and the very existence of ‘international development’ organisations 
have not been critiqued. This lack of challenge might be argued by some as 
reinforcing prevailing patterns. It also means that the conclusions do not push for 
any radical paradigm shift or promote alternative ideologies. However, some of the 
specific nuances of ‘market-based’ approaches have been challenged, such as 
reliance on western economic models and related dominance of international 
market actors, and some ‘softer’ capitalist models such as social enterprises and co-
operative working have been explored. Similarly, the arguments of post-
development writers around the detrimental conceptualisations of ‘developing’ 
countries that development activities can reinforce have been acknowledged and 
integrated into the analysis where possible.   
Since one of the key drivers behind the design and distribution of sustainable 
energy products is environmental concerns, one area that does perhaps require 
further challenge is the sustainability of turning relatively low consumption people 
at the BOP into consumers. Dolan (2012) brings attention to this in broader BOP 
approaches noting: “the effects of selling single-serve sachets of soap and shampoo 
in a context of global climate change” (ibid., p.3). Similarly Viswanathan and 
Sridharan (2009) suggest that: 
[…] perhaps most importantly, market engagement with the poor has to be achieved 
in socially, economically, and ecologically sustainable ways; thus, the challenge of 
sustainability must be squarely addressed. Progress through merely mimicking 
consumption behaviors of those at higher levels of the income pyramid represents a 
drastic threat to the already unsustainable conditions on the planet. (ibid., p.1) 
They conceptualise this as using business approaches to turn ‘subsistence 
marketplaces’ into ‘sustainable marketplaces’, as summarised schematically in 
Figure 55. Clearly the purposeful design of ‘sustainable’ energy products can be 
argued to inherently adhere to a sustainable marketplaces future. However, further 
consideration needs to be given to sustainable manufacturing processes, material 
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use and disposal. Battery use within pico-solar products is of particular concern, for 
example.    
Figure 55: From Subsistence Marketplaces To Sustainable 33  Marketplaces 
(Viswanathan and Sridharan, 2009) 
!
9.6 Suggestions for further research 
Approaches that incorporate environmental sustainability more concretely into the 
manufacturing and distribution of clean energy products could therefore be argued 
as an area for further research. Ways of facilitating domestic manufacturing capacity 
and overcoming consumer finance barriers have already been highlighted as 
interesting future case studies for marketisation research in this field. This thesis has 
also highlighted some areas where marketisation actors may benefit from more 
detailed understanding. Different reasons for valuation between development-
stakeholders and end-users are clearly perceived, but further research might explore 
the accuracy of some of these perceptions; environmental benefits may be more 
valued by potential customers than assumed, for example. Establishing and 
obtaining quality standards has also been seen to be a focus for development 
intermediaries involved in markets for humanitarian goods. However, what do 
quality standards mean to end-users in these rural African contexts? Do they value 
them and does it affect their purchase decisions?  
More specifically, expanding the research undertaken here into longitudinal 
research could offer much deeper insights into the longer-term impacts of market-
                                                      
33 Viswanathan and Sridharan (2009) note that sustainability is used in the broadest sense of the word to capture 
social and ecological in addition to economic aspects.!
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based approaches. GVEP International’s DEEP has now finished and unless the 
entrepreneurs have passed into its successor programme, their involvement with 
GVEP has finished. The longevity of the positive impacts of DEEP on its 
entrepreneurs beyond the project timeframe was a particular concern for their 
business mentors. Revisiting some of the entrepreneurs post-DEEP could provide 
some valuable insights into this, and generally allow more extensive analysis of the 
processes and impacts of their rendering into ‘economic’ actors. It is partly for this 
reason that the names of the entrepreneurs engaged with have been left in this 
thesis. Similarly, a future revisit to SolarAid’s SunnyMoney operations to observe its 
progress and any further shifts in approach would generate a valuable longitudinal 
analysis. Increasing access to sustainable energy goods and services is a long-term 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A: Methodological discussion 
The following discussion describes how the number of cases was chosen and the 
process of case selection, followed by an introduction to ethnographic methods and 
participant observation in particular.  
Number of cases 
Using ethnographic methods limits the number of case studies that can be focussed 
on and thus influenced the decision to select just two cases. Case study research has 
frequently been criticised or held in low regard due to inevitably involving a ‘low-n’ 
research design. Maximising the number of cases can certainly help to increase the 
likelihood of generalisability (Gerring, 2004). However, since generalisability is not 
the aim here, ‘low-n’ should not be seen as a limiting factor but as inevitable, and 
mitigated through the richness of an ethnographic approach. 
Equally, it can be argued that focussing on just one case would provide a deeper 
and more revealing ethnography. It is frequently documented that ethnographic 
research requires a large time investment in order to produce a representative 
analysis. DeWalt and DeWalt (2002) cite the example of witchcraft: where reports of 
witchcraft have been documented by ethnographers studying particular societies, 
this has only tended to happen during fieldwork periods longer than 6 months; 
ethnographers spending shorter periods in similar settings generally do not hear of 
such reports. They describe their own experience in support of this. In essence, such 
sensitive issues may only be allowed to become apparent to a researcher once 
sufficient trust and familiarity have been established (although even then they may 
still be concealed), which evidently takes time. In summary: “… the length of time 
that a person spends engaged in participant observation does make a very large 
difference in the kind of findings that may be reported.” (Ibid., p.80)  
Ultimately, deciding on the number of case studies was seen as a trade-off between 
a more detailed ethnography and a broader, more varied evidence base for analysis, 
and finally two cases were chosen instead of just one. Although cross-case 
comparison was not the research method per se, it is felt that having the 
opportunity to compare particular aspects of the cases has enhanced the analysis. 
Case selection 
There are various techniques for selecting cases, depending on the research aims. 
For example, causal analysis requires cases with a specific outcome to be chosen 
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(Bennett and Elman, 2006). This research, however, does not focus on any pre-
identified effect. Equally, the cases are not intended to be a representative sample of 
all similar development programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. In order to increase the 
breadth and richness of findings, I intentionally aimed for diversity between the 
cases, choosing different countries and contrasts in the programme designs. For 
example, GVEP International’s programme is non-technology and non-product 
specific, whilst SolarAid focuses only on particular solar photovoltaic products. The 
initial intention was to have a larger geographical difference between the two cases 
by selecting one in eastern or southern Africa and one in West Africa. This 
unfortunately did not prove possible, however, due to difficulties gaining access to 
the programmes identified in West Africa. 
Stake (1994) notes that case studies are often chosen due to particular personal 
interest rather than purely theoretical reasons and this was certainly one factor here. 
A desire to investigate solutions in areas lacking rural energy access was a key 
driver for the research and this is a particularly pertinent issue in sub-Saharan 
Africa. My professional background is in policies to promote sustainable energy 
systems and a trip in 2009 to a pico-solar assembly unit in Iringa, Tanzania, sparked 
my interest in programmes that combine clean energy products with livelihood 
creation. Not only were local people getting access to solar products, but the 
assembly unit specifically trained and employed disabled people who otherwise 
had very limited opportunities for work.       
Undoubtedly the other decisive factor in case selection was pragmatism. Language 
was a major consideration, extremely important for any qualitative research but 
particularly so for participant observation (Fife, 2005). I therefore restricted the 
country options to only officially Anglophone or Francophone ones. Even within 
this there were significant limitations: most African countries have a huge number 
of local dialects for everyday use, particularly in rural localities, regardless of the 
official national language. However, the main consideration for me was that I could 
converse easily and without need of a translator with the staff of the case study 
organisations.  
Another essential practical consideration in sub-Saharan Africa is personal safety 
(Gokah, 2006) and this reduced the list of possible fieldwork countries further. It is 
noted that the ethics procedure adhered to for this research considers possible risk 
to the researcher, as well as to the intended research subjects.   
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Gaining access 
The deduction process described above resulted in a list of possible countries 
suitable for the fieldwork. The final practical consideration was gaining access. I 
systematically made contact with and presented my research proposal to 
organisations identified as having programmes fitting within the described case 
criteria. Some were unresponsive, while some seemed initially interested but later 
ceased contact. The most responsive organisations were those contacted via 
personal links, conveniently illustrating the concept of personal networks as ‘social 
capital’.   
Of key importance was ‘selling’ my research and myself as a useful asset to the 
organisations during the research period. A benefit of using participant observation 
was being able to offer myself as a willing participant in the organisations’ activities. 
During the discussions with the organisations, we considered various roles that 
might be suitable from both a CV perspective and a research needs perspective, i.e. 
allowing me a full overview of the programme being studied.   
Following these discussions, the two case studies were essentially chosen through 
self-selection. Although this approach may appear to have limited scientific 
justification, ultimately it is only by taking the practical issues discussed above, such 
as language, safety and access, fully into account that a thorough and credible piece 
of case-based research can be produced (Gokah, 2006).  
Ethnographic Research Methods 
Ethnographic methods originated within anthropology but have since spread to 
diverse academic fields and now constitute a widely used methodological approach. 
The classic characteristic of ethnography is ‘thick description’, a term coined by the 
anthropologist Geertz (1973) in the introduction to his collection of essays entitled 
The Interpretation of Cultures. Various more descriptive definitions have been used 
since; O’Reilly (2005) provides a useful overview of these and draws out key 
elements to create the following description. 
Minimally ethnography is: 
• iterative-inductive research (that evolves in design through the study), drawing 
on: 
o a family of methods, 
o involving direct and sustained contact with human agents 
o within the context of their daily lives (and cultures); 
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• watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions, and 
• producing a richly written account 
• that respects the irreducibility of human experience,  
• that acknowledges the role of theory  
• as well as the researcher’s own role 
• and that views humans as part object/part subject.” (ibid., p.3) 
 
The main ethnographic method used was participant observation, supported by, 
and to some extent contrasted with, semi-structured interviews. I was also able to 
collect some survey data as part of my ‘participant’ role with the organisations, and 
some secondary data already collected by the organisations was made available to 
me.  
Participant observation 
The key method within ethnography is observation, either participant or non-
participant, determined by the extent of the researcher’s involvement in the events 
that they are observing. The main techniques within participant observation are 
fairly straightforward, in summary being to: 
• observe through participating in activities; 
• have informal conversations with people encountered;  
• make detailed fieldnotes (thick description) based on those observations and 
conversations for subsequent analysis, and; 
• collect other supporting data.  
(DeWalt and DeWalt, 2002) (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) 
The renowned anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski used an increased level of 
participation compared to other early ethnographers. During his famous study of 
the Trobriand islanders in Melanesia he learnt the local language within four 
months and was able to stop using an interpreter. He identified three main benefits 
of participation: becoming part of the natural setting so that research subjects would 
become less affected by his presence; having access to everything as a participant 
rather than having to repeatedly renegotiate access as a researcher, and; increasing 
understanding through experiencing things as an insider rather than an external 
observer (O'Reilly, 2005). For ethnography within organisations, the nature and 
benefits of participatory compared to external observation are even more apparent.  
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Using ethnographic methods for this type of research seems well justified in the 
literature. Dorman (2005) discusses the methodological reasoning for ethnographic 
study of human rights NGOs in Zimbabwe. She argues that the typical reliance on 
interviews with a large number of different organisations within studies of NGOs in 
Africa is detrimental and prevents adequate research into how NGOs actually 
function and the context of their emergence. Dorman (ibid., p.38) concludes that: “… 
we need to study NGOs from inside, using techniques such as participant-
observation that enable us to create detailed, descriptive case studies.” Similarly 
Suzuki (1997) notes that: “So far, little of the literature has discussed the internal 
dynamics of NGOs as organizations: most tends to treat NGOs as single, coherent 
entities. In reality, however, an NGO is a complex entity that consists of diverse 
offices staffed by diverse members who hold diverse values” (p.2). 
Gomm (2008) suggests that research methods such as surveys and interviews 
provide a distorted picture of reality because of being set up by researchers to 
generate data. Ethnographic methods, by comparison, focus on ‘naturally occurring’ 
situations which have been less impacted by a researcher’s actions. This can be 
described as ‘naturalistic validity’, analogous to studying animals in their natural 
habitats. However, reflexivity about the researcher’s impacts on data collected and 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
    
   
   
   











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix C: Methodological tools 
Initial questions for DEEP entrepreneurs 
Basic information 
• Entrepreneur Name 
• Company Name 
• Individual or group? 
• Anonymity? 
• Mentor Name 
• Date 
• Time / location:  
Core questions 
What are your main business activities?  
How did you first find out about the technology? 
How did you come to be a DEEP entrepreneur? 
What changes have you experienced due to your involvement with DEEP? 
(And if only positive answers provided to previous question) Have you 
experienced any drawbacks of being involved with DEEP? 
How would you like to develop your business in future? 
What difficulties do you still encounter with your business, or might stop you from 
developing it as envisaged?  
Who are your main customers? (e.g. wholesalers / individuals) 
How do you find new customers?  
Are the products you make/sell certified under an official standards framework? 
Are the products /services provided with a warranty? 
How do you determine the price of your products/services? 
 346 
How do customers pay you for the products/services? (e.g. in advance/ at 
purchase/on credit basis)  
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Initial questions for non-case study organisations 
Basic information 
• Name  
• Job Title 
• Organisation  
• Date 
• Time / location 
• Confidentiality 
Core questions 
What is the aim of your organisation?  
How do you describe your organisation? (e.g. NGO/not-for-profit/social enterprise 
etc.) 
What led to the organisation being formed? 
Where is it headquartered and where are the regional offices? 
How long have you/your organisation been working in this sector and region? Why 
this sector/region in particular?  
What number of staff? Local/expat? 
Who are you main donors/shareholders? What influence do they have on 
strategy/operations? 
What is your organisation’s current approach? How has your approach changed 
over time and why?  
How do you see the approach developing in the future and why? Main challenges 
to overcome? 
Do you work with other organisations in the same field? What do you gain from 
these relationships? Do you get any support from the government? (e.g. tax 
exemptions?) 
Do you have competitors and how do their approaches differ? 
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Questions specific to product manufacturers/distributors 
How did you decide which products to sell? How do you guarantee quality? Do 
you offer a warranty? 
How do you decide the pricing of your products? Do you offer a time payment 
service to end-users/dealers? 
Questions specific to carbon finance organisations 
What is the carbon project design, particularly in terms of carbon revenue? 
How significant do you feel the existence of carbon finance mechanisms is for the 
growth of clean energy product markets in the country/region? 
How could carbon finance frameworks better support the dissemination of clean 




Appendix D: Case study artefacts 
Developing Energy Enterprises Project (DEEP) Log Frame 
 
Logical Framework for the project
Annex C
Intervention Logic Objectively verifiable indicators of achievement Sources and means of vrification Assumptions
Overall What are the overall broader Objectives to 
which the action will contribute
What are the key indicators related to the overall 
objectives
What are the sources of information for these 
indicators
To increase the availability of sustainable, 
affordable and appropriate energy services to 
those unserved or underserved in rural and 
peri-urban areas of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda.
1,800,000 rural and peri-urban men and women 
have been able to access energy services from 
enterprises supported by the project during the 
project duration.
Data provided on business performance and 
service delivery provided by supported 
enterprises cross checked by community 
surveys
Since DEEP East Africa works upstream of the ultimate beneficiaries by 
helping start up and develop the micro and small energy enterprises which 
will provide the services, the key assumption is that this type of approach 
does indeed lead to increased access to energy for rural and peri-urban 
poor.  Experience from S3IDF, Shell Foundation, E+Co and AREED in 
particular reinforce the validity of this assumption.
To increase the availability of employment 
opportunities in rural and peri-urban areas.
1300 rural men and women employed in rural and 
peri-urban energy enterprises supported by the 
action at the end of the action duration. 
Reporting by GVEP International, project 
partners and supported enterprises via project 
M&E systems.
As the project does not directly employ energy service providers it is not 
possible to guarantee employment rates and some more efficient firms 
may actually employ less people, some firms will grow to be very large 
employers while others will remain at small scale.  The estimate left 
however uses a conservative average of three employees per firm across 
all surviving firms taken from S3IDF experience.
1300 rural men and women are employed in rural 
and peri-urban enterprises enabled by the provision 
of the energy services by enterprises supported by 
DEEP EA at the end of the action duration. 
Reporting by GVEP International, project 
partners and supported enterprises via project 
M&E systems.
As the project does not directly employ persons in firms using energy 
services it is not possible to guarantee employment rates since the range 
of services provided by supported energy firms will mean that some will 
enable many knock on employment opportunities (eg mini-grid electricity 
providers) whereas others such as improved stove makers may not.  The 
estimate left however uses an average of three employees per firm across 
all surviving firms taken from S3IDF experience.
Specific Objective What specific objective is the action intended 
to achieve to contribute to the overall 
objectives
Which indicators clearly show that the objective of 
the action has been achieved
What are the sources of information that exist 
or can be collected? What is required to get 
this information? 
Which factors and conditions outside the Beneficiary's responsibility are 
necessary to achive that objective?(external conditions) Which risks 
should be taken into consideration?
To enable the development of a sustainable 
and widespread industry of micro and small 
energy enterprises providing rural and peri-
urban energy services and employment in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.
1800 micro and small enterprises (MSEs) started-
up, diversifying into providing energy services or 
improving existing energy services in rural and peri-
urban areas with the assistance of the project.
Reporting by GVEP International, project 
partners and supported enterprises via project 
M&E systems.  Business registration 
departments of local governments will also be 
able to verify this as all supported firms will be 
registered to an address.
DEEP East Africa provides only the opportunity, support and incentives to 
people to start businesses in the energy sector.  Although market surveys 
and the business and energy climate indicate that this will be taken up the 
proportion of new starts to existing diversifying businesses to scaled up 
existing firms is difficult to ascertain exactly prior to project 
commencement.
720 firms with business ideas supported by the 
action (start ups and existing MSEs) receive 
financing for the business plans they present
Reporting by GVEP International, project 
partners and supported enterprises via project 
M&E systems.  The records of financing 
bodies will also provide this information and 
can usually be requested from that body.
Financing is available to the businesses developed from such sources as 
GVEP, private sector, donor, government, NGO, CSR and other sources 
430 supported firms survive past the second year 
providing energy services.
Reporting by GVEP International, project 
partners and supported enterprises via project 
M&E systems.  Checking of businesses at their 
registered addresses could also be undertaken 
to verify presence and operation.
DEEP East Africa addresses the main reasons for business failure i.e. 
poor management, lack of technical capacity and lack of financing.  
However there are still many other external reasons why a business may 
fail from personal issues of owners to environmental factors and markets.   
Expected results The results are the outputs envisaged to 
achieve the specific objective. What are the 
expected results? (enumerate them)
What are the indicators to measure whether and to 
what extent the action achieves the expected 
results?
What are the sources of information for these 
indicators?
What external conditions must be met to obtain the expected results on 
schedule?
Increased awareness of business and service 
opportunities through energy in the rural and 
peri-urban market. 
(Work Packages 1 +2) 
90 co-ordination meetings held with relevant 
stakeholders and other initiatives to increase 
collaborations and number of communications 
channels within the first 3 months of the project.
Progress reports will be prepared by project 
management staff.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of co-ordination meetings.
Tools for marketing and awareness raising 
developed and co-ordinated within the first 3 months 
of the project.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.  Completed 
tools will be reviewed after 3rd month.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of co-ordination meetings.  Electricity and other services 
such as e-mail and telephone to partner offices are not interrupted during 
the process.
An average of 10 key stakeholders and other 
initiatives at each of 15 kick off seminars during first 
3 months of the project
Progress reports will be prepared by project 
management staff.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of kick-off seminars.  Meetings will be arranged around 
existing cultural events or holidays to avoid clashes and maximise 
attendance.  Where appropriate workshops may be held as part of other 
relevant conferences or events.
30 MoUs signed with NGOs or other initiatives to 
assist in making their stakeholders aware of 
opportunity and involvement in marketing or to 
collaborate with the action in someother way.
Progress reports will be prepared by project 
management staff including lists of co-
operating organisations.
Legal or other concerns on the part of potential collaborating NGOs do not 
inhibit them from signing MoUs
An average of 20 attendees (at 50:50 proportion of 
men and women) at a total of 600 awareness 
raising and marketing workshops and seminars held 
over the first 2+1/4 years of the action (12,000 
people).
Short summary reports will be prepared by 
each consortium partner for each event within 
project progress reports and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate. 
There is sufficient interest in energy services mobilisable within the 
communities to enable such attendance.  Weather, political and travel 
conditions do not adversely affect arrangement of co-ordination meetings.  
Meetings will be arranged around existing cultural events or holidays to 
avoid clashes and maximise attendance.  Where appropriate workshops 
may be held as part of other well attended community events.
2400 attendees (at 50:50 proportion of men and 
women) at follow up idea generation and business 
start up meetings over the first 2+3/4 years of the 
action
Short summary reports will be prepared by 
each consortium partner for each event within 
project progress reports and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate. 
There is sufficient interest in starting or developing business ventures 
mobilisable within the communities to enable such attendance. Weather, 
political and travel conditions do not adversely affect arrangement of co-
ordination meetings.  Meetings will be arranged around existing cultural 
events or holidays to avoid clashes and maximise attendance. 
2000 initial ideas (50:50 proportions of men and 
women) having initial sustainable development due 
diligence carried out on them over the first 3+1/2 
years of the action
Progress reports will be provided by 
consortium partners listing applications and 
verified by project management staff as 
appropriate. 
There is sufficient interest in starting or developing business ventures 
mobilisable within the communities to enable such a number of 
applications and so initial due diligence appraisals.
1800 initial ideas (50:50 proportions of men and 
women) passing initial sustainable development due 
diligence (either at first pass or after feedback) and 
being approved for BDS/Technical support within 
the first 3+1/2 years of the action
Progress reports will be provided by 
consortium partners highlighting the number of 
individuals and existing MSEs being approved 
for full support under DEEP EA.
The level of education and ability of the individuals and MSEs completing 
the initial business ideas is such that it is possible with support to assist 
them in developing ideas which are suitable in principle.
Increased business management capacity in 
East Africa especially in rural and peri-urban 
areas 
(Work Packages 1+3) 
BDS tools and training procedures for rural and peri-
urban entrepreneurs developed and co-ordinated 
within the first 3 months of the project.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.  Tools 
should be presented and shared with partners 
after the 3rd month of the project.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of co-ordination meetings.  Electricity and other services 
such as e-mail and telephone to partner offices are not interrupted during 
the process.
300 business mentors trained and qualified 
(including proportions of men vs women) over the 
first 6 months of the project.  
Progress reports will be prepared by EMEA 
and verified by project management staff as 
appropriate.
There are sufficient persons in rural and peri urban areas suitable and 
interested in taking up the training and work as a business mentor 
including enough women.  
1,800 Entrepreneurs receiving business mentoring 
and training (including proportion receiving start-up, 
survival and growth training or more than one of 
these) over the duration of the project
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of trainings and mentoring meetings.  For assumptions about 
numbers of entrepreneurs participating see Work Package 2 which feeds 
participants into this task. 
10 mentoring sessions received on average per 
entrepreneur over the duration of the project
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 




Logical Framework for the project
1800 entrepreneurs attending classroom networking 
and peer group lesson learning sessions over the 
duration of the action.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of sessions.  Meetings will be arranged around existing 
cultural events or holidays to avoid clashes and maximise attendance.  For 
assumptions about numbers of entrepreneurs participating see Work 
Package 2 which feeds participants into this task. 
Each entrepreneur attending an average of 2 of the 
600 networking and peer group shared lesson 
learning sessions held over the duration of the 
action.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of classroom networking and peer group sharing sessions.  
Increased energy technical capacity in East 
Africa especially in rural and peri-urban areas  
(Work Packages 1+3)
Energy Technology training and support tools for 
rural entrepreneurs developed and co-ordinated
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.  Tools 
should be presented and shared with partners 
after the 3rd month of the project.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of co-ordination meetings.  Electricity and other services 
such as e-mail and telephone to partner offices are not interrupted during 
the process.
1800 entrepreneurs receiving energy technical 
training and consultancy during the duration of the 
action
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of trainings and mentoring meetings.  For assumptions about 
numbers of entrepreneurs participating see Work Package 2 which feeds 
participants into this task. 
1 x 5 day training session attended by each 
entrepreneur over the duration of the action
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of training.  
1 energy technical consultancy 1-to-1 meeting 
received per entrepreneur over the duration of the 
project.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of 1-to-1 consultancy meetings.
Increased access of rural and peri-urban 
energy enterprises to finance 
(Work Packages 4)
1620 business plans prepared for finance 
application over the first 3 1/2 years of the action
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
The level of education and ability of the individuals and MSEs completing 
the business plans is such that it is possible with support to assist them in 
developing plans which are suitable in principle.
1944 energy and technical due diligence appraisals 
carried out on business plans during the first 3+3/4 
years of the project (assuming a 20% rejection and 
resubmission rate)
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
The level of enthusiasm amongst applicants is sufficient for a proportion of 
those which are rejected first time to improve and resubmit their plans.
1440 business plans passing due diligence (either 
first time or on revision after feedback) and being 
forwarded on for finance application (50:50 
proportions of men and women) over the first 4 
years of the action.
Progress reports will be provided by 
consortium partners highlighting the number of 
individuals and existing MSEs going forward 
for financing which will be tracked against 
targets.
The competence of the individuals and MSEs completing the business 
plans is such that it is possible with support to assist them in developing 
plans which are successful at the acceptance, rejection and resubmission 
rates expected.
720 entrepreneurs receiving financing over the 
duration of the project (50:50 proportions of men 
and women).
Updates on the responses of funding bodies to 
proposals will be compiled by GVEP 
International.
Financing is available to the businesses developed from such sources as 
GVEP, private sector, donor, government, NGO, CSR and other sources 
7M Euros leveraged in funding for DEEP East Arica 
supported businesses over the duration of the action
Value and number of financing approved for 
supported firms will be tracked by GVEP 
International along with responses.
Financing is available to the businesses developed from such sources as 
GVEP, private sector, donor, government, NGO, CSR and other sources 
Activities What are the key activities to be carried out 
and in what sequence in order to produce the 
expeted results? (group the activities by result)
Means: What are the means required to implement 
these activities, e.g. personnel, equipment, training, 
studies, supplies, operational facilities etc.
What are the sources of information about 
action progress?
Costs
What are the action costs? How are they 
classified? (breakdown in the Budget for the 
Action)  
(See Left margin for approximate Work 
Package Costs)
What pre-conditions are required before the action starts? What conditions 
outside the Beneficiary's direct control have to be met for the 
implementation of the planned activities?




1.1) Make contact with other project initiatives 
and mobilise local resources
One-to-one meetings, telephone calls, e-mailing, 
newsletters.  Carried out by project management 
staff primarily in first 3 months of project.
Progress reports will be prepared by project 
management staff.
Awareness and cordial  relationships already exist between key project 
partners and other initiatives and local resources with which contact is to 
be made.  (This pre-condition is already met)
1.2) Conduct initial kick-off seminars with local 
stakeholders and other initiatives
Seminars, workshops and conferences.  Rooms, 
venues, tranpsortation, refreshments, presentation 
materials and equipment will be provided.  Carried 
out by project management staff primarily during 
first 3 months of project.
Progress reports will be prepared by project 
management staff.
Other local stakeholders and initiatives must have time to attend kick-off 
seminars.   Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of kick-off seminars.  
1.3) Conduct initial co-ordination meetings 
between partners to co-ordinate and adapt 
project tools and approaches
Team meetings and workshops, electronic and 
paper exchange of drafts and updates.  Involving 
both Management and implementation staff during 
first 3 months of project.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.  Tools 
should be presented and shared with partners 
after the 3rd month of the project.
Partners must already have experience and tools available to build from 
and co-ordinate with. (This pre-condition is already met)  Electricity and 
other services such as e-mail and telephone to partner offices are not 
interrupted during the process.
1.4) Develop detailled implementation strategy 
and roll out plan
Meetings between relevant partner team members 
at management and implementation levels during 
first three months of project. 
The plan will be presented to all partners and 
key stakeholders at the conclusion of the 
inception work package after the 3rd month of 
the project.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of co-ordination meetings.  Electricity and other services 
such as e-mail and telephone to partner offices are not interrupted during 
the process.






2.1) Marketing of DEEP EA opportunity to 
existing small business community
Advertising through business media, chambers of 
commerce, small business networks such as Jua 
Kali in Kenya, local journals and word of mouth.  
Arrangement of seminars and workshops over first 3 
years of the action.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Awareness of most relevant communications channels and access to staff 
with capacity to develop appropriate materials.  (This pre-condition is 
already met).  Additionally political and travel restrictions must not inhibit 
the dissemination of information or seminar arrangement.  Collaboration 
of groups, industry associations, networks etc is also required.  (See 
Activities 1.1 and 1.2)
2.2) Awareness raising and information 
dissemination on DEEP EA to local 
communities
Advertising through local popular media and 
information channels including through church 
groups, womens groups, radio etc.  Workshops and 
seminars staged in rural and peri-urban areas 
across countries of action in first 3 years.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Awareness of most relevant communications channels and access to staff 
with capacity to develop appropriate materials.  (This pre-condition is 
already met).  Additionally political and travel restrictions must not inhibit 
the dissemination of information or seminar arrangement.  Collaboration 
of church and womens groups, NGOs, co-ops, networks etc is also 
required (See Activities 1.1 and 1.2)
2.3) Initial idea start-up support workshops 
and one-to-one meetings
Advertised at the awareness raising sessions under 
Activity 2.2.  Held within subsequently in a local venue 
using brainstorming, market targeting and question and 
answer techniques.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
There is sufficient interest in starting or developing business ventures 
mobilisable within the communities to enable such attendance. Weather, 
political and travel conditions do not adversely affect arrangement of co-
ordination meetings.  Meetings will be arranged around existing cultural 
events or holidays to avoid clashes and maximise attendance.   Allowance 
must made for child care if necessary for female participation.
2.4) Conducting of initial sustainable 
development due diligence on initial enterprise 
ideas
Conducted by local community mobilisation and 
marketing staff of partner NGOs using standardised 
criteria and form to ensure alignment of initial proposals 
to project aims and that projects meet sustainability 
criteria.
Progress reports will be provided by 
consortium partners highlighting the number of 
individuals and existing MSEs being approved 
for full support under DEEP EA which will be 
tracked against targets
There is sufficient interest in starting or developing business ventures 
mobilisable within the communities to enable such a number of 
applications and so initial due diligence appraisals.





3.1) Recruitment and induction of business 
support "mentors"
Adverstisement of mentoring opportunity in 
business media and through existing mentoring 
channels used by EME-Africa.  Training carried out 
using existing training materials.  Qualification 
carried out through testing.
Progress reports will be prepared by EMEA 
and verified by project management staff as 
appropriate.
There are sufficient persons in rural and peri urban areas suitable and 
interested in taking up the training and work as a business mentor 
including enough women.  
3.2) Provision of business support advice and 
training in one-to-one meetings with mentors
Training programmes delivered in business start-up, 
survival and growth phases.  Business mentoring 
used as the main support vehicle through 1-to-1 
sessions with entrepreneurs.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
There are sufficient business mentors and trainers available (see task 3.1 
above), appropriate tools available for training (see Activity 1.3) and 
sufficient entrepreneurs to be mentored (see Work Package 2 above).
3.3) Provision of energy technical support and 
training in one-to-one consultancy sessions
Training programmes delivered on energy 
technology issues and opportunities.  Individual 
consultancy sessions with entrepreneurs to discuss 
develop and advise them on technology use.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
There are appropriate tools available for training (see Activity 1.3) and 
sufficient entrepreneurs to be trained (see Work Package 2 above).
 351 
Logical Framework for the project
3.4) Facilitation of group networking and 
information sharing sessions for DEEP EA 
supported entrepreneurs and peers
Forums created for discussion between supported 
entrepreneurs and sharing of experiences and 
resources.  Facilitation techniques employed by 
facilitators from DEEP East Africa.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect 
arrangement of sessions.  Meetings will be arranged around existing 
cultural events or holidays to avoid clashes and maximise attendance.   
For assumptions about numbers of entrepreneurs participating see Work 
Package 2 which feeds participants into this activity. 
Work Package 4 - Due 




4.1) Assistance in development of business 
plan and funding proposals
The Business planning approach and a template will 
be provided and explained to applicants in 
appropriate languages.   Initial drafts from 
entrepreneurs will be considered and feedback 
provided on them by mentors.
Progress reports will be prepared by each 
consortium partner and verified by project 
management staff as appropriate.
There are sufficient persons in rural and peri urban areas suitable and 
interested in taking up the training and work as a business mentor 
(including enough women)  since these will be the staff assisting in 
business plan preparation (see Activity 3.1)
4.2) Conducting of due diligence into business 
plans going forward for funding
Technical and Business due diligence will be carried 
out using a standardised approach and results 
presented using a standard format.
Progress reports will be provided by 
consortium partners highlighting the number of 
individuals and existing MSEs going forward 
for financing which will be tracked against 
targets.
There are sufficient persons in rural and peri urban areas suitable and 
interested in taking up the training and work as a business mentor 
(including enough women)  since these will be the staff assisting in due 
diligence, with project management staff oversight (see Activity 3.1).
4.3) Support to businesses in presenting 
proposals to funding bodies
All relevant funding opportunities will have been 
surveyed and contacted to ensure relevance and 
compliance with application procedures.  
Applications sent through agreed channels.
Updates on the responses of funding bodies to 
proposals will be compiled by GVEP.
The competence of the individuals and MSEs completing the business 
plans is such that it is possible with support to assist them in developing 
plans which are suitable in principle for submission to funding bodies.  
Additionally that their motivation is sufficient for them to revise and 
resubmit applications in cases where they are rejected by due diligence 
the first time.
Work Package 5 - 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation and Scale 
Up
5.1) Documentation of baseline situation in 
target areas
Physical surveys, social surveys, use of existing 
data from regional and national government data 
sources.  Database tools used to compile data.
Progress reports will be prepared by the M&E 
partner prior to delivery of the baseline report 
after the 6th month of the project.
Weather, political and travel conditions do not adversely affect the ability 
of survey staff to conduct their work.  That data held by local and national 




5.2) Capacity Building around M&E with 
business mentors
Training materials delivered during mentor training 
explaining need, approaches and standardised 
forms and reporting mechanisms.
Progress reports will be prepared by the M&E 
Partner on the progress of training during the 
first 6 months.
Training materials are available for training (see Activity 1.3). 
5.3) Development of indicators for project and 
for the businesses assisted
Starting with the framework provided by this 
logframe, develop further detailed indicators along 
with project partners during the first 6 months of the 
project.
Progress reports will be prepared by the M&E 
partner prior to delivery of the indicators 
framework after the 3rd month of the project.
Partners must already have experience in the sector in order to define 
appropriate SMART indicators.  (This pre-condition is already met)  
5.4) Conducting of ongoing and follow-up M&E 
of project and businesses supported
Tracking, collecting, chasing, checking and 
compiling M&E data coming in from project staff, 
business mentors and managers.  Database 
software used to store and arrange data to facilitate 
analysis.
Progress reports will be prepared by the M&E 
partner and verified by project management 
staff as appropriate.
Appropriate and usable reporting processes must be in place and capacity 
must be available within the project staff and supported businesses in 
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